

Tun Abdul Razak

A Phenomenon in Malaysian Politics

A Political Biography

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*to my daughters Tidi Maharani and Astrid Sinarti (lin)
instilling in them that honesty, sincerity and integrity
would make great leaders out of every individual*

Preface

Malaysia is currently striving along its path of success by performing and demonstrating a good and consistent record of economic development. It is ambitiously set to achieve a status of developed nation within the first quarter of the new century. Despite some injury partly self-inflicted, it has become a nation which stands tall in international forums to show its uncompromising principles in the highly western biased international political games. If there is one man to be named who initiated and laid the foundation for this path of success, that man is Tun Abdul Razak.

Known as "Father of Development", "Father of Peace" and "Architect of Malaysia's Development" there is need to assess and to revive the contribution of Tun Abdul Razak to the history of Malaysia's development by local and international analysts in search of better understanding of Malaysia's politics and development. There has been only one book about Tun Abdul Razak's life and times that was distributed internationally, written by William Shaw more than twenty years ago.

Twenty years after his demise, the author feels opportuned to revive Tun Abdul Razak's contribution by proposing this book as an honour and tribute to him. The book does not attempt to recount in detail Tun Abdul Razak's personal or private life, but essentially it is a political biography where analysis of the political development of Malaya/Malaysia will be related within the context of his time and his contribution.

By understanding Malaysian politics and development within Tun Abdul Razak's time, the current and future generation may appreciate how achievement needs a strong foundation and commitment and sincerity such as those demonstrated by the leadership of Tun Abdul Razak. This book is an attempt to highlight Tun Abdul Razak's achievements in laying a concrete foundation to the economic and political development of Malaysia especially at the stage when the Malaysian Government in 1969, had inadequate mechanism to withstand inherited, long-fermenting internal pressures. When the Parliament and the State Legislature were suspended, and the country placed under a National Operations Council (NOC) through the newly proclaimed Emergency regulations, there was a necessity for the nation to find a strong and non-compromising man to head this Council and make it

work. That man was Tun Abdul Razak, then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense.

His brilliance in reshaping the country's foreign policy from that of pro-western to non-alignment demonstrated the strong vision and leadership of Tun Abdul Razak when he was mandated the full power as Prime Minister. The fruits of this vision are today felt even more when Malaysia is recognised as a leader among the developing countries and not merely as a puppet of big powers.

Tun Abdul Razak's vision that was more felt by his people is without doubt the overhauling of the agricultural sector of the country. Tun Abdul Razak was convinced that it was necessary for the country to have a firm foundation and a modern and successful agricultural sector as a pre-requisite to further economic development. Under future leadership Malaysia could take off further to become an industrial and manufacturing nation, but its agricultural sector needs to be intact to support the nation's pursuit of a more ambitious development programme.

The scope of discussion of this book covers the period of Malaya's independence and the formation of Malaysia, the very significant part that Tun Abdul Razak contributed to his country's development and political affairs over a period of twenty-five years from 1951 to 1976 and the impact that he left to his nation from his actions and policies enjoyed now by all Malaysians.

Chapter 1 of this book revives Tun Abdul Razak's childhood life from the village of his origin to his schooling days. This early life of Tun Abdul Razak was well described in the book "Tun Abdul Razak: His Life and Times", written by William Shaw. The author has therefore extensively relied on William Shaw's narration, convinced that an understanding of Tun Abdul Razak's early days that started forming his character and qualities was necessary to appreciate fully the manner in which Tun Abdul Razak uplifted the economy of the country that he later led.

Chapter 2 focuses on Tun Abdul Razak's early involvement in the nation's struggle against the Japanese during the Second World War and struggle for the achievement of independence alongside Tunku Abdul Rahman and other colleagues. William Shaw's narration was again referred to, supplemented by memoirs of former colleagues and other people closely associated with Tun Abdul Razak then.

Chapters 3 to 8 describe in depth the different phases of leadership of Tun Abdul Razak. These Chapters in essence show the real political strength of Tun Abdul Razak, narrating his responsibility, his uncom-

promising political stance, and above all his contribution in laying a firm foundation to the economic development of Malaysia which made it possible for future Prime Ministers, notably Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir, to push it to greater heights by categorically transforming the nation from an agricultural based to a manufacturing based economy.

Tun Abdul Razak has also left for his beloved nation a living asset. The eldest of his five sons has not only inherited his father's fine political qualities but has also undergone a remarkably similar development to his father in his political career. Chapter 9 therefore focuses on Dato' Seri Najib as a son that political analysts have observed continuing the political legacy of his father. In the Epilogue, we shall see that the Institut Teknologi MARA (ITM) is another asset left by Tun Abdul Razak.

The Glossary of Names included at the end of this book is a unique feature. The names vary from Prime Ministers to Ministers, statesmen and politicians and also others associated with Tun Abdul Razak. Each of them has uniquely contributed in their own ways to the development of the nation but it is beyond the scope of this book to describe accurately their contribution in the short paragraphs dedicated to them – each paragraph just summarises the unique contribution as the name appears in this book. This book also includes Tun Abdul Razak's Life in Chronology and Other Historical Dates as they appear in this book.

The manuscript of this book was actually completed in July 1996. However, printing of this book is only possible now in 1998. Not all changes occurring after July 1996 have been incorporated.

To sum up, Tun Abdul Razak's unmatched integrity in his leadership to a large extent prepared the way for the present achievement of Malaysian performance economically and politically. The author believes that this book could be used as a self-checking reference for any individual of the country to assess the extent of their services and contributions to nation building, and to aspire to and model their leadership after Tun Abdul Razak. This book is also targeted to international readers who wish to understand in depth the dynamics of political and economic development in Malaysia resulting from the significance of Tun Abdul Razak's leadership.

Acknowledgments

Many people have contributed to the successful publication of this book. The author is particularly indebted to the following individuals:

- the immediate family members of Tun Abdul Razak; Tun Hajah Rahah, Dato' Sri Najib, Mr. Ahmad Johari, who have given full moral support, and who have provided the means and facilities for the author to gain access to privileged information, family photos, and to meet other dignitaries closely related to Tun Abdul Razak. Also to Haji Idris Shaari, formerly Tun Abdul Razak's Personal Bodyguard and later appointed by the Government to look after Tun Abdul Razak's family welfare, long considered by the family as part of them.
- Tun Omar Ong Yoke Lin, Tun Patinggi Abdul Rahman Ya'akub, Tan Sri Dato' Arshad Ayob, Tan Sri Fatimah Hashim, Dato' Harun Idris, Dato' Shahrir Samad, Dato' Michael Chen, who allocated time for the author to meet them to provide narrations and excerpts of their impressions in their associations with Tun Abdul Razak in work and on political occasions.
- Mr. Abdul Razak Abdullah Baginda of the Malaysian Strategic Research Centre (MSRC), who acted as an initiator and facilitator for the publication of this book.
- Mr. Alan Hart, Deputy Manager of the British Council Language Centre in Kuala Lumpur for proof-reading this book and other miscellaneous assistances.

The author had also planned to meet some other dignitaries whose names are mentioned in this book to get further privileged information in their long association with the late Tun Abdul Razak. But regrettably, the author had to abandon the plan in order to finish the book immediately when she was awarded a Visiting Research Fellowship under JIIA Fellowship 96 Program to be attached to the Japan Institute of International Affairs in Tokyo.

The author also wishes to thank her husband, Hassan Ibrahim, who, having all along felt that he owed his educational success to the New

Education Policy initiated by Tun Abdul Razak, from the beginning inspired her to write this book and took great interest and provided various forms of assistance throughout the process of completing this book.

It was not without difficulties that all the information gathered by the author could be assembled to produce this book. However, the assistance provided by the various people mentioned above facilitated her task greatly, and the author would like to share the success of the eventual publication of this book with them. The author also wishes to share this book with all Malaysians and non-Malaysians alike who have a loving and fond memory of Tun Abdul Razak for the great things that he accomplished for this nation of ours.

This book is most of all a tribute to the great leader and statesman himself, Tun Haji Abdul Razak Dato' Hussein, more than twenty years after he left us his inheritance.

Paridah Abd. Samad
June 1998

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List of Abbreviations

A. GENERAL TERMS

AMADA	Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement
ARF	ASEAN Regional Security Forum
ASA	Association of Southeast Asia
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CPSU	Communist Party of Soviet Union
EU	European Union
FPDA	Five Power Defence Agreement
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GESTAPU	September 30 Movement (Gerakan September Tiga Puluh)
GNP	Gross National Product
MP	Member of Parliament
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NICs	Newly Industrialised Countries
PAP	People's Action Party
PKI	Communist Party of Indonesia (Partai Komunis Indonesia)
PRC	People's Republic of China
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
SEAMEC	Southeast Asian Ministers of Educational Council
SEANWFZ	Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation
SIA	Singapore International Airline

SRV	Socialist Republic of Vietnam
TAC	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
UN	United Nations
ZOPFAN	Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in Southeast Asia

B. TERMS SPECIFIC TO MALAYSIAN AFFAIRS

ABIM	Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia)
ACA	Anti-Corruption Agency
BBMB	Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad
CAFS	Chief of Armed Forces Staff
ICU	Implementation and Coordination Unit
CLS	Chinese Language Society
CPM	Communist Party of Malaya
DAP	Democratic Action Party
EPF	Employees Provident Fund
EPU	Economic Planning Unit
EXCO	Executive Council
FAMA	Federal Agricultural Marketing Authority
FELCRA	Federal Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority
FELDA	Federal Land Development Authority
FMS	Federated Malay States
FOA	Farmers Organisation Authority
GERAKAN	Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia

IMP	Independence of Malaya Party
ITM	Institut Teknologi Mara
ISA	Internal Security Act
KADA	Kedah Agricultural Development Authority
KITA	Kesatuan Insaf Tanah Air
LPM	Labour Party of Malaya
LPN	National Paddy and Rice Authority
LUTH	The Muslim Pilgrimage Control and Saving Corporation (Lembaga Urusan Tabung Haji)
MAF	Malaysian Armed Forces
MAJUTERNAK	National Livestock Development Authority
MARA	Council of Indigenous People's Trust (Majlis Amanah Rakyat)
MARDI	Malaysian Agricultural Research and Development Institute
MARDEC	Malaysian Rubber Development Corporation
MAS	Malaysian Airline System
MCA	Malaysian Chinese Association
MCS	Malayan Civil Service
MCKK	Malay College Kuala Kangsar
MIC	Malaysian Indian Congress
MIDA	Malaysian Industrial Development Authority
MIDF	Malaysian Industrial Development Finance Berhad
MIEL	Malaysian Industrial Estates Limited Berhad
MINDEF	Ministry of Defence
MISC	Malaysian International Shipping Corporation

MPAJA	Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army
MPAJU	Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army Union
MSA	Malaysia-Singapore Airline
NCC	National Consultative Council
NEB	National Electricity Board
NEP	New Economic Policy
NF	The National Front
NGC	National Goodwill Council
NOC	National Operations Council
OSA	Official Secrets Act
PAP	People's Action Party
PBB	Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu
PBMUM	Malay Language Society of University of Malaya
PEKEMAS	Party of Social Justice
PERNAS	State Trading Corporation (Perbadanan Nasional Berhad)
PETRONAS	National Oil and Gas Corporation (Petroleum National Berhad)
PINTAR	Tun Abdul Razak Library
PMIP/PAS	Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (Parti Islam SeMalaysia)
PPP	People's Progressive Party
PSRM	Malaysian People's Socialist Party (Parti Socialis Rakyat Malaysia)
RIDA	Rural and Industrial Development Authority
RISDA	Rubber Industry Smallholders Development Authority
SDP	Socialist Democratic Party

SEDC	State Economic Development Corporation
SMP	Second Malaysia Plan
SNAP	Sarawak National Party
SPM	Malaysian Certificate of Education (Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia)
SPPK	Government Officer Housing Development Sendirian Berhad
SUPP	Sarawak United People's Party
SAP	Sabah Alliance Party
UDA	Urban Development Authority
UDP	United Democratic Party
UKM	National University of Malaysia (Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia)
UMNO	United Malays National Organisation
UMS	Unfederated Malay States
UMSU	University of Malaya Student Union
UUCA	Universities and University Colleges Act
VMR	Voice of Malayan Revolution

Chapter One

TUN RAZAK'S PERSONAL LIFE BIOGRAPHY

Tun Abdul Razak's phenomenal contribution to the socio-economic development of his country can only be understood well if one looks back at his earlier kampong childhood that left such a permanent impact on the style with which he later managed the country. Despite coming from an aristocratic family, he was born and brought up in the midst of a kampong environment, moulding a strong desire in his character to help improve the hardship and difficulties of the mainly Malay rural people in earning their livelihood.

His childhood days in the kampong spent soiling his hands with earth and mud developed his love for the agro-economic sector, the sector that he identified to be the pre-requisite for further development towards industrialisation. It was no surprise therefore that he would spend many days and hours deep inside the rural areas seeing for himself the stages of development of the scheme that he had initiated. A true "leader by example", he strongly believed that mere words were not sufficient to initiate progress, he had to be in the fields occasionally to inspect with his own eyes the developmental stages of the implementation of his policies. This way too he felt close at heart with the rural folk whose living standard he was trying to elevate.

This rural upbringing including the traditional religious teachings that Tun Abdul Razak went through in his early life also explained the build-up of the great leader, sincere and honest in his deeds. Dedicating his whole life to the development of his nation and its people, he had no time to accumulate wealth of his own - he never wanted to, firmly believing that with his religious and faithful wife taking care of and looking after the upbringing of his sons, God would reward him with God-fearing and successful children that would be able to look after themselves. When Tun Abdul Razak died he had not even left a home for his family - but he had left behind the nation as a heritage with an engine that was soon to propel the country to an unprecedented economic growth pushed to greater heights by succeeding leaders.

Kampong Life

Tun Abdul Razak was born on March 11, 1922 at Pulau Keladi, Pekan, Pahang. Abdul Razak, for Muslims, means Servant of God, from one of the ninety-nine glorious attributes of Allah the Exalted [1]. Tun Abdul Razak's father was a Pahang aristocrat, Dato' Hussein Mohd. Taib, whose ancestors were traced back to a deposed Bugis warrior prince from Macassar who settled in the 18th century near the royal capital of Pekan, and who later became a good and just administrator [2].

The very top positions in the civil service were, as one might expect in a colonial administration, filled by expatriate British. The necessity of finding suitable local officers of subordinate and junior grade had to some extent been solved by founding a number of secondary and grammar schools in which English was the medium of instruction. The Malay College Kuala Kangsar (MCKK), Perak was run on the lines of an English Public School of that period, but with a curriculum specifically designed to turn out both a privileged elite of government-oriented administrative officers and a supply of potential Sultans better qualified than their predecessors to lead their state in the way that the British authorities wanted them to [3].

Dato' Hussein Mohd. Taib was included among one of the early batches of Malay aristocratic youths selected to go to the Malay College. After completing his secondary education at the College, he stayed on to undertake a specialist course as an Administrative Probationer [4].

At the beginning of 1916, when Dato' Hussein Mohd. Taib was only eighteen, he received his first official appointment as a subordinate Malay Officer. Four years later he married a charming but unsophisticated young Malay girl named Fatimah Haji Daud, his cousin, from Pulau Keladi, a village near Pekan and settled her in his family's country house, which was only a mile or so away on the opposite side of the Pahang River. Tun Abdul Razak was the first child the couple were blessed with.

Soon after his first child was born, Dato' Hussein Mohd. Taib had the good fortune to be posted to the District Office in Pekan and so was able to live with his family in Pulau Keladi, travelling the six miles to and from the office by boat. This ideal existence lasted for less than two years. He was then promoted to Assistant District Officer and transferred to Temerloh [5]. This promotion, though otherwise welcome to an ambitious young man, came at an inopportune time, for his wife was about to give birth to another child, Datin Maimunah. Datin Maimunah,

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the second child of Dato' Hussein Mohd. Taib was later married to Dato' Muhammad Jusof, former Chief Minister of Pahang.

Before leaving for his new position Dato' Hussein Mohd. Taib therefore arranged for Tun Abdul Razak to be taken to the other side of the river to live in the village of Jambu Langgar with his paternal grandparents. There, the young Tun Abdul Razak was raised in a simple way. Although their home, the family's principal residence in the State, was by far the largest and most prominent house in the district, it had neither electricity nor modern sanitation then, the river serving as their common bathroom.

Every one in the village of Jambu Langgar had to work. Tun Abdul Razak, still a young child, was no exception although he was the son of Datuk Shahbandar of the royal town of Pekan and came from an aristocratic family which had long served the state ruler. His job was to tend his grandfather's buffaloes, riding upon the back of their leader when he took them to and from the rice-field [6]. Tun Abdul Razak's long devotion to rural development definitely stemmed from those years he spent in the villages of Pahang.

The memories of Tun Abdul Razak's early childhood consisted of rice fields, jungle, muddy paths, rickety bridges and an "attap" school. All these facets of kampong life and poverty in the twenties in Pahang made lasting impressions on the mind of Tun Abdul Razak. Tun Abdul Razak's later recollections of the early life formed his early visions of the future of his role in society.

Tun Abdul Razak was aware of the need to fulfil a duty to serve the people. Not surprisingly, his idea of serving the people was moulded by his own experiences and he recognised the basic needs of the vast majority of the people as one of his major priorities.

School Days

In 1928, when Tun Abdul Razak was six years old, he began to attend the village school. He plodded barefoot along the muddy path leading from his kampong in the back-waters of Pahang to his attap-roofed school two miles away. His right hand would finger the one cent coin in his pocket which his grandfather had given him as spending money for the day. With one cent, Tun Abdul Razak felt rich in a way. For on some days there was not even this one cent in his pocket. Although Tun Abdul Razak was aware of his lineage, he did not show it in class. Most of his

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classmates and teachers described him as being an ordinary school boy, in the sense that he did not behave or expect to be treated differently [7].

There he studied through primary one to four, starting at eight in the morning and finishing five hours later. This kind of schooling was not really designed to produce future Prime Ministers for sovereign states, but was rather intended by the Colonial Government to make the sons of the fisherman or peasants more intelligent fishermen or peasants than their fathers had been.

In the early years of the British Protectorate the education of boys in Malay villages in Pahang was provided by the "Surau" which was a prayer-house or religious school run by private teachers. Tun Abdul Razak was one of those who took both types of education; in fact half of his early schooling was on Islamic subjects [8]. This gives some indication of the important part that religion played, and indeed still does play, in the life of a rural Malay. Islam as depicted by the Holy Quran provides a comprehensive guide to every aspect of human behaviour, guiding him from his birth to his death and from the life of the temporal to the world of the divine.

Towards the end of 1933 Tun Abdul Razak was selected by the Resident of Pahang to attend the Malay College at Kuala Kangsar, his father's alma mater, with the intention that he too should be trained for a career in the civil service. He was eventually expected to succeed to his father's title of Orang Kaya Indera Shahbandar, under the state laws of Pahang. It was the ambition of Tun Abdul Razak to follow in his father's footsteps to be a civil servant [9].

At this point, however, he had to face the fact that he had absolutely no prior knowledge of the English language, which was the medium of instruction at the Malay College. He would have to master this difficult subject before he could even begin seriously to participate in the ordinary lessons. Fortunately, provision had already been made for other boys who had found themselves in similar circumstances, so that special instruction was available as part of the first year curriculum.

The quiet and rather introvert young Tun Abdul Razak was duly registered at the College on January 26, 1934 [10]. His previous lack of instruction in the language notwithstanding, Tun Abdul Razak managed to score seventy-one out of a hundred in English in the examinations held at the end of his first year at the College.

Being in a school attended by sons of Sultans and scions of chiefs he took all these in his stride and worked in earnest to prove he was not a "village boy". The adolescent Tun Abdul Razak began to show his brain-

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power from the first year. He was given double promotions after the first year for his brilliance and in four and a half years passed his School Certificate Examination (1934 - 1937). His report for 1937 described him as a very promising boy with both ability and character [11].

Although he had been quite happy to work alongside the other village children in the rice fields of Jambu Langgar, Tun Abdul Razak had always possessed a driving ambition to lead. In the limited world of the tradition of the Malay College this meant that in addition to distinguishing himself academically, he must also strive to become an outstanding sportsman and seek positions of leadership or distinction in the school societies.

By 1938 he was not only Captain of his house, but he was a prefect and later on became Head Boy of the entire student body, a major achievement in that he was younger than most of his final year peers. He was, too, a versatile sportsman who had already gained school colours for hockey, tennis and squash, and house colours for cricket. Hockey was a game of life-long devotion for Tun Abdul Razak [12]. His personal and paternal stewardship of the game at national level after independence would make Malaysia the third best Asian hockey nation and among the world's top.

In the middle of 1939 Tun Abdul Razak was appointed a Student-Probationer in the Malay Administrative Service. The Student-Probationers, the majority of whom were recruited from other secondary or high schools, received a year's training course at the Malay College, following a special syllabus that included English, Mathematics, History, Geography and, as specialist subjects, Elementary Law and Surveying [13].

On May 31, 1940, aged 19, Tun Abdul Razak left the Malay College with a scholarship that entitled him to take a three-year course in Economics, Law and History at Raffles College [14]. This was a centre for higher education that had been set up in Singapore in 1928 to offer diploma, but not degree courses, in a wide range of subjects. Raffles College was run partly along the lines of a British Public School of the period and partly along those of a University.

As soon as he began to attend classes, Tun Abdul Razak realised the irony that the boys who had been educated at the Malay College were generally well below the standard of those students who had come from less privileged schools like the Victoria and Raffles Institution. This, it seemed to him, was due mainly to the aristocratic exclusiveness of the intake at the Malay College, for the majority of the sons or nephews of

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Sultans and princes were not independent and so had no compelling need to work hard in order to ensure success in future careers. This was a situation which in later years, when he became Minister of Education, Tun Abdul Razak was able to rectify through the democratisation of the intake. When one of his own sons later failed the qualifying entrance examination to the Malay College, he was refused a place.

Multi-racial Raffles College, being predominantly Chinese, was a great change from the very Malay atmosphere of Tun Abdul Razak's previous school at the Malay College. It was at this College that Tun Abdul Razak met his future political colleagues and adversaries, and the leaders of his country's civil service after independence. One such person who became a firm friend after they had met at various gatherings of the Muslim Society during 1941, was a first year student named Ghazali Shafie (a Malay youth from the same home state of Pahang), with whom he was to have a long association in wartime anti-Japanese activities, in the civil service and in politics. Tun Abdul Razak also met Tan Sri Kadir Yusuf, from Muar, Johore, his wife's second cousin, who became Attorney General under the Emergency Cabinet that was formed on May 20, 1969.

As expected, he passed his first year papers at Raffles College without hitches. But his studies and his future, as well as that of the country he was later to lead and mould, were transformed by war. The Japanese invaded and occupied Malaya in 1942.

Family Life

Tun Abdul Razak first met his future wife, Tun Hajah Rahah Tan Sri Haji Noah, during a visit to the premier Malay party, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) headquarters which, in Dato Onn Jaafar's time as President, was located in Johor Bahru. At this time, Tun Abdul Razak found himself becoming more involved and committed to the affairs of UMNO.

One day, while he was staying at the house of Tan Sri Taib Andak in Johore, his friend surprised and intrigued him by saying that following the wish expressed to him by Tun Abdul Razak's father, Dato' Hussein Mohd. Taib just before he died, he had looked out for a suitable bride for him, preferably a Johorean girl. According to Tan Sri Taib Andak, she was still only a schoolgirl of seventeen, but a good many young men in the town already had their eyes on her. She was not only attractive with

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such intelligent eyes but also witty and exceptionally sophisticated for a Malay girl of that period.

After such a build up, naturally Tun Abdul Razak wanted to know and meet this beautiful paragon, Tun Hajah Rahah. At that time she was still schooling at the Convent of the Holy Infant Jesus in Johor Bahru. Out of curiosity Tunku Abdul Razak went with Tan Sri Taib Andak to the school for the purpose of seeing Tun Hajah Rahah. They parked the car outside the school gates so that he could get a good look at her as she went by. Fortunately, they had a ready-made excuse, for Tan Sri Taib Andak's daughter, Kalthum Taib, was a junior at the same Convent. It was said that "Tun Abdul Razak has always been able to think on his feet and make snap decisions. When he saw Tun Hajah Rahah walk through the Convent gates, he made one there and then".

The brother of Datin Zainab, the wife of Tan Sri Taib Andak, was married to Tun Hajah Rahah's eldest sister, Datin Teh. Tun Hajah Rahah's father was Senior Officer in the Islamic Religious Department in Johor Bahru and later became Speaker of the House of Representatives during the Premiership of Tunku Abdul Rahman.

Tan Sri Taib Andak was acting in place of a member of Tun Abdul Razak's family, all of whom lived far away in other states. He had to discuss and negotiate the marriage arrangement with Tun Hajah Rahah's father, Tan Sri Haji Noah, who at that time was Chairman of Johore State UMNO and a member of both the Federation Legislative and the Johore State Council.

Soon in 1952, Tun Abdul Razak and Tun Hajah Rahah were engaged in a traditional Malay ceremony. Before the engagement, she never really knew her future husband until her parents showed her a flattering picture of Tun Abdul Razak in shorts and a hat while studying in England. When contacted Tun Hajah Rahah agreed to an arranged marriage.

After the engagement, Tun Abdul Razak managed to see his wife-to-be a few times either in the house of Tun Hajah Rahah's parents or in Tun Hussein Onn's house. Tun Hussein Onn was then married to Tun Hajah Rahah's sister, Tun Hajah Suhaila. Caught with his busy schedule, Tun Abdul Razak only managed to take his fiancée and her relatives once for shopping and treat them to dinner in Singapore. It was the most exciting moment for Tun Hajah Rahah. After seeing each other, a few times in a limited time, they started to know each other more intimately. Tun Hajah Rahah started to call Tun Abdul Razak "Z" from the traditionally heavy sounding of "zak" on the name Razak. Tun Abdul Razak would call Tun Hajah Rahah "Hah". Every day, Tun Hajah Rahah

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became more confident that this man was meant for her and that her parents had made the right choice despite the fact that most of her family was married to Johoreans. Being the first in the family to marry an "outsider from Pahang", Tun Hajah Rahah braved herself to face a whole new world together.

After six months of engagement, the traditional Malay wedding of Tun Abdul Razak and Tun Hajah Rahah took place in Johor Bahru on September 4, 1952. Incidentally, on Tun Abdul Razak's way to his wedding from Pahang to Johore, he was ambushed by Communist terrorists on the winding roads of Bentong, accompanied by his mother, Fatimah Haji Daud and relatives. The family was, however, left unharmed.

The couple spent a wholesome week on Penang Island for their honeymoon in which they enjoyed their time looking at the beautiful, romantic view from a bungalow on Mt. Pleasure. It was said that a few days later while Tun Abdul Razak was enjoying his honeymoon a telegram arrived from Sir Gerald Templer, High Commissioner of the Federation of Malaya who occasionally liked playing practical jokes on his officer, informing him that Tun Abdul Razak's leave was cancelled and that he was to go immediately to the Cameron Highlands in Pahang State and prepare an official report on the fly situation. This actually referred to the issue of Chinese farmers in the area using on their small holdings a cheap fertiliser made from prawn dust which bred a self-perpetuating plague of two-wing insects that soon invaded the hill station's many hotels, leave centres and holiday bungalows. Normally a direct order from Sir Gerald Templer who was not noted for either his tolerance or his forbearance, was not something to be ignored even while honeymooning, but Tun Abdul Razak decided to risk assuming that it was intended as a joke and merely replied, "you can have Cameron Highlands either for a holiday resort or for gardening, but not both" [15].

Tun Hajah Rahah was a shy teenager at the time of their wedding. She was then eighteen and was born on June 11, 1933. Tun Hajah Rahah had been brought up in a family which went by strict religious discipline so the transition to being wife of a prominent civil servant must have been quite a shock. Tun Abdul Razak was then the State Secretary of Pahang, and Deputy President of UMNO. But she managed to adapt quickly to the new life and began the task of building a family life for the emerging national leader. Although Islam allows in certain circumstances for a man to have more than one wife, Tun Abdul Razak never married any

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other woman in his later life, he and his wife were blessed with five sons, living contentedly as a full family for nearly a quarter of a century.

The couple set up house in Kuala Lipis, Pahang, where their first child Mohd. Najib, named after President Naguib of Egypt, was born on July 23, 1953. Their second son, Ahmad Johari, was born on November 29, 1954, also in Kuala Lipis. The third son, Mohd Nizam, fourth son, Mohd Nazim, and fifth son, Mohd. Nazir were all born in Kuala Lumpur, on October 3, 1958, March 3, 1962 and November 19, 1966, respectively. Although Tun Abdul Razak looked like a serious father most of the time, he was very much a caring dad - all five sons had high respect for their father. These elite young men called their parents "Mummy" and "Daddy".

Tun Abdul Razak's marriage with Tun Hajah Rahah was not endowed with daughters. One day when Tun Patinggi Abdul Rahman Yaakub's eighth baby girl was due Tun Abdul Razak jokingly mentioned to Tun Patinggi Abdul Rahman Yaakub his intention to adopt the baby. It was, of course, impossible for Tun Patinggi Abdul Rahman Yaakub to give the baby away. It was destined that Tun Abdul Razak's third son, Mohd. Nizam, was later to be married to this daughter of Tun Patinggi Abdul Rahman Yaakub, Khatijah. However, the family had adopted three girls. The first daughter, Saidah Abdullah became part of the family just after Tun Abdul Razak and Tun Hajah Rahah got married. The second and third daughters, Rohaya Abu Bakar and Rodziah Hassan, in fact were given by their parents to the family because of poverty. Tun Abdul Razak was known for his sympathy and care for the poor - in his frequent visits to the rural areas to see with his own eyes the rural development happening there he was offered these babies by their poverty-stricken parents and readily accepted them as part of his own family. These daughters are now married yet they still maintain close contacts and spend holidays together with the family. Despite the fact that Tun Hajah Rahah is only 63, she is already a great grandmother since the first (adopted) daughter, Saidah Abdullah, is already endowed with grandchildren.

It was the will of Tun Abdul Razak to send their children for their tertiary education to England. Besides security reasons, Tun Abdul Razak preferred their children to be more independent. Staying in Malaysia would spoil the boys with the facilities and privileges provided to them as the Prime Minister's sons. Apart from that, uncomfortable situations and conflicts might arise between the teachers and the sons of the nation's leader. In England, the children was placed under the care of

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Wan Baharuddin, Officer of the Malaysian Student Department in England.

Mohd. Najib, the first son, received his primary and early secondary schooling at St. John Institution in Kuala Lumpur, going on from there to Malvern Boy's College in Worcestershire in England. Later he enrolled at the University of Nottingham for Industrial Economics. The second son, Ahmad Johari, attended the Malay College in Kuala Kangsar from 1967 to 1969 and later joined Malvern College, from 1969 to 1972. In 1972, he attended the University of Kent, Canterbury to take up law, the only child to inherit his father's interest in law. After obtaining his Bachelor of Law in 1975, Ahmad Johari went to Lincoln's Inn where he later became Barrister-At-Law in 1976.

The other three sons of Tun Abdul Razak, Mohd. Nizam, Mohd. Nazim and Mohd. Nazir left their home comforts even earlier to pursue their education. They were all sent to a college in Peterborough, England, where they took their Ordinary and Advanced Levels of General Certificate of Education (GCE "O" and "A" Levels). Mohd Nizam, the third son, attended Oxford University for his Bachelor's degree programme in Politics, Philosophy and Economics, graduating in 1980. Mohd Nazim, the second youngest son, appeared to be more interested in architecture, obtaining his Part 1 and Part 2 qualifications of the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) from the Architectural Association, School of Architecture, London in 1985 and 1987, respectively. The youngest son, Mohd Nazir, attended Bristol University from 1986 to 1988 for his Bachelor's degree in Social Science and further attended Cambridge University for its postgraduate programme, obtaining his Master of Philosophy (M. Phil.) in 1989.

Although Tun Abdul Razak had a tight schedule, he was always there for his children from homework to personal problems. It was Tun Abdul Razak who told his wife that one day they would be proud of their children. Indeed, they were. Dato' Sri Mohd. Najib and the other children were educated in prominent universities in the United Kingdom which qualified them as economists, architect, lawyer and social scientist. All five sons are successful in their professional careers.

Tun Abdul Razak was a genuinely devoted family man, being less preoccupied with his public image. While Tun Hajah Rahah was often in the limelight doing social work or accompanying Tun Abdul Razak, family life was kept as private as possible. They were seldom in the news, except for the youngest son, Mohd. Nazir who was always at the airport whenever his father travelled abroad on one of his numerous

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working trips while the family stayed home. Being friends with the children of Tun Abdul Razak's close friends such as Tun Hussein Onn and Tan Sri Taib Andak, the children of Tun Abdul Razak were well exposed under their father's leadership and care.

Being a prominent leader of the country, on his tours both in the country and overseas Tun Abdul Razak was always accompanied by his wife. Tun Hajah Rahah had acquired all the qualities necessary for the wife of a future Prime Minister of Malaysia. As a husband-and-wife team Tun Abdul Razak and Tun Hajah Rahah did much to inculcate the noble values of public duty and sense of service to society. They opened up new vistas of choice, opportunities and a new outlook for all Malaysians. Tun Hajah Rahah, who in her own charming way had been of immense inspiration to him, on her own had identified and associated herself with varied public activities. The Tun Hajah Rahah Hall in the Girl Guides Headquarters remains a fitting monument to the service she has rendered the Guide Movement in particular and the country in general. Tun Hajah Rahah was also President of Hockey Malaysia, President of the Speakers Club, Chairman of Restaurant Rakyat (People's Restaurant), a restaurant designed with a traditional concept accessible to ordinary people but a favourite place of Tun Abdul Razak and his family. Another favourite place for the family of Tun Abdul Razak was the Orchid Room in the Lake Club.

It was a beautiful moment for Tun Hajah Rahah when this young couple was given an award to cruise the globe six months after Dato' Sri Najib was born. Tun Hajah Rahah asked her mother to look after Dato' Sri Najib during her absence. It took 23 days by sea to arrive in England. From England they went to the United States, Hawaii and many other places. When they were in Niagara Fall, Canada, duty called for Tun Abdul Razak to cut the visit short. He was asked by Tunku Abdul Rahman to rush to London for the negotiation of the independence of Malaya.

Tun Abdul Razak always woke up at 5.30 a.m. in the morning to fulfil his religious responsibility, the early morning prayers. In facing any difficult circumstances and tasks, Tun Abdul Razak always prayed for Allah's guidance. An example of the making of this deeply religious man was cited by Tun Omar Ong Yoke Lin in one of the events after the incident of May 13, 1969. Tun Omar Ong Yoke Lin was staying in Tun Abdul Razak's residence as his guest after coming back home from Washington. When Tun Abdul Razak was coming back from the Istana Negara (National Palace) with the Emergency Proclamation, he told Tun

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Omar Ong Yoke Lin that he had been given unfettered Powers to restore peace and order. Tun Abdul Razak added that with such Powers by which he was empowered "in effect to Rule by Decree" he felt so humble that he was going upstairs to pray for Allah's guidance. Tun Abdul Razak fulfilled the fifth demand of his religion when he went for Haj on Friday, May 19, in 1961, together with Tan Sri Mohammad Khir Johari [16].

Being a devoted Muslim and the father of five sons and three adopted daughters, his responsibilities to the nation left him time for only one hobby - golf. Tun Abdul Razak played golf, once every week [17]. Tun Abdul Razak normally spent his holiday time with the children by going to the Cameron Highlands and Fraser's Hill where he liked to play golf and to Port Dickson, Pulau Pangkor and Pulau Tioman for swimming. Switzerland was one place overseas that Tun Abdul Razak liked to go for golf. Joe Lim was always with Tun Abdul Razak on his golf sessions as his golf partner.

A keen sportsman, Tun Abdul Razak was simultaneously in 1957 President of the Olympic Council of Malaysia and President of the Malayan Hockey Federation. At one time, Tun Abdul Razak was responsible for organising the first hockey team for Malaysia in Britain and became its first Captain. In 1975, Tun Abdul Razak was President of the Asian Hockey Federation and President of the Football Association of Malaysia.

Tun Abdul Razak also had a keen interest in music. He liked the "ronggeng" dance but only danced along with his wife. His most favourite tunes were nostalgic songs such as "Yang Di Tunggu Tak Tiba", "Injit-Injit Semut", "Joget Pahang" and "Autumn Leaves". Two volumes of "Lagu-Lagu Rakyat - Malaysia", which were a collection of traditional songs especially loved by Tun Abdul Razak, were published by Tan Sri Abdul Samad Idris, who was Minister of Culture, Youth and Sports, after the demise of Tun Abdul Razak as a tribute to Tun Abdul Razak - one notable song featured in the first volume was titled "Putera Berjasa" - with the lyrics written by Tan Sri Abdul Samad himself, reflecting in poetic form the great contribution of this "prince" to his nation.

According to Tun Abdul Razak's loyal Personal Body Guard Haji Idris Shaari, Tun Abdul Razak led a very simple life. He liked to take a banana and a cup of milk every morning. Tun Abdul Razak would take his lunch at home if he did not have to attend any function. His most favourite Malay kueh was "tepong pelita".

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Tun Abdul Razak's own birthdays were usually celebrated quietly at Seri Taman with members of the family and a few close friends. A "kenduri" with prayer and "Pulut Kuning" rice would be held the morning after. He would then spend the rest of the day with his immediate family. It was the character of Tun Abdul Razak not to shun the people. He just did not have the time for publicity stunts and public-relations jobs. The character of Tun Abdul Razak, who liked all things to be hurried, has caused some people to think of him as arrogant, impersonal and sarcastic. But from the time he became Prime Minister, he was living with a personal secret that would shock the nation and bring sympathy several years later. He was suffering from a rare disease of the blood commonly known as mononucleosis. His doctors and perhaps one or two of his trusted aides were the only ones who knew at first that he was suffering from a deadly disease. Not even his wife and sons knew.

Tun Abdul Razak would often travel to London for a medical check-up but on the pretext of holiday trips. No one suspected that he was going for treatment. Towards the end of 1975 his condition deteriorated. Word went out that Tun Abdul Razak was ill. People began whispering about it and still no certain voice came from the Prime Minister's Office, Tun Abdul Razak still carried on with his job as if nothing was amiss. But he would spend more and more time at home with his family and less at his office.

Meetings were held at his residence in Seri Taman instead of the office until the time came when he left for France. The Malaysian Ambassador to France, Tan Sri Jamal Latif, was Tun Abdul Razak's close friend. He boarded a French aircraft specially diverted from Singapore to pick him up in Kuala Lumpur. In the Subang Airport, with only a few close aides in attendance and his doctor, Dr. MacPherson, Tun Abdul Razak left the country for his last journey. Few knew he would never return alive to the nation he built and to the people he loved. Newsmen who knew were told not to say anything yet. Tun Abdul Razak did not want the people to worry about him. He passed away on January 14, 1976 leaving the people he loved to weep over him. The nation was without his leadership anymore.

Seri Taman had become Tun Abdul Razak's residence, ever since 1962, when he was Deputy Prime Minister. Seri Taman was the official residence for Malaysia's Deputy Prime Minister. Sharing moments of happiness and sadness, laughter and tears with his beloved family members in this house, the house has become very sentimental to the

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family, so much so that when Tun Abdul Razak became Prime Minister in 1970, humble leader that he was, he did not bother to move to the official residence of the Prime Minister.

Seri Taman had become a place for UMNO leaders from outside Kuala Lumpur to stay if they had to attend meetings in Kuala Lumpur. At that time there were very few hotels in Kuala Lumpur. A familiar guest was Tan Sri Fatimah Hashim who was Minister of Social Welfare under the Emergency Cabinet of May 20, 1969. In this very residence Tun Abdul Razak had acted as "parents" to Tun Omar Ong Yoke Lin and Toh Puan Dr. Aishah in their wedding ceremony in March 1974, attended by most Cabinet Ministers.

Eleven months after the demise of Tun Abdul Razak, the house was occupied by Tun Hussein Onn, Tun Abdul Razak's successor, from December 1976 to September 1981. Later, immediately after Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir became Prime Minister, after Tun Hussein Onn, he decided to transform the house, on May 6 1982, to become "Memorial Tun Abdul Razak" in honour of the significant contribution of Tun Abdul Razak to the nation [18].

According to the Director General of Arkib Negara, Dato' Zakiah Hanum, the concept of the Memorial Tun Abdul Razak was based more on the concept of libraries of Presidents of the United States. Part of the memorial was allocated to the project of Tun Abdul Razak Library (PINTAR). For many months after the opening of the Memorial, the place attracted approximately 50,000 visitors in a month. The Memorial is still frequently visited to this day [19].

After the demise of Tun Abdul Razak, Haji Idris Shaari, Tun Abdul Razak's loyal Personal Body Guard since 1965, was appointed by the Government of Malaysia to take care of the welfare of Tun Abdul Razak's family. The family moved from their official residence of Seri Taman to a bungalow on an area of two acres off Jalan Eaton in Kuala Lumpur. In his humble years of contribution to his country and his fellow citizens Tun Abdul Razak had not even acquired a house for his family. The house was a gift to the family by the Government of Malaysia in honour of Tun Abdul Razak's political and economic contributions to the country.

The loss of the great leader had affected Tun Hajah Rahah the most. For her, life was different without her dear husband but she would hide her sorrow from the rest of the family. Some close members of the family noticed that Tun Hajah Rahah would cry in private. Since the demise of Tun Abdul Razak, accompanied by the very loyal Haji Idris Shaari and

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one of her house helpers, Tun Hajah Rahah could be seen spending a couple of hours every Friday morning at 5.30 beside her husband's grave at the Kuala Lumpur National Mosque to read the Yassin verses for her beloved husband. The roofed "Makam Pahlawan" (meaning Heroes' Mausoleum) also marks the graves of Tun Dr. Ismail and Tun Hussein Onn. Outside the Makam Pahlawan are situated the graves of Tan Sri Mohd. Noah, Tun Sardon Zubir, Tan Sri Jaafar Albar, Tan Sri Syed Nasir Ismail and Tan Sri Kadir Yusof, an unforgettable team that had contributed to making the nation what it is today. For Tun Hajah Rahah, the nation may have lost a true leader, but for her she had indeed lost the precious gem of her life.

Tun Hajah Rahah was 42 years old when her husband died. Besides fulfilling her responsibilities of looking after the children, Tun Hajah Rahah spent her time in various religious activities. Besides a number of times performing Umrah, Tun Hajah Rahah had performed the compulsory Haj five times. She also instilled a high religious education in her children - three of them have gone for Haj while others have gone for Umrah several times.

Her loving memory of Tun Abdul Razak and the success of her five sons have inspired her with the strength to go on. Dato' Sri Najib appears to have picked up the traits of his father and has every quality of his father to become a leader of high charisma and integrity. Ahmad Johari has set up a legal practice and is currently Group Managing Director of Ancom Berhad. Mohd. Nizam has risen to the position of Chief Executive Officer of the Public Bank Securities Sdn. Bhd. Mohd. Nazim, a qualified architect, has set up his own consulting firm, being the Managing Director of NR Associates Sdn. Bhd. The youngest, at the age of 30, has also proven his professional credibility, being the Deputy Chief Executive Officer at Commerce International Merchant Bankers Bhd.

When the author met Tun Hajah Rahah, at the age of 63, the author greatly admired the woman before her. Beneath her beauty lie a heart of gold, confidence and strength of character that once gave Tun Abdul Razak good reasons to choose her as his life partner. It is not to be denied that his family was an important element in making him the man we continue to recognise and respect today. As a leader of the nation, Tun Abdul Razak was lucky to marry a well-rounded religious woman. He left his family without looking back, knowing that his dutiful, religious wife would educate and bring up his children well. Though he didn't live long enough to see his children grow into adulthood, he somehow felt

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and was hopeful that perhaps one of his sons would follow in his footsteps to continue to lead and build this so well-endowed nation, Malaysia.

Chapter Two

LEADERSHIP IN THE MAKING

Time of War

As soon as news spread to Pekan that Kuantan had fallen into the hands of the Japanese, the Sultan, his family and his close associates who included some members of Dato Shahbandar's family, left by river to seek refuge farther inland at Temerloh. Sometime later, they were joined by Tun Abdul Razak and his father, Dato' Husssein Mohd. Taib. In his capacity of Orang Kaya Indera Shahbandar, Dato' Hussein Mohd. Taib could act as adviser to the Sultan in his delicate negotiations with the Occupation Forces over the future administration of Pahang.

For most of the remainder of 1942 Tun Abdul Razak stayed in Jambu Langgar, Pekan, Pahang, living the life of a villager and surviving by planting and cultivating rice and by fishing. This kind of life, though undoubtedly safe and healthy, was rather too mundane for the young and ambitious Razak. Towards the end of the year, he travelled to Bentong to ask his father to find him a job. This he was unable to do immediately, as his Japanese superiors controlled all employment in the administration. Tun Abdul Razak borrowed several hundred ringgit (dollars then) and with the collaboration of a few friends started a weekly newspaper called "the Gegaran Masa", which may be roughly translated as "Alter the Present". It lasted for only four editions, however, for news, except for official edicts and pronouncements, was heavily censored, and the Japanese were overtly suspicious of the moves of a son of Dato' Hussein Mohd. Taib in control of a branch of the media [1].

The ultimate ambition of any young man willing to serve the occupation authorities then meant admission into the new sub-elite which could be gained only by graduation from the Koa Kunrensho of Government Officers Training Establishment.

As a Malay youth of superior education then, Tun Abdul Razak was soon selected by the local administration for training as an interpreter and in January 1943 was sent to Singapore to join the third Koa Kunrensho for a six-month indoctrination course in the Japanese language, Nippon culture and Bushido. The principal of this college laid

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more stress on the activities of physical exercise and military training that consisted of marching with the ceremonial Japanese "goose-step" and frequent forced marches of up to twenty miles in the tropical heat [2]. As soon as Tun Abdul Razak had completed his course he was sent back to Pahang and posted to a position with the Japanese administration office at Temerloh where soon after he became Assistant District Officer in Raub.

Tun Abdul Razak showed signs of ability to lead and influence people from an early age. During the Japanese occupation when no one dared to speak up or do anything against the Japanese, Tun Abdul Razak made a tryst with destiny to free his country from foreign domination and to free his countrymen from the quagmire of poverty, ignorance and illiteracy. He was engaged in redeeming that pledge.

In 1945, Tun Abdul Razak was approached by the representative of an underground Anti-Japanese Malaya Resistance Movement, which he quickly indicated his willingness to join. This movement, which had the secret support of His Highness the Sultan of Pahang who eventually became its titular Colonel-in-Chief, was called "Wataniah" [3]. Because of his position as a Japanese government official, it was not possible for Tun Abdul Razak to do much active work for the Movement, or to undertake training in the jungle, as his absence from his office would have led to investigation and discovery of the movement. He took a risk, however, ferreting out information about enemy dispositions and police activities and passing it on to Wataniah, either through the agency of the peripatetic Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie who was Tun Abdul Razak's friend since Raffles College days, or some other Malays who could move freely about the state without arousing suspicion. In fact, Tun Abdul Razak served as a Captain in Force 136 of the Wataniah Movement [4].

Student Days in London

It was a risky thing to pull against the ever-suspicious Japanese, but, in Tun Abdul Razak's mind, the country had to be liberated. Before the Wataniah Movement could take up any fight, the war ended and the British rulers came back. The return of the British was not greatly welcomed by Tun Abdul Razak. He was becoming more and more anti-colonial in ideology and more than ever convinced that Malaya should and could attain independence.

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The British took over control of Malaya after the Japanese surrender in 1945. Although Tun Abdul Razak remained a member of the Wataniah Movement until it was disbanded on December 1, 1945, the British Military Government considered that he would be more useful in an administrative position than as a soldier. He was therefore transferred into the civil service with the rank of Malay Officer on Probation, for despite the Japanese occupation he would, on April 1, 1943, the date on which he would have graduated from Raffles College after the three-year course, automatically have been promoted from Student-Probationer, had this not been interrupted by the invasion.

In the meantime, however, Tun Abdul Razak had applied to the Government of the Malayan Union for a scholarship to study law at the University of London, and on July 13, 1946, this application was approved by the Director of Education and two days later was confirmed by the Chief Secretary. Since he did not possess the qualification in Latin necessary to enter the University, his scholarship was postponed for a year [5].

Despite these difficulties, Tun Abdul Razak passed the London Matriculation Examination in Latin in May 1947 and three months later in August, still uncertain whether or not a place could be found for him at the University, he signed an Agreement to enter Lincoln's Inn of Court to study for the Bar [6].

Keeping up his good track record in studies thus far, he managed to get through the main portion of his law studies in eighteen months. Thus by April 1949 he passed his Bar Final Examination. That left him the remaining fourteen months to be called to the Bar. He was called in May 1950. Yet law was not the only thing he learned in London [7].

In 1949 he did, meanwhile, manage to enter Cambridge University and successfully complete the Second Devonshire Course in Economics and Public Administration; gaining knowledge that was later to be of great practical value to him [8].

Tun Abdul Razak's wartime experience and his stay in England had opened his eyes to the nation's urgent need for indigenous leaders, dedicated leaders who were willing to sacrifice themselves for the sake of the country. With this aim he became the Secretary of the Malay Society of Great Britain from 1947 to 1948.

The Malay Society of Great Britain, which was made up of Malay students only was the first student union that Tun Abdul Razak joined. Through this society he met the charismatic prince from the Kedah royalty, Tunku Abdul Rahman. Tunku Abdul Rahman was then President

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of the Society and was also then studying law. This was the start of not only a true friendship and close bond of a life-time, but also the birth of a political alliance that nursed a country through its birthpangs. When Tunku Abdul Rahman left England, Tun Abdul Razak took over as President of the Society from 1949 to 1950.

Political Apprenticeship

With hindsight into what happened to him and what he did later, the political interest and commitment of Tun Abdul Razak in some ways started in London. Being the Secretary of the Malay Society of Great Britain contributed to the beginning of Tun Abdul Razak's growing interest in politics. On February 1, 1948 the Malay Society of Great Britain celebrated the Federation of Malaya at Chez Auguste, the members' favourite Soho Restaurant [9].

Tun Abdul Razak discovered that there was a separate union for non-Malay students in London, called the Malayan Students Union. There were many students from Malaya there at that time and naturally they had to be organised. By bringing all students from Malaya in London under a one roof organisation, Tun Abdul Razak's first contribution to multi-racial nationhood was the formation of a Malayan Forum [10].

The Forum was rather more socialist oriented but devoted to the independence of Malaya as its major aim. This was in keeping with the mood of the host country at that time as the British had tried to bulldoze the Malayan Union and its people. It was a hard time for Malaysians back at home in the situation where the British were also moving against the Sultanate system and this directly involved Tun Abdul Razak as his father was chieftain under the Sultan of Pahang. Through the Malayan Forum, all students could meet and discuss matters of common interest to Malaya. In fact, Tun Abdul Razak was one of the members of the Working Committee responsible for the construction of Malaya Hall in London (see Chapter 3).

The host country, England somehow recognised the leadership of Tun Abdul Razak and Tunku Abdul Rahman. On September 29, 1948, they were, in their capacity as leaders of the student community, invited to Malaya House to attend a reception in honour of Sir Henry Gurney, the new High Commissioner of the Federation of Malaya. In 1949 Tun Abdul Razak attended the First World Assembly of Youth as representative from the Federation [11]. At this time Tun Abdul Razak

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was getting very serious about politics. He had not only studied the British system in theory, but as often as possible went to Parliament to see sessions in action.

Despite his aristocratic heritage, perhaps because his early years had been spent working with the village people in the rice fields, Tun Abdul Razak felt himself drawn politically toward social democracy and so, when the opportunity came, he joined both the British Labour Party and the Fabian Society. In understanding more about the concept and value of democracy, in his spare time Tun Abdul Razak voluntarily attended lectures given by some of the more progressive thinkers from the London School of Economics. Britain was under a Labour Party administration at this time and from what Tun Abdul Razak gathered, this administration was favourable to handing back power to the colonies so the British could concentrate on post-war development.

Early in 1950 Tun Abdul Razak's father, Dato' Hussein Mohd. Taib was admitted to hospital in Kuala Lumpur and Tan Sri Taib Andak, a very devoted family friend used to send regular reports on the health condition of Dato' Hussein Mohd. Taib to his son in England. When the day the dreaded cable arrived from Malaya, his carefree student days were over, for his inheritance carried with it responsibilities to his family and to his State, and so it was necessary for him to return to Pahang to manage his father's estate and his own future.

With his father's death, Tun Abdul Razak inherited more than family responsibility and obligations; these too were an important part of his life from then on. With his commitment as civil servant in the State of Pahang, Tun Abdul Razak gathered behind him quite a political following not only in Pahang but also in other parts of the country which explained why he rose so soon in UMNO's hierarchy. As UMNO gathered momentum day by day, Tun Abdul Razak felt that he would have to devote more time to the national struggle for independence. He had to leave his office a couple of days each week to attend to party matters.

Civil Service

Tun Abdul Razak left London for Malaya by air on May 6, 1950 [12]. He would soon inherit his late father's title, this honour being conferred upon Tun Abdul Razak on November 1, 1950 when he was officially

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installed as the tenth Orang Kaya Indera Shahbandar, a Major Chief of Pahang [13].

In February 1951, at the age of 29, Tun Abdul Razak was nominated a member of Malaya's Federal Legislative Council, the embryo Parliament in which he was to serve his ministerial apprenticeship. From early in this post-war period until his death in 1950, the member nominated for Pahang was Dato' Hussein Mohd. Taib. It was to his vacant seat that his son, Tun Abdul Razak, succeeded some ten months later.

In June, 1951, Tun Abdul Razak was appointed as Assistant State Secretary of Pahang. Over a year later, in January 1952, he became the State Secretary of Pahang, at the age of 30, the youngest man ever to hold this position in any part of Malaya, up to that time.

For much of that period Tun Abdul Razak was concerned with the administrative difficulties of moving the State Capital from Kuala Lipis, inconveniently situated right in the interior of the Peninsula and of the state, to the more practical site of Kuantan, on the coast, which was only about 20 miles away from the royal capital of Pekan. The seat of the state government was officially moved to the coastal port of Kuantan on August 27, 1955. By that time, Tun Abdul Razak had been promoted to Acting Chief Minister of Pahang. Soon he was promoted as the Chief Minister, a tribute to his hard work, energy and industriousness.

It is interesting to recall his contribution to the State of Pahang. While serving in Pahang, Tun Abdul Razak was President of many public bodies including football, hockey and athletic associations for many years. He was the founder-President of Pahang Adult Education Association, the Chairman of Pahang State Development Board for many years and representative of the State in the then Rural and Industrial Development Authority.

UMNO Leader/Politician

Despite the pressing problems of the nation, Tun Abdul Razak was able to serve in various organisations. Although civil servants were, in the colonial period, generally discouraged from playing too active a role in politics, Tun Abdul Razak soon found himself becoming more and more involved in the affairs of the premier Malay party, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the Kuala Lipis branch of which he joined soon after his return to Pahang. In August 1950, Tun Abdul

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Razak was chosen as the UMNO Youth Chief and at the same time became one of the Party's Vice Presidents.

Tun Abdul Razak filled the vacancy of UMNO Youth Chief created by the departure of Capt. Hussein Onn (later, Tun Hussein Onn). His appointment to the helm of the UMNO Youth Movement happened quite by coincidence and was not expected even by himself. He attended the UMNO Youth conference which was held in Kuala Lumpur in August 1950 as an observer to fill his spare time, since he happened to be in Kuala Lumpur on other business.

As mentioned earlier, Tun Abdul Razak had already begun demonstrating his leadership qualities when he was a student in England. He represented the Malay Settlements in the World Youth Organisation Conference held in Brussels [14]. He also joined activities of the Labour Party, a left-wing political party in England, just for the sake of getting experience. After returning from England he became a senior officer in the Pahang State Administration. All these factors contributed to him being unanimously appointed as the UMNO Youth Chief in the assembly.

In heading the UMNO Youth Movement, Tun Abdul Razak found it difficult to fully concentrate on its activities as he was still holding the post of senior officer in the Pahang State Administration. However, the appointment of UMNO Youth Chief was significant in charting Tun Abdul Razak's political career as this position enabled him to be close to the Party leadership at the central level.

During Tun Abdul Razak's tenure as UMNO Youth Chief, its members began to show a more progressive attitude towards its parent body. Up to that time, the members were always loyal and obedient towards the UMNO leadership. The UMNO Youth Movement under Tun Abdul Razak was more outspoken and the members were bold enough to present their opinions for the betterment of their organisation. The Malay political atmosphere at that time was striving to free the Malay Settlement from British rule and this inspired the UMNO Youth Movement to react more aggressively.

The following year, in August 1951, at 29, Tun Abdul Razak was chosen unopposed as the Deputy President of UMNO when Tunku Abdul Rahman became the President replacing Dato' Onn Jaafar, who resigned from UMNO. Tun Abdul Razak was re-elected annually since then. It was a position that he was to continue to hold until September 22, 1970, the day after he succeeded Tunku Abdul Rahman as Prime Minister of

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Malaysia. At the same time, Tun Abdul Razak also became the Permanent Chairman of the Youth Section of UMNO.

The ties between Tun Abdul Razak and Tunku Abdul Rahman which began in the Student Union Hall in London had bonded the two politicians into a partnership that had fought to free the country from British rule. From then on they became something of an inseparable pair even though they differed on many matters, be it relating to party, government or national affairs, due to their charismatic qualities.

The years from 1951 to 1955 were intensely busy for Tun Abdul Razak, for in addition to his civil service responsibilities he had to regularly attend meetings of the Legislative Council or the UMNO Executive in Kuala Lumpur.

Tun Abdul Razak's ended his bachelor life in 1952. Besides this wedding, he also experienced a marriage of another kind, a political marriage of UMNO and the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) that was to lay the foundation of the politics of the country and the backbone of national political life, for all the years ahead. UMNO at that time was operating on its own as the champion of the people in the fight for independence. The Chinese in Malaya then had their own network of guilds, associations and political groupings of which MCA was emerging the strongest.

The strength in unity of UMNO and MCA gave rise to an electoral pact which eventually led to the formation of the Alliance Party (the predecessor of the National Front). Tun Abdul Razak became a member of the First UMNO-MCA Alliance Round Table Conference and later the Alliance Executive Council.

Early in March 1955 the Government announced that Nomination Day for the first-ever Federal Election would be on June 15, and Polling Day on July 27 [15]. The joining of the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) to the Alliance made the Alliance tripartite and representative of all the major communities. The Party swept all but one of the fifty-two seats. The strength of the Alliance with representatives of all the major communities was effectively the writing on the wall for British rule in Malaya. After that Tun Abdul Razak became Deputy Chairman of the Alliance Party until 1970.

In this Federal Election, Tun Abdul Razak was invited by the Alliance to contest the Semantan constituency of his home state of Pahang. Since he was a government official, in order to do so he had to seek permission to retire on pension. In this first attempt, Tun Abdul Razak won and was then elected a Member of Parliament for this constituency. He continued

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to win in every future election but as Member of Parliament for the constituency area of Pekan, Pahang.

For more than a decade, Tun Abdul Razak was the unheralded backbone of the Malaysian Government, holding several high posts simultaneously. In February 1951, he was appointed as an unofficial member of the Federal Council and served until the Council was prorogued. As a member of the Federal Council Tun Abdul Razak served on many Committees including the Special Committee on Education. He was appointed Minister of Education on August 9, 1955 [16].

Schools under the British were a means of producing the "educated" locals they needed to fill the lower-ranking jobs in the civil service. They did not see any need for any uniform system of schooling or even an education policy of any sort. As Education Minister, the most important task of Tun Abdul Razak was to uniformise all types of schools around the country that adopted various systems of education by the creating of a National Education Policy. The National Education Policy was considered the first sign of Tun Abdul Razak's enormous capacity for foresight and planning. The Ministry of Education eventually published the Razak Report in 1956 and so thorough and far-sighted were the recommendations it contained that to this day it remains the basis of national policy on education. The Malay language was thus decreed as the national language and the eventual sole medium of instruction in educational institutes. Besides the implementation of the National Education Policy, Tun Abdul Razak also urged the building of more schools in rural areas where the vast majority of the indigenous populace lived.

In the meantime Tun Abdul Razak managed to continue to actively build up UMNO and help Tunku Abdul Rahman in his negotiations with the British on a peaceful transition to independence. In January 1956 Tun Abdul Razak was a member of the Merdeka Mission (Independence Mission) to London led by Tunku Abdul Rahman, who rightly was hailed as the Father of Independence when August 31, 1957 was set as Independence Day for the Federation of Malaya.

Tunku Abdul Rahman playing the role of the Father figure was popular being the First Prime Minister after the independence of Malaya. But Tunku Abdul Rahman needed someone at his side to help lay the foundations of nationhood. The choice was obvious and hence Tun Abdul Razak became Deputy Prime Minister. He was also appointed as Minister of Defence.

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As Minister of Defence and Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak led a drive against Communist guerrillas who had plagued the country for nine years. It was an immediate task which needed to be handled expertly and efficiently. The task was enormous since the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) which had helped in the fight against the Japanese wanted to gain power in the newly independent country. They had built an intricate infrastructure in the jungles during the years of underground resistance against the Japanese. Their members were mainly Chinese but the fight against Japanese occupation had brought them many Malay supporters too.

The Communist Party not only had a membership of several thousands but also a comprehensive network of support groups, cadre groups, fighting units and a supply system linked to Chinese settlements. Within a year of taking on the task, Tun Abdul Razak had brought the revolt down to manageable proportions. By 1960 many of the guerrilla units had been wiped out with help from the remaining British forces and the emerging Malayan army and police structure inherited from the British. The Emergency Period was eventually brought to an end on July 16, 1960.

Tun Abdul Razak managed to build up the Armed Forces from a rag-tag army into a fighting force to reckon with, if not in numbers then in efficiency. The Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) comprising the Royal Malaysian Army, the Royal Malaysian Navy and the Royal Malaysian Air Forces were developed and built up slowly as the defence needs of the nation grew with her nationhood. The success of combating the Communists can be partly related to the significance of Tun Abdul Razak's task of building and disciplining the Armed Forces.

As Minister of National and Rural Development (another portfolio held by Tun Abdul Razak when he was Deputy Prime Minister), Tun Abdul Razak was known as "Father of Development" due to his valuable contributions towards development, especially in the rural areas. Tun Abdul Razak took a special interest in rural development as a means of bringing impoverished Malays into the country's economic mainstream. He launched the Rural Development Programme in 1960 and was responsible for overall national development.

Being Minister of National and Rural Development for ten years, Tun Abdul Razak managed to lay the infrastructure for a comprehensive national development effort that continues to this day. Nearly half a million acres of rice, coconuts and other crops were irrigated during this period. Tun Abdul Razak set about his planning strategy brilliantly in a

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manner which later was imitated by some other developing countries. Besides irrigation efforts, schools, bridges, water supply, electricity, roads, clinics, community halls, and many more infrastructural projects were carried out throughout the nation. These infrastructural developments have permanently changed the nation and the way of life of its people.

As Tun Abdul Razak fought against the guerrillas through the operation room system inherited from the British, he introduced an adaptation of the operation room but this time for development. The areas to be developed were vast and far-flung. He needed to know what was happening everywhere at any time. Thus was born the concept of the "ops room" as it came to be fondly known with the wall-sized maps covered with multi-coloured pins indicating the varying stages of development or lack thereof.

To see the development progress personally in the related areas, Tun Abdul Razak travelled widely himself. He became a familiar figure in all parts of the country. He normally sported a bush jacket, a reflection of his devotion to efficiency rather than polemics, actions rather than words. Tun Abdul Razak's smooth face began to wrinkle from the long hours out in the open, together with the constant study of details and the concentration on every detail of a project he was inspecting [17].

Soon Tun Abdul Razak set himself other tasks, that of representing the nation at various international conferences or as a roving envoy to countries with which Malaya had dealings. He was often in London to discuss one thing or another with the British.

As he began to take an interest in foreign affairs, he was more and more employed by the Prime Minister in important international matters as a trouble shooter. Holding positions as Chairman or President of Malaysia's International made him an effective trouble shooter. Tun Abdul Razak was President, Federation of Malaya United Nations Association from 1959 to 1970. He was appointed Chairman, Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, Malaysia Branch and was also Chairman, Malaysia National Group of the Asian Parliamentary Union.

In August 1962 Tun Abdul Razak was Deputy Chairman of the Inter-Governmental Committee on the Formation of Malaysia. He was also instrumental in the reconciliation process with Indonesia during the Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation. In 1966, he was primarily responsible for negotiating an end to Indonesia's "Confrontation" with Malaysia. In view of this, he was also known as "Father of Peace".

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At the same time Tun Abdul Razak was learning the ways of institutional power politics. The germ of regionalism must have been planted in his mind about then, too. Expectedly, Tun Abdul Razak was one who played a major role in forming the five-nation Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967. He used ASEAN as a forum for his major foreign policy goal - "neutralisation of Southeast Asia".

Tun Abdul Razak was appointed as Minister of Home Affairs (Internal Security), another additional portfolio thrust upon him in June 1967 replacing Tun Dr. Ismail who resigned from the Government. The appointment of Minister of Home Affairs was an advantage to him as Director of the National Operations Council (NOC). After the May 13, 1969 incident, (see Chapter 4) Tun Abdul Razak became Director of the NOC under the Proclamation of Emergency from 1969 to 1971. He was also Chairman of the National Unity Council. Under the Emergency Cabinet of May 20, he was Minister of Finance, another portfolio added to his already great tasks.

In 1970, he was appointed Prime Minister of Malaysia following the resignation of Tunku Abdul Rahman. This was the focal point of Tun Abdul Razak's career as a prominent politician. As Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak was also Chairman of the Alliance Party and President of UMNO.

Chapter Three

THE TURNING POINT

Political Awakening Before Independence

The threat to the rulers came in 1945 after the surrender of the Japanese and when the British returned to Malaya and announced their plans for the setting up of a Malayan Union. Sir Harold MacMichael arrived in October 1945 and concluded treaties with all the Malay Rulers who effectively signed away all their powers to the British Crown. In January 1946, the British Parliament created the Malayan Union under the British Order-in-Council as a full-fledged Crown Colony with effect from April 1, 1946.

In this new unitary system the citizens would no longer owe their allegiance to the Ruler of their State but to the British Crown. The traditional Malay rulers would lose most of their powers and the Malays would no longer enjoy privileged status but would have to be content to be equal citizens with the emigrant Chinese and the Indians. There would be a united independent Malaya. The citizenship proposals and the cession to Britain both implied the end of the pre-war Malay States and the creation of a Colony where a Malay was merely another inhabitant, alongside the Chinese and the Indians.

In March 1946, a few weeks before the official inauguration of the Malayan Union, Dato' Onn Jaafar, the son of the former Chief Minister of Johore, called a meeting of all the Malay Associations and succeeded in amalgamating them into one body, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). The main objective of UMNO was to oppose the Malayan Union and to fight for a restoration of the rights and privileges of the Malays in their own Malay country. As the First President of UMNO, Dato' Onn Jaafar was able in his campaign against the Malayan Union to utilise the experience he had gained as editor of a Malay newspaper in the 1930s, when he was fighting for Malay rights during an argument over "decentralisation" [1].

With the formation of UMNO, for the first time the Malays started to realise the importance of Malay unity. They had to be united in

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preventing the creating of the Malayan Union and protesting particularly at the proposals which gave Malayan citizenship to all who had been born in the Peninsula, or who had lived there for at least the previous ten years.

This sudden outburst of emotion caught the British by surprise. It was difficult for them to believe that the Malays, who for so long had regarded the British as kind teachers or policemen, and had rarely questioned their actions, were violently opposed to the changes that they had introduced.

The Malay Rulers, the British and UMNO at last jointly signed a new accord called the Federation of Malaya Agreement restoring the power and privileges of the Malay Rulers, the establishment of a new nation called "Persekutuan Tanah Melayu" (Federation of Malaya) with effect from February 1, 1948. This 1948 agreement was designed towards eventual self-government.

Dato' Onn Jaafar remained the undisputed leader of the Malays until August 1951. Aware of the time-honoured British practice of divide and rule in their colonies, and inspired by the nationalist movements and the gaining of independence of Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) and Burma (now Myanmar), Dato' Onn Jaafar realised the importance of the three communities (Malays, Chinese and Indians) getting together in order to attain self-government. He decided that UMNO should open its door to non-Malays. When he could not obtain the support he needed, he left UMNO and formed the Independence of Malaya Party (IMP).

Dato' Onn Jaafar's vision was clearly rather far ahead of his time. Following his ill-fated attempt to forge a non-communal UMNO in 1951, the stalwarts who remained with UMNO chose Tunku Abdul Rahman to be the next President and Tun Abdul Razak became Deputy President in August 1951.

Four months later, in December 1951, an Alliance between UMNO and the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), was initiated between Dato' Yahya Abdul Razak, Chairman of the Kuala Lumpur UMNO Division's Election Committee and Tun Omar Ong Yoke Lin, Chairman of the MCA Liaison Committee in Selangor. The UMNO-MCA Alliance which represented the cooperation of the two largest communal groups in Malaya then was founded in Kuala Lumpur, in January 1952. It was to be further enlarged in 1974 (under the premiership of Tun Abdul Razak) to include more communal parties to form the National Front which has been and still is the Party in power, since 1955 [2].

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The first merger of UMNO and MCA received the spontaneous blessing of Tunku Abdul Rahman, the then UMNO National President and later First Prime Minister. This Alliance also received the blessings of Tan Cheng-Lock, the then National President of MCA, Col. H.S. Lee, S.M. Yong and T.H. Tan. In the first Kuala Lumpur Municipal Elections held in January 1952, the UMNO-MCA Alliance won 9 out of 12 seats [3].

Witnessing the political strength of the new UMNO-MCA Alliance, the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) which at first had joined the new party IMP led by Dato' Onn Jaafar in 1951, came over and joined the UMNO-MCA Alliance in 1954. MIC was then led by Tun V.T. Sambanthan. The UMNO-MCA-MIC Alliance representing Malaya's three major communities demanded early elections to form a Federal Legislative Council as a step closer towards independence.

The Alliance Party went on to win 51 out of 52 elective seats in the Federal Election for the Legislative Council in 1955. The election results proved that the three communities could work together harmoniously. An elected central government was installed for the first time with Tunku Abdul Rahman as Chief Minister and Minister of Home Affairs together with the appointment of ten other Ministers, while the British had the High Commissioner, the Chief Secretary and the Attorney-General under the establishment of the Federal Executive Council. Tun Abdul Razak was made Minister of Education.

Inspired by its success, the Alliance Party decided to fight for full independence of Malaya from the British. There was no armed struggle as such, the Communist insurgency notwithstanding. Indeed, the British had used the Communist threat as a good excuse for staying on longer.

At this time in 1955, Malaya was moving closer towards independence. Being the Chief Minister and the Alliance's leader, Tunku Abdul Rahman was in a position to head the independence movement. Meanwhile, Tun Abdul Razak was one of the first to join the independence struggle. Tun Abdul Razak played no small a role in the smooth transition from colonial domination to an independent Malaya. He was a member of the Merdeka Mission (Independence Mission) to London in January 1956 [4].

In planning to fight for Malaya's independence, Tunku Abdul Rahman was also approached by Dato' Sheikh Ahmad Mohamed Hashim, the Chief Minister of Perlis, the Malay Graduates Association of Johore, and several others that promised to give him full support in the struggle for independence. These leaders were aware that under the

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Malayan Federation Government the Malays were not getting any benefit as the indigenous people of their own country - they were just as poor as when they were under the direct rule of the British. Very few Malays were given Malayan Civil Service (MCS) appointments, and no Malays were appointed to senior positions in the police force. The highest they could go to would be Assistant Superintendent of Police. There seemed to be more expatriate officers but these expatriates were from Myanmar (Burma) and Sri Lanka (Ceylon), and some from India.

The sole objective of Malaya's independence, of course, was to free Malaya from foreign rule. As a matter of long-term planning, then, Tun Abdul Razak together with Tunku Abdul Rahman and the other UMNO leaders had to consider ways and means to prevent the destructive potential for the Malay race, culture and religion and this was used as a yardstick in drafting the new constitution for independence. A long-term strategy for the preservation of the Malay race, culture and religion had to be devised.

Tun Abdul Razak together with Tunku Abdul Rahman and Tun Omar Ong Yoke Lin had the privilege to go to London to finalise the Constitution in the spring of April, 1957. The other participating delegations to this Conference were representatives of their Royal Highness the Rulers of the Malay States and the British Government.

Through a series of negotiations conducted in London, the country was finally granted independence on August 31, 1957. The transition of power was gentlemanly, smooth and cultured. No upheavals, no power grabbing, no nationalisation of foreign-owned companies. The British civil servants and troops left the country graciously, not without feelings of nostalgia on both sides. In their place, British traders and businessmen arrived to do business and invest.

After independence the Malays started to hold political power in the country. General elections were held in 1959 and 1964 which reconfirmed their position. The Chinese had acquired ample opportunities to go about their business. The Communist insurgencies which erupted in 1948 ended in 1960. Tun Abdul Razak was made Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, two vital posts at the period when the country was still being harassed by Communist guerrilla warfare.

On the date of April 23, 1959 Tunku Abdul Rahman actually resigned voluntarily from the highest Government position of Prime Minister with his Deputy Tun Abdul Razak taking over as Prime Minister. Tun Abdul Razak took this unprecedented step as Tunku Abdul Rahman wanted to

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devote all his time and energy as the Party leader to campaign personally throughout the length and breadth of the Peninsula for the 1959 General Election. In this Election, for the first time in the history of Malaya, the Alliance won all 104 seats in the House of Representatives [5].

After the Alliance had won a resounding victory, Tunku Abdul Rahman returned as Prime Minister on September 1, 1959 and Tun Abdul Razak gracefully resumed his old portfolio as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. Although Malaya had experienced 12 years of constant bloodshed and killings caused by militant communists, Tun Abdul Razak's positive approach to various racially-intricate problems and his dedication to the principles of democratic government helped him to unite the various races. Racial unity was the most important weapon in the Government's battle against Communism [6].

The Formation of Malaysia

The wish to associate Malaya, Singapore and the northern Borneo territories in some form of union had been expressed in various forums even before 1961. However, the idea of this confederation did not progress towards reality until Tunku Abdul Rahman, then Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, made an apparently casual statement in the course of a luncheon speech to the Foreign Correspondents' Association of Southeast Asia in Singapore on May 27, 1961. Tunku Abdul Rahman stated that Malaya could not stand alone in isolation. He suggested that sooner or later his country should have an understanding with Britain and the peoples of the territories of Singapore, Sabah, Brunei and Sarawak to form Malaysia. While Peninsular Malaya has achieved independence in 1957, Sabah, Sarawak, Brunei and Singapore still remained under British hegemony [7].

Although the racial composition of the population of Malaya differed very markedly from that of Singapore, which posed a serious obstacle to a merger, the increasing threat of Communist take-over made the formation of Malaysia significant and important to the security of the country and of the region. Malaya felt that the numbers of increasingly-leftist citizens in Singapore would aggravate the problems posed by the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), which had already caused the 12-year Emergency from 1948 to 1960 [8].

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As for Singapore, it wished to be merged with the Peninsula, mainly for political reasons. It was envisaged that the establishment of the enlarged federation would not only speed up but actually consummate the attainment of political independence for Singapore and the three dependent territories in northern Borneo. Notwithstanding internal problems which might occur or remain after the establishment of the enlarged federation, it was intended from the outset that Malaysia was to have the constitutional status of an independent and sovereign nation which its people, including those in Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei (if it became a part) and Sabah, should equally proud of.

The inclusion of Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei was important for Peninsular Malaya. The reason can be related to the problem of numbers faced by the Malays in the Peninsula in the case of a direct Malaya-Singapore merger. With the inclusion of Sarawak, Brunei and Sabah, each of which contained a majority of indigenous people who were akin in varying degree to the Malays, the proposed Malaysia would maintain the numerical superiority of the Malays and other indigenous races together over the Chinese.

At the early stage of the formation of Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman sent Tun Omar Yoke Ong Lin as the leader of the Malayan delegation to the Solidarity Consultative Talks in Kuching, Sarawak which discussed the proposal to form an extended Federation of Malaysia. The other delegations were from the then British Colonial Territories of Sarawak and Sabah.

Britain's support for the formation of Malaysia became very evident when the Sarawak and Sabah Governments each published a White Paper in January 1962 urging the peoples of the two territories to support the Malaysia proposal. To adhere to well-known British practice in eventually granting self-rule to their dependencies, it was then decided to set up a commission of inquiry on Malaysia to ascertain the views of the peoples of Sabah and Sarawak on this question, and in the light of their assessment of these views then to make recommendations. The Commission comprised Lord Cobbold who was the Chairman, Sir Anthony Abell and Sir David Watherston, who were nominated by the British Government, and Dato' Wong Pow Nee and Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, who were nominated by the Federation of Malaya. The Commission undertook its tasks from February 19 to April 17, 1962. It held 50 hearings at 35 different centres (20 in Sarawak and 15 in Sabah). The Commission received nearly 600 letters and memoranda in Sabah and over 1,600 in Sarawak [9].

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In giving its assessment, the Commission concluded that about one-third of the population in each territory strongly favoured early realisation of Malaysia without too much concern about terms and conditions. In another third, many of them were favourable to the Malaysia proposal, but asked with varying degrees of emphasis for conditions and safeguards varying in nature and extent. The remaining third was divided between those who insisted on independence before the formation of Malaysia and those who preferred to see the continuation of British rule for some years to come.

Concurrently with the spread of political awareness, the Malaysia proposal fostered the development of nationalist consciousness in Sabah and Sarawak. The idea of belonging to an independent nation, a central and essential feature of the Malaysia proposal, gradually gained support and this was represented by the increasing number of people in Sarawak and Sabah to look favourably at and in the end to accept the proposal.

Tun Abdul Razak, Tun Dr. Ismail and Tun Tan Siew Sin flew to London in July 1962 for further discussion on the formation of Malaysia, a new union to consist of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei. After two weeks of frank and outspoken talks, the British officials agreed to prepare and to present to Parliament a Bill authorising the creation of Malaysia, and a year later in July 1963, the Bill was passed without division.

At that time the initial opposition to Malaysia which was shared by all political leaders in Sabah and Sarawak dissolved slowly, partly as a result of well-organised "study tours" of the leaders of these two states to Malaya, which included visits to some of Tun Abdul Razak's land development schemes. Then, the Malayan delegation led by Tun Abdul Razak, after a great deal of hard bargaining, finally worked out a compromise solution with Lee Kuan Yew's Government of Singapore.

The formation of Malaysia took twenty months, from May 1961 to September 1963, and it was basically an expansion of the Federation of Malaya. These three new areas became additional states of fundamentally the same Federation. The Malaysia Agreement provided for a series of adaptations of and additional provisions in the existing 1957 Federation of Malaya Constitution rather than the framing of an entirely new document. Thus the content of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia was to a great extent the same as that of the 1957 Federation of Malaya Constitution.

After the signing of agreements with Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak, Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman flew to London, where, on July 8,

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he and representatives of Britain, Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah, signed an Agreement which was to make history. On August 31, 1963 Malaysia would at last become a reality. When Malaysia was inaugurated on September 16, 1963, Tunku Abdul Rahman's earlier wish seemed almost fulfilled, only Brunei had decided in the end to stay out of Malaysia. The Sultan of Brunei remained adamant over the control of his oil revenues.

Confrontation With Indonesia

The desire to form a bigger and, hopefully, more viable nation had led to the establishment of Malaysia in 1963. But crises arose almost immediately and in the following years which imposed a severe strain on the Malaysian political leadership and the nation as a whole.

In this political disturbance the main preoccupation of Tun Abdul Razak in his capacity as Minister of Defence, was the continuing Confrontation by Indonesia and to a lesser degree, the more passive hostility toward Malaysia displayed by the Philippines.

The formation of Malaysia had, for whatever reasons, received a cold welcome from President Sukarno. Indonesia's undeclared war or "Konfrontasi" as Indonesia called it, against Malaysia began on April 4, 1963 [10]. In fact, Indonesia had started its Confrontation against Malaysia, even before proclaiming it. On the night of Good Friday, a well-armed group of "volunteers" from Jakarta slipped unnoticed across Borneo Island's border and launched a surprise attack on a frontier police station and shot down most of its unprepared defenders. Following this, Indonesia stepped up its campaign of Confrontation against Malaysia on sea, land and in the air.

The Confrontation also took other shapes. Even as the celebrations of the birth of Malaysia were taking place in Kuala Lumpur, after the United Nations Secretary-General's representative had given his approval to the Malaysia proposal, President Sukarno was adamant. He went ahead with preparations to cope with Malaysia by first dismissing the Malaysian Embassy in Jakarta and starting a number of border raids in Sarawak and Sabah. Against this, the Indonesian Ambassador to Malaysia, Major-General Djatikusumo, and his ring of spies were exposed and Malaysia ordered the rupture of diplomatic relations with Indonesia [11].

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President Sukarno meanwhile launched more guerrilla attacks against Malaysia in such out-of-the-way places as Pontian, Labis, and Kota Tinggi in the Johore State, in Singapore and in the northern part of Peninsular Malaysia.

Taking advantage of the racial riots already surfacing in Singapore, with the support of the Barisan Socialist Party and other Communist elements on the island, Indonesia used another tactic to undermine the stability of Malaysia. Indonesian agents had distributed leaflets in a house-to-house campaign calling for anti-government demonstrations. But once the plot had been smashed by the security authorities after the Communist unrest, which resulted in fourteen deaths in addition to about fifty wounded, the troublemakers in Singapore were promptly put in their place. Yet the background of racial animosity would still linger on in Singapore.

One very important aspect of war propaganda during the Confrontation days was an extraordinary broadcast by President Sukarno, calling on the Chinese residents of Singapore to oppose Malaysia which, he said, was meant to enslave the Chinese. This indeed was a very significant statement with strong repercussions, especially when related to President Sukarno's intimate relationship with Peking, and with his collaboration with the Chinese Communist Movements in Malaysia. But, whether or not this Confrontation propaganda was effective, Singapore which is predominantly Chinese eventually did opt out of the Federation of Malaysia in less than two years after it was proclaimed [12].

In overcoming the threat coming from the continuing Confrontation by Indonesia, on March 10, 1964 almost one year after the undeclared war, Tun Abdul Razak announced that as heavier and more widespread attacks must be anticipated, all citizens between the ages of 21 and 28 would, very shortly, be liable to be called up for National Service in either the armed forces or the civil defence.

Malaysia noted at that time that Indonesia had a standing army of about half a million, a paramilitary force of something like 130,000, a navy comprising some 183 ships of various sizes and 28,000 officers and men, and an air force with some 30,000 personnel equipped with 110 Russian MIGs and 26 TU-16 bombers [13].

The scale of Indonesian military intervention was stepped up following the inevitable breakdown of the Tokyo talks. The situation became even worse in mid-July, when it was reported that President Sukarno had ordered his navy to sink any Malaysian boats found using the Malacca Straits. This dangerous escalation of the crisis reached its

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zenith on August 17, 1964 when a raiding force of more than 100 armed and uniformed guerrillas from Indonesia, of whom 27 were Malaysian Chinese, landed at three separate places on the west coast of Johore. Such Indonesian armed attacks on Malaysia made the peoples of both countries indeed confused as Indonesian and Malaysian peoples have a lot in common, racially, religiously and historically. It was unthinkable to the peoples of both countries to anticipate any large-scale war.

The possible worsening of relations between these countries underwent a sharp change after the incident of "GESTAPU" (September 30 Movement) that took place in Indonesia on September 30, 1965. In this incident, six of Indonesia's most senior army generals were kidnapped and assassinated by members of a group led by Lt. Col. Untung, the Commander of the Palace Guard. Lt. Col. Untung claimed that the action of GESTAPU was necessary in order to forestall a plot by "the Council of Generals" to overthrow President Sukarno. It was indeed a tragedy in the history of wars - where six army generals were killed in a single coup.

● Lt. Col. Untung's reign was short-lived. He failed to receive support from other Army units, and possibly from all the Communist movements, which he had positively anticipated. His men were soon forced to surrender by loyal forces commanded by General Nasution and General Suharto. By this time President Sukarno had fled to Halim Perdanakusuma International Airport not far from Central Jakarta, where his private aircraft was kept. By a pure coincidence this was very close to the place where the captured Generals had been taken for torture, and soon executed and dumped. President Sukarno was accompanied by Omar Dhani, the Commander of the Air Force and a known Communist sympathiser.

When the coup failed, "Harian Rakjat" the leading Communist daily paper came out in full support of the GESTAPU coup. This was quite enough to confirm the already widespread suspicion that the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) was the real power behind GESTAPU. The Army was soon engaged in a massive anti-Communist drive.

After the GESTAPU incident and immediately after General Suharto took control of the country, Tun Abdul Razak, with the full backing of Tunku Abdul Rahman and the Cabinet, instigated the opening moves designed to lead to a final settlement of the Indonesian conflict with Malaysia. Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was tasked with seeking ways and means of

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ending the Konfrontasi. Special political action was initiated and credible contact was firmly established.

Tun Abdul Razak chose as his aide from the Indonesian side Des Alwi, the adopted son of former Indonesian Prime Minister, Shahrir, and a close personal friend since their student days together in London. Secret unofficial negotiations were begun with Des Alwi as go-between; and these were followed by an even more secret flight into Kuala Lumpur of an Indonesian military aircraft containing a goodwill mission of army officers [14].

It was suspected that the goodwill mission of army officers early in the morning of May, 27, 1966 was led by General Suharto himself. These emissaries were met at the airport by Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie who led them in a small convoy of closed cars to Seri Taman for a working breakfast with Tun Abdul Razak. Later that morning, the military mission flew to Alor Setar for a series of meetings with Tunku Abdul Rahman at his private residence. Accompanying them to Tunku Abdul Rahman's residence were Tun Abdul Razak and Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie. The meeting between Tunku Abdul Rahman and General Suharto clearly signalled Indonesia's intention to formally end its Confrontation against Malaysia [15].

The Indonesian peace emissaries returned to Indonesia on the same day, and two days later on May 29, Tun Abdul Razak and Tun Adam Malik, Indonesian Foreign Minister, attended the Peace Talks between Malaysia and Indonesia in Bangkok to work out comprehensive measures for the ending of Confrontation. These being worked out and agreed upon, on June 1, 1966, the two negotiators, Tun Abdul Razak and Tun Adam Malik left for home to report their success to their respective Governments.

Being responsible and answerable to General Suharto, General (Tan Sri) Ali Moertopo, assisted most ably by General (Tan Sri) Benny Moerdani, was also assigned a hidden but important role in the operational link in order to overcome the ruptured diplomatic ties between these two countries as a result of the Confrontation [16].

Consequently, on August 11, 1966 Tun Abdul Razak led a top-level delegation to Jakarta to sign the Peace Treaty. The Malaysians received an enthusiastic welcome from a huge crowd that had gathered at the airport to greet them, while President Sukarno, who was still President then, continued openly and as expected to oppose the peace initiatives. There had been rumours too that some fanatics who still supported

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President Sukarno might attempt to assassinate Tun Abdul Razak, or even the whole delegation [17].

Finally and historically, General Suharto witnessed the signing of the 1966 Peace Agreement. Malaysia was represented by Tun Abdul Razak and Indonesia by Tun Adam Malik. The signing of the Agreement ended hostilities and re-established diplomatic relations between these two countries. As all the details had been worked out earlier with Tun Adam Malik and General Suharto, the historic event went well - Tun Abdul Razak even had an unexpectedly amicable meeting with President Sukarno.

Separatism of Singapore

Aside from the Malaysia-Indonesia Confrontation, there were two internal crises which emerged within less than ten years after the birth of Malaysia, namely, the "Singapore Separatism" and the 1969 racial riots. They were not unrelated events for both were a continuation of the long-drawn conflict between the Malays and the Chinese. The Indians were not entirely uninvolved but because their number in Malaysia is relatively small, they tended to be overshadowed by the larger Chinese community.

Local political analysts have expressed the view that the political ambition of the Singaporean leaders of the People's Action Party (PAP), which unavoidably led to racial polarisation, was mainly responsible for the separation of the island-state in 1965. Although Singapore was allotted 15 Dewan Rakyat (House of Representatives) seats in the Malaysian Parliament, no Singaporean leader was appointed to the Federal Cabinet throughout the 23 months during which the Island was a part of Malaysia. It is clear that this exclusion from the highest echelon of national government increasingly frustrated Singaporean leaders of PAP and prompted them to assert themselves in an increasingly strident manner after Malaysia Day.

On August 31, 1963, Lee Kuan Yew declared, "Federal powers over defence and external affairs from today till September 16 (shall) be reposed in our Yang di-Pertuan Negara. We look upon ourselves as trustees for the Central Government of Malaysia in these fifteen days". Singapore held a snap General Election in September 1963, five days after Malaysia Day, and the PAP, which just two years before had lost 70

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per cent of its members to the Barisan Socialist Party, won 37 of the 51 Legislative Assembly seats. The Malayan Alliance captured none of the seats, humiliating the Kuala Lumpur based Alliance. Relations between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur were soon heading for disaster [18].

The Malayan Alliance leaders received more shocks when the PAP decided to extend its branches and registered eleven candidates in the Malayan Parliamentary elections of April, 1964. This was contradictory to a tacit understanding, agreed when Malaysia was formed, that Singaporean politicians would confine their party activities only to Singapore [19].

These turbulent circumstances reflected the fact that the political marriage between Malaya and Singapore did not rest on a firm foundation, and even in the first few uncertain months the partners were increasingly not seeing eye to eye. Furthermore, the concept of "Malaysian-Malaysia" conspicuously played by the Singapore PAP leaders contributed to the worsening of relations between these two countries.

The concept of "Malaysian-Malaysia" was meant in theory as well as in practice to educate and encourage the various races in Malaysia to seek political affiliation not on the basis of race and religion but rather on the basis of common political ideologies and common social and economic aspirations, which was to be the real basis of ensuring the emergence of a truly free prosperous and equitable national community. Intentionally, the concept of "Malaysian-Malaysia" was meant to challenge one of the most fundamental provisions of the Malaysia Agreement, namely, the privileged position of the Malays and the indigenous communities of northern Borneo.

In promoting the idea of "Malaysian-Malaysia", Singapore leaders of PAP argued that the Central Government which was Malay-dominated was trying to foist Malay rule on the entrapped peoples of Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak and treating all these states as inferiors. Such statements led to Singaporean leaders of PAP, especially Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, being considered by the Malay leaders in the Peninsula as great experts in organising campaigns to create doubts, suspicions and confusion in the minds of the people so that ultimately there would be chaos and troubles in the country.

Concomitant to this turbulent argument, Tun Abdul Razak was asked by Tunku Abdul Rahman who was away, to have a discussion on the subject of the continuing verbal and vocal disagreement between Singapore and Central Government leaders but had reached no

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agreement. Tun Abdul Razak was also asked by Tunku Abdul Rahman to discuss the subject of separation with the three other senior members of the Cabinet; Tun Dr. Ismail, Tun Tan Siew Sin and Tun V.T. Sambanthan. These three Cabinet Ministers and Tun Abdul Razak himself was unanimously of the opinion that no agreement with the Singapore Government were possible and that Singapore would have to be separated from Malaysia.

Tunku Abdul Rahman may still have entertained the hope that an alternative solution could be found. He wrote back to Tun Abdul Razak requesting him to instruct the Attorney-General to prepare the necessary amendment to the Constitution, and other legal documents, and to arrange for Parliament to be recalled.

Tunku Abdul Rahman at last realised that the consequences of the PAP leaders' persistent challenge to the Federal leadership by promoting the concept of "Malaysian-Malaysia" would exacerbate communal feelings to a point that could cause the disintegration of Malaysia. The only alternative in preventing a head-on collision between Malaysia and Singapore was to separate the two Governments.

The Malaysian Parliament was hurriedly convened, and in his speech on Singapore's separation on August 9, 1965 Tunku Abdul Rahman traced the origins of the conflict which led to the unfortunate break. On the same day, with all the Singapore leaders having withdrawn to their island, Lee Kuan Yew proclaimed that "Singapore shall forever be a sovereign democratic and independent nation, founded upon the principles of liberty and justice and ever seeking the welfare and happiness of her people in a more just and equal society. Singapore is out of Malaysia, twenty-three months after the inauguration of the new nation". After the separation, with the return to Singapore of the island's members of the Federal Parliament, the Malaysian Government ruled that the PAP, as a foreign-based political organisation, was illegal.

Despite the many conflicts of interest that had brought about the enforced separation of the two States and the hurt feelings that naturally emerged, Tun Abdul Razak had managed to arrange for a wide measure of understanding with Singapore, particularly in the fields of commerce and defence.

The Governments of Malaysia and Singapore recognised that it would be to the mutual advantage of their respective countries to have their own currencies. The arrangement was acceptable to both countries and compatible with their status as two sovereign independent countries. On

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June 12, 1967, Bank Negara Malaysia took over currency issuing functions for Malaysia, and Singapore issued its own currency [20].

The row over the breakup of the prospective jointly-owned airline MSA (the Malaysia-Singapore Airline), centred on the question of claim to the initials and on traffic rights, between these neighbours. The announcement of Singapore that its airline would continue to be called MSA and would fly to Kuala Lumpur really disappointed Malaysia. In fact, some UMNO hotheads were urging for Singapore's water supplies from the reservoir in Johore State to be cut off [21].

There appeared to be more efforts behind the scenes under the leadership of Tun Abdul Razak to take initiatives to sort out this problem and, as a matter of fact, other sensitive issues. Finally the two Government-owned airlines, the Malaysian Airline System (MAS) and Singapore International Airlines (SIA) came into being and have since the beginning pooled their flights between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore.

With the psychological warfare going on between two countries, at first there was suspicion that Singapore and Malaysia might not be willing to cooperate especially in defence needs. The ensuing event of Tun Abdul Razak's touring Europe at that time, including Paris and Moscow, to buy defence equipment underlined this suspicion. No reference had been made to joint defence needs, standardisation of military equipment or of parts by Singapore in any deal made.

Relations between Singapore and Malaysia eventually improved, and military cooperation proved successful. This prompted Tun Abdul Razak to announce that the States were jointly to seek a new defence pact with Britain that, if possible, would also include Australia and New Zealand. In 1971 after six years of separation, the five countries, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom discussed an integrated air defence system for Malaysia and Singapore.

They agreed to develop an integrated air defence system to cover both Malaysia and Singapore and also naval forces, which was to be significant to coastal defence. It was also agreed that a major Commonwealth joint exercise would be held in 1970 and that other joint army exercises would be held in the area after 1971. To facilitate this a joint exercise planning machinery and a jungle warfare training school on a multi-national basis was agreed to be set up. Military and economic assistance were promised to Malaysia and Singapore by the other three members.

In whatever uncomfortable circumstances of relations between Malaysia and Singapore there were usually some interesting lessons to be

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learned on what made the two tick. While the mass media in each country tended to be critical of the other's moves and motives, there seemed to be genuine moves towards a common purpose. The continuing attempts of these two countries to find common ground and to act in concert to solve these problems had the scars of separation soon healing but a complete cure would take time. Tun Abdul Razak's return visit to Singapore in November 1973 indicated medication to the relations of misunderstanding and uneasiness between these two countries [22].

Although protocol formalities by mutual consent were kept to a minimum, with Tun Abdul Razak accompanied, among others, by his wife Tun Hajah Rahah and Dato' Michael Chen, Minister of Special Functions, the visit was significant in that it was the first visit of a Malaysian Head of State to the new Republic of Singapore. It occurred eight years after the Republic seceded from the Federation in 1965.

The Philippine Claim On Sabah

Kuala Lumpur is also not without problems with its neighbour in the northeast, the Philippines. The level of irritation in the relationship between Malaysia and the Philippines is considered unnatural for two immediate neighbours who belong to a common regional grouping. In normal circumstances, their regional commonality would have served as a catalyst to cement and widen mutually beneficial ties of friendship and cooperation. Unfortunately, the relationship has been allowed to float and continues to be marked by mutual suspicion and distrust. The main contributing factor to this disturbing situation is the Philippines' claim on Sabah, one of Malaysia's 13 states. It is an issue that has remained unresolved for more than 30 years. The genesis of the main impediment to the normal and steady growth of constructive relations started in June 1962 when the Philippines officially filed its claim on Sabah [23].

Once a part of the Sultanate of Sulu, Sabah's land area exceeds 29,000 square miles, smaller than neighbouring Mindanao by about 8,000 square miles. Its centuries-old ties with the Philippines are indicated by the fact that the inhabitants of both came from the same racial stock and have similar customs and traditions. The Sultan of Brunei originally ruled this part of Borneo, but in 1704 the Sultan of Sulu helped suppress an uprising there and, as a reward, Sabah was ceded to Sulu. Subsequently, the Europeans came to Southeast Asia for the

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valuable minerals, spices, and other rich sources of revenue, and in 1878, two of these enterprising merchants leased North Borneo from the Sultan for 5,000 Malaysian dollars. Soon the North Borneo Company was formed and awarded a royal charter [24].

In the course of laying the groundwork for Philippine independence, the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippine Republic was circumscribed. This treaty did not include Sabah within the boundaries of Spanish, American or Philippine jurisdiction. Then, a mere six days after the Philippines was granted its independence on July 10, 1946, the British North Borneo Company turned over all its rights and obligations to the British Government, which in turn asserted full sovereign rights over Sabah through the North Borneo Cession Order [25].

There was no advancement of the Philippine claim on Sabah from 1946 to 1962. Within that period, successive administrations conducted low-key investigations on the merits of such a claim, and a study of these and other documents convinced President Diosdado Macapagal, then Chief of the Legal Division of the Philippines' Foreign Affairs Department, that a claim on North Borneo could be filed. The first official Philippine act on the matter, House Resolution No. 42, adopted on April 28, 1950, stated explicitly that North Borneo belonged to the heirs of the Sultan of Sulu and authorised the President to conduct negotiations for the restoration of sovereign jurisdiction [26]. But it was June 1962 before the Philippine Government notified the United Kingdom of its claim on Sabah, and the following December the two agreed to hold talks on the issue. The promulgation of the claim brought the Philippines into diplomatic conflict with the British, who regarded it as a nuisance in relation to their own plan to change the status of North Borneo from a colony into a state of an expanded Federation of Malaysia [27]. The British Government rejected the Philippine position in view of the over-riding need to form the Federation of Malaysia, ostensibly to contain Communism in Southeast Asia [28].

At the First Ministerial Conference on the claim, held in London in 1963, a joint communique was issued by the Foreign Ministers of Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines stating that the inclusion of North Borneo in the Federation of Malaysia "would not prejudice either the Philippine claim or any right thereunder". The joint statement was ratified by the Presidents of the Philippines and of Indonesia and the Prime Minister of Malaysia when they met later that year in Manila, and President Macapagal's participation in it jeopardised the Philippine claim on Sabah. In any case, the Federation of Malaysia came into being on

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September 16, 1963, and due to the physical possession of Sabah by Malaysia, the Philippine Government refused to accord diplomatic recognition, contrary to its solemn commitment in the Manila Agreement. When President Sukarno started his Confrontation against Malaysia, Manila reduced its representation in Kuala Lumpur to consular level [29].

As a matter of fact, the claim was relegated to the sidelines when it became entangled within the wider context of Indonesia's Confrontation on Malaysia with the Sukarno regime's threats to resort to military means to "crush" the nation. Upon termination of the Confrontation, the dispute over Sabah was carried to Bangkok, where bilateral negotiations aimed at its resolution were abruptly aborted. In the United Nations' General Assembly, the disputants exchanged contentious charges and countercharges.

Ironically, President Ferdinand Marcos recognised the formation of Malaysia in 1966, soon after he took over political power in the Philippines. The two finally agreed to restore full diplomatic relations in June 1966 after various unsuccessful attempts had been made to reconcile the Philippines and Malaysia.

With the inception of the five-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), there was a tacit agreement between Malaysia and the Philippines that the issue be shelved in the interests of regional solidarity, and both sides agreed that it should be finally resolved through ASEAN. Both countries have since tried to keep their relationship friendly, using ASEAN as a cornerstone of their foreign policies. They soon agreed to cooperate in the eradication of smuggling, subsequently entering into an Anti-Smuggling Pact and a Protocol on Border Crossing.

In March 1967, the Philippine Government was invited to send observers to witness the first direct elections in Sabah, but Manila refused on the grounds that this might prejudice its position on the claim. The refusal did not, however, impede the participation of the Philippines and Malaysia in the formation of ASEAN in August 8, 1967.

During the first meeting of ASEAN in Jakarta in August 1967, Tun Abdul Razak and the Foreign Minister of the Philippines made considerable progress towards detente, but this was nullified in September of that year when the Philippines Congress passed a Bill purporting to incorporate Sabah into the Republic. Malaysia, in retaliation, once again broke off diplomatic relations. By January 1968, however, reconciliation had progressed sufficiently to permit a State visit to Malaysia by President Ferdinand Marcos and his wife, and helped to

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re-promote friendship to such an extent that on February 6, Tun Abdul Razak was able to inform the Federal Parliament that new talks were soon to be held at Foreign Minister level.

Unfortunately, before the talks could even begin, a well publicised mutiny of Muslim Filipino recruits on the island of Corregidor in April revealed the existence of a para-military guerrilla force intended, so dissident members of the organisation claimed during press interviews, for the invasion and occupation of Sabah. Soon afterwards a number of armed men were arrested on an island off the coast of Sabah, and when questioned by the police some of them admitted to having received military training in the Philippines. After the notorious Corregidor Incident blew up in the Philippines, considerable public attention was given in the Philippines to the question of the Philippine claim on Sabah.

The matter became further complicated with the Philippines's institutionalisation of the claim through the enactment of Republic Act 5546 incorporating Sabah as part of the territory of the Philippines in 1969. This triggered Malaysia to suspend its diplomatic ties with the Philippines and created a new stumbling block to the progress of ASEAN. However, in the spirit of regional cooperation, relations were restored on December 16, 1969 during ASEAN's Third Ministerial Conference [30]. Indonesia, the dominant partner in the five-country alliance, together with other members, Thailand and Singapore, eventually obtained assurances from the Philippines and Malaysia that the Sabah issue would not be raised in ASEAN forums.

President Marcos made a dramatic move towards normalisation of bilateral relations with Malaysia in 1976. In his pronouncement of the normalisation of Philippine bilateral relations with Malaysia, President Marcos stated that the Philippines no longer intended to press its claim of sovereignty over Sabah, though he did not officially drop it. Just prior to an ASEAN summit meeting, President Marcos, with other Asian leaders, came to Malaysia to pay their last respect to Tun Abdul Razak who passed away on January 14, 1976.

The pronouncement, however, was never followed by any concrete action. The escalating Muslim rebellion in the Southern Philippines appeared to hinder the Government from formally implementing the policy.

The Formation of ASEAN

Malaysia cannot be isolated from its regional neighbours and the peace of the region is the concern of all countries in the region. It was in the pursuit of this regional cooperation that Prime Minister Tun Abdul Rahman proposed the formation of the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) in 1961 which comprised Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. Though ASA had suffered some initial setbacks it was hoped that the importance of ASEAN would be realised.

The idea of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was mentioned by Tunku Abdul Rahman at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London in September 1966 when he said that regional cooperation was the best means of meeting the threat to Southeast Asia from the communists in the North and of stabilising and strengthening the economies of each country in the area.

Although ASA was beginning to prove itself a constructive ideal and a practical idea that could benefit all the members in a wide sphere of cooperation and friendly relation, the formation of ASEAN was going to be an important development from the failure of ASA. The formation of ASEAN was significant in the context of the overall political situation in Southeast Asia that had altered drastically during the 1960s and 1970s, far more than changes that occurred in Latin America or in Africa during the same two decades.

Four factors were responsible for altering the political development in the Southeast Asian region. Of greatest importance was the fall from power of pro-communist Indonesian President Sukarno, who had been pursuing a policy of Confrontation against Malaysia which had raised tension throughout the region. The more pragmatic regime of President Suharto proceeded with the policy of reconciliation of these two countries. Secondly, all of Southeast Asia felt threatened by the increasing ferocity in Vietnam. Thailand saw that it could be the next "domino" to fall should the Communists achieve victory in South Vietnam, following which the military of North Vietnam might undermine the security of all Southeast Asian nations. This was particularly so in view of the signals of an eventual American military withdrawal that had begun to appear at about this time. Thirdly, China was going through a period of left-wing extremism in the Cultural Revolution which had international repercussions in the form of calls to Asian Communist parties to embark upon "peoples' wars". China both as a major power and as the origin of the influential Chinese minority in

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Southeast Asia, was therefore considered to be a potential source of regional instability. Finally, there were strong economic arguments in favour of closer association, including the need for a collective response to the rise of Japanese economic power.

Besides these four theoretical explanations, at the formal talks between Tun Adam Malik and Tun Abdul Razak in Bangkok at the end of May 1966, these two leaders agreed that the countries of Southeast Asia would be at loggerheads mainly not because of Communist expansion but rather because of the Cold War which was at its full blast then. The ups and downs of the rivalry would cause the countries of Southeast Asia to be split asunder in chaos and used as pawns in the Cold War. The predicament could worsen if the conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia were allowed to continue longer. At that time, both Tun Abdul Razak and General Suharto were of one mind that the Konfrontasi must cease and never be allowed to happen again, nor must it happen between neighbouring countries of Southeast Asia.

Since any regional organisation that should be established would not be the product of a formal treaty, rather of a solemn Declaration of commitment based on the indigenous spirit of faith in "togetherness", it was proposed that the regional organisation should be established only after the brotherly relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia had been restored so that together Indonesia and Malaysia would serve as the mainstay of ASEAN. Before a general disposition towards regional cooperation could be translated into a wider institutional framework, an agreement was reached to the terms on which Indonesia and Malaysia would participate for the success of ASEAN.

In the course of negotiating the end of the Confrontation, the Indonesian Foreign Minister and his civilian and military advisers had been in regular contact with their counterparts in Thailand and the Philippines, as well as with those in Malaysia. Before the formal ending of the Confrontation, the Governments in Bangkok, Manila and Kuala Lumpur had indicated their eagerness to revive the practice of regional cooperation, and this bore initial fruit with the convening of a meeting of ASA Foreign Ministers in July 1966. Regionalism had been a subject of discussion during the course of these formal talks and this was the impetus to the creation of ASEAN.

As noted earlier, the leaders of Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia had acted in concert in July 1961 to establish ASA in order to promote regional cooperation among like-minded conservatives of these three Governments. It constituted a feeble substitute for the Southeast

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Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) with which regional members had become increasingly disillusioned. Indonesia was invited to join ASA in 1960. President Sukarno had rejected the invitation from Tunku Abdul Rahman to join in this regional cooperation and had expressed open hostility towards the idea of ASA, whose credentials were questioned. In the event, without Indonesia, ASA virtually foundered and its activities were suspended, primarily because of the animosity between Malaysia and the Philippines arising from the latter's claim on Sabah.

The ending of the Indonesian Confrontation was marked by the date when Tun Abdul Razak led a top-level delegation to Jakarta to sign the Peace Treaty on August 11, 1966. It was a significant step towards the establishment of ASEAN. It was in 1967, a year after the end of Konfrontasi, and after a great deal of behind the scenes diplomatic activities and arguments that the words of the Declaration of ASEAN rose from the ashes of Konfrontasi on August 8, in Bangkok. Pushing for a chance of success, the organisation's political function should be low-key, giving it a more economic character to avoid forcing the organisation to deal with political issues which very often were a cause of grave difference.

Tun Abdul Razak of Malaysia, Tun Adam Malik of Indonesia, Narciso Ramos of the Philippines, S. Rajaratnam of Singapore and Tun Thanat Khoman of Thailand signed in Bangkok the ASEAN Declaration which paved the way for the formation of a regional grouping. Shortly after the signing of the ASEAN agreement, ASEAN inherited all of ASA's missions and planned projects. ASEAN, a machinery for cooperation, was created against a backdrop of uncertainty and instability, precipitated by regional strife and armed conflict in the region. The Association's primary and avowed aim was to create a stable region with emphasis on economic cooperation and harmony in Southeast Asia [31].

There was a deliberate vagueness about some of its provisions which was intended to keep the Association as flexible and open-ended as possible. There was, for example, a hint that ASEAN might be concerned with regional security in the statement that the signatories "are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation" and in the following assertion that "all foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned". But the Declaration limits itself to the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative

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fields in specifying areas where there was to be "active collaboration and mutual assistance".

At first, no precise form of cooperation was named. This low-key approach to the organisation was most apparent in the decision not to create a regional secretariat for ASEAN but merely to have a national secretariat in each country to administer the Association's affairs. The ASEAN Secretariat was established by an Agreement signed by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers during the 1976 Bali Summit to enhance coordination and implementation of policies, projects and activities of the various ASEAN bodies.

A response to the changing circumstances of that period, ASEAN history has so far been one of bending with the prevailing winds in an attempt to protect the interests of its members, it was intended to be primarily a diplomatic tool with the emphasis on informal consultation but with the flexibility to serve other purposes when required.

In the process, naturally, the performance of ASEAN has been more brilliant in the arena of politics and diplomacy than pure economic cooperation. For more than three decades, the resilience of ASEAN could be quoted for its ability to manoeuvre the turbulence of the Cold War and intense East West rivalries, despite the varied affiliations or non-alignment of its members.

Chapter Four

THE YEAR OF TURMOIL

The 1969 Election

Malaysia had gained independence from colonialism in 1957 without shedding a drop of blood. Since then, it had been a peaceful country marked by scenes of revelry and ceremonies which led Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman to declare that he was then the happiest Prime Minister in the world. The racial riots that erupted soon after the General Election of May 1969 naturally shocked the Prime Minister and shook the nation.

Between 1964 and 1969, many changes and conflicts had occurred simultaneously in the political scene of the country. Foremost of these was the emergence of larger, better organised non-Malay opposition parties. They included dissidents from the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), a Malayan offshoot of Lee Kuan Yew's People's Action Party (PAP) in Singapore known as the Democratic Action Party (DAP), and a vigorous Labour Party. The Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP/PAS) had extended its sphere of influence, notably in Kelantan, Terengganu and Kedah. Meanwhile, left-wing activists influenced and financed by the Communists were more numerous [1].

The General Election of 1964 showed that opposition parties such as the Labour Party, PMIP/PAS, and the mainly urban Chinese People's Progressive Party (PPP) had performed very poorly. The PAP won its sole seat on the mainland, for Bangsar constituency. This had resulted in a lack of voice of the oppositions in Parliament.

The General Elections held in West Malaysia on April 25, 1964 returned the Alliance Party with an increased majority. The total of 104 seats for West Malaysia in the House of Representatives was composed of the following parties:

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The Alliance	89
The Pan-Malayan Islamic Party	9
The Socialist Front	2
The People's Progressive Party	2
The United Democratic Party	1
The People's Action Party	1
Total	104

Forty additional seats are allocated for Sabah and Sarawak. The breakdown of seats in the House of Representatives at the national level was therefore as follows:

The Alliance (W. Malaysia 89, Sabah 16, Sarawak 20)	125
The Pan-Malayan Islamic Party	9
The Sarawak United People's Party	4
The Labour Party	1
The People's Progressive Party	2
The Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia	2
The Democratic Action Party	1
Total	144

With Singapore pulling out from Malaysia in 1965, remnants of PAP's attempt to sink roots in the Peninsula continued under a new banner, DAP. The DAP began expanding its base. Soon after, GERAKAN, a multi-racial but basically urban party was born. It brought several prominent opposition forces under a single roof.

Competition between the MCA, GERAKAN and DAP for the urban Chinese votes began to build up keenly from 1967 onwards especially. The keen battle for the urban Chinese votes among these parties forced some of them to resort to exploiting blatantly racial issues to win support. The question of citizenship for non-Malays, the special position of the indigenous Malays, the distribution of jobs in the civil service and numerous other issues with racial overtones were fanned into hot campaign platforms. History was intentionally forgotten. The deal made between the Malays and the non-Malays only a decade ago in preparation

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for independence, where the indigenous groups were to be given special privileges in exchange for citizenship for non-Malays born in Malaya, were ignored by unscrupulous politicians.

Meanwhile, the MCA and MIC with their moderate leadership, continued to plug the old line of unity and strength. They tried hard to refute as many of the racial issues as they could. But being responsible parties in the Government with inside knowledge of the thinking and functioning of the Government and its policies, the two parties sounded weak against the opposition's racial tirade.

The constant fanning of the racial issues by the non-Malay opposition had its backlash effects on the equally racial Malays who retorted with questions over why the non-Malays held the wealth in a country that was dominated and originally peopled by the Malays.

As usual, PMIP/PAS played upon the theme of religion and tried to make capital out of UMNO's coalition with the MCA and MIC. Tun Abdul Razak and the other Alliance leaders had always counter-attacked the PMIP/PAS onslaught by accusing it of accepting financial support from the Communists [2]. With regard to this the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) led by Dato' Harun Hashim was given the task of monitoring corrupt election practices during the 1969 election [3].

The long period of campaign which was provided for the May 1969 election favoured the opposition and gave them the opportunity to exploit sensitive issues with steadily increasing irresponsibility. Communal issues were given increasing prominence and interracial antagonism was deliberately stimulated.

Early in 1969, Tun Abdul Razak who was again responsible for his Party's tactics in this Election, was well aware that the Alliance was about to face far stiffer opposition compared to its experience in any previous electoral battle. In the 1964 General Election the platform of patriotism against Indonesian aggression had served the Alliance well. Before the 1969 Election Tun Abdul Razak had also directed his main effort to overcome the issue of the Philippines claim on Sabah. He had been closely associated with moves to settle this dispute amicably and therefore tended to project this issue to the electorate at large.

Spending the Polling Day in his constituency of Pekan, Pahang, Tun Abdul Razak, who was responsible for internal security, was aware that certain political groups were deliberately trying to provoke incidents that could, if not contained immediately, lead to savage outbreaks of interracial violence. As caretaker Minister for Home Affairs he was responsible for maintaining law and order in the country until a new

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government was sworn in. After the announcement of the full results of the Election Tun Abdul Razak was officially informed of the tension that was escalating among both sides, the Malays and the non-Malays.

The poor performance of the Alliance Party had raised the feeling of insecurity of the Malays in their own land and this was manifested in racial heating. The Malays felt that Merdeka (Independence) was meaningless to them. Most of the lands owned by the foreigners were sold to the non-Malays and while they felt that they had been tolerant in granting citizenship and in parting with a good share of their political power to the non-Malays, they realised that they had not received the economic opportunities promised to them in return for the deal. Feeling cheated over Singapore's pullout from Malaysia, just two years after the formation of Malaysia, further added insult to their injury.

After Tun Dr. Ismail resigned in 1967, Tun Abdul Razak was obliged to assume Ministership of Home Affairs as an additional portfolio. National Security was in the hands of the Ministry of Home Affairs. It was the responsibility of the Permanent Secretary, Tan Sri Sheikh Abdullah; the Inspector-General of Police, Tan Sri Muhammad Salleh; the Security Chief (the Head of the Special Branch at police headquarters), Abdul Rahman bin Hashim; and the Chief Police Officer Selangor, Dato' Mohd. Ariff to inform Tun Abdul Razak as Minister of Home Affairs, who was away in Pahang, of the skilful plotting of a group of Communist supporters lurking on the outskirts of the city, ready for action.

Tun Abdul Razak had in fact expected the poor performance of the Alliance in this election. He himself was not in any great trepidation, for when the result of his electoral contest with Yazid Jaafar of PMIP/PAS was declared, he found that although he had won by a very comfortable margin, his majority was down by 1,222 [4] as compared to the previous election.

The first announcements came with seat after seat being lost in Penang, Selangor and Perak. The Election results were reported throughout the night and on the following morning, the Alliance headquarters found that it had lost 23 seats in Parliament and 79 in the various State Assemblies. GERAKAN and their campaign allies, DAP, had won unexpected success in Selangor.

In comparison to the 1964 victory of the Alliance, the total number of seats won by the political parties in Parliamentary and State constituencies in the General Election in 1969 for West Malaysia were as follows:

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	Parliamentary	State
The Alliance	76	167
The Pan-Malayan Islamic Party	12	40
The Democratic Action Party	13	31
Party Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia	8	26
The People's Progressive Party	4	12
Parti Rakyat	-	3
Independents	-	3
	-----	-----
Total	113	282
	-----	-----

Tun Abdul Razak flew back to Kuala Lumpur immediately from his constituency in Pekan, Pahang. Upon arrival, he felt that he could safely disregard Penang for a while, as its loss was not likely to arouse the same amount of racial and nationalistic feeling, due to its long association with colonialism. Penang was not regarded as a true "Malay State" and was therefore not too sensitive with the Malays, should the State "fall" into the hands of the opposition. Instead, he concentrated the whole of his efforts on sorting out the explosive situation that had arisen in Perak and Selangor.

First of all, he consulted with the various police chiefs and military garrison commanders and instructed them that while remaining alert to meet any eventuality, they were to make every conciliatory effort commensurate with public safety to cool down tempers and de-escalate racial hatreds. Tun Abdul Razak was fully aware that the cooperation of the PMIP/PAS members was important, either actively or as the non-voting Speaker. In the event, PMIP/PAS representatives had refused to join in any association with non-Muslim parties.

In the meantime, however, Tun Abdul Razak also saw that the one hope of avoiding inter-racial Confrontation lay in the moderate leadership of GERAKAN. He therefore held talks with Dr. Lim Chong Eu, who had already been nominated by GERAKAN to be Chief Minister of Penang and who was, therefore, anxious to cooperate with the Central Government in maintaining law and order. Tun Abdul Razak succeeded in persuading Dr. Lim Chong Eu to agree that his Party would not support any anti-Alliance coalition in either Perak or Selangor. Unfortunately, this decision to remain neutral was not publicised by the Secretary-General of GERAKAN until early in the evening of May 13.

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by which time events had already been set in motion that made the havoc of Black Tuesday almost inevitable.

The May 13 Racial Tragedy

As more results were being announced on television throughout the night, it became obvious that the Alliance Party had been defeated in several constituencies. UMNO had almost lost governance of Selangor and Perak with Penang already firmly in opposition hands. Tension was escalating, contributing to the bloodshed in the evening of May 13.

The very poor performance of the Alliance in Selangor had made the political situation extremely delicate. Both the Alliance Party and the opposition won 14 seats each. A coalition, if agreed by the opposition parties and a defection made by just one winning member of the MCA, would swing the State government of Selangor into the hands of the opposition. This prompted Dato' Harun Idris who was the Chief Minister of Selangor, to successfully influence the only one of the Independent Party, Lim Tuan Sion, who was a former member of the Labour Party, to join the Alliance to enable the Alliance to form the government in Selangor, weak though it may be.

The tragic events of the evening of May 13 can be directly linked to the criminal excesses of provocation and insults perpetrated during the so-called "Funeral Procession" on May 9. Subsequently, the incident of the shootings of the Communists by the police in separate incidents on May 8 and May 9 in Jinjing, Selangor had sparked the racial volatility between the Malays and the Chinese [8].

It was revealed later that the Communists through their agents in the Labour Party, together with paid Secret Society agents were responsible for the generation of racial tensions to a dangerous pitch. The Labour Party, largely under the influence of the CPM and almost wholly Chinese in composition, possessed distinct chauvinistic tendencies. On May 4, 1969, a group of Labour Party youths was sighted painting anti-election slogans by a three-man police patrol in Kepong. When challenged, the youths attacked the Police with iron rods and catapults bearing metal shots and forced the police to fire in self-defence. One of the youths was wounded and later died in hospital [9].

In contrast to the quiet funeral of an UMNO worker who was murdered in Penang, prior to this incident the Labour Party preserved the corpse of the worker and planned a large funeral to coincide with Polling

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Day, May 10, 1969, so as to disrupt the elections. The body was deliberately kept frozen for this purpose. Permission for the funeral was given by the Police for May 9, instead of May 10, and the permit was given for a small procession not exceeding a few hundred persons, and to take a route that would not hamper traffic in Kuala Lumpur [10].

These elements defied Police instructions and organised a large parade in which an estimated number of ten thousand persons took part and marched through the centre of Kuala Lumpur, flouting every Police instruction. They chanted Maoist slogans and provoked Malay bystanders with shouts of "MalaiSi" (Death to the Malays) [11].

To make matters worse, when the results of the May 10 General Election were out, on May 11 and May 12, 1969, DAP and GERAKAN members and supporters held noisy, racially provocative and intimidating "victory" processions in Kuala Lumpur, followed by numerous splinter processions. The DAP held several processions on May 11, 1969 all of which were without police permits. Dr. Tan Chee Khoo, the successful GERAKAN candidate for Batu Parliamentary constituency, the leader of the Party, applied to the Kuala Lumpur Police for a permit to hold a "Victory Parade" on May 12 [12].

The supporters of the "victory" processions, some mounted on small trade vehicles and some on foot, followed the route laid down by the police, but they combined shouts of victory with jeers and insulting remarks aimed at Malays, whenever they were encountered. The victory motorcades screamed over loud-speakers "Melayu mati" (death to the Malays) and "China kuasa" (power to the Chinese). Malay policemen on duty were singled out for insults by making obscene gestures and shouting obscenities at them [13].

The Government viewed such jeering and insulting remarks coming from Communist agitators and left-wing extremists who wished to disrupt the peace of the country in the same way as they did during the Emergency from 1948 to 1960 [14]. The racial tension was now highly volatile and offered them the right opportunity to throw the country into another chaotic situation.

Several other processions of this nature took place in different parts of Kuala Lumpur. Groups of non-Malay hooligans went in front of the Chief Minister's residence in Kampong Bharu and shouted threats that he would be physically ejected from the house.

Despite these extreme provocations, the Malay communities in the areas most affected by these insults at first showed patience and restraint. A feeling of dismay and uncertainty, coupled with their memories of the

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1945 kangaroo courts, eventually swept the Malay community into the federal capital. On the morning of May 12 a group of Kampong Bahru UMNO youths met Dato' Haji Ahmad Razali Ali, an Alliance State Assemblyman, and told him that they wanted to hold an UMNO procession for the purpose of "showing to the opposition parties that UMNO, too, had a good reason to celebrate, as they were not defeated in the State elections" [15].

In fact there was an agreement made by GERAKAN that the Party would remain neutral in the Selangor State Assembly. This opened the way for the Alliance to claim that UMNO had won the largest number of seats to form the next State government in Selangor. On this basis, the Selangor UMNO had a reason to proceed with the proposed victory procession to celebrate the formation of the new government. The Chief Minister, Dato' Harun Idris agreed to the proposal to organise an UMNO victory procession but warned that the procession must be conducted in a legal, peaceful and orderly manner.

Dato' Harun Idris asked permission from the police to have an "UMNO Victory Parade" and also asked for police protection. Consequently, the rumours were spreading that the Parade was actually a manifestation of the preparation and readiness of the Malays to fight the Chinese.

While the Malays were gathered at the Chief Minister's residence in Kampong Bahru, news reached them that some Gombak Malays, would-be-participants in the procession, had been attacked by some Chinese in Setapak on their way to Kampong Bahru [16].

The fact was established later that some Malays while proceeding to the assembly point on foot and scooters (as the local bus service had apparently stopped) were taunted in Setapak by groups of Chinese and Indians, and this developed rapidly into stone and bottle-throwing incidents between opposing groups ten to fifteen minutes before the outbreak of violence in Kampong Bahru. It was news of this fight that sparked off the clashes in and around Kampong Bahru. The taunts and insults of the previous two days had only served to ignite the tense atmosphere [17].

It is clear that violence first broke out in Setapak, an unexpected area at about 6.00 p.m well before the procession was scheduled to start in Jalan Raja Muda. Once violence broke out it spread rapidly and uncontrollably to Jalan Campbell, Jalan Tunku Abdul Rahman, Kampong Dato' Keramat, Kampong Pandan, Cheras and Kampong Kerinchi. Houses and shops were burnt down. Many people were killed. Clouds of

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smoke could be seen in Kuala Lumpur from time to time. A curfew had to be imposed until further notice.

In maintaining law and order in the country, the Government's priorities were speedily agreed by a Declaration of a State of Emergency covering the whole Peninsula which implied temporary suspension of the (new) Parliamentary Government and resulted in the creation of a National Operations Council (NOC). The planned State election in Sabah and Sarawak was also postponed.

The next morning, Tun Abdul Razak with a very few selected people including Dato' Harun Hashim of the ACA, planned the ways and means of governing the country during the Emergency. After discussions, emergency regulations were drawn up for the day approved by Tunku Abdul Rahman and assented to by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (King) and became law the following day [18].

Tun Abdul Razak proposed that the NOC should be chaired and largely manned by the military, but Tunku Abdul Rahman did not agree. Tunku Abdul Rahman asked Tun Abdul Razak to accept the Chairmanship of NOC, while he, as Prime Minister, would continue to preside over a new Cabinet, yet to be selected. This virtually made Tun Abdul Razak the Governor of Malaysia. He was virtually given the power of a "dictator" to rule the country.

Being a reluctant "dictator", in quelling the flames of racialism, Tun Abdul Razak had to call on Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie in turn to help him do the "fire-fighting". By then, Tun Dr. Ismail had agreed to rejoin the Government and took over the Ministry of Home Affairs.

As the situation worsened and was getting out of hand, Tun Abdul Razak gave permission for the military to be called in to assist. Army deployment in Kampong Bahru and Chow Kit commenced at about 10.00 p.m on May 13. Police and military reinforcements were rushed to Kuala Lumpur throughout the night. Although much confusion and lack of coordination prevailed during the first critical hours after the outbreak of violence, the authorities had gained full control of the situation by the morning of May 14 [19].

In the 1969 Election the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur was still part of Selangor. Dato' Harun Idris foresaw that since Kuala Lumpur is politically dominated by the Chinese, continued poor performance of the Alliance in future General Elections could make Selangor fall into the hands of the opposition. Together with other important non-political reasons this was one of the strong pressing factors to separate Kuala Lumpur from Selangor.

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As it became increasingly clear that Kuala Lumpur could not continue to function simultaneously as capital of both the Selangor State and the nation, steps were taken to create a Federal Territory (Wilayah Persekutuan of Kuala Lumpur) to serve as metropolis for the whole nation. In 1974, the Sultan of Selangor signed the city over to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (the King of Malaysia). The Royal houses of the Sultan of Selangor and the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (King) put their signatures on an historic occasion witnessed by other rulers [5].

The establishment of the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur took place on February 1, 1974 under the Constitution (Amendment Act. No.2) 1973. Kuala Lumpur, which occupied an area of 94 square miles, was politically separated from its geographical mother state of Selangor. It then came under the charge of the Ministry of Local Government and Federal Territory. Four years later, a totally separate Federal Territory Ministry was formed to coordinate policy and planning and provide the necessary impetus for the development of Kuala Lumpur. The celebration was marked by the unveiling of a plaque by Tun Abdul Razak. Appropriately, the declaration of Kuala Lumpur's new status was held at the river confluence where the city had its humble beginnings. Policies on Kuala Lumpur emanating from the Ministry are administered by the City Hall, the Ministry's "executive arm", which is headed by the Mayor or Datuk Bandar. Through the Ministry of Local Government and Federal Territory, the federal government has full control of the federal capital of Kuala Lumpur [6].

As the federal capital of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur is the nerve centre of national life. For politicians, administrators, businessmen, students, artists, and especially young men and women in search of job opportunities, Kuala Lumpur is the ultimate destination. Unlike cities such as Washington D.C. and Canberra which are essentially administrative capitals, or New York with its commercial bent, Kuala Lumpur is commercial, cultural, educational and administrative centre of Malaysia, all rolled into one [7]. While Kuala Lumpur may have irreversibly fallen into the hands of the opposition parties, the political isolation of Kuala Lumpur from Selangor has great significance in that the Alliance Party could continue to dominate the State Government of Selangor and that racial tragedies such as the May 13 incident would not recur.

Chapter Five

SOURCES OF POLITICAL TROUBLES

The peaceful settlement of the Confrontation of Indonesia, the secession of Singapore, and the dormant situation over the Philippines claim on Sabah was far from implying that Malaysia was free from any political troubles. As illustrated in Chapter 4, new troubles emerged and threatened to become more serious because they coincided with a new wave of racial and religious ill-feeling that manifested itself in many forms of inter-communal bickering and the raising of sensitive issues. Lack of inter-ethnic harmony, social cohesion and national unity is certain to create social instability - it was a combination of these factors that culminated in the bloody violence of May 13, 1969.

Tun Abdul Razak admitted that the Government's measures to bring about racial harmony and social justice had been grossly inadequate. This inadequacy had led to a situation in which political agitators and other opportunists had been able to play upon the miseries which frustrated large sections of the population with results that could lead to a national disaster, perhaps even to civil war. The racial "battle" that erupted on May 13 was overcome as soon as it had started, but racial "war" was far from being over.

Two factors could be identified as sources of political trouble: economic disparity, and racial discrepancy and unity, which are elaborated at more length below.

Economic Disparity and Tun Razak's Economic Measures

The problem of economic disparities between the Malays and the non-Malays posed a high threat to the political order of the country. Historically, it was the British colonial power's economic policies that gave full economic opportunities to the immigrants in major economic activities of the country in the period before independence which caused the poor economic position of the Malays. The very poor participation among the Malays in the economic opportunities of their own land

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superimposed with attempts of the non-Malays to achieve greater political power in the country was in reality the very root of the racial disharmony that eventually sparked the 1969 riot.

The problem of the Malays who are economically weak in their own land has been a crucial element in the political tension of the country. The British Colonial Government in the pre-independence period had fostered economic development policies whereby the Malays were neglected and rendered completely unable to compete with the non-Malays' economic monopolisation [1]. With the economic monopolisation strongly protected by the non-Malays the weak economic position of the Malays continued to be worsened by the high-paced western style urbanisation and industrialisation and the free enterprise economic system encouraged by the government.

In the pre-independence period, the British colonial power not only gave the Chinese and Indian immigrants full opportunities in the economic activities in town areas, but after independence, they were even allowed to take over the British investments in Malaya. The almost complete replacement in British business circles gave the non-Malays control and strength not only over economic activities in all sectors, but also over most government contracts which involved millions of ringgit worth of projects. Meanwhile, the Malays had remained unable to improve their economic condition as the non-Malays had already monopolised the major economic sectors of the country [2].

Before the formation of Malaysia in 1963, there was no formal economic planning by the Government. The economic system was that of free-enterprise capitalism, a mere extension of the economy introduced by the British and based on the exploitation of tin and the production of rubber and other primary commodities for export, with rice grown for domestic consumption [3].

While Malaya underwent a process of modernisation in the period of pre-independence, many changes that took place within the economic sphere were not introduced into rural areas by the British colonials. The rural Malays were encouraged to continue to live mainly in villages, pursuing their traditional agricultural and fishing activities. As farmers and fishermen, the rural Malays had largely depended on middlemen to market their products, on moneylenders to borrow money if they were in financial difficulties and on landlords if they did not have land to grow crops. All these had weakened their bargaining position and made them easily exploitable. The moneylenders, landlords and middlemen had

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become very powerful in determining the level of rent, profit and interest [4].

This situation was further accentuated by the nature of the distribution of population, with each racial group concentrated in particular areas. The Malays were mainly in the economically less developed states of Pahang (61.2 per cent), Perlis (79.4 per cent), Kedah (70.7 per cent), Kelantan (92.8 per cent) and Terengganu (93.9 per cent). The Chinese, on the other hand, were concentrated in the urban centres of Penang (56.1 per cent), Perak (42.5 per cent) and Selangor (46.3 per cent) [5].

Although the Malaysian Government had spent a lot of money on rural areas for agricultural development, the activities of landlords, moneylenders and middlemen on a wide scale in extracting maximum profit from the villagers, had not helped to improve economic development in those areas. The villagers felt that their life was depressed even further [6]. Despite the achievement of political independence in 1957, social and economic progress among the Malays was manifestly slow until the period of the early 1970s. Although the Malaysian Government began implementing socio-economic development programmes for the Peninsula as early as 1950, the two Five-Year Plans between then and 1960 had failed to bring about more than marginal improvement in the lives of the Malays. Of particular significance, rural poverty continued to be widespread even when Malaysia was being formed in the early 1960s [7]. In conditions of economic depression the villagers had been easily influenced and exploited by political opportunists and extremists. The younger generation of the Malays had preferred to migrate to the towns, attracted to the development of industries there.

Since most of the economic sectors in the towns were monopolised by the non-Malays, the uneducated villagers who had migrated to towns did not have opportunities to become involved in business. Owing to their low education, their economic condition could not improve as they were only capable of becoming labourers and low-income workers. The free-enterprise economic system in Malaysia had provided the conditions for the monopolistic capitalists, both domestic and foreign, to exploit the low income workers to maximise their profits. In the competition to secure employment, these frustrated young rural Malays were willing to be paid low wages. With low incomes, they had to live as squatters in urban slum areas [8].

Development, both in town and rural areas, throughout the 1960s continued to demonstrate that the Malays were economically behind the

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non-Malays. T. H. Silcock claimed that the mean income of the Chinese in 1963 was 2.4 times as great as that of the Malays [9]. According to the Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysian Plan 2.6 per cent of households on the Peninsular Malaysia earned below RM\$200 per month - and they were found in rural areas.

While it is not true that every single Chinese is rich, it is true that the Malays are generally poorer than the Chinese. The pattern of Malaysian class structure, where the poor are the Malays whether they are situated in urban or rural areas, and the rich are Chinese, became clear in the 1960s. The Malays had virtually no economic strength on their own land. All they had was ownership of paddy fields and rubber small holdings in the rural areas.

On the other hand, the results of the 1969 general election in May were a clear manifestation that the political power of the Malays had eroded. The tacit agreement during the struggle for independence was that the political power would be held by the Malays since the economic power was enjoyed by the Chinese. It shocked the Malays to discover that this was a bad bargain as the Chinese had not only become richer but had quietly acquired political power as well.

This traditional division of power along communal lines had ceased to be relevant, but only partly so. The Chinese, having had unrestricted citizenship granted to them in the 1950s, were politically more powerful than before, backed by their strength in the economy [10]. According to the Second Malaysian Plan 1971-1975, investments in the private sector showed that 90.5 per cent came from the Chinese, 5.9 per cent from the Malays, and 3.6 per cent from the Indians. The Malays, on the other hand, were becoming uncomfortable with their economic stagnation. They often perceived their own economic backwardness as intolerable. It was obvious to them that the Chinese were increasing their political power without reducing their strong control of the economy, while the Malays were finding their small share of the cake not increasing and their strength in politics relatively diminishing. This perception of each of the racial groups of itself in relation to the others has created fear, mistrust and antagonism [11].

Steps had been taken by the Government to safeguard the interest and economic position of the Malays from further downfall. Numerous cases had been reported where the poor farmers had to release a piece of their land to the money-lenders and middlemen for their inability to repay their indebtedness to these people. An attempt had been made in 1933 to deal with this problem by the passing of the Malay Reservation Enactment in

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the Federated Malay State (FMS) and similar laws in the Unfederated Malay State (UMS) which forbade charge or lease of Malay Reservation land to a non-Malay. But this measure was not entirely effective in reducing Malay indebtedness to non-Malays.

When Tun Abdul Razak took over control of the Ministry of National and Rural Development, in 1959, he was aware that by far the greatest problem that he had to face was the increasing disparity in wealth and progress among the main racial divisions of the community. The task of overcoming this big problem had actually become a pivot around which Tun Abdul Razak's whole political life revolved.

When Tun Abdul Razak became Deputy Prime Minister he was also the Minister of National and Rural Development and Minister for Defence. These portfolios were more than sufficient for Tun Abdul Razak to handle his task with a dynamism and a determination that were to produce dramatic results. A man of clear vision, he foresaw that the only way that the framework of true democracy could be laid was on a foundation of economic stability, on a foundation of freedom from poverty and on a firm base of unity among the diverse races of Malaysia.

From the outset Tun Abdul Razak stressed "The greatest safeguard of Malaysia's sovereignty is not only Defence, but also Development". Development can be achieved by removing economic imbalances between the urban and rural people, and between the different groups of the population. Rural development should be given top priority in order to keep pace with industrial and urban development. There was a dire need of political leadership to channel national energies into development.

This indeed was a testing time for Tun Abdul Razak, a time of troubles and problems. Despite difficulties, he had kept development on its course and he had maintained its momentum. From the outset he warned his development officers "Let no obstacles, however forbidding, hamper or halt your march to greater development".

In giving his top priority for national and rural development, Tun Abdul Razak had brought the administration down to the kampong folks. He went there to teach, to lead and to inspire the officers and men responsible for the various undertakings. Even villagers' views were sought on programmes and projects.

These were the traditional attitudes of Tun Abdul Razak who believed that those government servants who were to work directly on development projects should be committed before any real progress

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could be achieved. In order to give a lead to his subordinates and to encourage his senior officers to get out of their office chairs and work actively in the field, Tun Abdul Razak himself spent as much time as he could possibly spare from his numerous other duties touring the rural areas wherever development projects were being implemented, travelling by landrover, boat and helicopter to check even the most remote construction sites.

From the formal point of view a change in economic development was the setting-up of military style operations rooms. Some two months after he took over full responsibility for the rural development programme, Tun Abdul Razak began to set up at federal, state and district levels a complex system of military-style operations planning rooms, closely patterned upon those formerly utilised by security forces to direct field operations against the Communist terrorists. They were not mere prestigious show-pieces to impress visitors - they were nerve-centres of the development of the nation.

The main National Operations Room was set up in September 1961. It was from here that he directed the country-wide development drive. The large wall maps, the charts, the multi-coloured drawing-pins and tiny flags indicated the various stages of the different projects.

Tun Abdul Razak also introduced several innovations which aroused the interest of all Malaysians. One great technique he adopted was the "Red Book" (see Chapter 8). The spirit of the Red Book was the antithesis of "Red Tape" and was important in sustaining the effectiveness of the development efforts and harnessing the resources of Government and its development machinery so that they could be geared into a singularity of purpose and action for the achievement of results in the implementation of development [12].

Tun Abdul Razak launched on March 14, 1966, a Community Development Programme called "Gerakan Maju" (Operation Progress). This Gerakan Maju assumed a more prominent role in coordinating the activities of ministries and government departments, particularly at district level. The District Development Committee normally visited villages to foster the spirit of self-help or Gotong Royong among the villagers to initiate development projects in their areas [13].

Approximately 2,230 Village Development Committees were formed under Gerakan Maju (Operation Progress) to facilitate development at village level. The Village Development Committees were of great assistance to the Government Extension Services particularly in the fields of agriculture, health, adult education, rural industries, cooperative and

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Gotong Royong or self-help schemes. Civics courses, which laid emphasis on the spirit of "Jayadiri" (self-efficiency) and self-help, were given to village leaders to enable them to work more efficiently and to instil in them the dynamic spirit of self-confidence [14].

After the launching of Gerakan Maju (Operation Progress) in March 1966 various local projects based on self-help utilising local resources were implemented. Besides these, two pilot projects were launched, namely Locality Health and Nutrition Projects [15].

Another innovation which proved popular was the Jayadiri campaign. This was aimed at preparing Malaysians to adapt themselves to changing needs, to use fully all available resources and to exert themselves so that all their individual efforts could produce positive results in national and rural development. The programme entailed a joint effort by both the Government and farmers and utilised one single effective force in which all the Government Extension Services were made more responsible and the farmers more active participants in the economic life of the nation [16].

Twenty-three places in West Malaysia were chosen as Jayadiri areas under the Regional Agricultural Development Plan. These areas were provided with facilities for development such as roads, transportation, irrigation, Farmers' Associations, marketing and credit facilities. The readiness on the part of the farmers to assimilate innovations towards agricultural improvement helped to accelerate improvement and development [17].

In facing the problem where the rural population was over-dependent for its economy on rubber, the policy of diversification therefore became important. At that time the price of this commodity was steadily falling because of its release in large quantities from the American strategic stockpile on to a world market that was already overburdened with synthetic substitutes. One of the main crops selected gradually to alleviate the situation was palm oil.

It is for this purpose of agricultural diversification that Tun Abdul Razak created the Jengka Triangle Project. The aim of this project was the resettlement of more than 12,000 peasant families in the central part of his home state of Pahang, with the then Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) tasked to run it. FELDA was set up in 1956. The result of this, Tun Abdul Razak's most ambitious land development scheme, would make Malaysia the world's largest single producer of palm oil.

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The Government also established such regional land development schemes on an even larger scale than the Jengka Triangle Project in other areas in the Peninsula. With better utilisation and more specific use of available land, such projects helped meet the nation's development objectives and fulfil the aspirations of the rural people to contribute more fully towards the economic development of the country.

Apart from FELDA, other institutions have been set up to enhance and speed up development in the rural and agricultural sector generally. The Federal Agricultural Marketing Authority (FAMA) was established in 1965 to improve the efficiency of the agricultural marketing system and in 1966 the Federal Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority (FELCRA) was established [18].

Under the Second Malaysia Plan the activities of these institutions were broadened. Bank Pertanian (the Agricultural Bank) made funds available for lending to producers through Rural Cooperatives and Farmers Associations and to FAMA for programme use. Then, a National Paddy and Rice Authority (Lembaga Padi dan Beras Negara or LPN) was set up to coordinate the various aspects of production, processing and marketing of paddy and rice [19].

After Tun Abdul Razak became the Minister of the National and Rural Development, the Ministry took several major steps towards modernising its agricultural sector and accelerating its development. Malaysia has invested millions of ringgit in establishing and improving its irrigation systems, millions of ringgit on the construction of a national network of agricultural access roads and millions of ringgit in converting its jungle into productive agricultural land. At the same time the private sectors were encouraged to take an active part in this great venture.

Tun Abdul Razak specified the aims of Malaysian agricultural planning and implementation. These fell into separate and definite categories as:

- Firstly, in the field of agricultural education, Malaysia's aim was to increase the quantity and enhance the quality of agricultural educationalists, researchers and extension workers, so as to expand the number of skilled farmers, and improve the skills of all individual members of the agricultural community.
- Secondly, in the field of research, Malaysia's aim was to support, on an intensive and continuing basis, research into agricultural, forestry, fisheries and livestock products so as to break down yield barriers and to develop, then improve patterns of production, processing and

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marketing that would utilise most economically the human, land and water resources of the country.

- Thirdly, in the field of production and diversification, Malaysia's aim was to stimulate its agricultural community to adopt improved practices and patterns of production and encourage diversification.

An independent research organisation, to be known as the Malaysian Agricultural Research and Development Institute (MARDI) was set up in 1968 to enhance further Malaysia's existing research facilities. The function of MARDI was to carry out scientific research for the agricultural sector of the country and extend the results of the research to the industry, both large and small holdings [20].

Malaysian agricultural planning and implementation has to be run in parallel with the industrial sector. Concomitant to this, the Malaysian Industrial Development Finance Berhad (MIDF) was set up as early as 1960 with the full support of the Malaysian Government as a national development financing institution in order to encourage the participation of the Malays in the industrial sector.

MIDF loans are meant to help small entrepreneurs. Perhaps MIDF's greatest contribution to small-scale industry was the establishment in 1964 of a wholly-owned subsidiary, Malaysian Industrial Estates Limited (MIEL) to develop industrial sites and build modern standard factories for small enterprises, a venture never before attempted in Malaysia. Furthermore, MIDF played a considerable part in floating and underwriting 95 million ringgit worth of shares on the Malaysian Stock Exchange.

In 1968, MIDF approved over 80 million ringgit for loans on 200 projects, both large and small, throughout the industrial sector of the Malaysian economy. This investment was indeed a significant achievement and in turn stimulated further investment of over a hundred million ringgit, creating jobs for more than a thousand workers.

Besides MIDF, there were other public enterprises that accounted for a significant part of the resource allocation process in the Malaysian economy. These organisations were important in forming the major bridge-heads in the Malaysian advance towards getting fair and equitable participation by all in the economic life of the country.

As in many other developing countries, public enterprises started in Malaysia with the provision of infrastructural utilities. The National Electricity Board (NEB), which supplied electricity to the whole Peninsula was set up in 1949 [21]. In 1951, the Rural and Industrial

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Development Authority (RIDA) was formed as a promotional and financing agency aimed at redressing regional and ethnic economic imbalances. However, RIDA was replaced in 1965 by Majlis Amanah Rakyat (the Council of Indigenous People's Trust - MARA).

MARA opened up a number of industrial ventures, such as the establishment of batik and shirt factories, the leather factory, the National Timber Corporation, the Amanah Saham MARA and others. MARA has given out substantial credits to Bumiputra businessmen and entrepreneurs, and helped them with professional advice. MARA has also been able to participate actively in the transport services. The policy of the Transport Division of MARA was to operate bus services on new roads under the Rural Development Programmes [22].

Since then MARA has been actively promoting dynamic programmes of industrialisation. Since the demand for skilled workers was increasing, MARA made an effort to train the Bumiputra to fill some of the new jobs as a result of these industrialisation programmes. Millions of ringgit have been invested by MARA for the training of thousands of Bumiputra in the professional, technical and vocational fields both at home and abroad. Until now MARA has provided scholarships and bursaries for students in colleges and in universities at home and overseas. One of the major undertakings of MARA in the field of training the indigenous groups was the establishment of the MARA Institute of Technology (ITM) and MARA Vocational Training School in Malacca [23].

By 1957, the year of independence, there were already 29 public enterprises in Peninsular Malaysia. Up to 1969, 54 more public enterprises were established, and in the following four years (1969-1972), 67 new public enterprises were set up [24].

After independence in 1957, the first Bumiputra (Indigenous) Economic Congress was held in 1965 to further encourage the expansion of public enterprises. In contrast to the early departmental form of public enterprises, which were traditionally established mainly in utilities, communication and transport, the number of public enterprises registered under the Companies Act of 1965 (or incorporated by special statutes) began to increase. Five major public enterprises were established in the late 1960s: Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad (BBMB - 1965), the Government Officer Housing Development Sendirian Berhad (SPPK - 1967), Malaysia Explosive (1967), Malayawata Steel Sendirian Berhad (1967), the Malaysian International Shipping Corporation (MISC - 1968) and Muslim Pilgrimage Control and Savings Corporation (LUTH/Tabung

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Haji - 1969). BBMB started to operate with a high degree of success [25].

LUTH was officially formed on August 8, 1969 under Act 8 after it was passed by Parliament at the end of December, 1968. Under the Act the two separate departments, Muslim Pilgrims Savings Corporation and Pilgrimage Control Office, were integrated to form a bigger and more dynamic body [26].

On December 29, 1969, Tun Abdul Razak, who at that time was Director of the National Operations Council (NOC) and Deputy Prime Minister, officiated at the first meeting of the Muslim Pilgrimage Control and Savings Corporation in the Operations Room of the Ministry of National and Rural Development.

LUTH has not only operated successfully, but also with impact. It has helped intending pilgrims to save so that the savings could be invested in a number of industrial ventures. It also provides assistance and facilities in a number of ways to intending pilgrims to perform the Haj.

Tun Abdul Razak's eventual achievements in rural development won him a permanent place in the hearts of the rural Malays, who dubbed him "Father - Architect of Development" even though he was not yet Prime Minister then. Tun Abdul Razak's imaginative thinking and planning, his optimism and courage and his dedication and sincerity had produced for Malaysia a blue-print for development.

In 1967 Tun Abdul Razak's efforts to raise the standard of living of the more impoverished of his fellow countrymen happily received international recognition when he was successfully nominated for the Magsaysay Award as a recognition for his outstanding contribution to Malaysia's national and rural development. Tun Abdul Razak, with his sincerity, tenacity, energy, capacity and dedication to work hard, improved the living standard of the rural areas and brought about overall development for the nation [27].

The major economic development programme and policies initiated by Tun Abdul Razak, however, were not directed explicitly towards solving the economic problems of the Malays [28]. As a true Malaysian leader he was responsible for the overall development, security, peace, harmony and economic well being of all the Malaysian population that he led, irrespective of race. While the Malays, the majority of whom lived in the rural areas, benefited greatly from the development programmes specifically targeted at the agricultural sector, the overall development brought about by the infrastructural changes throughout the nation was even greater in the urban areas, benefiting again the business

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groups among the Malaysians. The chronic problem of trying to create a more equitable share in business opportunities among the Malays and the non-Malays had hardly been touched.

According to Donald Snodgrass, a former economic advisor to the Malaysian Government during the period from the early 1960s until 1969, the Government was very much pre-occupied with the problems of the country's Confrontation with Indonesia and the attempts of Singaporean leaders to gain a share of power in Malaysia when Singapore was part of Malaysia. Singapore was separated from Malaysia in August 1965, and the Confrontation with Indonesia ended in 1967. Hence, for the whole decade after Malaya/Malaysia achieved independence in August 1957, the Government failed to identify and therefore overlooked the varied nature of the brewing ethnic (or racial as they are commonly termed in Malaysia) problems among the population.

In the late 1960s, hardly any rubber estates of 100 acres and above in Peninsular Malaysia were owned by Malays, although Malays and non-Malays shared ownership of rubber smallholdings. The ownership of the rubber, oil palm, and coconut industries was largely in the hands of non-Malays, even taking into account about 308,000 acres of FLDA (now

FELDA) land cultivated with rubber and oil palm which had been settled predominantly by the Malays.

In 1969, the Malays had only a 1.0 per cent share of the share capital of resident limited companies in Peninsular Malaysia, while the Chinese had 22.8 per cent. Foreign controlled companies or branches of companies incorporated overseas had the largest share of all.

Competition between the Chinese and Malays after the racial riots in 1969, to some extent brought about the institutionalisation of the New Economic Policy (NEP). The NEP was devised to build up Malay ownership of the economy to a level more commensurate with their status as the country's biggest ethnic and indigenous group, and to remove the poisonous resentment over economic injustice which had materially contributed to the bloody conflict [29].

Racial Discrepancy and Unity

Malaysia is a multi-racial, multi-religious and multi-cultural country which had been exposed to various types of security threats even before

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independence. The main threat during that time came from the Communists, which forced the Government to declare an Emergency in 1948. The Emergency ended in 1960 [30]. During that period, the country also faced other threats, particularly those from racial and religious conflicts. Between 1945 and 1957, there were seventeen racial incidents [31]. Racial and religious threats continued after independence. The Communists and racial discrepancies were interrelated factors that had superimposed to contribute to the racial riot of May 13.

The issue of Communist exploitation was the main element in communal discrepancies. Racial tension between the Malays and the Chinese at one stage reached a critical point. It was exacerbated by Communist exploitation of the racial issue compounded by the effect due to the economic imbalance from the view point of the Malays. Under these conditions, the responsibility of the Government to ensure peace and security was of prime importance. Compromises are usually worked out between the leaders of the different groups in the ruling party. To some extent, the top leaders in the Government had taken firm and definite measures to prevent the critical situation from further deteriorating and resulting in future bloodshed.

In the early stage of pre-independence the Malays and the Chinese were never given the opportunity to express their racial feelings against one another. The Japanese occupation served to separate the Malays from the Chinese even more. The Chinese were persecuted by the Japanese because they had given moral and material support to the Chinese nationalists in the Sino-Japanese war. This persecution aroused Chinese hatred against the invaders and envy of the Malays. Although some Chinese supported the organised resistance led by the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army Union (MPAJU), a loose organisation of non-Communist Chinese squatters and villagers, most turned to the jungles and became Communists in their struggle against the Japanese. Soon after the Japanese left the country, the Communists, mostly Chinese, tried to set up a Communist Government in Malaya which consequently led to the precipitation of Sino-Malay clashes [32].

The arrival and imposition of the British Military Administration backed by the full weight of the British Armed Forces stopped the racial clash from exacerbating and foiled the Communists' attempts to take over Malaya, while the Malays unsuspectingly welcomed what they thought was a return to the pre-war relationship with the paternal British. The United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), subsequently came

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into being in 1946 because of the Malays' fear of losing out to the Chinese [33].

The British Government declared a State of Emergency for the entire Federation of Malaya on June 23, 1948. The Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) and its affiliated associations were banned. Under the Emergency, race relations further deteriorated. As members and supporters of the CPM were mainly Chinese and members of the police force and the Malayan regiment almost exclusively Malays, the war appeared to be a racial war between the Malays and the Chinese. For the Malays, fighting the Communists meant fighting the Chinese. The insurrection led to the deaths of 11,000 people, including 2,500 civilians and the Communists' attempt to take over Malaya for the second time was foiled. The Communists' failure was largely caused by the daring resettlement of Chinese "squatters" brought from the edges of the jungle into protected "New Villages". This deprived the CPM of vital intelligence and logistical support [34].

The campaign against the Communist insurrection continued although Tunku Abdul Rahman made an attempt to induce the Communists to surrender by having a dialogue with their leaders in Baling in 1955. The Baling talks, however, failed to achieve the desired results and therefore the Emergency continued when independence was achieved in 1957.

The people as a whole were in sympathy with the thinking of their national leaders. The Muslims, in particular, increasingly saw the Communists as the greatest threat to Islam as it became quite clear to them that in countries ruled by a Communist regime, religion was relegated to a position of inconsequence.

In fact, for Tun Abdul Razak, upon taking over the helm of the Ministry of Education, the most immediate task that he had to tackle was the problem of subversion in Chinese schools. Many of these had for several years been heavily infiltrated by members and the ideology of the CPM.

The Emergency ended in 1960. Since then the CPM has remained relatively inactive as a result of its role as an alien rather than a national and indigenous movement. A national revolution would not be successful without getting support from the indigenous Malays. After this period, the Communist threat to domestic order can be related to the CPM's ability to attract support from alienated dissidents of the Chinese and alienated opponents of the Government. In a secret manner, the CPM had set up illegal organisations recruiting those alienated dissident opponents as members. The CPM had successfully attracted the sympathy of

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disgruntled Government opponents by supporting their grievances over what they see as the limitation of educational opportunities, economic rewards, the harshness of the Government's economic regulations and the erosion of Chinese cultural values.

The formation of Chinese Secret Societies was largely carried out at the instigation of the Communists. The issue of instigation was related to the situation where the great majority of the police force and soldiers in Malaysia were Malays and so the Chinese found themselves insecure. They felt, rightly or wrongly, that they could not depend upon the normal guardians of law and order to defend their own people [35].

Secret Societies took roots in this country with the arrival of the first waves of Chinese immigrants in the 19th century. Secret Societies' first recorded political activity took place about the middle of the 19th century when they contrived to create chaos in the state of Perak which led to British intervention and the Treaty of Pangkor in 1874. Since then, the role of Secret Societies had continued to be a destructive one. They were involved in "protection" rackets, extortion, kidnapping, robbery and other felonies [36].

During the General Election of 1969, Secret Societies always maintained a traditional hold over certain sections of the Chinese community, and their activities intensified. These Societies exercised a certain amount of influence on the political activities of a number of candidates. In some areas, candidates found it impossible to campaign without the payment of "protection money". Coercion and intimidation were the familiar methods of getting support during the political campaign in certain areas, especially in Kuala Lumpur. Some of these Secret Society agents, chauvinistically motivated, were dedicated to stimulating racial tension for the purpose of weakening the country.

A definite link was established between Secret Societies and the racial clashes in Kuala Lumpur, and some of these Secret Society thugs were known to be members of Communist-dominated branches of the Labour Party. They acted for their own specific objectives, to create and maintain a state of tension so that their extortion rackets could flourish.

Being the Minister of Defence, Tun Abdul Razak, who was responsible for internal security, was deeply concerned with the combating of armed Communist attacks upon the armed forces, realising that these overt acts of aggression were mere camouflage designed to cover far more insidious moves against the Government.

This was proven by the acts of violence in Penang during the course of 1967 instigated by the Labour Party. There were many Communist

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sympathisers and fellow-travellers among its membership that had become subject to a power struggle, with extreme radical elements plotting the overthrow of moderate leaders like Dr. Tan Chee Khoo, so that they could be replaced by a more aggressive faction.

In 1968 the power struggle within the Labour Party intensified to the point where Dr. Tan Chee Khoo, a man whose honesty and integrity was admired by people of all shades of political opinion, decided to quit. Dr. Tan Chee Khoo, together with Dr Lim Chong Eu, who himself had become disenchanted with his own United Democratic Party (UDP), joined forces with a number of other moderate and mainly intellectual socialists to found a new opposition party, Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (GERAKAN). Unfortunately, as this organisation expanded its scale of operations, it also picked up a large number of immoderate and less tolerant socialists.

GERAKAN's indirect involvement with the CPM in exploiting the communal issues in 1969 in part had led to the bloody race riot. In the General Election, the Communists were actively supporting the opposition parties, especially the Democratic Action Party (DAP), behind the scenes. On the nomination day itself the police found Communist flags in many places, especially in Perak where the Chinese population numbered more than 60 per cent. In their campaign, the Communists made full use of anti-government issues hoping to make a comeback and possibly gain power with the help of the opposition parties, DAP, and other socialist parties. The slogan "Malaysian-Malaysia" emerged again, a slogan successfully used by Lee Kuan Yew when he fought for Singapore's cessation from Malaysia [37].

The lack of a national language and a national education system for the country were the major elements causing communal division. The failure of the Government to implement the policy of the national language and the national education system in 1967, ten years after the independence of Malaya, could be singled out as the contributing factor to the outbreak of the May 13 racial riots.

The national language issue, and in particular the national education system, were included in the bargain of independence of Malaya in 1957. The Alliance partners, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) agreed that a common language was the most important cultural element by which diverse cultural groups could come together and form the basis for a national identity. Incorporated into the Malayan Constitution of 1957 (Article 152), and relevant to the

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requirement of the educational policy of Malaya, two reports, the Tun Abdul Razak Report and the Rahman Talib Report, which implied that any attempt to build a true Malayan nation would be through the use of the Malay language as an instrument of unification, were accepted by leaders in the Alliance then [38].

During the early 1950s, the Legislative Council Education Committee, of which Tun Abdul Razak was a member, accepted the Report of a Royal Commission. The Report recommended, among other things, that a New Education Policy should be worked out by ensuring the gradual phasing out of private communal institutions, which should be replaced by national schools using a common syllabus taught in either Malay or English.

Concomitant to this, as Minister of Education, Tun Abdul Razak headed a Committee of experts in September 1955 to enquire into the state of education in the Federation, and prepared a report, many of the recommendations of which were enshrined in the 1957 Education ordinance. The Razak Report was published at the beginning of May 1956 and presented by Tun Abdul Razak for acceptance by the Federal Legislative Council. One of the recommendations in the Razak Report was that "the ultimate objective of the education policy in this country must be to bring together the children of all races under a national education system in which the national language is the main medium of instruction" [39].

Subsequently yet another committee was appointed under Dato' Abdul Rahman Talib, who succeeded Tun Abdul Razak as Minister of Education, to examine the working of the Razak Report in the light of new experience. The pivotal point of the new policy was contained in section 3 of the 1957 Education Ordinance, which reads as follows:

"However, the implementation of national language and national education system policies were hardly carried out because of the Alliance Government's hesitance. The failure of the Government to make Malay the medium of instruction by 1967, that is, within ten years of independence, was essentially due to its fear of being accused of being communal despite the fact that the three component parts of the Alliance had agreed to this policy. The failure could also be attributed to the bad planning in the Ministry of Education, particularly the teachers' training division" [40].

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After confirming the significance of the failure of the Government to carry out the implementation of a national language and national education system in 1967 as being one of the major causes resulting in the May 13 incident, Tun Abdul Razak wasted no time in implementing the 1957 Education Ordinance.

The Education Policy of Malaya, according to the Education Ordinance of 1957 was "to establish a national system of education acceptable to the people as a whole which will satisfy their needs and promote their cultural, social, economic and political development as a nation, with the intention of making the Malay language the national language of the country whilst preserving and sustaining the growth of the language and culture of the people other than Malays living in the country" [41].

From then on all government schools started using Malay in annual stages as the medium of instruction, with English as the second language. Since then, the Malay language, from then on known officially as the Malaysian Language (Bahasa Malaysia) which is the sole official and national language of the country, has been used more extensively in administration, education and commerce. The English language, however, was and still is widely used especially in the private sector since both the Malays and non-Malays still prefer to use English, the language inherited from the colonial period.

The seriousness of Tun Abdul Razak in implementing the National Education Policy according to the 1957 Education Ordinance was based on his vision that the cultural consequences of the implementation of the national language and national education system could make diverse cultural groups come together and form the basis for a national identity. The consequences of the delay in cultivating a common culture for the country were great, and were anticipated in the Malayan Constitution of 1957. However, it required someone with strong guts to implement the policy.

Chapter Six

REVOLUTIONARY REVAMPMENT

The year 1969 was a momentous turning point for Malaysia, for its political development and for Tun Abdul Razak personally. The assumption taken for granted that the country was progressing well after independence built upon a strong foundation of a multi-racial, multi-religious and multi-cultural population working and living in harmony together had not been completely true after all. Lessons, however bitter, were learned, anyway. The 1969 incident had become a tainted landmark for the country to experience revolutionary revampment with the formation of a National Operations Council (NOC) with Tun Abdul Razak as its Director.

National Operations Council

Malaysia's political leadership managed to act quickly and without undue panic in handling the severity of the 1969 conflict. The National Operations Council (NOC) was immediately established following the declaration of a national state of emergency by the Yang di Pertuan Agong (King) on May 15. The proclamation of a state of national emergency by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (King) under Clause 2 of Article 150 of the Constitution was "to secure public safety and the maintenance of good order, the Constitution and Parliament were suspended, and the elections in East Malaysia were postponed indefinitely".

Tun Abdul Razak, Deputy Prime Minister then, was appointed as Director of the NOC by Tunku Abdul Rahman, with responsibility for administration under the proclamation of emergency. Tunku Abdul Rahman made it clear that he would remain as Prime Minister, and was still in complete overall charge of the country. The NOC would be responsible to him.

As parliamentary democracy was suspended the Director of Operations could coordinate executive action in restoring law and order.

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The wide powers given to the Director of Operations enabled the NOC to emerge rapidly as the centre of decision-making. Top military and police officers were brought into the NOC in order to ensure the execution of swift and decisive actions.

Tun Abdul Razak officially took up his appointment as Director of Operations on Sunday May 18, less than five days after the riots had first erupted. It was a position which gave him almost unlimited executive powers. Although a new Cabinet was sworn in two days later on May 20, with Tunku Abdul Rahman continuing as Prime Minister, it was Tun Abdul Razak, in fact, who from that date on, was the chief decision-maker of the country. Tunku Abdul Rahman was advised and briefed from time to time by the NOC. Although the original intention had been that this body should concern itself primarily with matters connected with internal security, the reason for including members of the armed forces and police, the unusually wide powers conferred upon its Director by the Royal Proclamation meant that in reality it superseded, instead of complemented, the Cabinet [1].

With Tun Abdul Razak as Director of Operations, the NOC, which had been delegated executive authority to administer the country, consisted of six Malay and two non-Malay members. The Malay members were Tun Dr. Ismail, Minister of Home Affairs, Dato' Hamzah Abu Samah, Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tan Sri Abdul Kadir Shamsuddin, Director of Public Services, General Tengku Osman Jawa, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces; and Tan Sri Mohammad Salleh, Inspector-General of Police. The Chief Executive Officer was General Tan Sri Ibrahim bin Ismail. The inclusion of military and police representatives was noteworthy, and the fact that the Council came to be involved not only in reestablishing law and order but also in the exercise of wide executive and legislative powers, which normally fall outside the authority of the armed forces, was to lead to rumours, later on, of the possibility of a military takeover. The two non-Malay members were Tun Tan Siew Sin, President of the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and Tun V.T. Sambanthan, President of the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) [2].

The new Emergency Cabinet, as mentioned previously, was superior to the NOC, and Tun Abdul Razak had to act on the Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman's advice. The Ministers appointed to the Cabinet were Tunku Abdul Rahman (Prime Minister); Tun Abdul Razak (Deputy

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Prime Minister, Defence and acting Finance); Tun Dr. Ismail (Home Affairs), Tan Sri Sardon Zubir (Health); Tan Sri Mohammad Khir Johari (Commerce and Industry, and acting Local Government and Housing), Tun Abdul Rahman Haji Ya'akub (Education); Tun Ghafar Baba (National and Rural Development and Lands and Mines); Dato' Hamzah Abu Samah (Information and Broadcasting); Tan Sri Fatimah Hashim (Social Welfare), Dato' Ganie Gilong (Justice); Tan Sri Temenggong Jugah (Sarawak Affairs); Tun V.T. Sambanthan (Works, Posts and Telecommunications); and Tun V. Manickavasagam (Labour and acting Transport). The next day it was announced that three MCA members were joining the Cabinet as Ministers without Portfolio (Ministers with Special Functions). They were Tun Tan Siew Sin (former Minister of Finance), Khaw Kai Boh and Lee Siok Yiew. During the emergency period, this Cabinet was playing a secondary role to the NOC [3].

There was a move afoot at the hurriedly called meeting of UMNO campaign directors after the elections to propose that Malay ministers should be appointed to take over the portfolios of Finance and Commerce and Industry and, in this connection, the assumption of Tun Abdul Razak and Tan Sri Mohamed Khir Johari of these two portfolios was therefore significant.

The composition of the NOC, which was representative of the communities, the Armed Forces, the Police and the Public Services, made it possible for the Council to consider fully all aspects of the problems connected with the administration and the restoration of the country to normalcy, and advise the Director of Operation in the best interests of the nation. Basically, its functions were to restore law and order, to ensure the smooth administration of the country and to restore harmony and mutual trust among the various races.

The Director of Operations was also assisted by a Chief Executive Officer. The Chief Executive Officer headed the Secretariat which provided the administrative machinery for the office of the Director of Operations [4]. The functions of the Secretariat were to make provisions for the amendment and promulgation of laws; to prepare papers for the consideration and approval of the NOC and the Director of Operations; to coordinate with federal ministries, departments and state governments in the maintenance of public order and of supplies and services essential to the life of the community and in the implementation of directives of the Director of Operations; and to administer and execute special directives issued by the Director of Operations and the Chief Executive

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Officer. From its establishment and up to the end of the year, the Director of Operations Secretariat issued 15 Emergency Ordinances, 45 Essential Regulations and 9 Directives. A total of 114 papers were prepared for the consideration of the NOC [5].

The NOC eventually managed to publish a report on the racial disturbances, published on 9 October 1969, representing the official view. It alluded to the role of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) and Chinese Secret Societies. Besides, there were several other factors. These included differences in the interpretation of the Constitution by the Malays and the non-Malays, and the resentment of "certain immigrant races" against Constitutional provisions relating to Malay special rights and the status accorded to the Malay language, especially under sections 152 and 153 of the Constitution. Section 152 provided for the Malay language to be raised to the status of the national language (Bahasa Malaysia), and ultimately the sole official language, which meant that English, Chinese and Tamil would all be relegated to a lower position. Article 153 covered the responsibility of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (King) to safeguard the special position of the Malays and the legitimate interests of other communities. The Report also acknowledged that the riots were caused by "ethnic polarisation and animosity" - or, to put it in another way, "the Malays and Chinese had not got on well together, as a result of the continuing Malay feeling of being at an economic disadvantage compared with the Chinese" [6].

The recognition of the continuing serious imbalance between the position of the Malays and the non-indigenous made the Malaysian Government embark on political and economic reforms soon after the 13 May incident. The immediate task of the NOC was the military, together with the police, carrying out a total of thirty-three joint operations to flush out Secret Society members, thugs, gangsters and other undesirable elements from their haunts. As a result of these joint raids over 2,000 arrests were made by the police.

Since communal sensitivities could cause more serious racial clashes, groups of Maoist agents, secret societies and communal extremist elements were identified that could foment racial unrest. Although the Maoist agents had gone underground, they were currently recruiting fresh supporters and were still planning to stage more showdowns as part of their "softening-up" process in their final bid for power. They posed, therefore, a constant barrier to the return of Parliamentary rule.

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In the past the Secret Societies existed as part of the social structure in some Chinese communities, exercising control and exacting extortion money. During these disturbances, some Secret Society thugs posed as protectors of certain Chinese areas. Consequently, they gained a certain amount of influence in these communities. This gave them opportunities to exploit the future communal situation for their own profit, either through intimidation (such as extortion rackets, boycott of Malay goods, etc.) or through clever use of persuasion and rumour-mongering [7].

There were many other important outstanding problems demanding Tun Abdul Razak's immediate attention when he accepted the responsibility of being the Director of the NOC, in addition to the paramount one of safeguarding people's lives, property and economic well being. At one stage, assuming executive control of the country, Tun Abdul Razak had to divert his attention temporarily from national matters in order to settle what could easily have escalated into a dangerous schism within his own Party, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). The clash happened when a future Cabinet Minister, Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, one of the newly emerged intellectual leaders in UMNO, already a member of its Executive Council, launched a vigorous personal attack on the Party's President, Tunku Abdul Rahman, one month after the incident of May 13. In the 1969 General Election, Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad was narrowly defeated by Pan-Malaya Islamic Party (PMIP/PAS) candidates.

As Deputy Chairman of UMNO, Tun Abdul Razak called a meeting of the Party's Executive Council in his official residence, Seri Taman, on July 12. After several hours of heated discussion it was at last decided that due to the delicacy of the internal security situation such disagreement as had been made public might lead to a fresh outbreak of trouble by setting Malays against Malays. Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir was therefore asked to resign from the Party's Executive Council. Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir retired temporarily from the political wilderness, to emerge some years later, without malice, and with new strength, to serve under Tun Abdul Razak as a Cabinet Minister.

Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir and his close associates including Tan Sri Syed Nasir Ismail, Dato' Harun Idris of Selangor, Tan Sri Musa Hitam and Dato' Syed Ja'afar Albar, a mercurial protagonist of Malay rights, and also other leaders of UMNO held views which were opposed to the "give and take" attitude of Tunku Abdul Rahman who was naturally considered a very nice and soft leader and liked to please everybody,

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especially his close colleagues. They moved closer together and agreed that a "new model Government in Malaysia was needed under a new leader".

The rejection of Tunku Abdul Rahman on Tan Sri Syed Nasir's demand that the Malay language should not only be accepted as the national language but should also be the sole medium of official communication, was one of the major issues marking the differences among the top Malay leaders [8].

Because of his belief in the importance of Malay unity and the strengthening of UMNO in August 1969, Tun Abdul Razak, with the help of Tan Sri Senu Abdul Rahman, made the announcement of the formation of a Committee to review the Party Constitution "to make it more flexible and prevent splits in the ranks".

While the nation had moved into an uncertain period, the length of which could not be determined immediately, the NOC, by the very nature of its appointment above politics, was expected to give the country confidence and a sense of stability. The country should move in the right direction. It took time before this confidence and stability could be transformed into mutual trust and harmony. In Tun Abdul Razak's efforts to restore racial harmony and to ensure that it would be enduring as a basis for Parliamentary democracy, he would need to consider a series of norms against which political ideas and activities could be measured so that racial harmony could at no time be placed in jeopardy. A number of principles had to be formulated with the ultimate purpose of sustaining a harmonious Malaysia. In other words, at this time, there could be no question of the country's returning to Parliamentary democracy until mutual trust and racial harmony among the communities could be assured.

The task of the NOC, under the leadership of Tun Abdul Razak, to restore mutual trust and racial harmony, was a long-term process. As indicated, one of the important tasks of the NOC in restoring racial harmony was the implementation of a national language.

Reflecting the importance of Bahasa Malaysia as an instrument of national unity, on July 30, 1969, Tun Abdul Razak announced a plan to introduce Bahasa Malaysia in stages, starting from primary one in 1970, as the main medium of instruction in Peninsular Malaysia schools. English was to be taught only as a second language. On this time-scale, by 1982 all secondary education, including form six, would be in the medium of Bahasa Malaysia, then it would be the medium of instruction

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in first year university classes, and would be introduced progressively year by year until all university classes would use Bahasa Malaysia as the medium of instruction, except for the teaching of foreign languages [9].

The reasoning behind this was that the Malay language was regarded as a means to create national unity. While it was conceded that English was widely spoken in Malaysia, it was considered to be "elitist", and national dignity dictated that a widely acceptable local language should be given pride of place. Chinese and Tamil were, in this sense, not thought of as being indigenous languages, and their continued use was regarded as only tending to encourage polarisation of the various communities.

Since there was still the question of the adequacy of Malay as a language of science and technology, "Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka" (the Language and Literary Institute) had busied itself with the advent and coining of new words, although it would take time to build up a really comprehensive and effective vocabulary.

The position of Malays in tertiary education was improved abruptly with the establishment of Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (the National University of Malaysia - UKM) in 1970. One of the reasons for the establishment of University Kebangsaan was to provide opportunities for prospective candidates who had difficulty to proceed to tertiary education due to their lack of competence in the English language. Aware of the significance of the National Language as an instrument for racial harmony, the leaders of the non-Malay communities had to inevitably accept the finality of the National Language Policy [10].

Besides the issue of National Language, there was also the issue of the low percentage of Malay students studying in the faculties of science, engineering and medicine. Of 474 students admitted to read science in 1970, only 53 were Malays. In the case of engineering it was five out of 131. The ratio in medicine seemed higher, 54 out of 174, until it was realised that the 54 students included 28 in special pre-medical courses. Only four Malay doctors, one engineer and 21 scientists graduated in 1970. If the Malays were sparse in these disciplines, they were abundant in the arts faculty. Of 1,217 students admitted in 1970, 854 were Malay students [11].

Reflecting this, the Constitution (Amendment) Bill also granted additional power to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (King) to direct post-secondary institutions to reserve certain proportions of places for Malays in selected courses of study where the numbers of Malays were

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disproportionately small, such as medicine, engineering and science. For the real solution, Tun Abdul Razak made an effort to fulfil the need for the strengthening of Malay secondary education in science.

The poor Malay enrolment particularly in the technical faculties (science, engineering, medicine and agriculture) had always been related to language difficulties. As a short term solution to language difficulties, the University arranged preparatory courses in English for Malay students entering the medical and science faculties.

In the meantime, UMNO and its right wing leaders directed their attention towards upgrading the economy of the Malays, which was lagging far behind, compared to that of the other races. The New Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced by Tun Abdul Razak in order to ensure at least 30 per cent of economic activities would be owned by Bumiputra. Tun Abdul Razak realised the specific policies of the NEP that should be immediately implemented in order to achieve its objective. One of the policies was related to citizenship and work permits as one of the oldest grievances of the Malays. It was discovered that citizenship had been given too easily to the Chinese and the Indians.

When the Constitution was amended in 1960, the responsibility to implement Article 30 of the Constitution was delegated to the Registration Department by the Elections Commission. According to Article 30 of the Constitution, citizens were asked to verify their status as early as 1966. The actual exercise began in earnest after the incident of May 13, 1969.

As the result of this exercise, official statistics showed that about 120,000 Malaysian "citizens" were automatically rendered stateless. The original cut-off date was April 1, 1970 but was followed by a six-month extension following appeals from political parties and members of Parliament. Of the 268,756 papers issued, only 141,196 had been received for verification by September 23. Of this total, 122,810 were in order and 15,807 defective and therefore cancelled with the balance still being checked. Those deprived of their papers could re-apply but they would also be required to apply for work permits [12].

Even though there was a protest from the GERAKAN leader Dr. Tan Chee Khoon, who pointed out that the cancellation of certificates was on the grounds of errors or discrepancies overstepping the Constitution, obviously the Government was within its constitutional rights to cancel certificates obtained fraudulently [13].

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While the Work Permit System came as an unpleasant surprise to many people, there had been plenty of indications that the Government under the leadership of Tun Abdul Razak intended to regularise the employment situation for the benefit of citizens.

Unemployment was a serious problem in Malaysia. Official statistics showed that at the end of August there were 142,545 unemployed registered in West Malaysia, an increase of 2,000 over the June figure and an increase of 18,729 since the beginning of 1970. The main categories involved were factory workers, transport operators and labourers (76,990) and clerical workers (32,421) [14].

Besides the Work Permit System, the policy of Tun Abdul Razak on the National Development Corps had partly contributed to overcoming the unemployment problem. The first batch of 500 recruits was accepted at its new centre in Dusun Tua. These youths, most of whom were Malays, were given a three-month course in physical training and civics before being assigned as "general workers" to Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) schemes and to the Public Works Department. Some were assigned to the Railways Department. One of the general aims of the establishment of the National Development Corps was that its recruits would replace non-citizen unskilled and semi-skilled workers whose work permits expired during the next six months [15].

As a matter of fact, the Employment (Restriction) Act which had already been passed in August 1968 called for the registration of all non-citizens engaged in 12 specified occupations ranging from public utilities to the petroleum industry. This aroused little interest but after May 13, the Government's increased concern over unemployment brought a new schedule to the Act, setting out about 2,000 categories including unskilled and semi-skilled areas of employment [16].

Naturally the shock came when the first recipients of new work permits found that they were stamped "non-renewable". In order to avoid any danger of sparking racial violence, Tun Abdul Razak warned trade union leaders not to make statements which could be misunderstood by the workers and those non-citizens involved that they would be deported if they broke the law. Even though the Government was accused of overstepping the Constitution, the imposition of the policy of citizenship and work permits had and has been able to protect the employment rights of Malaysian citizens.

The NOC, created during the Emergency to take over the country's administration, had achieved some success especially in restoring

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confidence. A complete return to normal conditions was still a long way off. The creating of more jobs and increasing the standard of living for the poorer sections of the population, both of which had been incorporated into the 1971/75 five-year plan as key objectives, were important tasks for the NOC.

At the same time, there was the need to have an effective governing system by providing alternative methods of governing the various member States of the Federation, all of which had their Legislative Assemblies suspended indefinitely. Tun Abdul Razak ordered to setting up of Operations Councils in each state by nominating members and delegating to them the authority to form Regional Councils, each under the leadership of the local District Officer, in order to assist them in the day to day running of their areas. In this way Tun Abdul Razak established an army-type chain of command that was able to quickly and decisively implement, without the need for the time-wasting discussion and argument seemingly inseparable from the bureaucratic process, the instructions that he passed down to them.

The election results of May 1969, underlining a loss of popularity of the Alliance Government and eventually followed by civil commotion, were a bitter disappointment to the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman. Tunku Abdul Rahman had to leave the day to day control in the hands of Tun Abdul Razak, Director of the NOC. Characteristically, Tunku Abdul Rahman had taken the initiative in forming a National Goodwill Council (NGC) under his chairmanship, a body which should certainly benefit from his undoubted flair for promoting communal harmony. Through its state branches, the NGC could function as one of the important bodies that could promote inter-communal goodwill. In fact, the NGC was formed on Tan Sri Senu Abdul Rahman's advice.

Tan Sri Senu Abdul Rahman entered the Cabinet as Minister of Information and Broadcasting after winning the federal seat of Kubang Pasu Barat in the 1964 General Election. He was UMNO Youth Chief in 1967 and added the portfolio of Culture, Youth and Sports to his ministerial duties. Preceding the 1969 General Election, his organisational skills were called upon to become UMNO Secretary-General.

Meanwhile the NOC took immediate action to set up the Civil Affairs Secretariat. The Civil Affairs Secretariat was established as a result of the Chief Executive Officer's Order No.1 dated May 21, 1969. By that order, the Chief of Civil Affairs was made responsible for coordinating

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all matters relating to civil administration and empowered to keep under constant review Government objectives and policies with a view to formulating new ones, so as to be in line with national objectives [17].

Soon after the establishment of the Civil Affairs Secretariat, Tun Abdul Razak announced the formation of the Department of National Unity. This new Department was entrusted with the responsibilities of reviewing Government policies and their implementation to ensure that they contributed to the promotion of national unity.

The Department of National Unity and the National Consultative Council (NCC) came into being in January 1970. Despite being more formal, these bodies had official links with the NOC. The NCC was foreshadowed in the Report of the NOC wherein it was stated that "it is intended after the publication of this Report to invite representatives of various groups in the country, political, religious, economic and others, to serve on a Consultative Council, where issues affecting our national unity will be discussed fully and frankly" [18].

Thus, the formation of the NCC which comprised community leaders, businessmen, academicians, religious leaders, teachers, journalists and politicians from both the opposition and the Government Party was meant to tackle at its roots the problem of national unity, particularly the issues of the alienation of the Malays from the mainstream of the nation's economy and the perceived erosion by the Chinese of their rights. In the absence of Parliament Tun Abdul Razak tapped the views of these advisors to formulate strategies to overcome the existing problems of national unity. At the same time, the NOC drew up the national philosophy called the "Rukunegara". The Malaysian Government intended to use the Rukunegara as the basic model for its strategy to bring about national unity. The principles enunciated in it were meant to serve as a bond to bind together the various strands of Malaysia's multi-racial society.

The Department of National Unity spent nearly a year drafting meticulously the Rukunegara as a National Ideology which thereafter went through frank and careful deliberation in the NCC for approval. In fact, Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie announced the guidelines that would take the shape of a national ideology in mid-July 1969. Only on August 31, 1970, the thirteenth anniversary of Merdeka, did the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (King) formally promulgate the statement of National Ideology of Rukunegara.

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The official proclamation of the National Ideology, or Rukunegara, set the ball rolling. It outlined five beliefs, a united nation, a democratic, a just, a liberal and a progressive society and five principles, belief in God, loyalty to the King and country, upholding the constitution, the rule of law, and good behaviour and morality [19].

The determination of the Government to implement the Sedition Act was important in order to prevent further racial political disturbances. Although the Communist threat had gradually declined and was under control, communal issues and problems reached a critical stage with the outbreak of serious racial disturbances on May 13, which were tragic episodes in the history of independent Malaysia.

As mentioned earlier, the racial riot in 1969 was mainly caused by the activities of the Chinese opposition party, the Democratic Action Party (DAP), which used the sensitive issue of race to get support from the Chinese in the General Election of 1969. Since the incident had embarrassed the Malaysian Government and spoiled its image on the international scene and also caused a decline in foreign investment, it was important for the Government to amend the Sedition Act of 1948 in 1971 in order to ensure the preservation of peace, harmony and stability of the nation [20]. The amendment of the Sedition Act of 1948 actually prevents the raising of sensitive racial issues like the special position of the Malays, the Rulers, the national languages and the use of other languages, the legitimate interests of the non-Malays and the qualification for citizenship [21].

Even though the imposition of the Sedition Act was perceived as detrimental to efforts to implement an absolute right of freedom of speech and expression in this country, it brought success to the Government in establishing an intellectual and ethical framework for a new national mood of debate, challenging though this might be at first. It was likely that certain code words would be used when sensitive issues were being discussed. The ban of the raising of sensitive racial issues could be enforced on a discretionary basis and therefore it did not mean that any mention of a sensitive issue in public would automatically be followed by prosecution. But it did make life a little difficult for those whose job it was to comment on public issues that could stir up feelings on the part of one community over the other.

On April 17, 1971, two sponsors, Sim Mow Yu and Khoo Eng Kuan, of the Chinese Unity Movement were charged under this Act, two months after the Movement meeting at Ipoh where eight speeches were

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taped by the police. It was discovered that there were significant differences of opinion between the leaders of MCA on the one hand and the leaders of the Movement regarding the interests of Chinese unity.

Besides the significance of the Sedition Act in preventing people talking openly about subjects which impinged on Malaysia's sensitive issues, in order to stop further aggravation of racial and religious tensions for the purpose of maintaining national security and public order, the Government enacted various other laws such as the Internal Security Act of 1960 (ISA), the Societies Act of 1966 and the Official Secrets Acts, and the Universities and University Colleges Act of 1971 (UUCA).

The Government also intensified efforts to reduce communal conflicts and to foster national unity by implementing new policies and strategies relating to socio-economic development. The formulation of new policies and strategies of socio-economic development together with new policies and strategies of education, language and culture have managed to contribute to the creating of a truly united Malaysian nation. The Government is confident that these policies will succeed in achieving the desired objective, and positive indications in this respect are many and readily discernible [22].

However, the process of implementing these policies has itself created various reactions which occasionally complicate efforts to foster national unity. There are quarters which are reluctant to accept the fact that, in order to redress the imbalance between the races, opportunities for advancement will have to be shared by all the communities. There are also various groups which are dissatisfied with these policies, despite the fact that they have been provided with substantial assistance and facilities and have achieved progress. Various groups are apprehensive of losing their identity and cultural heritage although these matters are guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. The above situations have been exploited by various quarters for their own selfish interests. These include political parties, pressure groups, and certain local and foreign press.

It was the NCC which took its cue from the NOC to permit the public to know and to note that the question of "racial economic balance" would play a key role in the national economic performance. Even though it must be stressed that the Malaysian economy was based on private enterprise, the imperatives of growth are not always compatible with what are immediately perceived as major social goals. The Government's overall strategy, based on the belief that the greatest threat to stability

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was the Bumiputra's resentment at being left out economically in their own indigenous land, is of extreme importance.

Concomitant to this, the NEP is also considered to have a significant role in determining the political and economic stability of the country. The implementation of the NEP involves the restructuring of the pattern of the economic and political development of the country, and therefore charts a new future for the nation.

While all these policies and strategies of Tun Abdul Razak were imposed by the NOC at the time of the promulgation of the Rukunegara, Tunku Abdul Rahman announced that he intended to retire from the Premiership which he had held since independence. On September 22, 1970 he formally submitted his resignation to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (King). The announcement of Tunku Abdul Rahman's retirement followed by Tun Abdul Razak's assuming office of Prime Minister earmarked the Government's intention to lift the suspension on Parliament and the various State legislatures.

As Director of the NOC, Tun Abdul Razak was then wielding more power than the Prime Minister, and executing his duties with both circumspection and humanity, he proved to be a reluctant Director. With these sentiments in mind, Tun Abdul Razak gladly returned the country to constitutional rule.

On February 23, 1971, Parliamentary rule was resumed at the State Opening of the new Parliament, and later in the day Tun Abdul Razak addressed the House of Representatives for the first time as Prime Minister in his own right. With the resumption of Parliament, the NOC continued as the National Security Council, under the leadership of Tun Abdul Razak. The NCC and the NGC were amalgamated to form a new multi-racial advisory body called the "National Unity Council". This new Council had the task of advising the Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, on sensitive racial issues, which were banned from parliamentary and public debate, and undertaking research in promoting race relations.

The resumption of Parliamentary rule in February 1971 meant that Malaysia had been ruled by NOC decree for nearly two years. The NOC was the supreme body of administration in the country, the Cabinet functioned under its directive. In a few months after May 13, 1969, life became fairly normal in Malaysia. Confidence among the various racial groups was slowly restored and economic activities returned to normal.

After Tunku Abdul Rahman voluntarily stepped down from the post of Prime Minister and Tun Abdul Razak took over from him on

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September 22, 1970, it became increasingly obvious that the new Federal Cabinet under Tun Abdul Razak was directing its energy to the need to redress the unfulfilled part of the earlier "bargain" that the Malays and other Bumiputra be uplifted to achieve economic parity and balance with the non-indigenous communities in Malaysia. As noted earlier, the principal means adopted was the NEP, on which the Government repeatedly emphasised that in the implementation of the economic policy, it would ensure that "no particular group will experience any loss or feel any sense of deprivation". The implementation of NEP had a significant effect on the future shaping of the Economic Planning Unit (EPU), a powerful department in the Prime Minister's Office.

The Retirement of Tunku Abdul Rahman

Political analysts observed that the ideal time for Tunku Abdul Rahman to have stepped down would have been in 1967 when Malaysia was celebrating the tenth anniversary of Merdeka (Independence) and when his popularity was still at its peak. Tunku Abdul Rahman exercised a peculiar ability to hold together the various racial groups in Malaysia. But the racial riots that swept the country and its capital in May 1969 had shaken much of the popular faith in Tunku Abdul Rahman. The Malay leaders felt that in order to maintain harmony, there was a necessity to curb the increasing display of Chinese and Indian supremacy and this could not be achieved as long as Tunku Abdul Rahman stayed in power. They became more frank in their criticism of Tunku Abdul Rahman.

The Alliance was worried over a split among the Malays, particularly in the rural areas. The increasingly large number of Malays joining the Pan Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP/PAS) had really affected the strength of the Alliance. Strangely too, there was also some defection of Chinese voters to PMIP/PAS in certain areas in Kedah.

A campaign aimed at forcing Tunku Abdul Rahman to resign was also carried out by students. In fairness, Malaysia's students might lack direct political experience, but the best of them certainly know the techniques of student revolt in other countries: they use the same jargon and flog the same issues privately and in their publications.

Students of the University of Malaya held anti-Tunku Abdul Rahman demonstrations for five days towards the beginning of September 1969, a

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little less than three months after the riots had died down. There were grave threats that these anti-Tunku Abdul Rahman demonstrations might spark fresh racial violence [23].

Tunku Abdul Rahman was criticised by the students on the issue of the National Language and the failure of Tunku Abdul Rahman in protecting the Malay interests. For Tunku Abdul Rahman, it was not the students' business to try and run the University or the country. The Language Society, known as the Malay Language Society of the University of Malaya (PBMUM), emerged the apparent champion, where its real concern was to establish a programme setting the future of the National Language (Bahasa Malaysia) in the University, but the demonstration, although in support of official policy on the language issue, was tactically clumsy. PBMUM leaders hoped for the establishment of the National Language (Bahasa Malaysia) as the medium of instruction in the Art Faculty by 1978 and in science and engineering 10 to 15 years later. The arrest of four student leaders after the demonstration against the Prime Minister further closed the student ranks. These four were Malay students who appeared most disenchanted with their Premier [24].

The country's non-Malays, mostly Chinese, might be realistically appraising Tunku Abdul Rahman's waning support, but they were wary of the unknown alternatives to his leadership even more. In this respect the students were divided. The students, however, appeared united in their multi-racial opposition to the police invasion of their campus to break up anti-Tunku Abdul Rahman demonstrations, and showed solidarity in their efforts to obtain the release of those in jail.

One of those being detained was Dato' Sri Anwar Ibrahim, a well known student leader at the University of Malaya, and the founder-President of the Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement (ABIM) and Secretary-General of the multi-racial Malaysian Youth Council. His far-sighted vision on Malay and Islamic causes, which was not compatible with Tunku Abdul Rahman's eventually led him to be detained under the Internal Security Act (ISA). His wide experience as leader in numerous local and international youth and Islamic movements has gained him strong political support especially from the younger Malaysian Muslim intellectuals, eventually leading to his rise to the rank of current Deputy Prime Minister.

In preventing increasing resentment of Tunku Abdul Rahman, Tun Abdul Razak had to make it clear that any campaigning, politicking,

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conspiring or demonstrating for the removal of the Premier would bring down on the students the full force of the Emergency regulations. The NOC acted by proclaiming stern action against students, who seemed to be bent on forcing Tunku Abdul Rahman out of office. The Council also made it clear that such action would be taken against all persons, irrespective of race.

Tunku Abdul Rahman had been Prime Minister for so long, and far too long. Being considered a national institution, Tunku Abdul Rahman had always responded to the idea that his people needed him. After the drastic reduction of his majority in his own Parliamentary Constituency of Kuala Kedah and the tragedy of May 13 he may have wanted to prove to his country that he was still needed [25].

It was a bad year for Tun Abdul Razak. Tunku Abdul Rahman and his very capable Deputy had maintained their almost father-and-son relationship for many years and had worked very well as a team. Many people wondered if Tun Abdul Razak would be able to manage the country by himself. Some observers were suggesting that Tunku Abdul Rahman had stayed on for this very reason. According to Dato' Harun Idris, with Tunku Abdul Rahman always being the planner, the task of implementing the policies was given to Tun Abdul Razak. Meanwhile Tun Abdul Razak and Tun Dr. Ismail were also very good partners in one team [26].

Tun Abdul Razak remained loyal and respected Tunku Abdul Rahman while serving under him as Deputy Prime Minister although they were known to have opposing views on some issues. Some leaders noticed that at first Tunku Abdul Rahman would have preferred a different man to be his Deputy but chose Tun Abdul Razak instead knowing the latter as a better leader. Tun Abdul Razak was the perfect Deputy, respectful and never overstepping the limit as the second man even though many a time he was called on to make important decisions. This was also because Tunku Abdul Rahman himself trusted Tun Abdul Razak and never interfered in his Deputy's work.

For many years Tunku Abdul Rahman was the affable leader who made the major decisions while Tun Abdul Razak was a simple, modest and unassuming man, known as a worker, trudging from one kampong to another, meeting the people and trying to upgrade their economic standing. However, towards the end, in the late 60s, Tun Abdul Razak began to show his discomfort with Tunku Abdul Rahman's stand and

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policy, including his foreign policy that excessively emphasised the Western powers.

For Malay intellectuals, they were hoping that Tunku Abdul Rahman would eventually step down so that the semi-feudal Malays who were established under the power of Tunku Abdul Rahman would be replaced by Tun Abdul Razak's technocrat politicians. Over the years Tunku Abdul Rahman had built up a powerful network of influence which could not be replaced overnight.

In spite of strong criticisms levelled against Tunku Abdul Rahman by members of his own Party and by students, he continued to maintain his position as national leader. However, the election of a new Yang di-Pertuan Agong (King) which had to be carried out by July 1970 was seen as the point before which Tunku Abdul Rahman would finally retire after thirteen years as Prime Minister. Firm favourite for the kingship was the Sultan of Kedah who, although being Tunku Abdul Rahman's nephew, was believed to be not on the friendliest of terms with him.

Tunku Abdul Rahman's eventual stepping down would be because he chose to and not because he was forced out. If Tunku Abdul Rahman gave the appearance of being a man in a hurry, it was probably because of his acceptance of the post of Secretary-General of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The establishment of this organisation was planned at the Islamic Foreign Ministers' Meeting in March 1970 in Jeddah where its headquarters was to be. Tunku Abdul Rahman had not explicitly said it was impossible to combine the role of a top permanent official of an international organisation and the premiership of Malaysia simultaneously [27].

Some observers believed that the Secretariat's prestige would have been enhanced if its leader had taken it over while still being Premier in Malaysia. Thus, to enable him to devote more time to his new appointment as Secretary-General of the new Islamic Organisation was the main reason given by Tunku Abdul Rahman to finally settling on September 21, 1970 as his resignation date. Tunku Abdul Rahman took over the Islamic Secretariat officially at the big meeting held in Karachi in December, 1970.

Tunku Abdul Rahman's heir apparent, Tun Abdul Razak, recognised that Tunku Abdul Rahman must be allowed to decide for himself if and when he wished to retire. Tunku Abdul Rahman discussed arrangements for his retirement first with Tun Abdul Razak and later with his senior Cabinet colleagues. Since Tunku Abdul Rahman decided to link his

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retirement with the installation of the fifth Yang di-Pertuan Agong, the Sultan of Kedah, which took place on September 21, 1970, on the night of August 30, through the mass media Tunku Abdul Rahman announced that he would retire on September 22. He would preside at the installation of his nephew as the new Yang di-Pertuan Agong and then, on the next morning, tender his resignation and request the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to appoint Tun Abdul Razak as the new Prime Minister.

The retirement of Tunku Abdul Rahman as national leader came after thirteen years as Prime Minister and twenty years as President of UMNO. Tunku Abdul Rahman, in fact, made sure, in close consultation with Tun Abdul Razak, that on this occasion there would be no lessening of the superlative quality of Malay ceremonies.

Being the second Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tun Abdul Razak invited the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) leaders and senior members all over the Peninsular Malaysia to assemble in Kuala Lumpur on September 23. At the head-quarters of the Language and Literature Institute (Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka), where four hundred leaders of UMNO had assembled in its largest conference room, Tun Abdul Razak, with the inspiration of his newly-conferred premiership, addressed the Assembly, announcing his cabinet appointments, including the return of the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) members to Cabinet posts, and his plans for the future Government of the country [28].

At the conclusion of his speech, Tun Abdul Razak turned to Tunku Abdul Rahman and handed him a very large silver tray. A gold medallion lay in the centre, bearing the Arms of Malaysia. It was surrounded by a forest of signatures, the autographs of every Minister and every State and Settlement Chief Minister. They had been engraved and skilfully arranged so that they covered almost the entire surface.

As Tunku Abdul Rahman was probably the one person who had enjoyed the trust and confidence of all races in the country and who had the personality that welded together the various races of Malaysia into one national entity, when he relinquished office towards the end of 1970, the non-Malays in Malaysia recognised that they might as well keep peace with the Malays.

Tunku Abdul Rahman's successor, Tun Abdul Razak, who had headed the NOC, was a model heir, never giving the impression that he was in a hurry to get the top job, always deferring to Tunku Abdul Rahman's wishes, always seeking to go about Tunku Abdul Rahman's

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business, and never his own. His record as a man of deeds was impressive and his reputation for integrity was impeccable.

Tun Abdul Razak's misfortune, however, is just the same as that of many politicians who have played second fiddle to outstanding leaders in history. Tun Abdul Razak's intimates knew him as a man capable of enormously hard work, loyal to the country, studious towards the task assigned to him, courteous to his subordinates. But, despite hundreds of occasions on which he had represented his country at home and abroad, and the constant contact he had had with newspapermen and radio reporters, they had not warmed towards him, as they had done towards Tunku Abdul Rahman. Although Tun Abdul Razak was easy to talk to and he was always calm, he had somehow managed to give the impression of being calculating, powerful, but friendless. It took a little time to shed that impression.

Despite all these, Tun Abdul Razak still believed that the Malays should come into their own in Malaysia and the non-Malays must recognise this fact and adjust themselves as co-citizens of the land. This belief had contributed in patterning the political and economic performance of the Malays and the realignment of the non-Malays to accommodate this after the period of the NOC.

Tun Abdul Razak had a very devoted, patriotic and extremely tolerant team of men around him to make a success of his concern over the Bumiputra's economic well being. In fact, there were many Malays like Tun Dr. Ismail who were not really so enamoured of the special privileges enjoyed by the Malays. Tun Dr. Ismail, while he was proud of his Malay heritage, felt embarrassed that the Malays should need special help in order to become "equal" to any other race.

Tun Dr. Ismail resigned from his portfolio as Minister for Home Affairs in June 1967. He returned to his old portfolio a few days after the May 13 incident. Since then he had been invaluable as the man who had the ability to discipline the Malays as well as the Chinese. Tun Dr. Ismail had a reputation for liberalism and was providing solid support for Tun Abdul Razak [29].

Born in 1915 into a distinguished Malay family in Johore State, Tun Dr. Ismail was educated locally, mainly at the English College (now Maktab Sultan Abu Bakar). He began his medical studies at King Edward the Seventh College of Medicine in Singapore, and went on to Melbourne University to graduate as a doctor in 1944, the first Malay to do so from an Australian campus [30].

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After taking over the reins from Tunku Abdul Rahman in 1969 Tun Abdul Razak came to rely more and more on Tun Dr. Ismail to the point where the latter was being referred to as "Razak's Razak", a reference to Razak's role since independence as Tunku's strong and reliable Deputy. Respecting each other's sense of purpose and integrity forged them into an unbeatable complementary combination. Both had their differences in approach and Tun Dr. Ismail's noted fiery temper was often used to drive home a point, but insiders say that once Tun Abdul Razak had decided on a course of action, his Deputy carried it out.

Tun Dr. Ismail's greatest contribution to the country was the stabilising influence he imparted after the May 1969 racial riots. Many believed that Tun Dr. Ismail had left the Government two years earlier, officially on health grounds, because of disagreements with both Tunku Abdul Rahman and Tun Abdul Razak. He was recalled from his private practice in the first few days of the riots to take over the Home Affairs portfolio. His tough, no-nonsense approach and his liberal, multi-racial stance helped to still the fears of both Malays and non-Malays. He was one of the few men in the Government "who has no one to apologise for". His sense of fair play made itself felt so often that whenever he came in to mediate over differences between the communities, his decisions were always accepted and respected.

Tun Dr. Ismail died of a heart attack on August 2, 1973 at the age of 57, leaving Tun Abdul Razak with the task of recovery from the economic and political chaos of the country. The death of Deputy Prime Minister Tun Dr. Ismail left the Central Committee of UMNO, dominant partner in Malaysia's ruling coalition, assembled on sombre business to choose a new party Deputy President. The job went to the Minister of Education, Tun Hussein Onn, giving him a powerful edge over his rival for the Cabinet's No.2 slot.

Malaysian Political Succession Circumstances

Tunku Abdul Rahman, Malaysia's first Prime Minister, relinquishing power peacefully to Tun Abdul Razak, when he was pressured to do so, remarked on the smooth constitutional process of political succession in the country.

Since independence, Malaysia has never experienced any political succession through martial law, coup d'état, revolution, heredity or other

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less than transparent procedures. It has a firmly based constitution specifying rules for choosing political leaders, and has actually practised them [31]. Any political party leaders are able to acquire top political posts through a free election as stated in the Malaysian Constitution. Malaysia has handled the problem of political succession quite well in the past, in contrast to most third world countries. The present components in the National Front Government that are still willing to cooperate to reach accommodations and to compromise among themselves, the non-intervention of Malaysian Armed Forces in politics, and the willingness of the top United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) leaders to share political power with leaders of other communities while still holding a dominant share of the Government have all contributed to the smooth and constitutional process of political succession.

However, increasing sophistication in political thinking, complex economic problems and the increasing power struggle, brought a new complexity to the succession process. This needed to be resolved in some way, otherwise the National Front Government might lose its political power, with fatal consequences for political stability.

As mentioned earlier, the crucial element that has complicated the problem of political succession is the nature of the country's plural society where no race forms a majority. Its significance can be related to the increasing power struggle between the Malays and the Chinese and the complexity of relationships among the components of the National Front Government.

Through a process of communal compromise and cooperation Malaysia was able to achieve independence in 1957 and formed a coalition government which consisted of three major racial political parties; UMNO, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). The formation of the coalition government in 1957 comprising Malay, Chinese and Indian political parties indicated the importance of inter-communal accommodation. The Alliance pattern of politics has dominated the scene till now, albeit in an enlarged form through the National Front since 1970 [32]. The current government of the National Front is made up of more than ten political parties from Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak, and represents various communities.

Political solidarity among the components of the National Front exists only at a primordial level. There is an increasing sense of racial self

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consciousness, leading people to tie themselves to their racial and religious groups and this has a significance in increasing the number of communal political leaders who participate in politics on ethnic terms.

Racial and religious consciousness first came to the Malay community as a result of the colonial policy of the Malayan Union where it was perceived as posing threats to the Malays' political, cultural and economic interests. The Malayan Union proposal was first announced by the British in January 1946.

Tunku Abdul Rahman's policy of coexistence, tolerance and moderation with the other races made them openly challenge and question the special position of the Malays which in the end finally led to the racial riots in 1969. Just after the riots, Tun Abdul Razak took over as Prime Minister when Tunku Abdul Rahman stepped down in September 1970 after being pressured by all sides. As mentioned earlier, like his predecessor, Tun Razak was a leader of charismatic quality. He secured a reputation for being an "administocrat", capable of handling the vexing problems of Malaysia's plural society. Most of the young and educated Malays perceived Tun Abdul Razak as a leader with intellectual and pragmatic qualities. Tun Abdul Razak demonstrated his statesman-like quality when he arranged to widen the Alliance coalition to include several opposition parties, most notably the influential Pan Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP/PAS). This new coalition undoubtedly strengthened UMNO [33]. However, in 1977, after a dispute over the right of the party to nominate the Chief Minister of Kelantan, the PMIP/PAS left the National Front [34]. Since then, it has been one of the National Front's strongest opponents.

The non-interventionist stance of the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) has helped in simplifying the succession problem of the country. Stanley Bedlington gave little credence to the eventuality of a military take-over and noted the absence of any real tension between the armed forces and the political leadership. Malaysia is one of few countries in Southeast Asia where the military has not intervened in politics and where civilian authorities have continued in power since independence [35]. Throughout post-independence, there have only been three important events that involved the military: the Communist insurrection from 1948 to 1960 (the period of Emergency), the Confrontation with Indonesia from 1963 to 1966 and the 13 May 1969 racial riots.

The MAF is a latecomer in modern Malaysian institutional development. Compared to the police and the civil services, which had

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started as early as 1876 with the onset and gradual establishment of British Colonial Government, the MAF can only mark its beginning with the establishment of the Royal Malay Regiment Experimental Company in 1933 [36].

There are various reasons that have made the MAF maintain its non-interventionist stance and keep its distance from being active in politics. The role of the armed forces in Malaysia has been clearly defined in terms of internal and external defence missions and is clearly subservient vis-a-vis the civilian authorities. This is clearly stated in the 1957 and 1963 Malaysian Constitutions where the MAF is described in Article 132 as a "federal public service". It is further stated that the armed forces are an integral body with its own service chief(s) who is designated by the Government of the day but drawn from the ranks of the armed services [37]. Under this set-up, the chain of command is clearly defined and service chiefs are responsible to the Minister of Defence. There are three service chiefs (Army, Navy and Air Force) with an overall commander known as the Chief of Armed Forces Staff (CAFS). At the apex is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, a position held by the supreme ruler or titular king, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong [38].

Zakaria Ahmad [39] gave three reasons for the non-interventionist stance of the MAF. First, the status and role of the MAF is legally stipulated by statute, namely the Constitution, the Armed Forces Act (1962) and several other pieces of legislation, statutes and enactments. Second, service matters and policy are discussed by the Armed Forces Council which is made up of civilians and military men. Third, and perhaps most important of all, the Defence portfolio in Malaysia has by and large been entrusted to the most senior or esteemed of the ruling political coterie. Such ministerial control has probably resulted in there being tight supervision of the military. To a large extent, the non-interventionist stance of the MAF is supported by the fact that the senior officers of the MAF have often been closely linked with the ruling political elite by family connections.

The long period of calmness is vitiated, to some extent, by the outbreak of the 13 May 1969 racial riots when the Army had to be called in to restore order. Such an incident actually opened up a good opportunity for the Army to seize control of the country, but this did not occur. It had much to do with the fact that General Tuanku Osman Jawa, Chief of the Armed Forces Staff then, maintained a very non-political

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stance and presumably would not have acted out a coup d'etat since the Prime Minister then, Tunku Abdul Rahman, was his uncle [40].

The MAF could be an important actor in the future process of political succession if a Chinese-dominated government were to win over the ruling authority of the country. The Malays would never accept the loss of their political power in the country which they feel indigenously belongs to them. This does not necessarily mean that the military would form the government in Malaysia. Political power might be returned to a civilian government when there existed a strong Malay political party that could form the government. Despite all these, unproblematic Malaysian succession circumstances had contributed to putting Tun Abdul Razak in power at the head of a strong civilian government.

Chapter Seven

PREMIERSHIP

Premiership of Tun Abdul Razak

Among the leaders of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), Tunku Abdul Rahman was probably the one person who had enjoyed the trust and confidence of all races in the country. He was the leader of the struggle for independence. Tunku Abdul Rahman was in the forefront for the formation of Malaysia. He led the Malaysian campaign against Indonesia's Confrontation, the biggest post-independence external threat to the security of the country.

Thus, taking over from Tunku Abdul Rahman was obviously difficult, where more efficiency was needed, and in historical perspective may prove to be a thankless task [1]. With the circumstance of the racial antagonism between the Malays and the Chinese still hanging, for all his experience, Tun Abdul Razak was to be the man who had to fulfil the need of the country for a dynamic new leader with enough personal magnetism to unite its multi-racial population after the resignation of Tunku Abdul Rahman.

Tun Abdul Razak had the practicalities of guiding Malaysia along a new path where the imperatives of economic growth had to be aligned with equally pressing problems of social justice. The fundamental task of Tun Abdul Razak was to reassure the Malay majority that they would participate fully in the benefits of development and to assure the other races that they could be secure in the knowledge that they too are Malaysians. To succeed in this balancing act Tun Abdul Razak would have to resist pressures from extremists not only on the political fringe but within his own Party, UMNO, and even within the administrative establishment.

In preventing racial and class cleavages that would overlap and threaten political stability once again, Tun Abdul Razak had to maintain his uncompromising stand on the country's need for self reliance and national unity, the need to bring peace, goodwill and prosperity to the people, especially the poor in both town and rural areas. Tun Abdul

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Razak believed in the leading role of UMNO in succeeding in bringing peace, goodwill and prosperity to the people on equal terms.

When Tun Abdul Razak officially became Prime Minister at 9.40 am on Tuesday, September 22, 1970, he did not announce the names of his Government. But when he came to speak to the Party stalwarts of UMNO the next day, on September 23, he made a single departure from his prepared text to announce that Tun Dr. Ismail, Minister for Home Affairs, would be his Deputy. Tun Abdul Razak also stated that it was the responsibility of UMNO to determine the pattern of the political and economic development of the country [2].

As mentioned earlier, the year 1969 was a momentous turning point for the country, for politics in general, for UMNO as a party, and for Tun Abdul Razak personally. Just after he became Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak managed to build a team of leaders who were willing to impose UMNO's preferences and interests as the functioning Party of Government. These new leaders were important in the process of changing not just the employment pattern of society but also the whole ownership structure of the economy. Such a change was necessary for national unity and for alleviating the psychological anxieties of the Malays.

This preference had immediately led Tun Abdul Razak to construct a Cabinet. Besides Tun Dr. Ismail who was appointed as Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak requested Tun Hussein Onn, who was his brother-in-law, to leave his private law practice to serve the nation as Minister of Education. Since the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) abandoned its decision not to participate in the Government, Tun Tan Siew Sin returned to the Cabinet as Minister of Finance.

Influenced by Executive Council (EXCO) of UMNO Youth, under the leadership of Dato' Harun Idris who was then the Chief Minister of Selangor, Tun Abdul Razak brought back Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir to the Government and to the Party. Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir, a man of vision who had demonstrated his charismatic leadership, a fact which eventually got him dismissed by Tunku Abdul Rahman due to incompatibility of thoughts, would not have escaped Tun Abdul Razak's attention.

Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir, a medical practitioner in the northern town of Alor Star, was welcomed back into UMNO early in March 1972 after three years in a kind of political uncertainty. He was expelled following anti-Tunku Abdul Rahman activities in May 1969. Dato' Seri Dr.

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Mahathir was branded as anti-Tunku Abdul Rahman, which led to him being considered as extremist. The simplistic hypothesis went out that Tunku Abdul Rahman was pro-Chinese, in a special sense, and thus those who opposed him must be anti-Chinese. Together in thoughts with Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir was Tan Sri Musa Hitam who had called upon Tunku Abdul Rahman to step down. Tan Sri Musa Hitam was then Vice-President of UMNO Youth and Chairman of the influential Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA). Incidentally, he sat on the Disciplinary Committee which readmitted Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir.

Initially, people generally saw Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir as an "ultra", a Malay nationalist who demanded that the Malays be given a better deal in their own country. The non-Malays had to make some kind of compromise, albeit modest, while the Malays had to make greater efforts to drag themselves out from their unproductive lifestyle. With time, it was discovered that the picture painted for Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir was not true. He would not have reached the top position in Malaysian politics, and built a multi-racial nation with such endeavour, if he were a racialist [3].

Tun Abdul Razak also showed his commitment to mutual tolerance by the withdrawal of the ban on party politics. The ban on party politics was withdrawn only after the National Operations Council (NOC), with the full support of the National Consultative Council (NCC), amended the Sedition Act in August 1970. As mentioned earlier, the NOC arbitrarily decreed the strengthening of the Sedition Act meant to prohibit public or parliamentary questioning of four key issues: citizenship, national language, special position of the Malays, and the position of the rulers.

The other great upheaval carried out during this same period was in the field of international relations, involving a spectacular re-alignment of foreign policy, which would face up to the realities of the redistribution of military and economic power in the world and take Malaysia firmly into the Afro-Asian camp, particularly in the Pan-Islamic camp. In view of Malaysia's non-aligned stance, and no compensating reference was made to the proposed Five-Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA), neutralisation in Southeast Asia was important. It was Tun Abdul Razak who emphasised that Malaysia must have a "good name" in the non-aligned world as well as among the states of Eastern Europe.

More importantly, Tun Abdul Razak, who faced the unfortunate national tragedy in mid-1969, was brought to the pinnacle of political

power in Malaysia, pledged to correct the country's social ills and promote inter-racial harmony, mutual tolerance and national unity. The driving force behind his political career was the ultimate implementation of what would amount to no less than the complete restructuring of the country's non-egalitarian society and of its racially unbalanced economy. The support of the Alliance Party, which was at the helm and comprised as before the three communal parties, UMNO, the MCA and the MIC (the Malaysian Indian Congress), was vital to Tun Abdul Razak's new strategy to meet the interrelated problems of the economic deprivation of the Malays and the hostility and ill-feeling of the Chinese which was keeping the Malays and Chinese apart.

Economic Restructuring

The Malays, with their own political system and a subsistence agrarian economy, tolerated the Chinese and Indian working class immigrants who streamed in before the Second World War but probably never imagined them as a permanent feature of the society and an ultimate threat to their own numerical superiority. Although one and a half million ethnic Chinese and Indians became citizens between independence in 1957 and 1960, the great majority of Malays continued to think of them as aliens and were sceptical of their loyalty to the country of their adoption.

The incident of May 13 made the Government realise that integration between these three races was not easy to achieve. This can be related to the artificiality of the political situation as a result of differences in language, religion, social values and economic wealth. Since the basic assumption of political science is that political power is the expression of economic power, the ultimate implementation of the complete restructuring of the country's non-egalitarian society and of its racially unbalanced economics was important in promoting inter-racial harmony, mutual tolerance and national unity.

The most urgent agenda for the betterment of Malaysia's overall economic situation was to make sure that the Malays get their share of the country's wealth. Otherwise the country's prosperity would continue to rest on an insecure political foundation. A number of measures had

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been taken to appease Malay discontent, such as work permits, education policy and the increased use of Malay as the national language.

The Federal Government made a profound assessment of the causes of the communal antagonism that had reached a cathartic point on May 13. It was felt that, basically, the political and economic "bargain" between the Malays and the non-Malays in the course of working for self-rule and achieving independence in the 1950s had not been fulfilled. In the course of working out the constitutional and national foundations of an independent Malaya, "the Communities Liaison Committee had come to the conclusion that the Malays would sacrifice their privileged position only if they could be aided in securing a greater share of their country's wealth" [4].

The feeling that the economic "bargain" with the non-Malays had not been fulfilled made the Malays perceive themselves in danger of "losing out" to the non-Malays with regard to the ownership of the Malaysian economy in terms of the pattern of ownership, distribution of wealth, and participation in the modernisation and developmental process. There was also a genuine fear among the Malays that economically, at any rate, they had been left far behind by the non-Malays. In 1970, the number of Bumiputra in the commercial sector was still disappointingly small and amounted to only around 24 per cent of the total number of persons employed, and a Sino-Malay Economic Cooperation Advisory Board which was set up soon after the May 13, 1969 racial riots to encourage joint ventures between Chinese and Malay businessmen came to nothing.

Thus, with grave political dangers, in encouraging the equal participation of the Malays in the economic progress and prosperity of the nation, Tun Abdul Razak recognised that his Government had to play a direct role in promoting many new commercial ventures, deciding their location and, in most cases, enforcing by legislation proportional representation by race among their work forces.

E.E.C. Thuraisingham, one of the elder statesmen of Peninsular Malaysia, stated "It is true, I and others believed that the backward Malays should be assisted to attain parity with non-Malays to forge a united Malayan Nation of equality" [5]. This inter-communal understanding among the Malay and non-Malay statesmen became a cardinal formula in the life of the ruling Alliance from 1955 onwards: "In time, a guiding theme and informal quid pro quo emerged in this elite bargaining forum: exchange of Chinese cooperation in improving the

Malay economic position, in return for Malay co-operation in improving the Chinese political position" [6].

In the light of this, Tun Abdul Razak ordered the Economic Planning Unit attached to the Prime Minister's Department to formulate a completely new economic policy and during the course of 1970 this objective became the basis of the Second Malaysia Five Year Development Plan that was to be put into operation from the beginning of January 1971.

For Tun Abdul Razak, restructuring the whole economy of the country so as to correct racial imbalances in education, income, employment opportunities, and the ownership of industry and basic national resources would prevent an eventual catastrophic return to the conditions of May 13. Restructuring the whole economy involved the policy of eradicating poverty for all Malaysians, irrespective of race, and correcting racial economic imbalance involved the policy of increasing the participation of the Bumiputra in the economic life of the country.

Tun Abdul Razak felt the necessity for the Malaysian Government to implement the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971. The NEP was aimed at narrowing down the economic disparities between the Malays and the non-Malays and was especially geared to improving the poor economic condition of the Malays. The NEP was devised to build up Malay ownership of the economy to a level more commensurate with their status as the country's biggest ethnic and indigenous group, and to remove the poisonous resentment over economic injustices which had materially contributed to the bloody conflict [7].

The NEP, which embodied the economic interests of the then emerging Malay capitalist class, was first expressed in a systematic manner during the two historic Kongres Ekonomi Bumiputra (Indigenous Economic Congress) of 1965 and 1968.

By ameliorating the economic plight of the numerically superior Malays and eradicating poverty irrespective of race, it was hoped to increase the Bumiputra's ownership of the corporate sector to 30 per cent by 1990, with other Malaysians holding 40 per cent and the stake of foreigners in corporate equity falling to 30 per cent [8]. The NEP is not just about equity distribution. It was equally important that job opportunities were also evenly distributed [9].

In Tun Abdul Razak's view, one of the major economic imbalances that had to be corrected in favour of the Malays had to do with the

restructuring of the ownership of wealth other than land. In 1970 a review of the total share capital of all limited companies registered in Malaysia, showed for example, that 61 per cent of the equity was in the hands of foreigners, 22.5 per cent was held by the Chinese, and only about 2 per cent was owned by Malays. He therefore set a target, scheduled to be achieved by 1990, whereby in twenty years from inception of this scheme, Malays would own 30 per cent of the total share capital of all Malaysian private enterprises.

As mentioned earlier, the aims of the NEP were incorporated in the Second Malaysian Plan (SMP). The Plan incorporated a two-pronged New Economic Policy for development. This first prong was to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty, by raising income levels and increasing employment opportunities for all Malaysians, irrespective of race. The second prong aimed at accelerating the process of restructuring Malaysian society to correct economic imbalance, so as to reduce and eventually eliminate the identification of race with economic function. This process involved the modernisation of rural life, a rapid and balanced growth of urban activities and the creation of a Malay commercial and industrial community in all categories and at all levels of operation, so that the Malays and other indigenous people of the country would become full partners in all aspects of the economic life of the nation.

The strategy to be adopted for the "second prong", the restructuring of Malaysian society to correct economic imbalance, was more far-reaching as it covered a wide range of programmes to enable the Bumiputra to participate in the dynamic sectors of the economy. It was therefore the target of Tun Abdul Razak to achieve a more balanced pattern in the ownership of assets in all sectors of the economy within a period of 20 years: the Bumiputra would own and manage at least 30 per cent of the total commercial and industrial activities of the economy in all categories and scales of operations.

The efforts of the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA), the Rural and Industrial Development Authority (RIDA) and Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA) and other bodies were inadequate, and not fully exploited to raise the economic standing of the Malay group. Under the First (1956-1960) and Second (1961-1965) Five-Year Development Plans and the First Malaysia Plan (1966-1970), the Government's developmental strategy was to directly undertake rural development, to

develop the economic infrastructure and to leave the development of commerce and industry to private enterprises. This strategy was increasingly considered unacceptable by many, especially among the Malays, particularly after the suspension of Parliament from May 1969 in the aftermath of the post-election racial riots. It was Tun Abdul Razak who felt the need for the Government to intervene in the development of commerce and industry instead of letting it be liberalised and ran by private enterprises.

There was almost no Malay middle class in the Federation (Malaysia) capable of carrying through an industrialisation programme by means of private enterprise; most of the existing indigenous private enterprise in manufacturing was Chinese, in management, ownership and work force. A policy of industrialisation which relies solely on liberal private enterprise must inevitably increase the economic power of the Chinese either in their capacity as industrial entrepreneurs or as investing capitalists.

Most of the jobs created in industry would therefore be filled by the Chinese, partly because of the method of recruitment, through the Chinese extended family system and partly because the Malays lacked the necessary skills, training, and aptitude for industrial work in the towns. With the competition for securing jobs at management or staff level proceeding at a faster rate than available jobs in industry, the Malays, unassisted, would lose in the competition. It was most unlikely therefore that private enterprise industrialisation would effectively improve the economic position of the Malays, either in their capacity as industrial capitalists or industrial workers. What was most likely to happen was that over the years the existing class of Chinese industrial capitalists and the Chinese industrial proletariat would be enlarged.

Although it was indeed difficult to imagine that the poverty of a very large selection of the Malays could be solved by any such minor adjustment to free enterprises, the logic of development through free enterprise would be to enrich those who already possessed capital. And the growth in economic strength of a very small selection of the immigrant population might only sharpen communal antagonism.

It was Tun Abdul Razak who soon found that in order to achieve the desired restructuring process, an increased measure of Government participation and intervention in some sectors of commerce and industry was both necessary and desirable. This was carried through in part by

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extending the activities of public enterprises (national corporations) like MARA (Majlis Amanah Rakyat), and State Trading Corporation (Perbadanan Nasional Berhad - PERNAS), which provided technical and financial assistance for existing Malay enterprises and helped in setting up completely new ones, particularly in selected development areas where private enterprise was unwilling to venture. In addition, these corporations set up a number of specialised businesses which they initially owned and ran, in time to be transferred to private Malay ownership. Lack of capital would be solved by continuing Government support, either through direct low interest loans, or through financial participation. In some instances marketing facilities would be provided by state corporations.

The expansion of public enterprises in Malaysia since the 1970s was therefore aimed primarily at addressing ethnic economic imbalances. Public enterprises were particularly used for the purpose of redistributing asset ownership and employment in favour of the indigenous citizens of the country. This policy was adopted when "less direct methods of state intervention" were considered unsuccessful in producing the desired results.

Hand in hand with this, public enterprises were expected to restructure society by increasing the Bumiputra's share of ownership, employment and participation in commerce and industry and through the development of selected rural areas. Through public enterprises, the Government sought to attain the 30 per cent share ownership by the Bumiputra in commerce and industry, with 40 per cent share for non-Bumiputra and 30 per cent for foreigners. As intermediaries, public enterprises were assigned the task of holding in trust share capital for the Bumiputra. Bumiputra employment in mining, industry, construction and commerce was planned to reach a target of 50 per cent of total employment by 1990. Between 1972 and the early 1980s, the establishment of public enterprises gained greater momentum as public enterprises proliferated in Malaysia.

The strengthening role of the establishment of public enterprises such as PERNAS, MARA, the Malaysian Industrial Development Finance Berhad (MIDF) and the State Economic Development Corporation (SEDCs) was basically important in promoting the growth of a viable Bumiputra commercial and industrial community with the intention of

selling them back to the Bumiputra once they become capable of purchasing them.

During the Third Malaysia Plan period (1976-1980), a total of about RM435.6 million was spent by these public enterprises with PERNAS taking a share of RM216.25 million, MARA RM78 million, Kompleks Kewangan RM48 million, and SEDCs RM93.4 million [10].

Apart from contributing to Bumiputra participation in commerce and industry, some public enterprises in the form of regional development authorities were engaged in developing rural areas. While SEDCs had been set up in all states and were engaged in various commercial and industrial projects, Selangor in 1964 (initially as the Petaling Jaya Authority), Penang, Pahang and Terengganu in 1965, Johore in 1966, and Kedah, Kelantan, Malacca, Negeri Sembilan and Perak in 1967, by 1975 these Corporations had widened their scope to include activities that involved groups such as paddy farmers, agricultural labourers, fishermen, rubber smallholders, coconut smallholders, and Sabah and Sarawak's indigenous poor.

The Rubber Industry Smallholders Development Authority (RISDA), for instance, provided funds collected through a replanting process to rubber smallholders to replant 412,000 acres; the Malaysian Rubber Development Corporation (MARDEC) provided better marketing outlets to many smallholders; the Kedah Agricultural Development Authority (KADA) increased the incidence of paddy double cropping from 276,000 acres in 1970 to 327,000 acres in 1975; the National Paddy and Rice Authority (LPN) raised the price of rice by 75 percent and stabilised it, while the Farmers Organisation Authority (FOA) encouraged better utilisation of land in rural areas [11].

To improve the standard of living of poverty-stricken groups, established public enterprises were directed to extend provision of public amenities such as water, electricity, sewerage, cheap housing, health and education. The "government-in-business" strategy was implemented through government participation in the establishment of new companies with the Government as the sole owner; another was by setting up joint-venture companies with private entrepreneurs as part owners; the third was by buying a proportion of the publicly-traded shares of existing companies.

Meanwhile, the Urban Development Authority (UDA) was set up in November 1971 to implement a variety of short-term and long-term

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projects for commercial and property development. Significantly, among its short-term projects had been the "leasing, purchase and construction of commercial premises for Malays and other indigenous people for printing, tailoring, offices, restaurants, shops, mini-markets, travel agencies and wholesale trade". Also within the scope of eradicating poverty, in assisting the movement of Malays from traditional agriculture to the modern industrial and commercial sectors, MARA, UDA and SEDCs played an indirect role by providing technical, financial and capital assistance for the Malays and other indigenous people to enter such sectors [12]. Financial assistance was given to the companies in the form of grants or loans, or transferred through government purchase of their shares.

Another important source of funding has been the Malaysian public, who deposit their money in a variety of government-controlled or sponsored financial institutions, including the Muslim Pilgrim Fund and Management Board (LUTH - Tabung Haji), the Employees Provident Fund (EPF) and the Bumiputra Investment Foundation (ASB).

Government institutions were given different roles to ensure that the New Economic Policy would work. The Federal Treasury dealt with budget and loan approval, the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) was responsible for government allocations and project approval, the Public Services Department dealt with personnel management, and the Central Implementation and Coordination Unit (CICU) monitored and evaluated the performance of public enterprises in the country. As the first Director-General of CICU Tunku Tan Sri Shahriman Tunku Sulaiman was responsible for setting up an efficient mechanism so that strategic information on the performance of public enterprises would reach his Department promptly for monitoring and evaluation. In order to increase Malay participation in the construction industry, Tun Abdul Razak set up a special corporation, which was financed and managed by PERNAS. Its chief aim was to train Malay contractors so that eventually they could compete on equal terms with their counterparts from other communities.

In order to develop a stronger local-holding industry in which the Malays would have the chance to participate, Tun Abdul Razak's Government also set up the Malaysian National Insurance Company as a subsidiary of PERNAS. In June 1973, the Malaysian National Reinsurance Berhad was formed as a joint venture in which PERNAS was the majority shareholder, and ten locally-owned insurance

companies owned smaller shares. In this same year, legislation was passed that required all new insurance companies incorporated in Malaysia to allocate a minimum of 30 per cent of their issued share capital to Malays or to other indigenous groups.

Tun Abdul Razak decided that one of the new plan's first priorities should be to improve life in the rural areas, by affording the people there similar amenities to those enjoyed in modern and progressive urban communities. One of the efforts to attain this objective was to get rid of money-lenders and middle-men and to promote the commercialisation of agriculture. Thus the Government agencies had to honour their commitment by continuing to extend credit facilities. From 1971 to 1973 loans given to small-scale agro-based industries by MARA, MIDF, and BBMB (Bank Bumiputra Malaysian Berhad) amounted to about \$300 million.

At this period FELDA had already developed 224,000 acres of land. More than 200,000 acres of new land comprising some 75 land schemes had been opened up. More than 16,500 families, once poverty-stricken, landless and helpless, found a new way of life and a new hope in these schemes. These schemes have led to the concept of greater land schemes based on a single large regional area, like the Jengka Triangle involving 150,000 acres and to the concept of accelerating the movement of rural farmers from traditional to modern agriculture. It was the target of Tun Abdul Razak that by 1970, the end of the First Malaysian Plan, some 140,000 more acres would be opened up for the benefit of another 21,000 families [13].

Although the NEP contained many benefits for the politico-bureaucratic Malay elite, this policy was also considered as a wider political strategy to provide a "new deal" for the Malays, which was vital for party power and for remedying their widespread and historical sense of economic and group weakness. By getting greater control of society's resources, and thereby helping to shape the rate of Malay mobility and wealth expansion, the Government could, under the right conditions, create a positive platform for the Malays as a whole.

Meanwhile a much more revolutionary concept was declared by Tun Abdul Razak to create a completely new Malay commercial and industrial community that would be capable of directing, managing and manning enterprises, at all levels of complexity, at par with similar, established communities of other races. This meant, of course, that it

would be necessary to provide suitable technical education and managerial and commercial training both theoretical and practical, on an unprecedented scale, that would not only benefit the Malays in the urban areas but also in the rural areas.

It was decided that the employment pattern at all levels should reflect more closely the racial composition of the population. For most industries, a 40 per cent quota figure was set for the employment of Malay staff although this obviously depended on the availability of suitably trained and qualified Malay personnel. Restructuring the work force therefore became an important part of Tun Abdul Razak's new employment policy. Employers gradually restructured their work forces until at all levels, including that of top management, they reflected the racial percentages of the Malaysian population. It therefore became essential to create additional employment opportunities through expansion and diversification.

While some progress had been achieved, by the beginning of 1974 employment and ownership imbalance among the different races still remained serious. In pioneer industries, which constituted the fastest-growing sector in the manufacturing field, participation by Malays accounted for about 45 per cent of the total employment. However, about 55 per cent of the Malays employed were still unskilled labour, while the Chinese accounted for 77 per cent of the professional and managerial group and 73 per cent of the technical and supervisory group. To ensure increased representation of professionals in the private sector, the Government had to encourage Malay scholarship holders who would normally be absorbed in government agencies, to enter the private sector upon completion of their studies.

In 1975, in an extension of this policy, the Government put into law the Industrial Co-ordination Act, which provided that every enterprise engaged in manufacturing of any kind, no matter how long it had been in operation, must be licensed by the relevant Ministry supervising that particular activity, and that the Minister involved could attach any conditions to the new license that he considered in the national interest.

Over the years the economic position of the Malays lagged even further behind that of the non-Malays. While the share of economic wealth did grow for the Malays, the non-Malays experienced higher economic growth, pushing the disparity even further. In 1985 the non-Malays' share of ownership of national economy increased to 57 per

cent, compared to the Malays' share of only 18 percent. Strangely enough the non-Malays were still not happy with the NEP claiming that the new economic opportunities for the Malays had affected their (the non-Malays') opportunities in the economic activities provided by the Government. These two controversial and chronic economic imbalances would remain the roots of potential politico-economic problems in the country, indefinitely. While the NEP was meant to diffuse future racial turbulence, its implementation was not without racial tension - although it is recognised to have been an important element in sustaining political stability since the early 1970s.

Political Reform (The National Front)

Historically, the National Front is of significant difference from its predecessor, the Alliance. The Alliance was born out of necessity for the three major races (Malays, Chinese and Indians) to work together to fulfil the prerequisite set by the British for negotiating independence for Malaya. The National Front, on the other hand, came to life as the saviour of a nation on the brink of collapse.

It was the belief of Tun Abdul Razak that too much politicking in the country (as he thought there already was) was a bad recipe for national development. Thus, the United Malays National Organisation's (UMNO) "National Front" rationale centred on the need for less politicking and more joint efforts to speed development. Tun Abdul Razak's grand proposal for a "National Front" government roping together all political parties to join in a coalition seemed to be accepted very well by the other parties. The idea was accepted in principle even by the anti-Alliance groups. Even the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP/PAS) agreed to join the National Front, viewing the coalition as a temporary move aimed at getting additional development funds for Kelantan while building up its own strength in Northern Peninsular Malaysia.

The entry of PMIP/PAS into the Government implied a historic success for UMNO - there would no longer be an influential Malay opposition party in Parliament. There was, however, also a growing feeling among leaders of UMNO that its two long-time partners in the ruling Alliance, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), were not working hard enough to maintain the active support of their communities, as evidenced by their

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performance in the 1969 General Election, which could threaten the political power of the Alliance Government in future General Elections [14].

The 1969 General Election revealed the disabilities of the MCA and MIC in containing non-Malay challenges to Malay political dominance and delivering stable non-Malay voter support. Tun Abdul Razak was initially angered by this massive non-Malay voter defection from the Alliance and threatened that there would be no non-Malay representation in the Government (resulting in MCA's impulsive withdrawal).

For the first time, the Alliance seemed to have lost its two-thirds majority in Parliament. The MCA in particular had lost credibility by winning only 13 out of 33 seats contested, effectively outbidden for the Chinese votes by the Democratic Action Party (DAP), GERAKAN and the Peoples Progressive Party (PPP). UMNO too had suffered severe erosion of its rural base to PMIP/PAS.

The poor performance of the Alliance together with the ensuing riots would put the future of the three-party coalition in jeopardy and aggravate the post-election uncertainties. Maintaining the collaboration of these three racial political parties was considered no longer practical nor tenable.

Malaysian politics had undergone a change - any future inter-racial collaboration would have to include a wider spectrum of political interests. With regards to this, although it was a big risk, Tun Abdul Razak was clearly credited with the nurturing of a new and bigger collaboration to gather back the voters' support that would otherwise move to more radical and chauvinistic parties.

From the perspective of UMNO, especially the newcomer of Malay elites, maintaining the government under the Alliance formula, with its eroding or increasingly unstable mass support, could not be a long-term strategy. Engineered by Tun Abdul Razak and approved by the UMNO top leadership, it was the beginning of a tactical move that created the state-level coalition governments between the Alliance and opposition parties under the form of inter-racial political collaboration. The belief of Tun Abdul Razak and other UMNO leaders in the nurturing of the new inter-communal political collaboration had inspired the ruling party to the concept of a "National Front".

Meanwhile, aware of the folly of their unbridled campaign against the Government and the danger of the country not recovering from the

trauma made the opposition parties, with the exception of hard-liners like the DAP and Parti Rakyat, agree to the possible alternative of inter-communal political collaboration. The concept of the National Front involved the alignment of major political parties, representing a large segment of Malaysians dedicated to national unity and harmony in inter-ethnic power-sharing of a National Front which was expected to become a durable foundation for a strong and united multi-racial nation.

In initiating the existence of a National Front Tun Abdul Razak renewed his commitment to inter-ethnic power-sharing based on the principle of elite accommodation. He stressed the fact that the political and economic system of the country is dependent on the unity of UMNO's political elite. The accommodation of politics among UMNO had to be approached as the first step, then widened to inter-ethnic accommodation in order to build up a stable mass resulting from the alignment of major political parties.

Tun Abdul Razak's strategy of reasserting the primacy of the Malays and the hegemony of UMNO was achieved by maintaining the dominance of the moderate party leaders (such as Tun Dr. Ismail, Tun Hussein Onn, and some of Tunku Abdul Rahman's loyalists) and infusing "new blood" into the Government by coopting UMNO radicals (such as Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, Tan Sri Musa Hitam) and technocrats (such as Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie). Tun Abdul Razak's motive was to install a dynamic UMNO-dominated Government and to strengthen UMNO elite cohesion.

By a strategy of cooption Tun Abdul Razak effectively neutralised a dangerous source of intra-party outbidding and inducted new leaders into the art of accommodationist politics. The year 1971 marked UMNO's silver jubilee, a revised Party Constitution and the establishment of the Central Executive Committee (later called the Supreme Council).

Beyond UMNO-elites and constituency unity, there has always been a strong motivation among Malay political leaders to consolidate Malay communal unity to preserve supremacy. Nationalistic Malay unity behind the 1946 anti-Malayan Union movement, however, gave way to later native conceptions of the Malay polity. It was, thus, a singular achievement of Tun Abdul Razak that the strategy of coalition-extension under the National Front framework successfully neutralised communal outbidding by PMIP/PAS, if only for a brief period, by co-optation of its

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top leadership into the Federal Government and positioning of its second-echelon party elite in state coalition governments [15].

PMIP/PAS joined the ruling coalition in early 1973. A special conference of PMIP/PAS delegates took the decision at a tense seven-hour closed-door session. The vote, in fact, indicated significant opposition to the move: 194 for, 90 against with 14 abstentions. A further 30 voters stayed away [16].

Just after PMIP/PAS joined the ruling coalition, its leader Dato' Mohamed Asri was appointed Minister of Land Development with concurrent responsibility over Islamic Affairs. Although one Cabinet seat and one seat on the Terengganu States Executive Council, that of Deputy Chief Minister, were given to PMIP/PAS, UMNO, in return, managed to get a voice in the PAS-controlled Kelantan State Government [17].

UMNO and PMIP/PAS mutually coopted each other into a coalition government in Kelantan, Trengganu, Perlis and Kedah. UMNO entered into coalition with other opposition parties in Sarawak, Penang and Perak to offset declining support for its partners, MCA and the MIC.

State level coalition governments between the Alliance and opposition parties were formed in Sarawak (July 1970), Penang (February 1972), Perak (May 1972) and Kelantan, Terengganu, and Kedah (January 1973). A State coalition government happened between the Alliance and the Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP) in Sarawak, between the Alliance and GERAKAN in Penang and between the Alliance and People's Progressive Party (PPP) in Perak [18].

The longer-term National Front grand coalition that replaced the Alliance formula of a tripartite coalition became a legal entity on June 1974, comprising nine component parties namely, UMNO, MCA, MIC, PMIP/PAS, PPP, GERAKAN, SUPP, Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (PBB), and the Sabah Alliance Party (SAP) [19]. The process of elite accommodation and power-sharing of the National Front seemed to have enhanced the concept of government over politics, to contribute to political quiescence and inter-ethnic peace, which were crucial ingredients for the implementation of the country's far-reaching socio-economic policies.

For UMNO, the cost/benefit ratio seemed profitable, despite the need to share power and positions with PMIP/PAS stalwarts. But the PMIP/PAS leadership's behaviour in joining the National Front could not be correlated with a change in attitudes or motivations about inter-ethnic

accommodation. Certainly Malay unity was significant where the two parties (UMNO and PMIP/PAS) had been locked in antagonism for so long as a result of the conflict in ideological dimension.

For the non-Malay parties in the National Front, there was a basic calculation of benefits and costs: the benefit of participating in an UMNO-dominated government far outweighed the cost of losing some non-Malay voter support. In the heightened atmosphere of Malay intransigence after 1969, the threat of an all-Malay government was a real one; hence non-Malay elite motivation was to support the moderate UMNO leadership, to ensure that a greater number of non-Malay candidates would be elected on the Government ticket to provide a stronger influence on public policy, and to defend non-Malay cultural interests.

In fact, many observers felt that a diversity of parties in the National Front with little in common was not regarded as an ideal way to plan for the future. Tun Abdul Razak, who suggested the National Front Coalition when his three-party alliance appeared to crack in the wake of the 1969 racial riots, however, seemed convinced of the viability of the National Front [20].

The validity of the National Front was reflected in the 1974 General Elections, when the grand coalition swept to an overwhelming victory of 135 out of 154 parliamentary seats (104 in Peninsular Malaysia, 16 in Sabah and 15 in Sarawak), or 87 per cent of the seats, and 59 per cent of the popular vote.

When the results were known after polling on August 24, it was the opposition that had been annihilated. Landslide was hardly strong enough to describe the National Front sweep. All eleven assemblies in West Malaysia stayed firmly under National Front control. Three of them, Kelantan, Perlis and Pahang did not have a single opposition member [21].

Three opposition parties performed badly in this Election: the Malaysian People's Socialist Party (PSRM) and the newly-formed Kesatuan Insaf Tanah Air (KITA) did not win a single seat, and the Party of Social Justice (PEKEMAS) scraped home in only one Parliamentary and one state seat. Only the DAP held on in the Parliament, but managed to pull in five others, thereby retaining its strength at nine.

Tun Abdul Razak and the National Front had no difficulty in achieving the desired two-thirds majority, the two-thirds being the

majority needed to change the Constitution, a power used frequently since independence. In fact, the National Front went one step better and secured a two-thirds majority in the Federal parliament by virtue of the seats it held in West Malaysia, 104 out of 154.

In subsequent general elections, in 1978, 1982 and 1986, the National Front has been successful in maintaining its four-fifths majority in Parliament, demonstrating its superior organisational strength, though, in terms of popular votes, the party's share has hovered around 60 per cent. The latter indicated that the National Front has recouped the inter-communal support base lost by the Alliance formula in the 1969 General Election. Tun Abdul Razak's formation of a stable coalition government thereby restored the continuity and feasibility of multi-ethnic power-sharing and denied the demands of the apostles of single-race hegemonism.

The pact of inter-ethnic accommodation of the National Front not only gave it parliamentary strength but led Tun Abdul Razak to assume prominence over politics where the elites experimented with a new format of governance based on central and local coalitions.

Politically, the National Front administration remained solidly entrenched. The governing parties had not decided whether the coalition arrangements should extend beyond the next elections, UMNO wanted to keep its options open, only because of the continuing weakness of its two original partners, the MCA and the MIC.

Despite this, UMNO remains solidly entrenched with the annual congress reducing politicking to a bare minimum and putting emphasis on broad economic and other problems. This was in sharp contrast to the brawls that usually preceded MIC meetings and the MCA Central Working Committee meetings at their own headquarters under the watchful eyes of the police.

The one outstanding feature of political life in Malaysia since World War II has been the continued dominance of UMNO, the major partner at first, then in the three-party Alliance, and since January 1973, in the ten-party National Front coalition. In the process, and despite opposition attempts and tactics, its hold on the country was never really challenged. Malaysia has been ruled by the same political grouping and the same basic ideology since it achieved independence in 1957.

The long-term National Front grand coalition is really a success story in social engineering. The National Front's success in maintaining its

power since the 1974 general election was an eloquent testimony to the end of racism in politics. In the process, it has evolved a unique form of parliamentary democracy a'la Malaysia. More than 10 political parties in the National Front represent all the races, tribes and religions in the country, therefore making it a self-contained forum of check and balance in a government of national unity and consensus.

Malaysian Foreign Policy

The analysis of Malaysia's foreign policy since 1957 can be divided into four phases, the first phase lasting from 1957 to 1970, the second phase from 1970 to 1976, the third phase from 1976 to 1981, and the last and current phase from 1981 onwards. Each of these phases fell within the leadership of each of the Prime Ministers of Malaysia. In the first phase, i.e. from 1957 to 1970 the country was led by Tunku Abdul Rahman. In the second phase, the leadership was exercised by Tun Abdul Razak. The third phase came under the leadership of Tun Hussein Onn and in the current phase, political leadership is being exercised by Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir.

During the first phase of Malaysia's foreign policy that lasted from 1957 to 1970, there was a remarkable predictability about foreign policy issues. During this time, Malaysia, under Tunku Abdul Rahman's leadership, was closely aligned to Britain by way of economic, political, cultural and defence linkages. The alliance relationship was heavily underpinned by the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement (AMADA) of 1957.

During this period, Malaysia demonstrated her strong opposition to Communism both at home and abroad and this was marked by aligning herself with the Western bloc nations in various international forums, in particular the United Nations Organisation.

After about twenty years of independence and having survived the very traumatic challenge of an Armed Communist uprising, the threat of Indonesia and the Philippines to abort the formation of Malaysia, the country had grown in confidence. The people were enjoying a standard of living beyond the reach of most of the Asian nations then.

The political instability that occurred in Malaysia immediately following the civil disturbances of May 13, 1969 did not critically affect

the general posture of Malaysia in her international relations. Under the premiership of Tun Abdul Razak, Malaysia became more actively involved in regional and international affairs. Tun Abdul Razak recognised, besides the urgent need to come to terms with the fast emerging Chinese nuclear superpower, there was the necessity of taking into consideration, in all of his future policies, the increasing strength and influence of Japan in Asia, particularly in the fields of commerce, industry and finance.

Malaysia's carving out a new international role was for reasons of long-term security. There was a feeling in Kuala Lumpur that after the threats from Indonesia and the Philippines, Malaysia has in principle no quarrel with anybody, so the ring of friendship should be extended as far as others would accept.

One point was worth mentioning. Though Tun Abdul Razak, in his capacity as Director of the National Operations Council (NOC), had been the *de facto* Head of Government from May 1969, he made no attempt to change the country's foreign policy for as long as Tunku Abdul Rahman held the title of Prime Minister. However, Tun Abdul Razak increasingly believed that Malaysian conservatism and over-dependence upon alignment with the Western democracies no longer adequately served the country's needs.

Malaysian domestic political stability could deteriorate and this was proven in the past. The internal conflicts of the country, which are largely caused by the political struggle among various groups resulting from differences of ideology, culture, religion and ethnicity, are easily aggravated by the involvement of foreign elements. Foreign infiltration and subversion could become effective where there are local forces, such as the local Communist movements or other rebel groups, supporting their interference. Accordingly, Malaysia's principal security concern since its independence, has centred upon the dominant issues of Communist insurrection and communal divisions.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Communist Party of China backed armed revolutions in Malaysia and in other Southeast Asian countries. Indonesia and Vietnam particularly regarded China as a potential threat and shared a distrust of this country. Vietnam was still facing the threats of Chinese-supported Cambodian rebels in Cambodia as well as armed incursions by Chinese troops along the Chinese-Vietnamese border. In the GESTAPU tragedy in Indonesia in 1965, it

was China that backed the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) in their violent struggle to seize political power in the country illegally which caused the killing of six prominent Indonesian army generals [22].

The influence of Communists not only affected the Peninsula but also Sabah and Sarawak. The North Kalimantan Unitary State Revolutionary Government for North Kalimantan and the Malayan National Liberation League received public support from China after 1965. The Malayan National Liberation League was even invited to establish a permanent diplomatic mission in Peking in January 1966. On April 29, 1975 the Chinese Communist Party sent a congratulatory telegram to the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) on the occasion of the celebration of its 45th Anniversary. A shocked Malaysian Government made a strong protest to China through the Chinese Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, condemning the telegram as an interference in internal matters and a violation of mutual promise. However, the threat of Communist insurrection had increasingly diminished.

When Tun Abdul Razak became Prime Minister after the communal riots of 1969, Malaysia moved gradually away from the traditionally vehement anti-Communist stand. While the pro-Western bias in international affairs of Malaysia was still continued by its political leadership, at this period, there was a toning down of the country's rigid anti-Communism. Malaysian diplomatic and political contacts were established and intensified with a whole variety of Communist nations both in Europe and in Asia. The effort was climaxed with the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China.

Tun Abdul Razak's making conciliatory overtures towards Communist China was a complete reversal of the country's former policy. It was to be Tun Abdul Razak's policy to continue and to establish diplomatic relations with all countries, no matter what their political persuasions, as long as these countries were prepared to respect Malaysia's sovereignty and independence, for their internal policies and ideologies were solely the concern of their own people.

When speaking on the subject of his Government's new foreign policy in the House of Representatives on July 26, 1971, Tun Abdul Razak carefully explained to members of Parliament his intended fundamental change in the country's approach to international Communism.

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The opening move in this revised strategy on China involved the despatch of a 19-delegate trade mission to Peking. Before Malaysia established relations with Peking, communication between Malaysia and China had already moved beyond ping-pong, badminton, medical and trade diplomacy, with negotiations between the two countries' representatives taking place in New York.

Tun Abdul Razak paid a dramatic visit to the People's Republic of China in May 1974 leading subsequently to the establishment of official ties and representing a fresh start in the relations between these two countries after the doubts and differences which had existed for two decades. This official visit of Tun Abdul Razak was on the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai. This was the first official visit ever exchanged between Malaysia and the People's Republic of China and that fact alone underlined its particular significance. Tun Abdul Razak, accompanied by representatives of political parties in the Government and government officials, called on Chairman Mao Tse-tung and conveyed to him the best wishes of the Malaysian Government [23].

Three main political issues can be identified on which Malaysia wanted assurances from China. Firstly, the withdrawal of support to the outlawed CPM. On this, while China would perhaps not jeopardise state to state relations by providing military assistance to local insurgent groups, it had been unwilling to renounce its ideological support of revolutionary movements, at least so long as the Sino-Soviet conflict continued. Secondly, there was the issue of the "Suara Revolusi" or Voice of the Malayan Revolution (VMR) radio broadcasts emanating from the Chinese soil. Peking had denied knowledge of this. Finally, Malaysia wanted an explicit statement of policy from Peking on its position regarding the Overseas Chinese. With regard to the Chinese Malaysians, those who had acquired local citizenship, Peking seemed to accept the doctrine of "jus soli". The problem seemed to centre around the status of the 220,000-odd Chinese in Malaysia who had not become citizens. Though Peking rejected the "jus sanguinis" doctrine, it was reluctant to renounce them. From the Malaysian perspective, it would be extremely destabilising if this large group of technically stateless Chinese should suddenly claim the protection of the Chinese Embassy in Kuala Lumpur [24].

It was felt in Malaysia that it would be difficult for the CPM to step up its activities, at least in the immediate future. In fact, after VMR, the

clandestine radio of the CPM, broadcast Kuala Lumpur's new relations with Peking, local observers suggested that the CPM would have to quickly change its tactics [25].

The question of the stateless Chinese was complicated by the fact that many of them, born in Malaysia but without documents to prove it, had never been to China and might not want to take up Chinese citizenship. These stateless Chinese, along with other foreign citizens, must obtain permits to work in Malaysia. The issue of the problem of the stateless Chinese happened because of Malaysia's decision not to relax its citizenship rules to accommodate the stateless Chinese, but the accord would presumably enable this group to move elsewhere in search of employment.

Since China wanted bilateral problems to be held over for detailed talks when formal ties were established, all outstanding issues between the two countries including the major problem of the status of some 220,000 stateless Chinese who permanently resided in Malaysia had apparently been resolved [26].

Differences in ideology and in approaches to some international issues seemed not to present obstacles to the development of fruitful relations and beneficial cooperation between these two countries. Concomitant to this, Malaysia recognised the Peking regime as the sole and legal government of China. Malaysia also felt it logical to support Peking's claim for a seat in the United Nations, with the reservation that this was not to be at the expense of unseating Taiwan. Malaysia was among those countries which supported the seating of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations in 1971.

Even in its eagerness to normalise relations with Peking, Malaysia had been sensitive to the reservations of other members of the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN), particularly Indonesia, on China. In July the same year, Tun Abdul Razak personally reassured President Suharto that in the pursuit of its China policy Malaysia would not allow relations with Indonesia to turn sour.

In the perspective of Malaysia-Indonesian relations, the signing of the 1966 peace agreement on April 11, 1966 in Jakarta between Tun Abdul Razak and the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Tun Adam Malik marked not only the turning point in relations between Malaysia and Indonesia, but opened the eyes of leaders of the other countries in the region to the need for peaceful co-existence despite differences and disagreements.

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The peace between Malaysia and Indonesia was followed by the improvement of relations between Malaysia and the Philippines, despite the Philippines claim on Sabah, and by the formation of ASEAN. The ensuing peace afforded the countries in the region the much needed financial resources, time and opportunity to build their young economies.

Malaysia stepped up rural development and adopted the policy of import substitution by encouraging foreign investment. Indonesia too, whose economy had declined during President Sukarno's era, launched a massive food production programme. Within a mere decade, President Suharto moved Indonesia from a food deficit to food surplus nation. Hunger was eradicated and food sufficiency remains President Suharto's greatest achievement. Economically, Malaysia and Indonesia have established themselves as among the fastest-growing economies in East Asia and are facing major challenges in the international market place.

Besides China, Malaysia established diplomatic relations with North Korea, North Vietnam and East Germany in 1973. In 1968 Tun Abdul Razak became the most senior Malaysian Minister to visit the Soviet Union which was followed shortly by the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1970. Malaysia established an embassy in Moscow. Trade agreements were also signed with the Soviet Union with a view to enhancing trade relations. An Air Service Agreement was signed with this country, enabling the establishment of direct air communication between the two countries. This Agreement was expected to open up new avenues of cooperation between Malaysia and the Soviet Union.

In stressing Malaysia's commitment to improve its relations with Communist countries, Tun Abdul Razak had still perceived the importance of the country's aligning with Western counterparts. Although there was at least a British military presence of sorts in the region after the termination of the AMADA in 1970, the scope was far from grand: a battalion group with a detachment of gunners, five frigates or destroyers, a submarine, a contingent of Nimrod long-range missiles, an unspecified number of Whirlwind helicopters and a scheme to send a substantial number of British servicemen to train in jungle warfare.

The fading of the British military presence was due to a greater significance in the relations between Malaysia and Singapore. Both were sharply aware of their new defence commitment. As Tun Abdul Razak put it "Malaysia and Singapore are countries of this region. Therefore our responsibility is primary. The others are only here to help"[27]. This

implicitly recognised that the two countries must coordinate their defence efforts, standardise training and weaponry and evolve a viable command structure and a common doctrine on strategy.

Soon after the continuing gradual rundown of British military power in Southeast Asia that inevitably would sooner or later lead to a total withdrawal, coupled with the determination of the United States progressively to disengage its armed forces from the various territories of Indo-China, Tun Abdul Razak began to implement his own plans, which he had formulated in the hope and expectation of securing the future safety and well-being of Malaysia.

The AMADA of 1957 lapsed in 1970 and was replaced by the Five-Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA). At this time, Malaysia, with its small conventional army and embryo air-defence systems, still needed Western allies, and so in April 1970 Tun Abdul Razak, in his capacity as Minister of Defence, was a prime mover in the FPDA subscribed to by Australia, Britain, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore. The Agreement was signed in London.

It was agreed that there should be developed an integrated air defence system to cover both Malaysia and Singapore and naval forces that would cooperate effectively in coastal defence. It was also agreed that a major Commonwealth joint exercise should be held in the area after 1971. To facilitate this a joint exercise planning machinery and a jungle warfare training school on a multi-national basis would be set up. Military and economic assistance were promised to Malaysia and Singapore by the other three members [28].

In the long haul, the FPDA might prove incompatible with the latest foreign policy aims of Malaysia and Singapore. These called for the neutralisation of Southeast Asia, its new status to be guaranteed by the United States, China and the Soviet Union. As seen from here, the defence plan was necessary as long as the security of the region was not underwritten by these big three.

When Macapagal was succeeded by President Marcos in 1966, and when President Sukarno was removed from power in Indonesia in the same year, the region's international relations seemed to have entered a new political environment. President Marcos recognised the new Federation of Malaysia in 1966, and both sides agreed in a Joint Communiqué to clarify the Sabah claim and discuss the means of a settlement. ASEAN was created the following year.

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The period following this saw the loosening of Malaysia's links with the United Kingdom and closer ties being forged with nations in the region, especially with the member states of ASEAN. In parallel with Malaysia's new stance, Tun Abdul Razak emphasised the need to neutralise Indochina and get rid of foreign troops. For Tun Abdul Razak, the countries in Southeast Asia needed to focus all their energies on the development of the backward rural areas, and not to fritter away precious money, time and energy on building up defence against possible outside aggression.

Simultaneously, Tun Abdul Razak worked on another foreign strategy. To secure world-wide respect for a zone of neutralisation in Southeast Asia Malaysia needed to transform her pro-Western foreign policy to one of non-alignment. In all this Tun Abdul Razak repeatedly stressed that Malaysia wanted to be friends with every nation in the world no matter what the system of government it had as long as it respected Malaysia's sovereignty and the principles of peaceful co-existence.

Ties with other socialist bloc countries followed soon and Malaysia was increasingly recognised as a full-fledged member of the non-aligned movement. This set the stage for the ZOPFAN proposal (Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality). Malaysia's commitments towards the neutralisation of Indochina together with its transformation of policy to one of non-alignment, had contributed to the development of the concept of ZOPFAN. Whilst ASEAN was set up in 1967 it was the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 1971 which propounded for the first time working towards the establishment of ZOPFAN as an ASEAN policy.

The idea of ZOPFAN was originally expounded in the Non-Aligned Nations Conference in Lusaka, Zambia in August 1970. ZOPFAN was one of the most ambitious projects in Tun Abdul Razak's plan for re-aligning his country's foreign policy, and one of the most difficult to achieve because of its dependence for success upon the cooperation and goodwill of other more powerful nations, mainly Britain and the United States.

The ZOPFAN proposal was the framework within which the countries of ASEAN hoped to achieve a secure freedom, lasting peace and greater prosperity for their troubled region. The way ahead was designed to serve the interests of all.

One important step for advancing the early realisation of ZOPFAN was the establishment of a Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (SEANWFZ), comprising all Southeast Asian states, which would serve as an effective measure for reducing tension and promoting peace and security in the region. However, Malaysia and its neighbours in Southeast Asia collectively realised that if they did not endeavour to create in this region a climate of peace, others would not disperse the clouds of war for them. An effort by ASEAN to make the Southeast Asian region a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone was not going to stop the build up of Chinese military capabilities.

Although the neutralisation scheme professed by Malaysia's foreign policy had been slow in its acceptance, to the disappointment of Malaysia, it had demonstrated its entrepreneurial diplomacy. The policy of ZOPFAN as an ASEAN proposition must be ranked among the brainchildren of Tun Abdul Razak, in promoting regional and international peace.

With Malaysia's achievements as the co-founder of ASEAN, which has significance as an active instrument of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia, Malaysia further sought membership in the Non-Aligned Movement. Reflecting this, Tun Abdul Razak enlarged Malaysia's contacts with the members of the non-aligned movement and intensified the country's initiatives within the movement.

Malaysia had joined the non-aligned group of nations in September 1969, and in April the following year had sent a full team of representatives, headed by Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie who was at that time Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Dar-es-Salaam, the capital of Tanzania, where its first meeting was being held. Later that same year Tun Abdul Razak, then Director of the National Operations Council (NOC) as well as Deputy Prime Minister, had personally led the delegation to the Third Summit Conference held in Lusaka, Zambia [29].

Tun Abdul Razak, in a personal appearance, attributed great importance to the very high level Fourth Conference that was held in North Africa early in September 1973. In this Conference, he urged member States to combine their strength in order to fight as a powerful united force for a more equitable share of world economic opportunities for their people. This was paralleled by Tun Abdul Razak's belief that the country's natural resources, commerce and industry should be

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controlled locally and not be subject to excessive exploitation by foreign interests. This period also witnessed a wider range of active political and diplomatic intercourse with member states of the Islamic Community. For Islamic reasons, sympathy for the Arab cause in the Middle East was important, although Kuala Lumpur's initiatives in this direction had not always met with success.

Despite its stand on non-alignment and neutralisation, since the official religion of the country and the religion of the Malay race is Islam, the Malaysian Government permitted monetary contributions to be solicited from the general public and even enlistment of volunteers, though response to the latter was negligible, to aid the Palestinian cause.

In line with the country's stance on non-alignment, Tun Abdul Razak diversified and developed his contacts with the Arab states, especially the Gulf states. Malaysia maintained the warmest and most cordial of relationships with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Socialist Republic of Egypt, two Arab states fundamentally different in terms of their ideological commitment and political organisation.

The country's continuous widening of its spectrum of interaction with the international Islamic political community was to a great extent facilitated by the growth of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) of which Tunku Abdul Rahman became the First Secretary General following his retirement from the Prime Ministership.

Tun Abdul Razak's attempt to be on close terms with foreign leaders, particularly those from the region, led to him being considered as a man for all nations. Tun Abdul Razak preferred to deal with leaders in an informal atmosphere. His meetings were associated with an identical pattern. He would drop in on neighbouring countries informally for talks and invited other leaders to Malaysia in a similar vein. A great deal was achieved in this friendly atmosphere, according to several of his close aides. The pattern for most of the talks was for a formal, short meeting attended by officials, after which the two leaders would have a long discussion by themselves. One official said Tun Abdul Razak was always in "top form" on these occasions and appeared to relish such contact. This style of leadership made Tun Abdul Razak successfully transform Malaysia's new stance in its foreign policy.

Interestingly, however, there were also complaints of diplomats being unable to meet Tun Abdul Razak, who was also Minister of Foreign Affairs, except on official occasions. This was largely because of his

preoccupation with administrative work. He often delegated the Minister of Information Tengku Ahmad Rithaudeen to act as Minister of Foreign Affairs at ceremonial functions. Tun Abdul Razak himself was most of the time preoccupied as driving force to ensure that the Second Malaysian Plan would provide the grounding for the Bumiputra to have a 30 per cent stake in the economy by 1990 without fail.

There were also the comments from abroad, especially from countries that previously had enjoyed a honeymoon relationship with Malaysia, that the Malaysian Government muddled its way through the running of the country, with no overall plan or direction, stumbling from one ad hoc decision to another. As a matter of fact, Tun Abdul Razak was wisely reserving the country's position in a complicated world, keeping its options open and ensuring that it was able to respond pragmatically to the vagaries of the country's internal system of checks and balances and to crises imposed from outside.

Importantly, in global perspective, with Tun Abdul Razak's wisely implementing the country's foreign policy, Malaysia was able to show its commitment to the cause of peace by consistently pursuing a policy of non-alignment and regional cooperation and of extending its hand of friendship to all countries who wished to be friends with Malaysia, irrespective of their political ideology or social system, on the basis of mutual respect, non-interference and coexistence.

National Security

During the post-independence of Malaya, there were two distinct dimensions of Malaysia's political stability and security: internal dimension and external dimension. Internal dimension can be related to memories of the 1948-60 Emergency years that had increasingly been stirred by spasmodic outbreaks of urban attacks, area curfews north and south of the capital. The enemy was infiltrating all levels of society, including the Chinese triads (Secret Societies) and drug trade. External dimension can be related to the extension of Indonesian incursions, to the significance of the Philippines claim on Sabah and the separation of Singapore.

Under the premiership of Tun Abdul Razak, these two distinct dimensions of Malaysia's stability and security took different forms of

commitment. It was not in the form of threats, as happened in the period of post-independence of Malaya, but more in the commitments and measures of Tun Abdul Razak, as Minister of Defence, in overcoming internal and external threats to the stability and security of the country.

In May 1965, the Royal Address to the Malaysian Parliament indicated the need for a further expansion of the armed forces in the light of the extension of Indonesian incursions to Peninsular Malaysia. Tun Abdul Razak knew that the expansion in 1966 would involve a very big increase in the strength of the infantry and would also include the raising of an engineer unit, another signal regiment, and units of workshop, supply and transport. The Malaysian navy and air force would acquire new ships, helicopters and strike aircraft.

An infantry brigade each had been established in both Sarawak and Sabah under the command of the First Malaysian Infantry Division based in Kuching. In line with the development of internal threats, in June 1968 Tun Abdul Razak announced the setting-up of a West Malaysian Command to coordinate the operation of the armed forces and police in dealing with the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) presence along the Malaysian-Thai border in which the appointment of Director of Operations was of significance, given to the Army Chief, Tan Sri General Abdul Hamid Bidin.

The rise of the profile of the military in the post-1969 period can easily be misinterpreted due to the change of leadership from Tunku Abdul Rahman to Tun Abdul Razak and the parliamentary interregnum when the National Operations Council (NOC) was under Tun Abdul Razak in absolute control of the country. The membership of the NOC represented a tight circle of politicians and civil servants together with the police and military chiefs.

Whatever the real reasons for such a unique development in the state of civil-military relations, the Communists had been considered as an element in causing the riot of 1969. The cooperation of the military was important for the NOC to overcome the riot. As a Director of the NOC Tun Abdul Razak brought Tan Sri General Ibrahim Ismail to be a member of the NOC, then appointed him as Chief Executive Officer of the NOC. This was one of the earliest instances of the apparent readiness of the political leadership to bring the military into its confidence. This had significantly raised the profile of the military and the police with sufficient authority in their hands.

In line with the confidence and authority of the military and police, the Essential (Community Self-Reliance) Regulations introduced sweeping and controversial measures under which acts of terrorism and violence would be tried in special courts. Tun Abdul Razak himself underscored the need for the new laws and the need for the support of the people. Then, the new "Rukun Tetangga" (Pillars of the Community) scheme was formulated under the unrepealed provisions of the Emergency Regulations introduced by the NOC which governed the hectic days after the May 1969 riots.

The increasing political threats to the country's stability can be identified by the sign of the rapid increase in development expenditure on defence. It was in 1971, too, that the Government finally admitted to a rapid increase in development expenditure on defence over the past few years: more than twice the amount spent for the preceding five years from 1966 to 1970. In the Second Malaysia Plan itself the total development allocation for both defence and internal security had increased to a more than 15 per cent share. Even the planners were conscious of the need to keep this figure "under careful review" since it competed for the use of limited resources with other activities; this rapid increase in development expenditure on defence was important to the security of Malaysia as a small country.

Malaysia must rely on its own resources for the defence of the country. The country had to continue to expand its armed force, its army, navy and air force and must have a well-trained, highly mobile and effective forces, capable of withstanding any limited form of aggression against the country. Even the defence of Malaysia still depended on a defence arrangement of the Five-Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) as it was not possible for Malaysia to go it alone if confronted with an external threat or if Malaysia were to be attacked by a major power.

As mentioned earlier, when the British announced their decision to withdraw their forces from this region, Malaysia asked for a meeting of the five powers closely concerned with the defence of Malaysia and Singapore (i.e. Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia) to take counsel and discuss problems of joint defence. It was the commitment of these five Commonwealth countries on the security of the region that brought them to discuss an integrated air defence system for Malaysia and Singapore.

In the wake of British military withdrawal scheduled for completion in 1971, Tun Abdul Razak had been compelled to give priority both to his own defence needs and those of the region as a whole, for even though the Government in the United Kingdom might participate in a Five-Power Commonwealth defence force, almost certainly it would not provide anything like its former number of troops. The changing situation in Vietnam and to some extent terrorist activities on the Malaysian-Thai border had also reinforced the needs. While statements issued by the Australian and New Zealand Governments confirmed that they would maintain a military presence in the area after 1971, the extent of such commitment would be difficult to anticipate.

Despite all these, fortunately both Malaysia and Singapore have shown a genuine desire for cooperation on defence while pursuing their own independent defence policies. Over the longer term the two have conceivably been drawn together through the economic activities of the regional organisation of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which both are members. With Malaysia and the Philippines prepared to shelve their differences over Sabah following a welcome resumption of diplomatic relations, finally all members agreed to subscribe to an ASEAN fund of RM15 million to finance regional projects. Significantly, this has made ASEAN eminently successful in projecting an image of an effective regional economic organisation which has significantly contributed to the stability of the region.

The further expansion of Malaysian armed forces had been determined by the significance of the possible threat of China. China, not the Soviet Union, was considered more of a military threat in Southeast Asia. The so-called aggression and military build-up of the Soviet Union in the region was no more than what was necessary for her own security, being surrounded on all sides by nations that regarded her as hostile. The build-up of Soviet naval power in the Pacific was merely responding to superpower shifts in global strategy [30].

Most Malaysian political observers hold similar views. For them, the massive Soviet arms build-up had not been dramatic or a sudden response to any particular event, but substantial and steady [31]. Soviet naval bases in Vietnam were not military bases in the actual sense of the word; they were merely facilities being used by the military. Cam Ranh Bay was nothing more than a supply port where their ships, after the long

passage from Russia, needed to replenish their supplies; it was not really a naval base as naval bases took years to be developed [32].

The Southeast Asian region was far down the list of Soviet priorities in the world and the Soviet Union had not done well in the ASEAN states [33]. Since the Soviet Union had no specific intention to be aggressive in any part of the Asia-Pacific region [34], Malaysia did not worry much about its military threat. The Soviet Union had very little inclination to assist national liberation struggles in Malaysia. There was no possibility at all of the Soviet Union getting involved with the CPM; its largely ethnic Chinese composition served as a further deterrent to Moscow [35].

According to Soviet former Deputy Foreign Minister Igor A. Rogachev, in connection with Soviet policy towards the Asia-Pacific region, the key to understanding the objectives of Soviet international policies, can be found in the concept of international security as formulated by the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). This comprehensive expression of present-day Soviet perceptions of international security covered the military, political, economic and humanitarian spheres, and was justified as follows [36]:

- 1) Military: Renunciation by the nuclear powers of fighting either a nuclear or conventional war, prevention of an arms race in outer space, cessation of nuclear weapons tests, and elimination of nuclear weapons,
- 2) Political: An unconditional respect of the sovereign right of every nation to choose the ways and forms of its development, measures to build confidence among states, guarantees against external aggression and the inviolability of frontier, and methods to prevent international terrorism,
- 3) Economic: Renunciation of all kinds of discrimination, blockades and sanctions, equitable settlement of the problem of indebtedness of developing countries, and establishment of a new economic order, and
- 4) Humanitarian: Access to information, strengthening of the spirit of mutual understanding and agreement, and eradication of genocide, apartheid and fascist propaganda.

"The Soviet Union has proposed that every member of the UN Security Council should undertake not to interfere in the affairs of

countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, not to threaten them with force, and not to draw them into military blocs" [37].

The Soviet goals in the region were to legitimise the presence of their military power in competing with the United States military power, in containing China and in limiting the role of Japan [38]. With a certain level of arms strength in the region, the Soviet Union could ensure the safety of its commercial sea lanes. In fact, most of the Soviet's grand strategy was to contain China. Moscow's fear of China was compounded by the fact that Beijing, as a major Asian Communist power, could count on additional resources to contain Soviet influence in the region, with support from the sizeable ethnic Chinese minorities, especially in Malaysia where they constitute over 40 per cent of the population.

Malaysia shared a similar perception with Indonesia that the Soviet threat was less urgent and more distant than their perception of the threat from China. China was perceived as a possible external source of aid to subversive and insurgent elements, or seen as a nation that might interfere in an intra-regional dispute [39]. Malaysia considered China's modernisation objectives as posing a potentially greater danger to its military security. In their modernisation objectives, the Chinese were not only keen to expand trade and investment opportunities but also military capabilities. The Four Modernisation Plans to the military called for the introduction of more technologically advanced weaponry, new training methods for troops, higher education standards for officers, and re-examination of its military strategy and doctrine. The strategy for future wars would not be the People's war of the past but the People's war under modern conditions. This was defined rather vaguely as the application of advanced technology to modern battlefield conditions.

Although the Chinese had declared that military modernisation had a lower priority than the other three modernisation plans and that Chinese military spending had actually fallen, military modernisation had significantly expanded their weapons technology and enhanced the sophistication of their weapons. While there were no signs that China had any aggressive intention, the perceived Chinese military threat according to Bruce Gale [40] emanated from the belief that China at some future date would adopt a belligerent attitude towards Southeast Asia. The possibility would be greater when it no longer needed ASEAN support for its objective in Indochina.

In line with the increasing fear of China's threat and its link with the significance of the sizeable Chinese minority in the country, it was Tun Abdul Razak who pushed the rapid increase in development expenditure on defence in the interests of the national security of the country.

In the internal perspective of national security of the country, Tun Abdul Razak had also related it to the influence of political participation. Malaysia is particularly concerned with the frequent incidents of deliberate misreporting about Malaysian internal and foreign affairs by the foreign press. The first few bitter doses of uncalled for publicity occurred shortly after the May 13, 1969 racial riots in which foreign readers were regaled with distorted views of the events [41]. The Malaysian Government was condemned as undemocratic, unjust, cruel, chaotic in administration, corrupt and incapable of succeeding in national development [42].

It was quoted that "the starting point of foreign media distaste for Malaysia is the misunderstanding of the New Economic Policy". The foreign journalists saw the NEP as a discriminatory policy which "consigns the non-Bumiputra to second class status" instead of stressing that the NEP was an affirmative action taken to correct imbalances in society. The other cause of foreign media antipathy towards Malaysia derived "from the position of Malay political pre-eminence in the country which described the Malaysian Government as undemocratic without making historical justification of the political right of the Malays as sons of the soil" [43].

In order to stop further aggravation of racial and religious tensions for the purpose of maintaining national security and public order, the Government under the leadership of Tun Abdul Razak enacted various laws such as the Sedition Act, 1948, Internal Security Act, 1960 (ISA), the Societies Act, 1966, the Official Secret Acts, 1972 (OSA) and the Universities and University Colleges Act 1976 (UUCA).

The ISA is the most effective Act and feared by the Government's enemies. The ISA a relic of colonial "emergency" legislation, allowing detention for long periods without trial [44]. Detention beyond the initial 60-day interrogation period is automatic once the Minister of Home Affairs signs a detention order of two years, renewable every two years thereafter [45].

The danger of being detained under the ISA is that the Act could deny the detainees' right to self-defence (Advisory Board hearings can hardly

be taken as a fair means of self-defence). There is a provision of ISA that enables the Minister of Home Affairs and the authorities to refuse in a court of law to divulge information which purportedly underpins the detentions. Significantly, the ISA also allows the courts to refrain from questioning the grounds of the detention [46]. The ISA in particular enables the Government to prevent any person from acting in a manner prejudicial to security, the maintenance of essential services or the economic life of Malaysia.

The amendment of the UUCA, a special law promulgated by the King in 1971, was aimed to keep student activists in check and to ensure that their interests were confined largely to the classroom in order to bring peace to the campuses, and to make the students more disciplined and improve their academic performance. The Act was also aimed judiciously to diminish the political role of students and academicians, especially those who were likely to be used by saboteurs trying to gain power. Sections 15(1) and 15(2) of UUCA, stated that university students and student bodies were prohibited from being members or being associated with any political party, society or trade union except those provided for by the university constitution or by obtaining written permission from the Vice Chancellor [47].

The UUCA was directed at the threat posed by students and academicians of the local universities. As a vocal and intellectual group, the threat of students and academicians is not limited to the campus but extends to the whole of society. A progressive change in the nature of student activists in Malaysia happened after the riots of 1969. Since then, the number of Malay students in local universities has increased, most of them coming from the rural areas and bringing with them a strong Islamic tradition and a genuine Malay concern [48].

In the University of Malaya, the oldest university in Malaysia, the political vehicle of these new groups of Malay students was the Malay Language Society. For the Chinese students, their unity and outlet were found both in the officially recognised student political organisation, the University of Malaya Student Union (UMSU), and the Chinese Language Society (CLS). Since the Malay students were likely to fight for national issues concerning the Malay community, they were easily exploited by other forces. For example, in the student demonstrations of 1974, which involved the majority of Malay students, the leaders of these demonstrations, who believed in Socialism, were actually members of the

University of Malaya Student Union (UMSU) and the Chinese Language Society (CLS). By using issues of the landless squatters in Johore and the poverty of the Malay rubber small-holders in Baling, these non-Malay leaders had successfully attracted the Malay students to conduct rallies and to spur unrest and disruption in the University.

According to the White Paper published by the Ministry of Home Affairs, there was evidence of a link between the demonstrations and campus disturbances and the CPM. The CPM had infiltrated the Chinese Language Society (CLS) and University of Malaya Students' Union (UMSU) through a member of the CLS who was the UMSU Publication Secretary. This student had sought to propagandise and use his position to enter and eventually control the UMSU [49] whose membership was open to every student at the University.

Since the majority of students involved in such demonstrations and campus disturbances were directly or indirectly Malays whose overall academic performance was generally poorer than their non-Malay counterparts at the local universities, a restrictive Act was thought necessary to curtail their rights of political participation. The issues they fought for on behalf of the Malay community had attracted other Malay groups, who joined them in rallies to protest against the Government [50]. The significance of this in threatening the stability of the country could be high.

Just before the return to Parliamentary rule, the NOC passed the UCCA ordinance that made all political activities and external affiliations illegal for all students and student bodies. This piece of legislation seemed to be aimed at the diminutive Parti Rakyat whose support was based largely on student radicals who liked to consider themselves Marxists. Furthermore, the Union at the University of Malaya was replaced as the representative body for students by a "Student Representative Council" of only four members, all of whom would be under the directive of the Vice Chancellor.

Though there was an Official Secrets Ordinance in the colonial period, Malaysia first promulgated a secrecy law only in 1972. The 1972 law did not contain any definition of "official secrets", however, it appeared to be more concerned with spying and communication with foreign agents [51].

The passing of the amendment to the 1972 OSA was important in order to stop government secrets from being purloined and falling into

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the hands of the government's enemies. In the process of expansion of the country's armed forces and defence installations, it was necessary for defence secrets to be preserved and to be kept away from enemy eyes. The OSA 1972 was intended to control the activities of the foreign media and to reduce the number of spies working for foreign countries. The falling of such Government secrets into enemy hands at the wrong time could cause a serious problem for national security. Stealing defence secrets would also cause much embarrassment and damage the Government's defence negotiations with other governments. Obviously no government wants to read about its "top secret" material in either local or foreign media. Such legislation is desperately required in a multi-racial society since a number of citizens among the minorities were found to have been disloyal to the country, working for the Communist government of China [52].

Another Act that also strikes at press freedom is the Sedition Act. In fact, this Act is mainly aimed at opposition parties. As mentioned earlier, the threat of seditious activities to Malaysian society has always involved racially-sensitive issues. The racial riot in 1969 was mainly caused by the activities of the Chinese opposition party, the DAP, which used the sensitive issue of race to get support from the Chinese in the General Election of 1969. The incident had embarrassed the Malaysian Government and tainted its image on the international scene and also caused a decline in foreign investment. Following the incident, in 1971, the Sedition Act 1948 was amended to ensure the preservation of peace, harmony and stability of the nation. The amendment of the Sedition Act 1948 actually prevents the raising of sensitive racial issues like the special position of the Malays, the Rulers, the national languages and the use of other languages, the legitimate interests of the non-Malays and the qualifications for citizenship [53].

The amendment of the Sedition Act does not mean that the Government leaders will use it freely as a weapon to weaken those who are challenging them. There are a large number of people who may be guilty in the eyes of the Government of uttering seditious words. In fact, the Government has to take great pains to bring either an individual or an organisation to court on a seditious charge.

The contribution of the Sedition Act and the ISA in reducing the activities of such individuals and organisations in undermining the national security of the country has significantly stabilised the political

order of the country. However, the Government has still been condemned for throwing natural justice out of the window by using the law to suppress its political opponents.

The OSA has indirectly helped the Government in assuring the nation's security. In the multi-racial society of a developing country like Malaysia, or any country for that matter, not all civil servants and public members are noble and civic minded. Some will be most willing to betray national secrets for sufficient compensation.

The effect of the UUCA in promoting a healthy growth of higher education and improving the academic performance of especially the Malay students has been great. It was Tun Abdul Razak who was aware of the importance of the academic performance of the Malay students in order to balance economically and politically with the non-Malays. The Act was felt necessary to improve the academic performance of the Malay students. However, the negative affects of these repressive actions are showing; the students are becoming politically less active, less critical and less vocal in expressing their views and criticism [54].

Chapter Eight

SIGNIFICANCE OF TUN RAZAK'S POLICIES

The Tun's Legacy

If 1975 in Malaysia was crisis-filled with violence and killings by the Communists, the prospects for 1976 appeared even more disastrous with the tragic departure of Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak, who was flown to Paris for urgent medical treatment on 18 December, 1975. The Premier, who had been losing weight rapidly, was suspected of suffering from what a senior university medical officer called "as yet unidentified malignancy" [1].

At this critical time, rumours had covered every possible disease that could explain the Prime Minister's loss of weight. Speculations included cancer of the throat and a liver condition arising from a lack of rest after hepatitis two years earlier. One "highly reliable" source said Tun Abdul Razak suffered from a glandular malfunction and another diagnosed the problem as an exotic viral infection that could not be identified [2].

In theory, Tun Hussein Onn should succeed if Tun Abdul Razak had to leave the scene. But Tun Hussein Onn had wanted to retire. Indeed, there was a reliable report that Tun Hussein Onn had already set a date early in 1976. Even if these speculations proved to be unfounded, Party officials said that Tun Hussein Onn, the son of the founder of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), Dato' Onn Jaafar, did not enjoy the cut and thrust, and the manoeuvring and lobbying of Party politics. His ill health too was something that had worried his Party for some time. For the Party's top leadership, the departure of Tun Abdul Razak for Paris indirectly gave them a chance to lobby and jockey for position [3].

While the local style of politics did not allow for open conflict, with the departure of Tun Abdul Razak for Paris and the uncertain position of Tun Hussein Onn, the Party's Vice-Presidents, Tun Ghafar Baba (then Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development), Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah (then Chairman of the National Oil and Gas Corporation - PETRONAS), Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir (then Minister of Education) and

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Dato' Harun Idris (then ex-officio Vice President as leader of UMNO Youth), and also Tun Patinggi Abdul Rahman Ya'akub (then the Chief Minister of Sarawak) had to rate their chances seriously. The fifth Vice President, Datin Paduka Aishah Ghani, being a woman, was not likely to consider her chance.

Tun Abdul Razak never did develop a genial political style. But by the time he died of leukaemia in London Clinic at the age of 53, he had become an effective leader for Malaysia, as well as one of the most influential political figures in all of Southeast Asia. His domestic policies, aimed at improving life for the country's rural population, earned him the title "Father of Development" and had produced a steadily growing economy. He daringly pursued an innovative and independent foreign policy course, steering Malaysia from an ardent pro-Western stance zealously protected by his predecessor Tunku Abdul Rahman, to non-alignment.

The demise of Tun Abdul Razak came in the same week as the demise of Chou En-lai. Asia had lost two prominent regional figures at one time. The two men had much in common. It was said that both were singularly free from the egoistical ambitions of most politicians, were very loyal when they were Deputies, but showed their charismatic capabilities when they held top leadership. Both practised arduously their beliefs that actions spoke louder than words and were essentially executives, efficient implementers rather than creators of policies [4].

In many senses Tun Abdul Razak had been his country's top executive for almost two decades. As one Asia's efficient administrator, at times accepting several ministerial responsibilities, he made sure to push through plans and projects and to keep the files moving. He was more than a brilliant manager because he was never merely a desk man. He travelled constantly throughout the country to see for himself how the projects were going and to talk to the people to find out for himself what impact his Government was having on their lives. Malaysia's high degree of organisational effectiveness was his monument.

It was bitinglly ironic that, as Tun Abdul Razak lay dying, Kuala Lumpur was still claiming that he was on holiday [5]. During his long career in public service, beginning as a civil servant in his home state of Pahang and subsequently as a politician, Tun Abdul Razak took very little rest. The clumsy attempt to conceal the fact that he was critically ill and the reason for the desperate dash for Paris then to London was possibly in deference to the Prime Minister's own desire not to worry or

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upset the people of Malaysia. The situation seemed almost calculated to create rumours.

Tengku Ahmad Rithaudden (Minister of Foreign Affairs) and Tan Sri Abdul Kadir Shamsuddin (Chief Secretary to the Government) in fact, when they arrived in London on January 13, were unaware that their Prime Minister was close to death. They had come to consult Tun Abdul Razak on the already-postponed Malaysian-Thai border talks.

It had been known for some time that he had been unwell and photographs had shown that Tun Abdul Razak had lost a great deal of weight, but few realised the serious condition of his health and the nature of the disease. Tun Abdul Razak had gone first on holiday to Paris and then went to London for treatment for leukaemia, a disease which actually had been diagnosed six years earlier but kept highly confidential. As a matter of fact, Tun Abdul Razak had in 1970 been given much less than six years to live but he had seemingly held his own against the encroachment of the disease. He had kept the knowledge of his ailment to himself and to only one or two others throughout those years. One of them was his Deputy, Tun Dr. Ismail, who was a medical doctor. For many years, while travelling, especially on overseas trips, Tun Abdul Razak was always accompanied by his British doctor, Dr. MacPherson, who was a close friend of Tun Dr. Ismail.

In mid-1975 people close to Tun Abdul Razak or those who often met him began to notice a change in him. He was looking more tired those days, his bush jackets hung loose on his shoulders as he grew gaunt. His jowls began to sag. Tun Abdul Razak himself would reiterate his standard reply to people who asked about his health. At other times he described his condition as pure exhaustion. Aides, not knowing any better, were unable to answer further queries from colleagues, friends and people in general [6].

While the disease was progressing faster, Tun Abdul Razak refused to tell people, even close aides, about his serious health problem. He had secretly worried all his life for the future of his people. When he faced a question of his own life and death he did not wish to burden people with his own personal problem. Tun Abdul Razak's mind churning with ideas, projects and proposals, made him a man in a hurry to accomplish as much as he could for the nation in the short time he had. Government servants often withered under his grilling as he was quick and he wanted others to be as quick as he was. After the first few years of his premiership, Tun Abdul Razak probably knew that the time left for him to complete his dreams and visions was limited.

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Towards the end of 1975 his condition deteriorated. Many people whispered about Tun Abdul Razak's poor health, but still no word came out from the Prime Minister's office. He carried on with his job as if nothing was amiss. But he spent more and more time at home with his family and less at his office.

Meetings were held at Seri Taman instead of at the office. As mentioned earlier, it was one night in December, with only a few close aides in attendance, when Tun Abdul Razak left for the last time for Subang Airport. He boarded a French aircraft specially diverted from Singapore to pick him up. He had left the country on a final journey. When Tun Abdul Razak left for Paris, Tun Hajah Rahah and her children were in Port Dickson. She and her eldest son, Dato' Sri Najib, joined him later [7]. Tun Abdul Razak's second son Ahmad Johari, third son Mohd. Nizam and fourth son Mohd. Nazim were in England, studying. Some months before Tun Abdul Razak's death, Tun Hajah Rahah recalled that Tun Abdul Razak's deceased grandfather came to him in a dream and chided him for having been so long away from the village where he was born.

When Tun Abdul Razak entered the London Clinic on December 22, 1975, his condition was so serious that his life was diagnosed not to last beyond Christmas Day. However, he rallied and appeared to be progressing well until Sunday, January 12, when he had the relapse from which he never recovered. His eldest son Dato' Sri Mohd. Najib was told of his father's terminal illness three weeks before his death but he never told his mother. Tun Hajah Rahah knew that death was imminent only a week before it came. His death came quickly on January 14, at the London Clinic, before he could manage to return to Malaysia [8]. Just before his demise, the youngest son of Tun Abdul Razak, Mohd. Nazir was preparing to leave Malaysia to join the rest of the family in London with the wife of Dato' Michael Chin, when he was informed that his father had already passed away. For the better part of the nearly one month he had been in London, Tun Abdul Razak had been commuting from his hotel overlooking Hyde Park to the London Clinic in Regent's Park for regular checks and treatments.

A few hours after Tun Abdul Razak had died, his body was removed to an East London mosque for washing, a compulsory Islamic ritual, and for a brief religious service. The Foreign Minister and Malaysian High Commission officials were among the small congregation for what was called a "private service". The body was then brought to the High Commission in Belgrave Square where it lay in state. A book of

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condolence was opened. The Sultan of Selangor, who was in London, was the first to sign the book. Then Malaysians in London filed past the body to pay their last respects to the deceased Premier [9].

The shroud of secrecy that had been thrown around Tun Abdul Razak's illness lingered after his death. It was many hours after Tun Abdul Razak had died that it became known that acute leukaemia had claimed him, not the "viral infection" that had been announced previously by the Malaysian High Commission in London as the reason for the Prime Minister's ill-health [10]. According to another report, Tun Abdul Razak had acute mononucleosis. Another ominously suggested leukaemia. The mildest and perhaps most credible rumour even had the Prime Minister suffering from a debilitating glandular condition known as Malta fever.

It was the usual style of Tun Abdul Razak not to take the advice of his doctors, who reportedly ordered him to follow a limited work schedule. At that time, he had many urgent agenda that simply could not be ignored. Communist guerrillas throughout peninsular Malaysia had been mounting increasingly costly attacks on Government outposts. For the first time in years, the country as a whole was facing some economic problems. As if all these were not enough, within his own party, the taciturn Prime Minister also had to deal with a mushrooming challenge to his authority.

The most pressing problem might well be the guerrilla threat. Government intelligence sources said rebels numbered nearly 3,000 in widely scattered units. They had shown signs of re-establishing the nation wide network of communications and supply lines that was shattered in the Malayan "emergency" a decade and a half ago, and they had also stepped up their infiltration of key urban areas.

The long-standing security problem posed by Communist guerrillas sharpened and Kuala Lumpur experienced repeated assaults from urban guerrillas. The insurgents had killed a total of 60 soldiers and embarrassed the Government with terror attacks in the capital itself. To combat the threat, the Government had toughened its laws on terrorism and announced plans to recruit 30,000 new anti-guerrilla fighters.

If the security and economic difficulties were not bad enough, Tun Abdul Razak's political problems were multiplying and as illness presumably began to sap his strength, his powers of persuasion apparently also slackened. A few months before he left for London for "medical treatment", Tun Abdul Razak tried to strengthen his hand by

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engineering the ouster of the irascible Tun Mustapha as Chief Minister of Sabah [11].

The Sabah issue was a challenge both to Tun Abdul Razak's strategy and to the central authority he represented. Certain politicians became bolder in their willingness to exploit ever-present communal tensions for their political ends. Intrigues began to divide his own party, UMNO and the National Front coalition he had created to provide a framework for a Malaysian consensus.

Tun Abdul Razak met the challenges squarely. Besides taking draconian steps to suppress terrorism from the Communists, to overcome economic difficulties and to face the increasing challenge to his authority, Tun Abdul Razak reasserted the centre's authority and resolved to crack down on corruption. Similarly, Tun Abdul Razak was locked in a risky test of will power with Dato' Idris Harun, then the Chief Minister of Selangor. A firm believer and practitioner of integrity and honesty, his conscience was disturbed when he was informed of his close ally Dato' Harun Idris, practice of corruption. His own leadership was at test. In 1974, Tun Abdul Razak directed the National Bureau of Investigation to conduct an investigation into allegations made against Dato' Harun Idris.

In its efforts to stamp out corruption in this country, the Government created the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) with a view to strengthening it by amalgamating the powers of investigation (exercisable by the Police and Customs), the power of prosecution (exercisable by the Legal Department) and the functions of research and prevention of corrupt practices (carried out by the civil service) in a single Agency. It had powers to investigate and prosecute any person including Members of Parliament, Members of a State Assembly, Government employees and employees of semi-government bodies who were involved in corrupt practices. The Agency under its new set-up began to function from October 1, 1967 [12].

In an effort to save Dato' Harun Idris from the allegations thrown at him, Tun Abdul Razak appealed to Dato' Harun Idris to go to the United Nations or to other countries where he might like to be ambassador of Malaysia. By right Dato' Harun Idris thought that before becoming ambassador, he had to clear his name. This was because the news of his involvement in corruption was spreading all over the world together with news on the boxing match between Mohammed Ali and Joe Bugner which incidentally was connected to the allegations.

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Dato' Harun Idris rejected the kind offer citing the reason that he had first to clear his name which had been brought into disrepute. Dato' Harun Idris's rejection of this offer received the support of the UMNO Youth members. On November 1975, Dato' Harun Idris was charged in court with the alleged misappropriation of Bank Rakyat's stock and share funds, totalling nearly RM 8.0 million. Dato' Harun Idris was alleged to have used the money belonging to Bank Rakyat to finance the World Heavyweight Boxing match between Mohammed Ali and Joe Bugner in Kuala Lumpur. Dato' Harun's actions in misusing his power to cover up the losses suffered by Syarikat Tinju Dunia was an offence under the law, irrespective of his intention and the circumstances then prevailing.

It was Tun Abdul Razak who previously appointed Dato' Harun Idris to be Chief of UMNO Youth. Being the Chief, Dato' Harun Idris in fact wanted more function and role in the UMNO Youth in order to upgrade the image of the Movement. One issue worth mentioning on the role played by the UMNO Youth then was regarding a letter sent to the Malaysian Government from the Muslim organisation in the Philippines because of the protest of UMNO Youth to the Philippines Embassy regarding the killing of Muslims in that country. It was Dato' Harun Idris who took quick action after knowing the plan of the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party Youth (PMIP/PAS) to organise a demonstration to protest at the Philippines Embassy in Kuala Lumpur. Dato' Harun Idris felt that UMNO Youth should take this issue seriously before PAS did. At the Supreme Council, the protest of UMNO Youth to the Philippines Embassy was questioned by Tun Abdul Razak and other members of UMNO Supreme Council such as Tan Sri Syed Nasir and Dato' Syed Jaafar Albar. Tun Abdul Razak was actually worried about the affect of this action on diplomatic relations between Malaysia and the Philippines. Claiming that this action was the stand of UMNO Youth and had nothing to do with the Government of Malaysia, Dato' Harun Idris eventually won support from the Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Dr. Ismail and other members of the Supreme Council.

Dato' Harun Idris held the leadership of the UMNO Youth Movement from 1971 to 1976. Throughout this period, the struggle of the Youth Movement was centred mainly on matters ensuring the success of the New Economic Policy (NEP) and upholding its role as a watchdog of the implementations of the Government's policies.

Dato' Harun Idris was responsible for enabling the UMNO Youth Movement to portray a new image of itself which eventually increased the confidence of the young generation and society in the Movement.

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Consequently, the strength and power of the Youth Movement began to be felt in the nation's political arena.

However, the success achieved by Dato' Harun Idris and the Movement in carrying out its functions gave rise to uneasiness among Government bodies and the private sector. In fact, there were some UMNO leaders themselves who felt uneasy with the outspokenness and the firmness of Dato' Harun Idris and members of the Movement in handling any issue. The political and strength calibre of Dato' Harun Idris was so overwhelming then that he was rumoured to be capable of becoming the Prime Minister in the future. In these circumstances if Dato' Harun Idris managed to win the support of many of his colleagues in UMNO and to portray Tun Abdul Razak's attack on him as an act of vindictiveness, the blow to Tun Abdul Razak's reputation and dignity could be fatal.

History was also unjust to Tun Abdul Razak. He took office in the aftermath of communal riots which had shaken the very foundation of Malaysia and its future development. Tun Abdul Razak was able to inspire as a fair and just leader. Painstakingly, he built up a developmental strategy which, if it did not satisfy the aspirations of all, was accepted as the only workable compromise between the mutually contradictory expectations of the various sectors of Malaysian society. His developmental strategy had removed some of the worst frustrations inherent in it and improved the lot of Malaysia's poor, not just the deprived Bumiputra.

Despite all this political turbulence, the late Prime Minister never named a successor. His deputy was himself a sick man, still suffering from the after-effects of a serious heart attack. Tun Hussein Onn had a heart attack in 1975 and was reportedly thinking of retiring himself. Due to his health condition, he inherited a strange doubt about his ability to carry the burdens of office for more than a caretaker period. Observers said, more ominously, none of the potential standard-bearers seemed to have the kind of charisma, leadership ability and broad base of popular support indispensable to anyone who hoped to fill Tun Abdul Razak's shoes as the man responsible for keeping under control the centrifugal forces in Malaysia's multiracial society. In these circumstances, Tun Abdul Razak's death was expected at the beginning to plunge Malaysia into a dangerous political passage.

Tun Hussein Onn faced the unenviable task of attempting to assert control over both his party and his country. And the latter task might prove to be the more difficult. Despite Tun Abdul Razak's immense

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personal popularity, his legacy to his successor consisted of a growing Communist insurgency, new disaffection among the Chinese community because of a policy of economic and political preference for Malays that had caused high racial tension and challenges to the central authority by influential local political leaders. Even for a healthy Prime Minister, any one of these problems would be difficult to deal with [13].

The saddest and first task that Tun Hussein Onn had to perform as the Acting Prime Minister was to announce the sudden death of Tun Abdul Razak over the television network of Malaysia. As one who was very close and in-law to Tun Abdul Razak and as his Deputy, Tun Hussein Onn found it not only most painful but also very difficult to make an announcement which shocked him and all other Malaysians. Many a time he wept during the announcement. It was a sad day in the history of Malaysia.

The body of Tun Abdul Razak was lying in state at the Malaysian High Commission in London when Tun Hussein Onn was sworn in as his successor. A smooth transfer of power appeared to have been achieved; an operation of which the meticulous Tun Abdul Razak would undoubtedly have approved [14].

More than 100,000 people thronged the airport for the arrival of Tun Abdul Razak's body. Millions watched on television or listened to the radio while 300,000 citizens filed past the flag-covered coffin, first at Tun Abdul Razak's official residence, Seri Taman, then at Parliament. In a spontaneous outpouring of grief, hundreds of thousands of his multi-racial countrymen crowded the streets as a gun carriage bore the casket to its final resting place.

The remains of Tun Abdul Razak were interred at the Heroes' Mausoleum in the grounds of the modernistic National Mosque in Kuala Lumpur's fourth state funeral. Two days after the burial, thousands of people were still making their way to the side to say a few words of prayer before moving on.

The unexpectedness of the event deepened the sadness of the hundreds of thousands of Malaysians who, also in company with foreign leaders such as Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew, Australia's Malcolm Fraser, the Philippines' Ferdinand Marcos and Thailand's Kukrit Pramoj, filed past Tun Abdul Razak's flag-draped coffin to pay their last respects [15].

The leaders of the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand held a series of discussions among themselves and with Malaysia's new Prime Minister Tun Hussein Onn. Indonesia's President Suharto was the lone

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absentee; he stayed in Jakarta recovering from a gall bladder operation [16].

The presence of such foreign leaders reflected the achievement of Tun Abdul Razak in creating the regional unity that he sought all his life. The gathering of these Southeast Asian leaders was considered as a mini-summit. Although this mini-summit had taken place in the shadow of the tragedy that robbed the region of one of its policy pioneers, the leaders managed to remove their lingering doubts and decided to hold the first ASEAN Summit in Bali on February 24 to 25, 1976 [17].

This Summit was considered as a conference on which depended perhaps the destiny, the survival of the five small countries of the region. Since any possible threat would only be seen as coming from the newly triumphant Communist states of Indochina, security was essentially what Malaysia and other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) had elevated to priority status. The ultimate aim was the establishment of a Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia, the phrase Tun Abdul Razak had popularised as the main plank of Malaysia's foreign policy.

Tun Abdul Razak's innovations with ASEAN, with Peking, and with the search for ZOPFAN were later followed up by Tun Hussein Onn. The traditional cosiness with the Western democracies had been disrupted.

Tun Hussein's Premiership

A man known for his high principles, Tun Hussein Onn was welcome by the Malaysians to become Prime Minister to continue Tun Abdul Razak's leadership. Like his charismatic father, Dato' Sir Onn Jaafar, Tun Hussein Onn had in the past turned down a number of political advancements in order to preserve his principles. His previous political career had inspired confidence among the Malay leaders.

Both father and son were determined that racial unity was vital for the independence of Malaya. When they could not persuade their political associates to convert the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) to a multiracial organisation, they quit the organisation in August 1953. Many years later, Tun Hussein Onn rejoined UMNO. The minorities, no doubt, found some of the traits of his character reassuring. It had been

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said of Tun Hussein Onn that he had strength of character, unquestionable integrity and plenty of guts.

As Premier, Tun Hussein Onn, like the leaders of many other Asian countries, had to grapple with majority communalism as much as he had to defuse minority grievances. Besides his role as a conciliator among all communities, he also had a role to overcome the consequences of the young Malay politicians impatiently waiting in the wings.

Born in February 1922, Tun Hussein Onn was the eldest son of a national politician and UMNO's founder, Dato' Onn Jaafar. He grew up in the Sultanate of Johore and was educated partly in Johore and partly in Singapore. Like Tun Dr. Ismail, Tun Hussein Onn was educated at the English College, Johor Bahru. He joined the military forces of his native Johore State and was one of three cadets sent to the Military Academy in Dehra Dun (India) during World War II. Following the fall of Malaya to the Japanese during the Second World War, the stranded officers joined the British Indian Army where Tun Hussein Onn served as a captain in the 19th Hyderabad Regiment during which period he saw action in Syria, Palestine, Iraq, Egypt and the surrounding areas [18].

The war's end saw him return to Johore as Commandant of the police depot. Young Hussein had displayed a distinct flair for politics even when he was in the army. Joining the Malay Administrative Service, he became more and more involved in the nationalist movement.

Tun Hussein Onn was a deceptively mild man with a political career dating back to the early days of UMNO. He became actively involved in his father's political moves, becoming the first UMNO Youth leader and later, the Party's third Secretary-General in 1950 before he was 30 [19].

As mentioned earlier, Tun Hussein Onn and his father left the Party in 1951 when UMNO rejected his father's call to open its doors to non-Malays. His father's political limelight faded after that, and Tun Hussein Onn went on to study law, at Lincoln's Inn, London. On his return, he concentrated on his practice which flourished over the next several years until just before 1969 when Tun Abdul Razak persuaded him to stand for election. He was a close friend and had an in-law relationship to Tun Abdul Razak, as their wives were sisters. After his return to politics, Tun Hussein Onn was named Minister of Education and then Minister of Finance.

Tun Hussein Onn was known as a man of principle. Before he dropped out of UMNO in the early 1950s, his political career looked very promising. He stayed out of public life for more than a decade until Tun Abdul Razak prevailed upon him to help ease the nation through a period

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of racial polarisation in the late 1960s. At the time Tun Abdul Razak called upon Tun Hussein Onn to join the Government, relations between Malaysians of Malay and Chinese origins had dwindled. Bloody street fights between the two groups had shocked the nation and racial antagonism had become commonplace. With his humane reputation, Tun Hussein Onn was credited for helping to calm the troubled racial waters.

As a result, he never got back to his law practice but remained in the Malaysian Government, earning a reputation as a workhorse and a stickler for details. He underlined everything he read in different colours for emphasis. His reputation for taking a very long time in making up his mind was almost legendary, a trait attacked by his critics but admired by staff, aides and supporters.

Tun Hussein Onn did not return to UMNO until after his father's death. His successful law practice was attributed to his painstaking attention to detail, and many conceded that his stewardship of the Education Ministry marked him out as a future Prime Minister.

While respected by his colleagues, Tun Hussein Onn was regarded as a man with few personal ambitions, who disliked the intrigue and manoeuvring of party politics. He was picked as Tun Abdul Razak's Deputy following the death of Tun Dr. Ismail. Traditionally, the Deputy Prime Minister would be UMNO's Deputy President. In fact, intensive lobbying began almost as soon as Tun Dr. Ismail died of heart malfunction. The odds-on favourite, Tun Hussein Onn, then Minister of Education, was in London on holiday and for a medical check-up, and did not return until just before the crucial UMNO Supreme Council meeting which unanimously elected him. Besides Tun Hussein Onn, other UMNO Vice-Presidents, namely Tan Sri Sardon Zubir (Communication Minister) and Tun Ghafar Baba (National and Rural Development Minister) had rated their chance of being the Deputy Prime Minister.

It was said that Tun Hussein Onn had so much respect for the law that he would invariably override political considerations if there were occasions to make a choice. But with the passing of Tun Dr. Ismail, the Party at that time had lost its unifying force and started lobbying for positions, long in the making. There were the ambitions of the second echelon politicians and the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) President and Minister of Finance Tun Tan Siew Sin's inexplicable last minute threat to leave the Government if he was not appointed Deputy Prime Minister, which made Tun Hussein Onn's position difficult. With characteristic good public manners, no junior politicians would openly

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challenge Tun Hussein Onn's position. Since there was some kind of understanding too within UMNO that the next Prime Minister must be from Johore, Tun Hussein Onn's election fulfilled Tun Abdul Razak's choice.

Tun Tan Siew Sin had asked to be Deputy Prime Minister only hours before the UMNO Supreme Council meeting which, as it turned out, refused to even discuss the possibility. Informed sources said Tun Abdul Razak would have been faced with a full-blown crisis if Tun Tan Siew Sin had left the Government then. The Minister of Finance's apparently rigid stance angered Tun Abdul Razak so much that sources said he was prepared to consider the immediate possibility of a Government without the MCA. Wisdom prevailed and Tun Tan Siew Sin backed down, though not until after three separate meetings with Tun Abdul Razak. At one of these meetings, Tun Tan Siew Sin was accompanied by his close advisers, MCA Deputy President Lee San Choon (also a Cabinet Minister), Executive Secretary Ny Chin Hong, and Secretary-General Kam Woon Wah.

It was not clear what prompted Tun Tan Siew Sin to make his demand at this juncture. This episode helped to bring about a further erosion of his support among MCA members. What was potentially worse for Tun Tan Siew Sin, suspicion brew within UMNO itself about his motives. UMNO sources said they were prepared to consider the possibility of more than one Deputy Prime Minister, in which case Tun Tan Siew Sin would have had a more than even chance to fill that post. However, the MCA's decision to leave the Government even for a while after the establishment of the National Operations Council (NOC), since May 1969, had partly affected Tun Tan Siew Sin's chance of becoming Deputy Prime Minister.

With Tun Hussein Onn becoming the new Deputy Prime Minister as anticipated, in August 1973, Tun Abdul Razak made several Cabinet changes, mainly promotions of Deputy Ministers, and in the process appeared to have ignored Tun Tan Siew Sin's advice not to appoint Dato' Micheal Chen and Dr. Lim Keng Yaik. Dato' Michael Chen, a confidante of Tun Abdul Razak, was also aligned with the MCA reform group formed by younger elements in the Party. Dr. Lim Keng Yaik, was pressured out of the Cabinet by Tun Tan Siew Sin (three months before September 1973). In the past, in the local style of Malaysian politics, Tunku Abdul Rahman had accommodated the wishes of both MCA and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) leaders when appointing their members to the Government. This arrangement appeared to have lapsed.

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Being Malaysia's new Prime Minister, the 53 year-old Malay lawyer, the quiet urbane British trained politician, Tun Hussein Onn was gaining the affection of his countrymen largely because of his estimable personal qualities. His ascension had been a popular one. Many Malaysians who began to appraise him seemed to like what they saw. They were impressed by his obvious humility. The Malaysian non-Malays who still remembered his response in exiling himself from national politics, were seemingly encouraged that he, at last, was given the authority to lead the government.

Known as a humble and a sincere man, the charming quality about Tun Hussein Onn was his lack of any fear in expressing his emotions. Tun Hussein Onn gave full vent to his emotions when he went on radio and TV to announce Tun Abdul Razak's death. Tears flowed freely and his voice broke several times. His shyness was legendary and he had a tendency to take his time over decisions, but once he had arrived at a decision, it was difficult to make him change his mind.

At this moment, with most of his countrymen on his side, Tun Hussein Onn would seem to have a leg up on his tough new job. But he suffered a severe heart attack in March 1975 and recurrence of his health problems could limit his ability to lead his nation aggressively. Tun Hussein Onn's personal physician had pronounced him fully recovered, but one of his close aides informed the media then that his health was as good as any man of 53 with a coronary problem. Given Malaysia's problems of continued racial woes, an uncertain economy, Communist guerrilla activities, the question remained whether that health statement was good enough.

After taking over power in the country, apart from the worries about his health, Tun Hussein Onn had all the necessary qualifications that could be expected to enable him to build on the foundations inherited from Tun Abdul Razak. Any team which might replace the latter must persuade all the communities which made up Malaysia that they had also inherited Tun Abdul Razak's inherent sense of fairness.

Tun Hussein Onn was worried about the recent deterioration in the security situation. He had put his finger on latent Malay radicalism as a potential threat. He warned that efforts to beat the Communist guerrilla threat would fail if ethnic Malays joined the terrorist ranks. An emerging plank of his security policy was the winning over of Malays as vigilantes against Communist terrorism. It was the popular appeal of Tun Hussein Onn as a leader who enjoyed unreserved mass backing from the Malays that made this emerging plank of his security policy a success.

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As Tun Hussein Onn moved into the top slot, the vacancy of Deputy President of UMNO loomed large and important. The natural successor was the most senior Vice-President, Tun Ghafar Baba, Minister for Agriculture and Rural Development. In the past, the Vice-President was automatically Deputy Premier, but according to UMNO sources Tun Ghafar Baba might not want to serve as Tun Hussein Onn's Deputy outside the Party rooms.

Tun Ghafar Baba could be the least controversial choice [20]. He had once acted as Premier when Tun Abdul Razak was away and Tun Hussein Onn ill. Tun Ghafar Baba's standing in UMNO was excellent as the Party General Assembly proved in June 1975, when he polled 838 votes to be elected Vice-President. The link between Tun Hussein Onn's legal background and administrative experience and the rural development expertise of the man expected to be his Deputy, Tun Ghafar Baba would benefit the country's economic development.

Almost 200 votes behind Tun Ghafar Baba was Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, then the Chairman of the National Oil and Gas Corporation (PETRONAS). Tengku Razaleigh was unlikely to be offered the post because of his young age and because he was not yet in the Cabinet. At the age of 27, he was in no hurry.

The Third Vice-President, Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir, polled 474 votes. He was said to be acceptable. He was Minister of Education and once was regarded as an ultra-nationalist with a fixed "Bumiputra first attitude" that the other races found disturbing.

Tun Patinggi Abdul Rahman Ya'akub was another candidate and was mentioned as a serious contender for the controversial and as yet unfilled post of Deputy Prime Minister. There was also a reliable report that with his record of handling the Communist insurgency in Sarawak, if not appointed as Deputy Prime Minister, he might be making a bid for the Ministry of Home Affairs [21].

Amazingly, Dato' Harun Idris, the powerful Selangor Chief Minister and UMNO Youth Chief, despite his current legal tribulations, was seriously regarded among aides as a potential Prime Minister. According to the ruling National Front insiders, Tun Hussein Onn had long regarded corruption not merely as an evil, but a serious obstacle to both national security and development. He was constantly pressing the late Tun Abdul Razak to move against "the big fish" during all his years as a politician. Tun Hussein Onn's deep-seated dislike of corruption and love for the law thus asserted itself very quickly when he took office. The long parade of

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allegedly corrupt officials and leaders through the Malaysian courts had truly begun.

Perhaps even more remarkable, new amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code Legislation were rushed through both Houses of Parliament, then given royal assent and passed. Dato' Harun Idris' case would go to the High Court without preliminary inquiry in the Sessions Court. Dato' Harun Idris had a slim chance in the circumstances of Tun Hussein Onn's stand to establish a reputation as a fighter against corruption.

It was in November 1975, when after months of intensive investigation by the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) and widespread speculation, Dato' Harun Idris was charged with corruption. It was not an easy decision initially for Tun Abdul Razak to allow the process of law to take its course although the case against Dato' Harun Idris was strong. Dato' Harun Idris was not only politically influential but charismatic as well.

The issue became more complicated with Tun Abdul Razak's death. Dato' Harun Idris' angry youthful supporters were hopeful that Tun Hussein Onn, Tun Abdul Razak's successor, would adopt a stance more favourable to their mentor. They were sorely disappointed. Tun Hussein Onn not only decided to proceed with the case, but broadened the scope of action by having the UMNO Supreme Council take a stand on the issue [22].

The sudden demise of Tun Abdul Razak elevated Tun Hussein Onn as the Third Prime Minister of Malaysia and acting President of UMNO to adopt a firm attitude regarding Dato' Harun Idris' problems although there were pressures from the Youth Movement that a pardon be granted to Dato' Harun Idris. The UMNO Supreme Council at its meeting on March 18, 1976 took a stand on the issue by advising Dato' Harun Idris to resign from all posts held by him in UMNO, in the Government and in the National Front. Dato' Harun Idris refused to accept the advice of the UMNO Supreme Council on the grounds that he had not committed any offence towards the Party.

UMNO Supreme Council had to strip Dato' Harun Idris of his membership in UMNO in accordance with Article 11, Clause 13 of the UMNO Constitution. Consequently, he was forced to give up his posts as the Youth Movement's Chief, Head of Selangor State UMNO Liaison Committee, Chairman of the Selangor Alliance and the Chief Minister of Selangor, and as an UMNO member. However, with the support of the Youth Movement and UMNO old guards, such as Dato' Syed Jaafar

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Albar and Tunku Abdul Rahman, Dato' Harun Idris was finally re-accepted as an UMNO member on October 23, 1976.

At the peak of his political career, being Chief Minister of Selangor, Vice-President of UMNO, President of the Youth Wing of the Party, Dato' Harun Idris was long regarded as a potential Prime Minister of Malaysia in the near future. Dato' Harun was also a former Legal Adviser to the Selangor State Government and Deputy Public Prosecutor [23]. Even after he was found guilty and sentenced to six years imprisonment by the Federal Court in December 1977, his Selangor UMNO Youth supporters refused to allow him to leave his house to report to the Pudu Prison. A warrant of arrest had to be issued. On March 1, 1978 he surrendered to the police and was escorted to prison [24].

On August 1, 1981, Dato' Harun Idris was given a remission by the King and released from jail after serving 40 months. On August 31, 1982, he received the royal pardon [25]. All these adverse circumstances had not stopped Dato' Harun Idris' high respect for Dato' Onn Jaafar, Tun Hussein Onn's father, and impressed by Dato' Onn Jaafar's ability and charisma, reflected too in his son, his relations with Tun Hussein Onn always remained amicable.

From the choice between the highly speculative Dato' Harun Idris, Tun Ghafar Baba, Tengku Razaleigh and Tun Patinggi Abdul Rahman Ya'akub, it was Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir in whom Tun Hussein Onn finally placed his faith to continue leading the nation. Tun Hussein Onn announced his Deputy on March 5, 1976. Tun Hussein Onn had to convince a nation in the grip of suspense and speculation that the Deputy must be appointed immediately for the sake of national interest.

Tun Hussein Onn had made his choice and could only pray and hope that the choice was a correct one and that Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir would be accepted and supported by the country generally. The choice of Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir as a potential successor must have been Tun Hussein Onn's most difficult decision since he took office. In choosing Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir (earlier regarded as a rebel by Tunku Abdul Rahman, and author of "Malay Dilemma", a book which was banned for its highly provocative statement of Malay grievances and arguments for special treatment for the Bumiputra as sons of the soil), as Deputy Premier of a multiracial country, Tun Hussein Onn ended nearly two months of speculation [26].

Son of a schoolteacher, Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir was born in Alor Star, Kedah. His father, Mohamed Iskandar, once taught Tunku Abdul Rahman as one of his pupils. Graduating in medicine from the University

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of Malaya in Singapore, he resigned in 1957 from the Government services to go into private practice. Being actively involved in the UMNO movement, the Alor Star people nicknamed him – "Doktor UMNO".

The Prime Minister hadn't discussed the issue of the post of Deputy Prime Minister even with his closest colleagues. Tun Hussein Onn preferred to play his cards close. Tun Hussein Onn's bold decision to proceed with Dato' Harun Idris' trial and the appointment of Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir as Deputy Prime Minister, had not received the total endorsement of the UMNO hierarchy, especially those who felt that they had been edged out. Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir's political "rehabilitation" by Tun Abdul Razak, as highlighted by his readmission by UMNO followed by his appointment as Minister of Education, was not welcomed by some senior UMNO politicians who saw him as a threat in their political rat race [27].

Tun Hussein Onn, despite his cosmopolitan visage, was intent on avoiding any suggestion that his actions might split the Malay community, the very charge hurled at him and his father when they walked out of the party. By picking Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir rather than someone from outside the Vice-Presidential ranks, he re-established his own credentials with UMNO; with the Party solidly behind him, he would be in a stronger position to deal with problems that the coalition partners might toss up in the months ahead.

As anticipated perhaps, the MCA had not shown any official enthusiasm for the appointment of Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir as Deputy Prime Minister. From its central headquarters there was no doubt that the Party had to accept the Premier's decision. Since becoming Minister of Education he had tried to live down his reputation as the author of *Malay Dilemma*, published after the 1969 riots, stamping him immutably as a Malay radical [28].

Another National Front partner, Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP/PAS), had also failed to register any enthusiasm for the choice of Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir as Deputy Prime Minister. The major political parties in Sabah and Sarawak had unreservedly welcomed the new Cabinet. Although the Sarawak National Party (SNAP) had remained silent, the leaders of BERJAYA and Tun Mustapha United Sabah National Organisation (USNO) in Kota Kinabalu had gone out of their way to express their enthusiasm for Tun Hussein Onn's Cabinet, heaping praise on the new leadership. BERJAYA must have felt particularly grateful that it still had a Minister in the Cabinet, Dato' Ghani Gilong.

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One clearly unhappy reaction came from the former Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman. Obviously displeased with Tun Hussein Onn's choice, Tunku Abdul Rahman however wisely said that since the Prime Minister had made his choice it was necessary to support him [29].

Party officials tried to understand the reasons for Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir's being the inevitable choice. It appeared simple enough. As traditionally practised, one of the Vice-Presidents of UMNO had to be appointed. Tun Ghafar Baba, apparently, could not work with Tun Hussein Onn and Tengku Razaleigh was too young. It was obvious to most observers, however, that the considerations in choosing Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir as Deputy Prime Minister were far more complex. Tun Hussein Onn himself admitted that his choice was finalised only the night before the announcement.

It was learned that Tun Hussein Onn would not move against the obstructionists until July 1976 when the annual UMNO General Assembly met. The Assembly gave Tun Hussein Onn a clear mandate as leader of the Party by confirming support for his choice of Deputy President, Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir.

The period of Tun Hussein Onn's stewardship as Prime Minister was marked by the continuation of Tun Abdul Razak's policy. One of the first tasks that Tun Hussein Onn carried out soon after he took over the reins as Prime Minister of Malaysia was to speed up and improve the already existing nerve centre of the Government: the National Operations Room. The first National Operations Room was designed and introduced in 1975 by Tun Abdul Razak. Essentially the heart of this monitoring system was the Red Book which documented the development progress of each district in the country and provided an easy way to check the progress of a specific area. Situated on the second floor of the Computer Centre Building at the Prime Minister's Department, Jalan Dato' Onn, Kuala Lumpur, was the massive computerised information system. It became the major decision-making centre for the Government [30].

Tun Hussein Onn gave specific instructions that the monitoring and evaluation system of the Government should be improved and that it should have the capability of analysing, intervening and determining the planning of programmes and projects to achieve the desired benefits and targets [31].

The National Operations Council set up the computerised information system with the objectives of reviewing and evaluating the performance of the major Government development and investment programmes, as well as to ensure that actual implementation and current performance

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should be in force and that basic objectives of the performances could be achieved and completed in time. The system is also designed to explain and inform the general public on the policies and programmes of the Government, and to enable exchange of ideas and opinion between the politicians and the bureaucrats so that unanimous decisions could be reached at the planning and implementation stages. Possible errors or under-performance would thus be quickly identified and analysed to help in making positive decisions for more effective implementation. Thus, members of the public would be able to grasp and understand the right perspective on the country's development techniques and progress. This mutual understanding of developmental perspectives between the members of the public and the Government was promoted by Tun Hussein Onn's urging of Cabinet Ministers, Members of Parliament and State Assemblymen to hold meetings, called the "people's sessions", to find out the aspirations and the needs of the various races [32].

As his one important contribution with regard to foreign policy, Tun Hussein Onn made a direct appeal to the Soviet Union as a major power to use its influence to assist in finding a peaceful solution to the conflict in Indo-China. Malaysia was concerned to find an early peaceful solution to the problem. Malaysia needs a neighbouring environment of peace and stability to further its economic and social development. Tun Hussein Onn asked for Soviet's support in establishing a Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia. At the same time, Tun Hussein Onn reiterated that the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) was not and would not be a military grouping and would commit itself to being a vehicle for strengthening regional cooperation.

The Retirement of Tun Hussein Onn

On May 15, 1981, after just over five years of premiership, Tun Hussein Onn, addressing a local Party Congress in his home base of Johor Bahru, announced that he was relinquishing the Presidency of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the nation's dominant political force, and stepping down as Premier "as soon as possible". In verifying what everyone had known or anticipated, the 59-year-old Tun, who underwent critical coronary bypass surgery in London just three months earlier, clinched months of speculation that he would have to surrender the premiership on grounds of poor health.

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He told the 1,000-odd Johor Bahru UMNO delegates that his lingering heart condition had forced him to face squarely his twin duties as Prime Minister and UMNO President. After his operation he found that his health had not improved as much as he had hoped. He resigned on July 16, 1981.

Thus, Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir, the 55-year-old trained physician whose rise in politics had been as controversial as it had been spectacular, was now poised to become perhaps the first national leader who had written a book banned in his own country. The book, "Malay Dilemma", an unvarnished view of communal relations in Malaysia, was blacklisted soon after Malaysia's May 1969 race riots. That was also the time when Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir, a native of Alor Star in the northern state of Kedah, charged the then Premier Tunku Abdul Rahman with being too soft towards the ethnic Chinese. Though he was previously bounced from UMNO, in 1972 he returned to the Party and rose to the 20-member Supreme Council. He became Deputy Prime Minister in early 1976 shortly after Tun Hussein Onn took over the reins of government following the death of Tun Abdul Razak.

Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir too was widely respected in UMNO for his diligence and keen mind. But as local UMNO divisions were scrambling to nominate him as Party leader, the real contest looming at the National Assembly was that for Deputy President. The only confirmed candidate for the post was Finance Minister, Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, 47, one of UMNO's three Vice-Presidents and Minister of Education, Tan Sri Musa Hitam, 47, who, like Tun Hussein Onn himself, is a native of the UMNO-powerful southern state of Johore. The post of Deputy Prime Minister eventually went to the Minister of Education, Tan Sri Musa Hitam.

The most startling turn of events before the retirement of Tun Hussein Onn as Prime Minister, however, was Tunku Abdul Rahman's revelation in his weekly newspaper column that the Pardon Board had already decided to release from jail former Selangor Chief Minister Dato' Harun Idris, from serving a six-year sentence on charges of corruption. The 56-year-old Harun, who went to prison in March 1978, still commanded a powerful UMNO following particularly within its militant Youth Wing. Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir later admitted that he personally had submitted the appeal for pardoning Dato' Harun Idris to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (King) while serving as acting Premier during Tun Hussein Onn's medical retreat to London, leaving party officials and analysts puzzled.

Though the amended Societies Act forbids convicted individuals to hold office within five years after of release, the law had not yet been

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passed, meaning that Dato' Harun Idris technically could stand for Deputy President of UMNO. One of Dato' Harun's stalwarts in Penang vowed to nominate him for UMNO's No.2 job though this did not happen.

Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir soon proved to be another legacy of his own. Poised on a platform initially prepared by Tunku Abdul Rahman, further engineered and perfected by Tun Abdul Razak, and reinforced further by Tun Hussein Onn, he is determined to transform Malaysia into a nation that stands out on the globe and is targeted to attain developed status by the year 2020.

Economic Recovery

Four years after the bloody riots, far from disintegrating, as foreign journalists seemed to want it to be to prove their doomsday theory, the country was back on its feet and facing the future confidently. The vicious outburst of inter-communal fears of the May 13 riots, which was predicated to be the "end of multiracial and democratic Malaysia", seemed very far off. Kuala Lumpur boasted growing symbols of increased prosperity and more importantly, of growing confidence.

Malaysia figured very high in any short-list of Asian countries. It had attracted foreign investors to come to the country. In 1970 the gross national product grew by 6% to reach US\$3,863 million, achieved because of a boom in consumption and investment and despite a relatively poor performance in exports. Perhaps the most encouraging feature of performance after the riots was the sharp drop in unemployment and the growth of job vacancies [33].

The Malaysian economy recorded satisfactory progress during the decade of the 1970s, despite a global economic environment that was severely affected by the sharp rise in oil prices beginning in 1973. During the 1970s, the Malaysian economy grew at an average rate of 7.6 percent and annual per capita income increased from RM1,109 to RM3,719 by 1980. The unemployment rate decreased from 7.8 to 5.7 percent during the same period. During the early 1970s, the main thrust behind economic growth was public investment. Since the 1970s the growth of the economy proceeded with the minimum of dislocations, distortions and resources constraints.

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The Second Five-Year Plan, launched in 1971, proposed a total investment of almost US\$5,000 million by 1975, equally divided between the public and private sectors. There seemed no reason to doubt that the main objects of the Second Five-Year Plan would be achieved: an annual growth rate of 6.5%, doubling industrial production to account for more than a quarter of GNP by 1975, and the creation of 600,000 jobs [34].

In the international economic system Malaysia has been active as an exporter of primary commodities, particularly rubber and tin. In view of the value attached to these commodities for strategic purposes Malaysia is an important and reliable source of these commodities to Western nations. Since British colonial times and for decades after independence the major markets for Malaysia's primary commodities were located within the Western bloc. The leadership, first under Tunku Abdul Rahman and from September 1970 under Tun Abdul Razak, and subsequently under their two successors, has concentrated not only on re-establishing the necessary political leverage but also on gaining economic confidence, both internally and externally.

As Tunku Abdul Rahman's right-hand man, Tun Abdul Razak managed to build his political support and gained his political acumen which was important for the foundation of the economic performance of the country. He tirelessly criss-crossed the country, visited villages and projects in order to see the achievement of the objectives of the New Economy Policy (NEP). The NEP, which had been accepted by all component parties in the National Front Government, had been expected to contribute to the political and economic recovery of the country, which had an important significance for national security. It was the Government's desire to implement a programme for social justice. With rapid economic growth and prosperity, a more just distribution of newly acquired wealth would strengthen the country's political stability.

As mentioned earlier, the NEP was adopted in 1971, as part of the response to the 1969 race riots, to ameliorate the economic plight of the numerically superior Bumiputra and to eradicate poverty irrespective of race. The main objective of the NEP was to ensure that the Malays would get at least 30 per cent of the economic pie without taking away anything already held by the other races. The strategy was to increase the economic pie of the Malays by creating new opportunities for investment.

For this sole purpose dozens of public enterprises or statutory Government bodies, such as the Urban Development Authority (UDA)

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and the State Economic Development Corporations (SEDCs), were established to promote the involvement of the indigenous, purportedly on behalf of, and in trusteeship for, the Malay community as a whole. At the beginning, the Government implemented programmes to support the activities of private entrepreneurs, an approach which had been adopted during the pre-NEP era, but which met with little success.

It was under Tun Abdul Razak's leadership that growth in the rural sector, especially agricultural growth, began on an unprecedented scale. Under the setting-up of land scheme and agricultural projects thousands of acres of virgin jungles were opened. Tun Abdul Razak took a special interest in rural development as a means of bringing impoverished Malays into the country's economic mainstream. During his ten-year reign as Minister of National and Rural Development more than 80,000 acres of virgin jungles were opened up for agricultural development [35].

It was the responsibility of Tun Abdul Razak to ensure the effectiveness of Malaya's agricultural expansion during the period of independence. His programmes, such as the Land Development Authority's work and the technique of the Emergency together with his tribulation and coordination at the monthly meetings of the Ministry, had made Malaysia's rural development programmes without doubt one of the most effective in all of Southeast Asia.

Drainage and irrigation for rice and other crops were improved based on Tun Abdul Razak's Green Book (Buku Hijau) policy. The policy was later extended to urban areas where urbanites were encouraged to grow their own to supplement household needs. Following the positive result of the rural development in many villages throughout Peninsular Malaysia, implementation of an increasing range of other Government programmes achieved impressive results too. Agricultural production improved, the range of public services reaching the rural population expanded, family incomes rose, and social mobility increased.

It was amongst the peasant smallholders that underemployment was rampant, and they suffered from the perennial problem of low productivity. To alleviate these problems, the Government pushed numerous quasi-government institutions to deal with all of the different primary crops grown. To help Malaysian rubber smallholders improve their production technology, Rubber Industry Smallholders Development Authority (RISDA) was established in 1973.

Since the advent of the NEP, the Government made many changes to the general administrative structure in order to facilitate implementation

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of its various development programmes. The impact of such changes at the district level was great.

It was the hope of Tun Abdul Razak to ensure that clear plans for making the best way of life for the inhabitants of the old kampong would become a reality. From his Operations Room, duplicated in every state and district headquarters, Tun Abdul Razak was able to keep constant watch on the performance by each agency of government assigned responsibility for a share of the work. Working 16 hours a day and living modestly, scheduled and surprise inspection trips took him 60,000 miles a year. With no hotel facilities deep in the development scheme, it was not uncommon for him to sleep in peasants' houses during these trips.

As mentioned earlier, it was Tun Abdul Razak who believed that all Government economic projects should be cross-checked for their progress and performance and measured on their significance to the economic performance of the Malays. On August 13, 1967, Tun Abdul Razak was given the Magsaysay Award by the Magsaysay Foundation of the Philippines for his outstanding contribution to national and rural development in Malaysia. By this award the Board of Trustees of Magsaysay Award recognised Tun Abdul Razak as a politician with a quiet, efficient and innovative mind who was successful in reshaping his society for the benefit of all [36].

In education, the implementation of the NEP has increased the number of educated Malays especially in arts studies. Whether for the students enrolled in arts or science courses, the availability of grants for higher education by the provision of Malay privileges as enshrined in the Constitution has increased the number of Malays in the upper and middle class slightly. In line with Tun Abdul Razak's rural development policy, those who graduated from local universities and originated from the rural areas were encouraged to return to their origins to improve the life of their own folk.

Now for almost three decades after the race riots of 1969, many graduates of local universities have entered politics either in the Government or in the opposition parties. They are gradually replacing the breed of English educated Malays who had earlier received higher education in the West and whose behaviour and attitude had been much influenced by Western thinking and lifestyles.

Things, certainly, had not happened so smoothly along the way. During the development process, not everyone possesses the integral qualities demonstrated so zealously by Tun Abdul Razak and Tun Hussein Onn. The NEP was designed to eliminate poverty but in the

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process fund diversion had occurred with projects more biased towards the "basic amenities" type, especially construction projects. This diversion led to the creation of a new business elite who later held an unprecedented grip on Malaysian politics. The district development machinery, which controls and monitors every aspect of all NEP district and development projects, has also become an integral part of the local ruling party apparatus.

The politicians, who were the people's representatives, had a strong influence in deciding and making development projects happen. Through close associates, some of these politicians established their own businesses in order to get lucrative Governments projects and contracts, turning themselves into rich personal financial resources. The efforts of establishing businesses by these politicians were interpreted by them as partly fulfilling the 30 percent quota of Bumiputra ownership in business and management, as outlined in the NEP. In other words, these politicians believe that they have to fulfil to some degree the "restructuring of society" objective of the NEP, but ironically and on their own admission, by taking advantage of the "poverty eradication" schemes objective. This enormous personal material gain has in turn given the politicians the ability to buy political support which has generated tremendous internal political competition within the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO).

Looking from another angle, efforts aimed at reducing poverty among the Malaysian people have met with considerable success since 1975. Good progress has been seen in the moves to enhance property ownership and management of economic activities by the Bumiputra. The number of Bumiputra workers at all levels in the manufacturing industry has increased at an encouraging rate. Nonetheless, there is still a shortage of skilled and trained Bumiputra in the technological and professional fields. But with intensified efforts to further expand the teaching of science and technology in secondary schools and with increased opportunities and facilities for training the Bumiputra in these fields by MARA, the ministries and other government departments, colleges and the universities, the number of Bumiputra trained in such professional, technical and management fields will inevitably increase in times to come.

Many of the modern management concepts and practices were evolved in the West. They naturally are based on the socio-economic and cultural environment in those countries. Malaysia, with its own cultural and economic background, will need to develop its own management

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philosophy and techniques. Japan has shown an example after successfully evolving its own management philosophy and techniques in order to cater for its cultural peculiarity, where the pattern of influence of the home is strongly felt even within firms and factories in foreign lands.

The need for a better Malaysian management approach further exemplified Malaysian experience in planning and implementing the cultural development plan. The Red Book system was one of the Malaysian innovations in management of rural development efforts. Through the techniques of the Green Book, the Red Book and the Operations Room, instituted by Tun Abdul Razak, Malaysia achieved creditable success in planning and implementation of infrastructure development necessary to further enhance economic progress. Malaysia's significant economic progress has astounded leaders and statesmen of other developing countries, who have had opportunities to see what has been done in Malaysia. Some of them have been so impressed that they have started to implement the techniques pursued in Malaysia [37].

It was the inspiring leadership of Tun Abdul Razak who crusaded for national development of the country. He had only one aim, the greatest good for the greatest number, in the shortest possible time. He introduced many projects with new schemes in every district; since then development has, indeed, become the main preoccupation of the peoples of Malaysia. Hundreds of thousands of people, especially in the rural areas, are reaping the benefits of Tun Abdul Razak's massive Development Plan [38].

Tun Abdul Razak believed that the rural development which he instituted is a prerequisite to a faster economic development. It was also his belief that a fast development of the country but which neglects rural development, would sidestep the objective of the NEP, resulting in the economic status quo of the majority of the Malays who are situated in the rural areas disabling them further from coping with the significance of the fast economic development. It could be a vicious circle spiralling downwards – the antithesis of pursuing an economic balance between the different races of the country. The direction that Tun Abdul Razak pursued and dedicated his life to was therefore very clear to him.

Political Recovery

By his words, by his actions and by his deeds Tun Abdul Razak had strikingly demonstrated his favourite theme of unselfish service for the

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nation. At the same time, as a politician and statesman of the highest order, he had always emphasised the importance of doing the right thing at the right time.

Perhaps Tun Abdul Razak's main weakness was his kindliness and a lack of ruthlessness. He was reputed to be too tolerant of his colleagues, slow to anger and reluctant to chastise those who failed to deliver the goods. However, he was able to demonstrate his wisdom in implementing the National Education Policy which has significantly contributed firstly to the political recovery and secondly to the political stability of the country.

When Tun Abdul Razak was Minister of Education, he produced the Razak Report on Education which laid the foundation of the National Education Policy of the country and fostered the spirit of unity while recognising the richness of diversity. In recognition of his contribution to the advancement of education, the University of Malaya conferred upon him the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws.

The final objective of the National Education Policy is to create solidarity among the country's multi-racial population. This has started to be carried out since the incident of the racial riots in 1969. The National Education System, using one medium of instruction, Bahasa Malaysia, is the best way to achieve its long-term objective, with English, according to the resolution agreed upon by the Razak Committee and the Rahman Talib Report, the second language after Bahasa Malaysia. It is necessary to study English in schools. The Government had to give an assurance that the study of English would not jeopardise the position and status of Bahasa Malaysia.

Thus, the National Education Policy of Tun Abdul Razak was not only designed from the viewpoint of its national impact on education, but more than that was a strategy designed to mould the country's multi-racial population into a single national identity as a fundamental basis of national unity. The creation of national unity has successfully set the time frame within which the racial imbalance in higher educational opportunities would be redressed and be worked out in the spirit of consultation and consensus of the National Front. With higher education and professional qualification more Malays would have access to become better professionals in all fields of endeavour. A new breed of Malay entrepreneurs can now hold their own together with other Malaysians even on international platforms.

Besides the political contribution of the National Education Policy, Tun Abdul Razak was also able to show exceptional political skill and

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perceptiveness in bringing political parties together under the National Front grand coalition. The National Front emerged as a force of national unity, political stability and communal peace. It has prevented the splitting of both the Malay and non-Malay votes excessively, a useful ingredient to form a strong and reliable coalition Government.

Sources close to Tun Abdul Razak claimed that the Government under Tun Abdul Razak had improved its strength within the Chinese community. Tun Abdul Razak's main broker for the Chinese vote was the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA). Before the election MCA's prestige among the Chinese was low. Although the Party's "young turks" had agitated against Tun Tan Siew Sin, the veteran Finance Minister, as a man alleged by the radical Chinese to have lost his grip on the Chinese, the Party remained unreformed after his resignation.

After the formation of the National Front grand coalition the MCA had shown even greater flexibility and had completely reversed its once disastrous political fortunes by absorbing young blood, led by Dato' Alex Lee, a young, Cambridge-educated lawyer. He and his followers made frequent visits to the villages to win local support and to help kill the image of the MCA as representing little except the interests of Chinese "towkays".

Tun Abdul Razak also brought GERAKAN, the MCA's rival, into the National Front and thus managed to acquire a credible representative of the Chinese. GERAKAN's leaders were offered leadership posts in the Government. Besides the Chinese and the Indian communities, the other constituents of the National Front, were, by and large, from the upper strata. They were men who were involved in commerce and other transactions which in some way or other required the goodwill of the Government.

Tun Abdul Razak's farsightedness and pragmatic approach in forming the National Front to bring together the fragmented political parties to participate in the Government of national coalition, was not only significant to the Government's effort in reducing inter-party politicking and to the improvement of political and economic stability, but it significantly enabled the country to direct its energy towards full-blown economic progress.

The Significance of the National Front

The concept of the National Front has become a durable foundation for a strong, united and multiracial Malaysia. It would be described as a unique and epoch-making achievement in Malaysian political life where it was gratifying to Tun Abdul Razak personally as it took place during his life time. Tun Abdul Razak's high hopes and expectations were not misplaced as the National Front henceforth grew to become one of the most enduring coalition parties in modern history. Besides the New Economic Policy (NEP), the National Front was one of the most significant instruments of the Government to correct some of the fundamental problems that had almost torn the country apart in the post-1969 general election.

After more than three decades, the National Front is perhaps among the most successful coalition parties anywhere in the world, although it may not be able to claim itself a perfect coalition. Its ability and the willingness of component parties to downplay differences and draw on their similarities are significant to political and economic stability and to tremendous economic progress. The other major achievement of the National Front Government is greater distribution of wealth among the races, which in turn has led to a stronger sense of belonging among Malaysians [39].

Although Malaysia will not escape the spectre of communal divisions and antagonisms for several generations, serious communal violence could be avoided. Fortunately, most Malaysians realise that communal violence will lead to terror, poverty and misery for all. In itself, this helps to sustain the ethos of accommodations and consensus which appears to characterise the mood of the country since 1970. There is a close correlation between ethnic accommodation and the National Front government that has significantly contributed to the stability of the country. Thus, the country enjoys the confidence of foreign investors and the respect of the international community.

With the formation of the National Front four years after the incident of May 13, 1969, it became the hallmark of Malaysian politics. The National Front has tested its support and legitimacy since the General Election of 1974. Unlike the Alliance which was noted for fluctuating from strength to the point of collapse in its electoral performances, the National Front has maintained its strength in all subsequent General

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Elections. In the 1974 General Election it won a landslide victory, securing 135 out of 154 parliamentary seats and gaining control of all state governments. The extra lead gave the National Front the ability to survive the subsequent General Elections literally intact despite the expulsion of the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP/PAS) by Tun Hussein Onn in 1977 and the loss of some seats and states to the opposition [40].

It will be both a challenge and an opportunity for the National Front to face a changing socio-economic environment, accommodating new thinking and fulfilling new expectations and aspirations of vastly different generations of Malaysians. Besides communal and religious issues which remain important and will continue to be used by the opposition to erode the power of the National Front government, it has to look beyond these with greater vigour. The new agenda for the National Front has included elements that will enhance and guarantee the continued prosperity and survival of the country as well as those that will attract young and more sophisticated voters to its fold.

Malaysian society is, however, beginning to show signs of wear and tear as a result of rapid growth. Social ills are becoming widespread, involving the very people in whom the country's future lies, the youth. A strong youth agenda on the part of the National Front would steer them clear of social ills and make them healthy Malaysians. The National Front needs these people just as much as they need the guiding hand of its leaders, leaders of the highest calibre, integrity and unselfishness.

The National Front's contribution in the inter-related success in both economic development and political stability can be considered as a success story of Tun Abdul Razak's social engineering. While Malaysia has evolved a unique form of parliamentary democracy a'la Malaysia, the National Front which is in power is eloquent testimony to the end of racism in politics. There are 14 political parties in the National Front representing all the races, tribes and religions in the country, therefore making it a self-contained forum of check and balance in a government of national unity and consensus.

The Blossoming of ASEAN

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established by the Foreign Ministers of the five founding Member Countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) in August 1967 and at first was formally limited to economic, social and

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cultural cooperation. Malaysia was represented by Tun Abdul Razak at this historic event. However, almost all those who participated in its founding agreed that their principal motives were diplomatic and political in nature. These motives were not identical, but a very important common thread was the desire to use their collective bargaining power to strengthen individual national governments and thus maintain political stability and the existing order of nation-states in the region [41].

It was more than 30 years ago that ASEAN was inaugurated in Bangkok, Thailand. The first ten years of ASEAN were rather uneventful. It was a period of foundation laying and confidence building as the ASEAN sub-region had just concluded a period of bilateral confrontations.

During these 30 years the ASEAN Secretariat was established in Jakarta, Indonesia, and several important declarations and treaties were signed by the Member Countries such as the 1967 Bangkok Declaration, the 1971 Kuala Lumpur Summit Declaration on the Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) signed in Bali in 1976. All these documents provide ASEAN with an institutional framework and the sinews of future cooperation, emphasising the fact that ASEAN is indeed an association of (independent) Southeast Asian nations for economic and social cooperation. It is with this slender institutional framework that ASEAN embarks on a journey to prove the viability of the philosophy of building "regional resilience" based on the respective "national resilience" of each of its Member Countries, anticipating an era of peace and cooperation.

ASEAN was created as an overall framework to stabilise interstate relations among countries disengaging from a state of conflict and to prevent the future eruption of hostility and violent disputes. Singapore had just separated from Malaysia, both sides had to recover from strong racial feelings and political tensions. Malaysia and Indonesia were engaged in a process of reconciliation and readjustment after the "Konfrontasi" and in the Philippines, a new government was looking for a way to sidestep the diplomatic impasse with Malaysia as a result of the Philippines' claim on Sabah. Thailand had a long history of interest in regionalism as a frontline state. That the five governments shared a free-market, anti-communist outlook facilitated cooperation [42].

Tun Abdul Razak fully realised the importance of ASEAN in fostering regional economic and political cooperation. The fostering of economic and political cooperation of ASEAN was important for the political and economic stability of the region. He demonstrated clearly

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his strong conviction on the principles of ASEAN by redirecting his own government's policy to establish diplomatic relations with all countries that are prepared to respect Malaysia's sovereignty and independence, no matter what their political persuasions [43].

Tun Abdul Razak's emphasis on both economic and political cooperation in ASEAN was initiated by three main events. First, the detente in Sino-U.S. relations in the 1970s led to the breakdown of the bipolar system, replacing it with a multipolar one and thereby disrupting the pro-U.S. policy of ASEAN Member Countries, particularly Thailand and the Philippines. Second, and most crucial, however, was the Indochina fiasco because it threatened the freedom survival of ASEAN. In the 1960s while paying lip service to the idea of mutual cooperation, each of the five Member Countries had pursued national issues in preference to those of common interest.

After the Communist victory in Vietnam in 1975, however, the Member Countries were preoccupied with seeking a regional solution to meet this Communist challenge. Moreover, the political rivalry between China and the Soviet Union created more uncertainty for ASEAN. Third, the upsurge of internal Communist insurgent movements, which had serious implications for regional security, also strengthened the political will of ASEAN, since the movements were supported by China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), who has emerged as the strongest military power in the region. The ASEAN leaders, in response to the new developments since 1975, have frequently reviewed the economic and security issues.

ASEAN still has a few constraints, narrow nationalism has been a stumbling block which has seriously impeded regional cooperation because national interests have been zealously guarded. Despite its weaknesses and imperfections, ASEAN is more consolidated than in the late 1960s. Unlike the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and Maphilindo, it has survived and become a useful political mechanism through which regional stability, national interests, and global recognition can be promoted.

Although at the first stage ASEAN lacked a plan for gradual political and economic integration and for some years appeared to be an inactive irrelevance, merely by bringing its members into regular contact with each other it helped to defuse their own conflicts and obliged them to seek consensus viewpoints on various matters.

Functioning as a regional group, ASEAN has developed into useful forum for the discussion of security issues, both regional and extra

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regional and has also served as a mechanism for moderating intra-ASEAN tensions. ASEAN organises special meetings to discuss potentially security sensitive areas such as the workshop of ten nations, the ASEAN Regional Security Forum (ARF) which meets annually for discussion on the security problems. Such an informal quasi-official forum would assist ASEAN in exploring ways to resolve differences and produce solutions.

Though ASEAN has not yet eliminated the roots of interstate disputes, it can further contribute to the peace and security of the region by strengthening the machinery for the settlement of disputes within its own ranks. The TAC provides for a High Council of Ministerial representatives to settle disputes, through the regional process, if the parties to the dispute agree to its application.

With the TAC, its signatories are obliged to refrain from threat or use of force and shall at all times settle such disputes among themselves through friendly negotiations. As a consequence, the possibility of interstate disputes occurring, which in turn might trigger regional instability, has now been reduced. It is interesting to note that outstanding territorial and maritime issues have never been referred to ASEAN mediation. It may be left to the spirit and trust of the next generation of officials perhaps to implement such a provision.

Facing squarely an act of aggression from the most powerful military power in Southeast Asia, ASEAN was able to weather this turbulent and dangerous period of its existence despite its lack of a strong institutional framework. Vietnam, the second most powerful country in Asia, invaded Cambodia during Christmas 1978. The emergence of Cambodia as a security problem in 1978 gave ASEAN a definite focus for action.

It was at this highly critical juncture in January 1978 that ASEAN issued the Jakarta Joint Statement strongly censuring Vietnam's action and calling upon the world not to let this act go unpunished. It was an important as well as a momentous decision. Later, ASEAN diplomatic success to pressure for a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia and a political settlement, projected ASEAN as a credible and effective entity at the United Nations.

The first generation of ASEAN delivered its political promise. Through the establishment of a machinery of cooperation, the institutionalisation of political consultation and modes of conflict resolution, ASEAN has managed to transform the sub-regional environment into a haven of stability and security. It lowered, if not eliminated, the expectation of violent conflict among themselves and the

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exploitation of violent conflict among external powers. Without ASEAN, territorial disputes, of which there were many, between member states could have developed out of hand. Other bilateral problems were also solved in the "ASEAN traditional spirit of cooperation and cordiality".

Known for their preference for resolving problems through negotiations, it is expected that in the long run most, if not all, the intra-ASEAN disputes will be resolved in such a manner. It is interesting to note that with the glaring disputes and differences among ASEAN Member Countries, whatever forms of relations that exist contemporarily are not further aggravated. The situation today is better with many positive trends towards increasing the chances for peace and reducing the possibility of security conflict.

ASEAN countries continue to show a high growth rate with more business and investment opportunities particularly from the developed nations. The region began to adopt a united front in the international economic negotiations of the 1970s and important trade dialogues were initiated with the United States, Japan and the European Union (EU). ASEAN as a whole was second only to the United States in its share of Japanese trade, and much effort went into improving ASEAN's economic relationship with Japan. Japan itself proved responsive to united pressure from ASEAN over such matters as its production of synthetic rubber, which competed with Southeast Asia's natural rubber production.

As indicated at the outset of this chapter, the motives behind the creation of ASEAN were largely political and diplomatic in nature. Although the Association's activities were initially limited to economic, social and cultural cooperation, the Bangkok Declaration of August 8, 1967 that founded ASEAN referred to the determination of the Member Countries to ensure their stability and security from external interference and declared that foreign bases in the region were temporary.

In November 1971 the ASEAN Member Countries issued a joint statement declaring their desire to see Southeast Asia recognised as a "Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside powers". But the impact of this was lessened by the evident determination of Thailand and the Philippines to retain their close links with the United States. A significant breakthrough came with President Nixon's visit to China in 1972 and the considerable thaw which ensued in China's relations with the rest of the world. This removed at one stroke a major pillar of the structure of alignments and enmities which had prevailed in Asia for twenty years, and ASEAN, with some

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reluctance on Indonesia's part, was able to agree at a 1972 ministerial meeting to begin the process of improving relations with China. In these circumstances, ASEAN remained primarily a consultative arrangement amongst its members.

The number and scope of consultations amongst ASEAN members over security questions continued to grow throughout the 1970s. The ASEAN governments have with great pains denied that ASEAN is in any way a military organisation; there were, however, joint naval exercises between Thailand and Indonesia and bilateral agreements over border security between Thailand and Malaysia, Malaysia and Singapore and Malaysia and Indonesia. Incidentally, military spending by ASEAN countries has increased sharply.

Section E of the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, which specifically deals with the problems of security cooperation, is another indication that the consolidation of ASEAN is progressing, as all members have agreed on the importance of continuing cooperation in security matters on a non-ASEAN (i.e., non-bloc) basis in accordance with their mutual needs and interests. The significance of such an agreement is that it gives the member states flexibility in dealing with external threats and yet leaves open the possibility of a military pact. Indeed, bilateral security arrangements have already become a pattern of regional cooperation.

The solidarity of ASEAN has been demonstrated without a formal alliance such as in the form of a military pact or in the form of a collective security system. It has been ASEAN's diplomatic success that sustains its political cohesion. The creation of a military pact or collective security system within the framework of ASEAN is unlikely, at least in the foreseeable period. However this does not preclude defence cooperation between Member Countries. Joint exercises are in fact regularly carried out bilaterally between the armed forces of some of the Member Countries. Once existing problems and suspicions amongst Member Countries are resolved, these exercises can be expanded to include all members.

One problem that lingers among ASEAN Member Countries is the existence of suspicions and prejudice between one member and another. The different socio-economic and ethnic-religious orientations of these Member Countries have resulted in the existence of suspicions and prejudice which could become the main source of regional conflict. This is further superimposed by the different security perceptions possessed by each of the ASEAN members.

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The different security perceptions possessed by each ASEAN Member Country can be seen from their differences in approach to security, specially concerning the implementation of the ASEAN Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). As a result of the different perceptions of threat of ASEAN Members ZOPFAN has remained dormant and unfulfilled. Consequently for Singapore, the best guarantee of security in the region is still a strong United States presence in the region to redress the balance of power. Meanwhile, the unresolved Cambodian conflict has propelled Thailand towards subscribing to Singapore's view of maintaining the United States presence in the region.

Beset by internal problems and dissident elements in the armed forces, the Philippine Government also favours a balance of power approach, as manifested previously by the retention of the United States bases for decades in that country. Indonesia, which does not have a security treaty with any foreign power, agrees that such alliances may be necessary to those ASEAN members in the process of developing their own "natural resilience and self-reliance".

As the founder of ZOPFAN, Malaysia has never favoured a balance of power approach but has always shown a commitment to a policy of neutralisation or equi-distance with major powers. Malaysia believes that major power involvement at the regional level should be in terms of socio-economic development, thereby contributing towards peace, stability and progress in the region. ZOPFAN implies disengagement from major power alliance and alignment so as to avoid becoming enmeshed in major power ambitions.

The different perceptions of threat of ASEAN Member Countries had at one time divided ASEAN into two camps, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei in one camp whilst Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines were in the other. Malaysia and Indonesia viewed the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) as the main threat, especially in the long term perspective. Without dwelling on details, the position taken is understandable, especially when the experiences of both countries with China were taken into consideration.

This view is still believed to be prevailing. Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines on the other hand appeared to see the Soviets and the Vietnamese as most threatening. Thailand's perception had been influenced by the Kampuchean (now Cambodia) conflict, whilst Singapore recognised the limitations of PRC militarily, at least in the short term [44].

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The different security approach among the ASEAN countries has increased the degree of suspicions, which has significantly activated the militarisation of the states in the region, especially in the form of military modernisation programmes. Experiencing such differences of security approach and military modernisation performance, since its inception in 1967, ASEAN as a geographical zone has not suffered any major overt military aggression carried out by a member of ASEAN on its neighbours.

The solidarity of ASEAN has already been demonstrated even without a formal alliance. ASEAN has so far opted for a low profile and non-provocative cooperation which, in the long term, will benefit the Member Countries and provide for everlasting stability in the region. The maturity, good sense and flexibility of the ASEAN Member Countries and their preservation of an essential unity despite underlying differences of approach, provide hope for peace and stability.

ASEAN continues to be burdened with the emergence of new suspicions or conflicts such as the rise of Japan, China and India as new regional military powers. In predicaments such as these, the countries of ASEAN try to ensure that regional disputes are peacefully resolved or managed and that neither China nor Japan seeks to dominate the region. Identifying their common economic, political and security interests can be a factor in expanding political integration among the Member Countries to bridge those differences and fears.

Although ASEAN has been organised without any aim at military cooperation the association provides an effective deterrent against any act of aggression. There has been a rapid expansion in bilateral security and defence ties among its members. Bilateral and trilateral cooperation in defence among different sets of ASEAN countries has been conducted so far outside ASEAN and has led to an "entente cordiale", which promotes cooperation among the commanders-in-chief of the various armed forces, as well as exchanges in analyses, intelligence information and training personnel, joint exercises, joint border patrols, and cooperation in procurement, repair and maintenance of military equipment [45].

Contact between the various armed forces of the ASEAN Member Countries began from simple exchange of visits and these have since expanded. There is now exchange of intelligence on insurgents on their common borders, joint operations against these insurgents, regular contact between high level military officials, the admission of senior officers into the Staff College of other ASEAN countries, provision of

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training facilities, joint maritime surveillance, arms transfer and a range of military exercises to develop common operating procedures for joint action against a common threat [46]. These have performed a useful "confidence-building" role which contributes to reducing suspicions concerning the possibility of military adventurism within ASEAN countries.

The Five-Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA), replacing the AMADA of 1957, has been successful in creating cooperation defence linkages, particularly between Malaysia and Singapore, with the active assistance and aid of Australia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand. The success of the FPDA by a mutually reinforcing defence mechanism, has opened up the possibility of the widening of the scope of this arrangement and the inclusion of Brunei, then a new member of ASEAN, with the FPDA. These developments still leave ASEAN some considerable distance from the level of integration achieved in Western Europe. But the process of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia has then achieved a momentum that would be difficult to halt. One of the interesting features of ASEAN is that it has progressed so far without any sort of formal blueprint for integration other than the vague commitments of the ASEAN Declaration. This makes it difficult to predict what the next stages of regionalism will be.

There has been some speculation about a possible "Pacific Basin Community" being created, which would link ASEAN with the successful economies of East Asia and perhaps to Australia, New Zealand and the United States. The ASEAN members themselves have already developed links with the Communist states of Indo-China, which they see as contributing to the reduction of tension in the region.

Pushed by world events such as the end of East-West rivalries following the demise of the Soviet Union and the rejection of Communism in Eastern Europe but not in China, North Korea and Vietnam, the floundering of the Uruguay Round, the weakening of GATT, the establishment of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the strengthening of the European Union (EU), ASEAN has to make a thorough review of itself and its mechanisms to meet the new challenges that could no longer be based upon old fears.

Therefore, in assessing the shortfalls of ASEAN if the search was purely in the realm of economics, of course there would be many. The first thirty years should be regarded as the period of preparation for securing national and regional resilience, for confidence building among

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members through observing scrupulously the principles of detente to ensure an enduring and durable entente.

The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) which is a platform for economic cooperation between fifteen countries located on both sides of the Pacific Rim, which includes all earlier six ASEAN Member Countries, is testimony of a form of extension of regional cooperation beyond that of ASEAN. In March 1996, the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), which initiated cooperation between the fifteen countries of the European Union and ten countries of East Asia, which included all seven ASEAN Member Countries then, further underlined the move towards an even greater regional cooperation.

Meanwhile the enlargement of ASEAN membership to ASEAN-10 is clearly on the way. Vietnam joined ASEAN as its seventh member in July 1995, much to the world's surprise considering Vietnam then as the only odd country out due to its being a socialist state, and the country once dreaded by other ASEAN Member Countries, especially by Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines. Vietnam's inclusion only served to signal more brilliantly ASEAN's principles of neutrality and nonalignment.

ASEAN celebrated its 30th anniversary on August 8, 1997, in Jakarta, the seat of ASEAN Secretariat, welcoming the membership of two more countries, Laos and Myanmar. The "early than expected" inclusion of Myanmar into ASEAN has created disapprovals among some developed countries, and country grouping such the European Union, who claimed poor exercise of human rights in Myanmar. ASEAN, however, strongly pronounced that the decision to include Myanmar was their stance – recognition of ASEAN must automatically mean recognition of its full membership. Contrary to the views of these developed countries, ASEAN firmly believes that it is through the inclusion of Myanmar in the Association that human rights violations would eventually be diffused in this country.

It was originally planned that ASEAN-10 would have been realised during the ASEAN's 30th anniversary. The political turbulence that erupted in Cambodia just a couple of weeks before the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Manila in mid-1997 reluctantly forced the Ministers to exclude Cambodia, giving the country more time to sort out its internal problem before it is ready to join the Association. Assurance, however, has been given that Cambodia would become a member "as soon as possible".

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ASEAN thus has grown and flourished a long way since the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) was first initiated in the early sixties. The mechanism of transformation of ASEAN from the springboard of ASA as a brainchild of Tun Abdul Razak and his four counterparts, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, bonded by their signatures on the ASEAN Declaration signed in 1967 in Bangkok, will be permanently recorded in history.

Chapter Nine

DATO' SRI NAJIB: CONTINUING TUN ABDUL RAZAK'S LEGACY

Brief Personal Background

Dato' Sri Najib was born in Kuala Lipis, Pahang on July 23, 1953. He received his early education at St. John's Institution, Kuala Lumpur and continued his studies in Industrial Economy at the University of Nottingham, England. Initially working at Bank Negara, Malaysia's central bank, in 1970, he later became Manager of Public Affairs in the National Oil and Gas Corporation (PETRONAS) from 1974 to 1976 [1]. He is married to Datin Sri Rosmah Mansor, an educated and career woman from Negri Sembilan. His national duty which always comes first for him never allows him a long leisure time at home, but the short time he spends at home surrounded by his young children: two girls - Puteri Norliza and Noryana Najwa, and three boys - Mohd. Nizar, Mohd. Nasifuddin and Nor Ashman Razak makes him more and more a devoted family man.

Dato' Sri Najib's family background and exposure has helped shape his style and manners. He is soft-spoken but capable of bursting into hearty laughter, when the moment so requires. He speaks with a clipped British accent acquired during his days as an economics student in Nottingham, England. A typical Malay man who enjoys both western-style and traditional Malay dishes he is just as comfortable if his plate is filled with roast beef or with smoked fish wrapped around banana leaf. His late father would not miss puffing from his pipe after a good meal with the family, but Dato' Sri Najib thought that a good cigar is more practical rather than messing around with tobacco. With memories of his grim-faced but loving father vivid in his mind in the living room guiding him and his brothers and adopted sisters through their growing years, Dato' Sri Najib always presents to a more gentle face to his wife and children and the house staff he has around him at home, in spite of the very hectic time he has had the whole day.

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The death of Tun Abdul Razak on January 14, 1976 had somewhat prompted Dato' Sri Najib to take an early dive into politics. As eldest son, he was destined to continue Tun Abdul Razak's political legacy and leadership qualities inherited from the deposed Bugis prince from Macassar that settled in Pahang in the 18th century, soon to be observed when he had to inherit as the "Orang Kaya Indera Shahbandar" that had been passed for generations to his father. It appeared to be more than coincidence when he succeeded his father at the age of 22 as Member of Parliament for Pekan, Pahang, Peninsular Malaysia's largest state.

At that age Dato' Sri Najib was still young, boyish and shy. Since he had just been thrust into public life following the demise of his father, he had to work very hard to prove his worth. Being the son of a former Prime Minister could be a special privilege destined for him but being Tun Abdul Razak's son that privilege would take away his carefree character as a young man. His father was a freedom fighter, whose life was dedicated to serving his nation and his people. Dato' Sri Najib was not then - not yet - he was just a young man who had just returned from many years of study abroad and was not even sure if he would like to follow in his father's footsteps. But already he realised very early that he could not live the carefree life of a young man of an aristocratic family. He felt that the image and the reputation of his late father, and the strong love of the Malaysian people for him had somehow been placed upon his shoulders, together with the responsibilities that came with them, which he could not neglect [2].

The loss of his father and the emotional stress he and his family endured subsequently led to him take an early plunge into politics. Trained to be a technocrat, when he entered politics instead, Dato' Sri Najib's rise in politics was beyond his expectations. Indeed, Tun Abdul Razak never wanted any of his sons to go into politics. He had wished Dato' Sri Najib to become an accountant. Although Dato' Sri Najib started young, his rise has been a steep ascent up the political hierarchy which gave him no time to look back. Dato' Sri Najib felt that he must continue what his father had done. In order to proceed with his father's achievement, Dato' Sri Najib did not have much time to think of the consequences of his plunge into politics.

Upon completing his studies, he originally gave himself 10 years to decide if he would like to venture into politics. He realised that in normal circumstances, age, experience and political base were important prerequisites in a political career. But Dato' Sri Najib was no stranger to politics. Being the son of a leading politician, politics formed a part of

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his growing up process. Entering politics at the very young age of 22, his renowned family background definitely was a very important leverage to him to initially present himself. Obviously without the goodwill due to his father's image he would not have been given and able to shoulder that kind of responsibility. People usually start without having full confidence of in their own ability.

His distinct family background too has made Dato' Sri Najib highly acceptable to a lot of people. His family has historical ties and deep-seated roots with many in the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) for a long time. Tun Hussein Onn, Malaysia's third Prime Minister after Tun Abdul Razak's demise was Dato' Sri Najib's uncle, by virtue of the marriage of Tun Hajah Suhaila, sister of Tun Hajah Rahah, who is Dato' Sri Najib's mother, to Tun Hussein Onn. To have an uncle as the Prime Minister succeeding his late father, lending him guiding hands in his early years of involvement in politics, Dato' Sri Najib had all the ingredients for a good start towards a successful career in politics. But Dato' Sri Najib realised too that he could not rest on his family's laurels too long - and he is not the type either to do that. He had to work extremely hard to show his own worth.

His involvement in UMNO began when he won the uncontested Parliamentary by-election in February 1976. Exhibiting every semblance of his father, gentle and warm, Dato' Sri Najib was very emotional when he accepted the offer to contest the Pekan Parliamentary by-election in his father's constituency in 1976. He was the youngest Member of Parliament in the history of the Malaysian Parliament, being only 22 years old. When he became MP, Dato' Sri Najib was already a member of the UMNO Youth Executive Committee.

He was then appointed Chairman of the National Livestock Development Authority (MAJUTERNAK) in 1977. Being a Member of Parliament for Pekan and Chairman of MAJUTERNAK, Dato' Sri Najib had to pay a high price for venturing into politics at an early age. Perhaps the highest price the 22 year old eldest son of the late Tun Abdul Razak had to pay, was the loss of the freedom and privacy of a young man.

As Chairman of MAJUTERNAK, Dato' Sri Najib admitted that he felt a little odd being appointed to lead such an important agency but he was confident that he had not been chosen just because he was Tun Abdul Razak's son. Since MAJUTERNAK was responsible for some 100,000 farmers and involved programmes worth millions of ringgit, Dato' Sri Najib pledged that he would do everything possible to provide the kind of leadership needed by MAJUTERNAK [3].

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It was not his major concern, if many people would think that Dato' Sri Najib was an MP and a Chairman of MAJUTERNAK only because he was the son of the former Prime Minister. He wasn't even denying that being the son of a former Prime Minister had helped him in his political venture. While he did not want to live under the shadow of his late father, he had to admit that the people's perception of him would not change overnight.

Dato' Sri Najib had been equally conscious that he needed to step out of the shadow of his late father and develop his own image. If he were to continue to depend on his father's image, he would never have developed as a leader and he would be considered a weak leader. As much as he adored his father, the time would eventually arrive when he wished to be accepted as a leader in his own right.

In any circumstances, Dato' Sri Najib seriously considered his appointment as MP for Pekan and Chairman of MAJUTERNAK could very well be the test which could determine whether he would survive or sink in the political whirlpool. As an elected representative, Dato' Sri Najib described it as challenging but gratifying, especially when he was in a position to do something for the people. He gradually felt that he was being treated by his constituents more and more as their MP rather than as the son of an ex-Prime Minister. In the 1978 elections, he stood in the same constituency and easily defeated the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP/PAS) candidate, Mohd. Rusdi Arif with a strong majority of 9,533 votes.

It is Dato' Sri Najib's family nature, especially that of his father, Tun Abdul Razak, to always have great care and sensitivity for the people. Tun Abdul Razak never spoilt his children for being a distinguished family in the country. Enjoying tremendous rapport with his constituents made Dato' Sri Najib considered as earthy as he is urbane.

In the meantime, he continued serving PETRONAS as a full time member of staff. As Chairman, his appointment in MAJUTERNAK did not require full-time attendance. The post of Chief Executive in the Authority was held by the Deputy Chairman.

Apart from being an MP and Chairman of MAJUTERNAK, he was also proclaimed the "Orang Kaya Indera Shahbandar" a title which had been passed down from generation to generation and which he inherited from his father as the ninth Shahbandar. All these positions and responsibilities had transformed his life and accelerated his maturing process.

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Dato' Sri Seri Najib was awarded the Pingat Darjah Sultan Ahmad Shah (DSAP) by the Sultan of Pahang on October 23, 1978 and the Pingat Darjah Kebesaran Sri Sultan Ahmad Shah (SSAP) on October 24, 1985. By then he had several years of experience in the Government. He was appointed Deputy Minister of Energy, Telecommunications and Posts from 1978 to 1980. At the age of 25 he became the youngest ever Deputy Minister in Malaysia. He was later appointed Deputy Minister of Education in 1980 and Deputy Minister of Finance in 1981. In the 1982 elections, Dato' Sri Najib contested and won the Pekan State Assembly seat and was then tasked with being Chief Minister of Pahang until 1986, a post his father once held. From 1986 to 1990 he was Minister of Youth and Sports. He became Minister of Defence from 1990 to 1995 and since May 1995, he has been Minister of Education. These latter two ministries were also headed by his father before.

Unlike his father, Dato' Sri Najib has not had the chance to be given a portfolio which had been very close to his father's heart, the Ministry of National and Rural Development. The rural environment that Tun Abdul Razak went through in his early life had become the major factor that eventually led him to dedicate his whole life to improving the lot of rural folk.

When he became the nation's Minister of Education Dato' Sri Najib's position in UMNO rose to Vice President, a key post in the Party. Before he was appointed UMNO Vice President in November 1993, Dato' Sri Najib was Head of UMNO Youth Movement from 1987 to 1993. The Deputy President of the Party, who traditionally moves on to become Chief of the Party, usually comes from the ranks of Vice-Presidents.

Dato' Sri Najib was 40 when he was selected as Vice President of the Party. His father, Tun Abdul Razak, in fact was 35 when he became Deputy President of UMNO in 1957. Dato' Sri Najib admitted that, having a high respect for his late father, he never invoked his father's memory before an audience in his campaign, but it is a "bonus factor", anyway. People above 55 who were with his late father and continued to have fond memories of him would come to support him (Dato' Sri Najib). In any circumstances, Dato' Sri Najib has achieved high success in his political career while he has made it a compulsory rule to guard against being over-ambitious to be a number one politician [4].

A Young Politician On The Rise (UMNO Youth Leader)

Dato' Sri Najib's qualitative exposures to and experiences of diverse political situations and responsibilities, make him emotionally and mentally a very mature person. His young age was never considered a hurdle in the numerous responsibilities that he held and in his ascent up the political ladder. Beginning his involvement in UMNO Youth Movement in 1976, he was soon elected to this Youth Movement's EXCO from 1976 to 1982. From 1981 to 1987 he moved up to UMNO Supreme Council.

Dato' Sri Najib became the Deputy Chief of UMNO Youth from 1982 to 1987. Upon Dato' Sri Anwar's resignation as UMNO Youth Chief, Dato' Sri Najib assumed the number one Youth position in an acting capacity on April 24, 1987. The appointment was announced by Dato' Sri Anwar himself during the Movement's Annual General Assembly. Dato' Sri Anwar had eventually decided to name his successor following increasing pressure from amongst UMNO youth stalwarts for him to contest one of the three UMNO Vice President slots [5].

The date May 21, 1988 was observed by Party analysts as an important turning point in Dato' Sri Najib's political career. When UMNO was de-registered and replaced by a new political party, the "New UMNO", it was then that Dato' Sri Najib was appointed to Youth Chief of the newly-revived UMNO. The appointment was historic in that it was the first time in the Party's history that the number one position in its Youth and Women (Wanita) wings had been appointed by the President and his Supreme Council. Traditionally, that is before UMNO was deregistered in 1987, the posts were determined in the Youth and Women wings biennial elections [6].

Dato' Sri Najib's stewardship of the UMNO Youth was also a period which saw tumultuous changes taking place within UMNO. It was during this period that the Party's unity was badly affected by a major split between members who supported Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir-Tun Ghafar Baba, on the one hand, and Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah-Tan Sri Musa Hitam on the other. It was during the height of conflict between these two political camps that Dato' Sri Najib's mettle as a leader could be seen. He was then seen to be a tactful and mature leader, especially in facing up to the various accusations and slanders directed at him from various quarters [7].

His stance to remain friends with all sides and not to make enemies made Dato' Sri Najib viewed by critics as afraid to take sides, perhaps

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even vacillating. When Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah challenged Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir for Party President in 1987, Dato' Sri Najib remained neutral throughout the campaign as he did not wish the two good leaders of UMNO to drift further apart. Much to his dislike, this was the first time in the history of UMNO that the post of Party President had been challenged. He had somehow anticipated the worst happening at the end of the election - UMNO could lose one or more of its potential leaders at the end of the contest.

For Dato' Sri Najib, the institution of Prime Minister should be respected by all and he would put it on the highest pedestal to avoid political instability [8]. If the institution of Prime Minister was not protected and allowed to be disturbed, it would only bring about chaos and instability. For Dato' Sri Najib, the leadership of Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir should not be questioned and he should be respected as the foremost leader in the country. If there are changes to be made, a smooth transition of power should follow. Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir will surely ensure a transition of power to his successor in a proper manner. For Dato' Sri Najib, the posts of the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister should not be contested nor challenged.

As a working Minister, it is Dato' Sri Najib's allegiance that has always made him stand by the side of the Prime Minister and support him in his vision and the manner in which he steers the nation. With these mature qualities, Dato' Sri Najib had emerged unscathed and managed to stay clear of controversy involving his personality and style of leadership. His gentle and calm disposition, his conservative and rather unconcealed aristocratic outlook, and unassuming character, could not have possibly led him to take a partisan stand in the conflict between the two divided camps in UMNO then.

It was in these attitudes and leadership qualities that his strength and wisdom lay. As a conservative and aristocrat as well as an insider in the UMNO ruling elite, his personality had been fine-tuned towards the Party's culture and tradition. Dato' Sri Najib's style of leadership, oriented towards UMNO's leadership style and tradition, has made him well-liked by veteran figures in the Party, as compared to most other younger leaders then.

Dato' Sri Najib has always stood by the belief that all members and leaders of the Party need to be more sincere in voicing their stands for solidarity and unity, in order to avoid negative sentiments and hatred. By adopting this reasonable and common stand in facing up to the disunity which occurred within his Party, he had reinforced the notion that the

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blood of his late father was still running strongly in his veins. For it was his father, Tun Abdul Razak, who had often voiced out on the need for unity amongst UMNO members, when he was the Party's President.

As a leader seen by many as sincere in his struggle, Dato' Sri Najib could be seen as trying to carry on a "mandate" from his late father in the struggle to maintain Malay unity. It was the spirit of solidarity that led him to participate in a delegation comprising Cabinet Ministers to London to meet with former Deputy Prime Minister, Tan Sri Musa Hitam, asking him not to resign from his Cabinet positions. It was also Dato' Sri Najib who had, without fear or favour, voiced his undivided support for the implementation of the historic Johore Malays Assembly Resolution which was a political formula aimed at reviving the unity of UMNO members in Johore. Despite his support for the resolution, Dato' Sri Najib also cautioned all quarters within the Party not to neglect UMNO leaders in Johore who had been instrumental in reviving the Party in the UMNO stronghold [9].

The UMNO Youth under Dato' Sri Najib's leadership did manage to project its own identity. The identity was, however, only known after a year of his appointment. It was then initially known as a "pressure group" within the context of the struggle for the Malays and for Islam.

As an UMNO Youth leader Dato' Sri Najib proved himself to be a champion for the survival of the Malays and Islam with his stand on these two matters unshakeable and uncompromising. Being a stubborn and an uncompromising UMNO stalwart, especially in the midst of struggles for the survival of the Malay masses, he had always insisted that the relationship between the Malays and "the national accumulated debt to the race" should be accepted as an important struggle. He had accorded struggles to defend the honour and dignity of the Malay race, the UMNO Youth's topmost priority. For him, the UMNO Youth must always cling to the philosophy which considered the Malays as a dominant and indigenous race in the country's administration, and this philosophy should never be deviated from over time. And he truly believed that this concept of the dominant Malays should be consistently and seriously championed by the UMNO Youth but taking into account certain flexibilities in approach.

With respect to this stand, Dato' Sri Najib urged the Government to ensure that any economic programme replacing the New Economic Policy (NEP) must maintain the special privileges of the Malays. This stand made him reject the Malaysian Chinese Association's (MCA) proposal for a common framework for nation building based on the

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principle of equality and justice. Any new policy to be implemented which did not take into account the interests of the Malays should be rejected. The MCA proposal was aimed at removing the quota system which was the thrust of the Malay struggle. For UMNO Youth the proposal had ignored Article 153 of the National Constitution [10].

Dato' Sri Najib preferred that the emphasis of the post-1990 NEP should be on "balanced development" in addition to its two-pronged objectives of poverty eradication and society restructuring. With regard to this, a continuation of the NEP was important if the country was to continue enjoying political stability, racial harmony and economic growth. Since he described the NEP as "an unfinished agenda", there must be an uninterrupted continuity of NEP after 1990. Future Government policies, as well as changes in attitude and culture, must fall in line with the NEP aspirations [11].

Even though the NEP was eventually replaced by the National Development Policy, Dato' Sri Najib considered that their principles and concepts were virtually the same [12]. Here lies the importance of equity ownership, of creating Malay equal participation in the corporate sector, of enabling them to determine how the country's economic resources should be used and of giving them the right to decide on the affairs of every business and industry in this country. The restructuring of society, however, must not merely aim to increase the corporate equity of the Bumiputra - it should ultimately develop a generation of Bumiputra capable of competing in all economic races with the other communities in the country. It is equally important for the Malays' equity share to be nurtured to grow bigger to ensure their economic survival in the long term.

Thus, for Dato' Sri Najib a balanced development between rural and urban sectors, between industries, between districts and between the races will guarantee that Malaysians from every level will reap the fruits of economic growth and national development. As the country is aspiring to reach the status of Newly Industrialised Country (NIC), the benefits of the country being a NIC should be equally distributed among the people.

Dato' Sri Najib actually ticked off the private sector for its "far from satisfactory" contribution towards attaining the objectives of NEP. The private sector has not done enough to absorb the Bumiputra in all levels of employment. It is not an exaggeration to conclude that the Malays are still confined to the lower strata of employment in the private sectors. Malay executives at the top level sometimes assume posts which are

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merely symbolic without the power to influence or to be deeply involved in the way business is done.

Another major issue successfully tackled by Dato' Sri Najib as UMNO Youth Chief was regarding a plan that threatened the existence of Islam in the State of Sabah under the power of Sabah Chief Minister, Dato' Joseph Pairin Kitingan. This was definitely considered unbearable to UMNO Youth. With regard to this, Dato' Sri Najib promised that UMNO Youth and himself then as Minister of Defence, would ensure that any element, whether local or foreign, who breached the law would be dealt with accordingly. As Minister of Defence and UMNO Youth Chief, Dato' Sri Najib and Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, Dato' Megat Junid would present a combined front in tackling the issues created by Dato' Joseph Pairin.

The UMNO Youth Movement's proactive involvement in national and international issues and the appointment of several of his EXCOs in Government bodies had contributed to the strength of Dato' Sri Najib's leadership. The strength of his leadership was proved when he was not challenged in the next Movement assembly. The reappointment of Dato' Sri Najib as UMNO Youth Chief enabled him to attend to his uncompleted tasks. There was a strong urge in him to transform UMNO Youth from being a pressure group prejudiced with a somewhat anti-establishment identity into a much more mature and integrated body.

After considering that the Youth wing was mature enough and there were enough leaders around who could continue leading the group, on July 11, 1993, Dato' Sri Najib announced in Temerloh, Pahang his intention to leave the Movement and vie for one of the three UMNO Vice-President slots [13].

Dato' Sri Najib was Chief of UMNO Youth for six years from 1987 to 1993. Within that period he managed to change the image of UMNO Youth from being very radical, anti-establishment, sometimes even a bit rabble-rousing to being a more mature and responsible wing.

UMNO Youth has also participated in the decision-making process and leadership role in the Party. Quite a number of its members have been given seats in the Senate, Parliament and State Assembly reflecting the growing confidence of the leadership in the Movement.

A Leader of Many Talents (Pahang Chief Minister, Sports Minister and Defence Minister)

Dato' Sri Najib became the Chief Minister of Pahang from 1982 to 1986. A man of moderate manner, one of the significant roles he played in this position was when he helped to overcome the serious rift between the Sultan of Pahang and the State Government.

Dato' Sri Najib, a leader who could conveniently adapt himself to different situations, was appointed as Chief Minister of Pahang on May 4, 1982 after the April General Election, at the age of 29. He was then the youngest Chief Minister in the country. It somehow seemed extraordinary that the biggest State in Peninsular Malaysia was to be led by the country's youngest Chief Minister.

Being the Chief Minister of the biggest - and yet not the most developed - state in Peninsular Malaysia, Dato' Sri Najib realised that the people's expectations of him were high. At this time UMNO was undergoing "a lot of political tension" in his home State of Pahang. Although he was still in his 20s, he was able to diffuse the political tension in the State, without alienating any faction. Being the son of a former Prime Minister who still commands respect from both Palace and Party helped him to resolve this.

Given the State of Pahang politics and the relationship with the Palace so vital for any Chief Minister, everyone expected him to push development when he took over political power in the State. In these circumstances, Dato' Sri Najib had to push himself very hard in order to be acceptable to all internal quarters on the Pahang internal scene and also the Palace. He sometimes became quite demanding and aggressive. His standards were pretty high in the first place, but he realised that he had to be more tolerant and more aware of the limitations of the government officers especially at state level [14].

It was in the 1970s that the State was badly hit by recession. Its lack of budget had made the State Government unable to meet its expenditure. In fulfilling the expectations and demands of the people of the State, especially on its economic development, Dato' Sri Najib had to convince his people that the recession was a global phenomenon and that it had not only affected the State but rather the whole country. At the same time he had to argue with the Federal Government that Pahang deserved to be much better off financially.

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For Dato' Sri Najib, the development of the State should go on as the bulk of the people in Pahang are involved in agricultural development, the organised sector as well as the traditional sector. Almost 43 per cent of all FELDA schemes are in Pahang. About 900,000 acres (360,000 hectares) were approved for FELDA scheme in the State. Having allocated so much land to FELDA, the Chief Minister had to get back a revenue appropriate to the size of the investment. At one stage, he was fuming when the State was allocated a mere RM1 million for rural projects. With most of West Malaysia's rural agricultural schemes hosted in Pahang he found it a disgrace to himself to be given such a small token allocation. The problem was eventually resolved after he had to bargain hard with the Federal Government for more allocation [15].

Besides concentrating on "rural" development of the State, Dato' Sri Najib also showed his commitment to improving the basic infrastructure in order to attract investments such as resource based industries. One example was a project to use wood waste and to build up the downstream of wood-based industries. He pushed Kuantan Port to be a centre of port-based industries.

Dato' Sri Najib's talent and charisma would not let him remain long at State level. He was soon called to the Central government to take over the seat of the Minister of Sports in 1986 where he brought in some refreshing changes to the country's sports development. However, he needed staunch dedicated followers to help him pull the country out of the pits in many international and regional sports events. It took four years for Dato' Sri Najib to lift the shroud covering Malaysian sports. He strongly believed that the dedication of the sportsmen and women, the invaluable hours spent by untiring coaches, and the tremendous crowd backing could be harnessed further to contribute to further success [16].

Being a Minister in the Federal Government and a Chief Minister are indeed two different perspectives and roles. It is not only the portfolio, but how one uses it to demonstrate a quality leadership. The Minister of Sports can develop programmes that propel them to the forefront of public attention. One needs also to view any change in a positive sense and Dato' Sri Najib enjoyed his stint here in this Ministry.

In May 1987, the Ministry was revamped to Youth and Sport. The deletion of "Culture" was initially seen as an erosion in power, responsibility and base. For Dato' Sri Najib, in fact, the absence of the Culture portfolio turned out to be a blessing. Entrusted with the promotion of the nation-wide sports that cuts across the private and public sectors, the Ministry is given greater attention and wider

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responsibility including the projection of the country's image at international sports events.

There was high awareness that success at a higher level is becoming increasingly difficult to achieve due to the competitive environment. But with greater allocation of resources, material, finance and manpower, both from the Government and private sector, Malaysia should strive to find a niche at global level. There was also a need for a comprehensive structure with the road to excellence starting as early as at school level.

For Dato' Sri Najib, there were so many variables in the improvement of sporting activities in the country. Given the commitment and availability of sufficient resources, he believed that Malaysia could be number one in Southeast Asia (SEA) in the performance of sports [17].

As Sports Minister, Dato' Sri Najib left a lasting impression on sports-loving Malaysians. In his four-year tenure he added a new dimension to local sports with his enthusiasm, incisiveness and dynamism. He phased out the deadwood, ticked off non-performing associations, reversed an embarrassing sports trend and started a host of projects aimed at the future.

The most memorable moment and feat as Sports Minister was undoubtedly the 1989 Sea Games. In the Sea Games, Dato' Sri Najib was the joint-organising chairman of the biggest sporting extravaganza in the region. The 66 medals won were enough to set a record. It was one event that moved the nation. The support from the people appeared to gather steady momentum. They wanted to make the GAMES the best ever, with a great sense of pride. It brought the people together and proved that sport transcends all barriers. Sport is an effective instrument in nation building [18].

Dato' Sri Najib's contributions to the Ministry of Sport were especially seen in the creating of the cash incentive scheme, the coaches scheme, the national sports policy and the sports gallery to honour the past national greats. To promote national glory in international events needs serious long-term sustainable efforts and preparations. Without overdoing it, he felt that appropriate incentives and adequate facilities had to be provided to achieve excellence at all levels of the people involved in sports. A strict disciplinarian himself, Dato' Sri Najib persistently instilled the spirit of discipline among his sportsmen. He often retorted in his motivation speeches to his sportsmen, "...discipline is the highest requirement for anything to succeed".

All the projects were introduced with the objective of improving the overall structure of sports in the country. He also suggested the creation

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of the National Sports Institute and a Sports Science Unit to foster more scientific studies and approach towards uplifting sporting credibility and performance from the national infrastructure right down to individual sportsmen.

Dato' Sri Najib's movement up the political ladder bore a remarkable resemblance to his father's, as was seen again when he was appointed Defence Minister in 1991. There was a tinge of sadness. While he loved every minute of his tenure as Sports Minister and had in mind more improvements for national pride in the sports sector, he had to move on, to a ministry of more importance and significance, a ministry that involves the strategic defence and security of the country, the Ministry of Defence. With no military background, Dato' Sri Najib did need some time to assimilate himself into the mainstream of the Defence Ministry. There was plenty of scope for Dato' Sri Najib to get involved again because the Defence Ministry provided him with a wide opportunity to enhance the country's image diplomatically in various international disputes.

Soon, Dato' Sri Najib was conferred Singapore's highest military award - the Distinguished Service Order (Military) for his significant role in fostering closer bilateral defence relations between Malaysia and Singapore. Dato' Sri Najib was considered instrumental in setting up the Malaysia-Singapore Defence Forum, a mechanism to propel the existing excellent bilateral ties to greater heights.

Dato' Sri Najib was the first Malaysian to receive the award. Other foreign recipients include the Sultan of Brunei Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah, Thai Armed Forces Supreme Commander Air Chief Marshall Voranat Apehichari, Indonesian Defence and Security Minister General Edi Sudradjat and former Indonesian Armed Forces Chief General L.B. Muerdani [19].

While Malaysia is still considered a small and developing country from the viewpoint of the developed world, its participation in sending peace troops under the auspices of the United Nations is very significant in upholding Malaysia's foreign policy and its strong adherence to the principles of non-violence, peace, neutrality and non-alignment.

In the Serbia-Bosnia Herzegovina conflict Malaysia was proud to be one of about 30 nations that sent peacekeeping troops led by NATO to separate the combatants, giving Serbs, Croats and Muslims a chance to recover from the worst atrocities and destruction in Europe since World War II.

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At the peak of the conflict in Spring 1992, Malaysia protested strongly on international platforms at the siege of Sarajevo and the "ethnic cleansing" by the Serbs against the Muslim Bosnians, actions that inflicted self-injury on Malaysia from the developed world when these countries retaliated by various subtle means to hurt Malaysia, especially economically. Malaysia just would not tolerate the massacres and the panicky exodus of largely Muslim Bosnians due to the actions of the Serbs. In 1991, from a population of 4.3 million largely Muslim Bosnians, 200,000 were dead, 200,000 more were injured including 50,000 children, and more than 2.5 million had been driven from their homes.

It was the conscience plus the leadership of Dato' Sri Najib which resulted in sending Malaysian troops as part of the 60,000 NATO-led peacekeeping troops. Together with fellow soldiers from other nations Malaysian troops braved across rivers contaminated by toxic wastes from bombed-out industrial plants and soil polluted with millions of leg-shattering land mines. Malaysian soldiers held their esteem high, encouraged by their Minister of Defence, Dato' Sri Najib and his wife who visited them during one of the Idulfitri (a religious celebration among the Muslims to mark the end of their fasting during the month of Ramadhan). The sharing of this peace-keeping responsibility has no doubt earned Malaysia a name in the international community.

Assuming Bigger Responsibility (Education Minister)

In the Cabinet line-up in May 1995, Dato' Sri Najib moved again, this time from the Defence portfolio to Education. Once again political observers noticed him following in the steps of his late father, except that Dato' Sri Najib did it the other way round. The late Tun Abdul Razak was Minister of Education first, before changing to Minister of Defence (MINDEF).

Discounting the First Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman who had to hold the first top post automatically, all other three Prime Ministers, Tun Abdul Razak, Tun Hussein Onn and Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir, each had become Minister of Education somewhere along their political career. Not every Minister of Education, though, had been successful in making further inroads to the top leadership in their political career, as such success demands a much more complex blend of other fine and great leadership qualities, and luck, apart from a mere ability and

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capability to lead a Ministry. For Dato' Sri Najib, who has demonstrated that he possesses many of these qualities, becoming the Minister of Education certainly appears to be a definite leap closer to becoming the Deputy Prime Minister or Prime Minister in the future [20].

The Ministry of Education is a high profile job as every decision and action that Dato' Sri Najib takes would have an influence on almost everyone and every sector of the country. The Education Ministry is not only the biggest Ministry, given the largest budget and with the largest number of employees and audience, it is also a sensitive Ministry. He is honoured that the Prime Minister, Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir, has confidence in him in appointing him to this Ministry and he considers it as a challenging task especially in testing his capability to handle this bigger responsibility [21].

In leading the Ministry, Dato' Sri Najib prefers to work efficiently in line with the trust placed upon him by the Prime Minister. This is vital because Malaysia's Vision 2020 towards becoming a developed nation can only be achieved through appropriate education. To be at par with developed countries the education mainstream cannot be static, it has to be dynamic and continuously adjusted.

In line with Malaysian Vision 2020, Dato' Sri Najib has made a drastic change to the education system of the country with the Parliament's passing of the Education Bill 1995, the Universities and the University Colleges Bill 1996, the National Council on Higher Education Bill 1996 and the Private Institutions of Higher Learning Bill 1996. Although preparations of some of these changes started before Dato' Sri Najib's entry to this Ministry, it is definitely his early vision and his strong pushing factor that resulted in this quick and historic move in the education system of the country. The move has significantly changed the education system in the country after many decades since the period when his father was the Minister of Education of Malaya [22].

Dato' Sri Najib's father, Tun Abdul Razak, charted out a National Education Policy that was not only sound from the point of view of education, but was also a strategy that would mould the country's multi-racial population into a single national identity. It was a policy which continuously restructured the varied population to create national strength. Tun Abdul Razak's education policy alone would have established him as a leader of the highest calibre. The Tun Abdul Razak Report on Education 1959 is still the basic policy for schools of the country being used to this day.

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With the Parliament's passing of the Education Bill 1995, the Universities and the University Colleges Bill 1996, the National Council on Higher Education Bill 1996 and the Private Institutions of Higher Learning Bill 1996, Dato' Sri Najib was aware that each Bill has its specific function in placing the education system of the country onto a new progressive track which is clear, strong and practical in helping to evolve Malaysia into a regional centre of excellence.

The National Council on Higher Education Bill 1996 would help the Ministry to oversee and steer the development of higher education in the country. The Council would also be responsible for charting a long-term higher education plan which would be more systematic and strategic, involving private and government institutions. The Education Bill 1995 and the University and University Colleges Bill 1996 would accommodate the need of the country for a skilled workforce in various fields. The Private Institutions of Higher Learning Bill 1996 has the objective of turning Malaysia into a centre of education excellence in the Southeast Asian region.

Dato' Sri Najib would have realised the tremendous difference in the work style between the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Defence. For one thing, the Ministry of Defence is very organised, disciplined and quite a specialised sector. It runs itself. People usually do not realise the importance or significance of the Ministry of Defence until or unless the country is at war or involved in some kind of internal or external conflicts. With the security of the country given highest priority the chain of command in the military is precise and strictly adhered to to ensure performance. So, even with more than 100,000 men and women in the Armed Forces, the Ministry does not really have an industrial relations problem.

In the Ministry of Education, Dato' Sri Najib has more than 200,000 men and women, making it the largest single organisation in the country manpower-wise and with a more than somewhat different sort of discipline to what he had been accustomed to at the Ministry of Defence. In fulfilling his tasks and responsibilities given the importance and significance of the Ministry, Dato' Sri Najib has to accept the need to use a systematic approach in order to avoid any reverse significance in the process of his efforts to improve the education system and to continue with what his predecessors had done.

It is characteristic of the Ministry of Education that a change in one department will result in a spill over to other departments as well. For example, if the Ministry has to decide to introduce a new subject in

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school, this would involve preparations on the overall curriculum, syllabus, book publications and appropriate teacher training. Therefore, changes have to be tackled systematically from an overall perspective. Since the education system is a forerunner to the country's aspirations, the improvements and changes to the country's educational policies should be significant in achieving Malaysia's Vision 2020.

Malaysia may soon no longer be proud to consider itself as a leader among the developing countries. Instead, Malaysia could concentrate on developing to become a leader according to its own mould and hold. The good education policies and system in place with its "incremental improvement" from time to time can no longer fulfil the needs of the country as Malaysia prepares to become a developed country. What is required to accommodate this paradigm shift in order that Malaysia may one day be among the world's leaders is a quantum leap in the country's education policies and system.

Being a third world country but ambitious to transform itself to become a developed country like Japan and Taiwan by the year 2020, Malaysia has to fire up its education system. In line with this vision, the Education Ministry under the leadership of Dato' Sri Najib has made an effort to emphasise the significance of science and technology studies, the role of private education, the corporatisation of universities and the improvement of the performance of schools.

The introduction of the technical education blueprint, the corporatisation of institutions of higher learning, the role of private education and the improvement of the performance of schools, were not viewed individually by Dato' Sri Najib but as a total package in the "Quantum leap" and an integrated package of the modernisation of the country's education system. Dato' Sri Najib's priority of deciding on the appropriate number of universities and polytechnics in the country, and improving and upgrading the academic performance of school students particularly in science subjects, was important in creating a knowledge-based society in the appropriate fields as well as sound human resource development parallel with the objectives of Vision 2020 [23].

The education sector and human resource development in general constitute the most important component in the country's objective to be among the major global players. The revampment of the education policies and system would enable Malaysia to produce the required number of qualified workforce with the desired skills to achieve the Vision.

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The country is currently short of a variety of professionals, such as engineers and doctors. According to the Malaysian Industrial Master Plan Review in 1993, it is estimated that there will be a shortage of about 17,000 engineers and some 53,000 technicians by the year 2000 (this is based on the period between 1991 and 2000). The nation will require an additional 320,000 skilled workers by the year 2020. Nearly half will be in the technical field as the country is experiencing a rapid expansion in the industrial and service sectors [24].

Concomitant to the ever-increasing demand for skilled workers, the revampment of education would also enable Malaysia to produce enough people with necessary skills, be they professionals or skilled workers. Necessary manpower is important to succeed in the industrialisation process of the country. There must not be a mismatch between supply and demand - a perfect match is instrumental. With regard to this, the adoption of such pragmatic strategies in order to achieve its industrialisation goals is important. As the nation becomes more dependent on technology, and as the creation of more technological universities or specialised technological courses becomes more vital, the challenge for Dato' Sri Najib is to ensure that the same standard of education can be provided in Malaysia, if not better than that in developed nations [25].

Dato' Sri Najib's plan to modernise the education system by making it more technologically-biased and by ensuring the same standard of quality offered in developed countries, has bolstered the nation's objective of making Malaysia a regional centre for education from the year 2000, keeping up with the development world-wide. Steps taken by the Education Ministry to increase the number of secondary school pupils opting for the science stream, beginning from the new school term in January 1996, would enable universities to enrol more students for science-related fields.

The introduction of space science, which is incorporated as a new branch of the engineering course in local universities, and the concentration towards technical studies have contributed to the modernisation of the country's education system. The blue-print prepared by the Ministry has consequently provided more technically-skilled students, which is important to cater for the future manpower needs of the country [26].

At present the developed nations have offered dramatic breakthroughs in technology which have allowed many Asian nations to move to the forefront of world economic activity. The newly industrialised

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economies have turned their collective energies into harnessing this technology for their domestic industrialisation programmes with great success.

Dato' Sri Najib's priority of collaboration with foreign corporations, such as in Germany and Finland, by intensifying the transfer of technology, cooperating in degree programmes in the form of twinning courses in technical studies and sending young Malaysian executives overseas in order to expose them to various fields of expertise, has not only brought new vitality into the education system but financially marks out Malaysia as a strategically important market area for the cooperating countries.

Dato' Seri Najib's also places emphasis on the development of more home-grown, indigenous technology. Indigenous research and development must be encouraged and be seen as an integral part of the Malaysian education system in order to ensure Malaysia to draw upon the best industrial technology in parallel with the concept of "Asianness". The Ministry's excelling in the fields of education and culture and instilling in the youths of Asia a sense of idealism and altruism beyond economic well being are important for Asia in leaving behind a legacy for others, just as the West has done. It is time for Asians to rise above their system and come with their own indigenously built legacy.

Malaysia has to create a whole person, not merely an academic character achieving tertiary education to earn a reasonably comfortable life. The system of education should be adequate to prepare future leaders in society, and leaders in various walks of life so that the country can have a part in leading the future global economy and not merely being subservient to it. There is a need to make the students able to learn about life and to cope with it, aware of the real world and able to work out solutions to overcome some of the ills of society. Thus, instilling moral and ethical values in the Malaysian education system is important. With the irony of the deteriorating moral and ethical values among students despite the current curriculum which do include these elements, the Ministry of Education has also felt the importance to modify the learning process of the moral subjects and Islamic studies.

The revision of curriculum and textbooks for Islamic Studies would make the learning of the subject more effective and holistic. The updating and replacement of many reference materials and books used as texts in schools, the upgrading of the methodology and approach to training the religious teachers so that they can impart knowledge

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effectively, would not make Islamic studies static but instead more proactive and dynamic so that pupils will find learning the subject more interesting. The improvement of the pedagogy for teaching Islamic Studies among teachers could make pupils practise the teachings of the Quran and the Sunnah and transform them to a way of life.

The Ministry's effort to introduce Islamic Civilisation as a subject in the universities was not meant to force non-Muslim students to study the Islamic religion but rather to expose university students to many good things which can be learned from the subject. It was also a dream of Dato' Sri Najib to see this subject be taught in Arabic, the language of the Quran [27].

Globalisation of Malaysia's education system signifies that Malaysians should seek knowledge everywhere that will bring benefit to the people. Language must not be made a barrier to this requirement. Malaysia has placed much emphasis on the use of the Malay language nationally and should be able to go further to develop the Malay language to be recognised globally.

Dato' Sri Najib emphasises the need to elevate the Malay language to a higher level without the deterioration of competency in the English language, to encourage discussions on various aspects of the Malay language and literature, especially in the context of developing and promoting it nationally and internationally. With knowledge fast growing, the Malay knowledge has to be dynamic and develop its vocabulary momentum to include new products and new concepts and to ensure its high social acceptance and practice. This would highlight the excellence of the Malaysian language and literature from the perspectives of its use in history, geopolitics and science and technology.

The highest significance of Dato' Sri Najib's effort to globalise Malaysia's education system is seen in the burgeoning of private education which has resulted in the increase of leading universities in the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia and other developed countries setting up branches in Malaysia. The burgeoning of private education in the country involves the entire spectrum of private colleges, twinning programmes and distance learning programmes. Under the programme of private education, imported value and technology would be modified and adopted for local needs based on the national education curriculum for use in classrooms. The Ministry's requirements of the teaching of Malaysian history and culture in private universities and colleges has significantly promoted towards nation building [28].

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Under the Private Institutions of Higher Learning Bill 1996, foreign students are encouraged to come to Malaysia to pursue their higher education; the Bill also provides opportunities for Malaysians to obtain their degrees without going abroad. The increasing number of foreign students in Malaysia, especially from the neighbouring ASEAN countries, and from Muslim countries to enter private universities has regionalised the education system of the country.

In regionalising the Malaysian education system, Dato' Sri Najib suggested strategies for broadening the participation of other institutions of the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Council (SEAMEC) member countries. These address the members' needs by developing their present centres of higher learning to become centres of excellence which offer more viable programmes. The establishment of a special department for private education which is headed by a Deputy Director General of Education has ensured the national fulfilment of private education [29].

The Private Institutions of Higher Learning Bill 1996 upholds Bahasa Malaysia as the main medium of instruction. Using Bahasa Malaysia as the medium of instruction in private institutions of higher learning would further underline the change to the current situation where almost all courses offered in private institutions of higher learning are conducted in English. English would be used only when deemed necessary. This is to ensure that Bahasa Malaysia will not be compromised in view of the proliferation of other languages [30].

Dato' Sri Najib's efforts to improve the quality of education in universities and to ensure that there will not be a brain drain from local universities by corporatisation will eventually result in a better service scheme for its staff. With corporatisation, the hand over of the governance of universities by the Government, gave all its bureaucracy to a body with a more dynamic and responsive management. Corporatisation will expedite decision-making and will enable better use of resources to make universities centres of knowledge and culture.

Citing statistics in the mid-term review of the Sixth Malaysia Plan, in 1992 only 25 per cent of the country's architects were Bumiputra, accountants (12.1 per cent), engineers (37.8 per cent), doctors (30 per cent), dentists (28.6 per cent), lawyers (24.9 per cent) and surveyors (48.8 per cent). The expected target on education under the New Economic Policy initiated by Tun Abdul Razak was far from being achieved. If opportunities for Bumiputra students to pursue higher education in these private institutes are limited, it will affect efforts to

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produce more Bumiputra professionals. Since the number of Bumiputra students in these institutions is too small, a quota for Bumiputra students would be determined [31].

The current limitation of opportunities for the Bumiputra in the higher learning institutions, due to their financial inability, Dato' Sri Najib ensured that the Bumiputra would not be deprived from entering these higher learning institutions as a result of the Ministry's emphasis of the role of private education and the corporatisation of the institutions of higher learning.

Prime Minister Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir and his Deputy Dato' Sri Anwar Ibrahim had agreed to an allocation to start a National Education Fund to encourage more Bumiputra students to enrol in private institutions of higher learning. As a means for them to strive and attain knowledge so that they can contribute to the development of the people, the fund would balance the entry of Bumiputra and non-Bumiputra students into private institutions. Such a fund will allow Bumiputra students to study first and pay later [32].

Another major issue which has to be tackled by Dato' Sri Najib is on the disparity in academic achievements between the rural and urban pupils which has widened more and more over the years. The performance of urban pupils has been far ahead of those in the rural areas. The Ministry has to pay more attention to improving the learning facilities in rural areas in order to improve the academic performance of the rural pupils. While quality performance of primary and secondary schools, especially in rural areas, needs to be improved, the socio-economy of the Malay families needs to be appropriately addressed, so that their children will have every opportunity of going through primary and secondary education adequately.

A very revealing survey made by the UMNO education bureau indicated that of 216,000 Bumiputra pupils who completed their primary six examination (Ujian Pencapaian Sekolah Rendah - UPSR) in 1989, only 125,000 reached form five of the secondary school in 1994. A staggering figure of 42 percent had dropped out. It is a serious problem and if this were allowed to happen every year, unchecked, the repercussion on the nation's overall development, in particular to the placement of the Bumiputra's status among the multi-racial society in their own land, would be in jeopardy.

In providing rural pupils with the necessary learning facilities, Dato' Sri Najib emphasises the building of a premier primary school in every rural district which would be adequately equipped with hostels, learning

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facilities, highly qualified teachers and quarters for teachers. He stresses on the dire need for improving the teachers' teaching programme, upgrading the teaching profession, providing training opportunities, upgrading the qualification of teachers and creating a conducive teaching environment in order to motivate teachers so that they will carry out their duties diligently.

Dato' Sri Najib follows again in the footsteps of his father who had spent more time in the field than in office in order to see and monitor the progress or level of success of the development programmes that he introduced. Ever since he became the Minister of Education the people of this country had witnessed Dato' Sri Najib going in and out of various schools throughout the country, staying close to the school children to give them the motivation to push along their education efforts, and to convey his vision directly to teachers and educationalists to provide adequate and appropriate education for the children.

Less than a quarter of a century ahead, in the year 2020, these children will be the very people that will continue the struggle of the nation to become a developed nation on this side of the globe and prove to the rest of the world that VISION 2020 was not a mere dream of the Malaysian politicians of the nineties, but a collective effort of every single citizen of this country. It is also a collective responsibility of Dato' Sri Najib and other leaders of UMNO to see that while the country may achieve greatness by the year 2020, the position of the indigenous groups in their own country will not be further diminished.

Epilogue

Tun Abdul Razak

Malaysia's development both politically and economically has been phenomenal since it achieved independence. The last two decades, especially, had a marked effect in evolving the country from an agricultural based to a manufacturing based one, bringing a prosperity to its citizens never before anticipated. The transformation enjoyed by the country is a direct testimony to the capability of the citizens of the country to manage their own nation led by their able leaders to prosperity far above the capability of the colonial power when they were in control of the country.

The economic development trodden by the country is indeed a revolutionary process, a revolution exercised in peace and in silence with determination and care, but not without tragedies and problems. The exercise of moderate and yet able, flexible and yet firm, leadership had been instrumental in successfully steering the country along its path of development. The trust and admiration of the Malaysians for their disciplined leaders is one factor that explains the success story of the nation.

While Tunku Abdul Rahman, Malaysia's first Prime Minister, had been known as the Father of Independence, it was the second Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, who had been instrumental in moulding the country both in national and rural development. Known as the Architect of Malaysia's Development, Tun Abdul Razak was the phenomenal man responsible for charting the economic progress of the country, launched not from the manufacturing houses of the industrial estates, but rather uniquely from the development of the rural estates.

Tun Abdul Razak was the most remarkable and dynamic personality on the Malaysian political scene. Noted for his integrity of thought, integrity of word and integrity of deed, Tun Abdul Razak was a man of deep conviction, whose sacrifice for his country remain unmatched by any other Malay leaders. His words, his deeds and his unselfish actions made him remarkably a true model of a politician, a leader and a statesman of the highest order, unparalleled by anyone else in Malaysian history. The current status of development would not have been enjoyed by the country without Tun Abdul Razak cementing its firm foundation.

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Tun Abdul Razak's blueprint for action was an integration of political, administrative and civic forces into a system of inter-communication between the Government and the people. The result was a country with social and economic development highest among the developing countries, with a system of government unique but workable to provide a stable political system enjoyed by its people.

Tun Abdul Razak had brought hope to the whole structure of the population in the rural areas, which had been neglected all those years and decades. As a young boy, despite his politically influential father, Tun Abdul Razak grew up in the rural areas, walked barefoot, and attended a village school with an earthen floor and attap roof. Most of the other children came from the poorest of families. The hardship that he himself experienced and the suffering that he saw endured by the village folk around him, mostly Malays, left an ineradicable mark in his life. It was no surprise that the rural areas became a target of his developmental ingenuity, when fate endowed him with the opportunity to lead his country.

Tun Abdul Razak's achievement for his country was not centred just around rural development. As early as 1951, Tun Abdul Razak had joined hands with fellow leaders of the Malay political party, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), in leading the country's fight for freedom from the colonial power, fully aware that under colonial rule the Malays had been deprived and got the worst economic opportunities in their own land. Under the right leadership the Malays, budding with their rich culture and devotion to their religion Islam, were seeking their identity and idealism and were determined to prevent any further destructive process of their race, culture and religion. Tun Abdul Razak was one of the first few Malays to join the independence struggle. As one of the members of the Mission for Independence to London in January 1956, Tun Abdul Razak played no small role in the smooth and peaceful transition from colonial domination to an independent Malaya in August 1957. Being qualified as a lawyer, Tun Abdul Razak was among those entrusted to work on a Constitution for Malaya.

Tun Abdul Razak, before becoming the Deputy Prime Minister and ultimately the Prime Minister, was successively the Minister of Education, Minister of Home Affairs, Minister of National and Rural Development and the Minister of Defence. Being Malaysia's first Minister of Education Tun Abdul Razak completely revamped the educational system he inherited from the colonial rule. The Razak Report on Education was a landmark in the history of the national unity of the

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country, introducing the policy of having Bahasa Malaysia as the eventual medium of instruction in all schools. This report was considered very significant and bold in contributing to the unification of the younger generation through the education system.

When Tun Abdul Razak was Deputy Prime Minister he was also tasked with the portfolio of Minister of Home Affairs. In this Ministry he was directly involved in efforts to end the Emergency period with the elimination of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), with the remnants of its army either killed or eventually forced to surrender. Tun Abdul Razak's task in disciplining security forces had contributed to this success.

His experience as the Minister of Home Affairs also reminded him that raising the living standard of the people living in the rural areas was a sure way of defeating the Communist terrorists who would prey on the rural folk for their supplies, and influence them in their hardship to raise arms against the Government. It was in Tun Abdul Razak's capacity as Minister of National and Rural Development that he had the opportunity to focus his attention to elevate rural poverty and structure rural development. Haunted by the hardship of the village folk around him in his childhood days, Tun Abdul Razak was determined to raise the living standard of the population living in the rural areas.

Although Tun Abdul Razak was well known for his military style operations rooms which he set up in each district to monitor rural development, he was not a chair-bound person. He was frequently out in the field, inspecting land schemes and other development projects with his own eyes. He would travel hundreds of kilometres over rough roads and terrain to satisfy himself that the projects that he directed and the development that was entailed were carried out according to his expectations.

Tun Abdul Razak's true leadership and strength was demonstrated during the grave racial crisis in May 1969 when he assumed supreme control of the country's legislative and administrative machinery to suppress the riots.

May 13, 1969 was a significant turning point for the country, and for the careers of the top political leaders including Tunku Abdul Rahman and Tun Abdul Razak. It was clear then that the existing political and governmental system was inadequate to withstand the internal pressure of the long-brewing racial feelings and differences among the races. It had to be replaced quickly by an effective and secure mechanism.

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Parliament and the State Legislature were suspended and the country was handled by the National Operations Council (NOC), immediately formed under the newly proclaimed Emergency regulations, which was granted full powers to restore order immediately and to plan strategies to avoid recurrence of similar incidents in the future. The Council would have to be headed by a tough leader. Tun Abdul Razak, a leader well known for his non-nepotism and who had many times said no to pressure groups, was then the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence. He fitted the great responsibility well.

The appointment of Tun Abdul Razak as Director of the NOC aroused considerable reactions among many in the non-Malay communities. Due to his strong determination in championing the cause of the Malay peasants when he was Minister of National and Rural Development, he was branded by the non-Malay communities as racist, as biased against the Chinese, as a religious fanatic who would discontinue, even reverse, the liberal and humanitarian policies so wisely pursued by the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman.

Foreign correspondents of the international press were equally unsympathetic; influenced by the radicals of the opposition parties, they were generally hostile to the manner in which the UMNO-dominated Malaysian Government managed the country. Partly responsible for heightening the brewing racial tension then, the racial outburst that finally occurred on May 13, 1969 gave these correspondents an excellent opportunity to condemn further the Malaysian political and governmental system.

Despite Tun Abdul Razak being a zealous and devoted Muslim, the fear of discrimination against the non-Malays proved groundless. He was dedicated to the economic advancement of his own race to acquire a more reasonable equilibrium with the greater economic being of the non-Malay communities, especially the Chinese. He had to work hard to convince the non-Malay communities that there would be no harmony and no peace among the various races if the Malays community were educationally and economically deprived in their own land. He strongly urged tolerance and moderation both in religious and mundane matters. Eventually, using wisely and honestly the great power conferred upon him by his office, he finally won the acceptance and respect of the great majority of his fellow countrymen.

In his position as Director of the NOC Tun Abdul Razak was probably the first man in modern Malaysian history to become virtually the dictator of his country. However, when the time was right he

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voluntarily gave up his near dictatorial powers which led the country back to democracy, albeit with a few necessary restrictions built into the Constitution to guard against any recurrence of the tragedy of May 13. He voluntarily relinquished that position in order to become an elected Prime Minister, and finally to be democratically re-elected to that office three years later with an overwhelming Parliamentary majority.

After the riots of May 13, Tun Abdul Razak realised that a great deal of work had to be accomplished. He noted the fact that the economic policy of *laissez-faire* under the previous administration would not produce an equal society where the main races could live prosperously side by side. It was at this point that Tun Abdul Razak learned of his terminal condition which made him even more determined to push on with his reformation policies as rapidly as possible. His reformation policies altered the whole style of a government that needed economic and political changes.

At first public attention was focussed on the more obvious changes: economic - with the restructuring of society, and political - the attempt to obtain a consensus and the elimination of friction among the parties and races in Malaysia by the formation of a coalition, the National Front.

The New Economic Policy (NEP), the basis for the Second Malaysia Plan, was engineered by Tun Abdul Razak to become the mechanism to bridge the economic gap between the races. It has guided the national economy to a more healthy state and created a united, prosperous and just society.

The national philosophy was then introduced. Tun Abdul Razak was not only credited with giving birth to the national philosophy of "Rukunegara" but in parallel importance with making development the national agenda to support the national philosophy.

Tun Abdul Razak's policies of nation building, as in creating the national philosophy, in changing the life of the rural people, in imposing the national education system, and in disciplining the security forces, seemed successful. These achievements realised by Tun Abdul Razak's moderation and sense of justice greatly impressed the leaders of predominantly non-Malay opposition parties, formerly unreservedly critical and suspicious of Tun Abdul Razak's Government's actions, eventually pulling them together to join and reinforce the UMNO-led coalition Government.

Simultaneously, Tun Abdul Razak with his farsightedness and pragmatic approach to problems, formed the National Front by bringing together as many political parties as were willing to participate in a

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Government of national coalition to reduce politicking and to divert energies towards economic development. Politically, the combination of PAS in the National Front made the Malays stronger.

Tun Abdul Razak had never been a radical and never had a liking for confrontation in politics. Gradually the old style politicians, the old guards who had been in UMNO since the 1950's and had accompanied Tunku Abdul Rahman throughout, were pensioned off. They were replaced by younger men, more often university educated, resulting in a more definite rise in the intellectual calibre of the majority of the Cabinet. These changes did not always please the old guards, notably when Tun Abdul Razak brought back individuals like Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir who had fallen foul of Tunku Abdul Rahman's dislike of his radical style, but he was able to carry on with the loyal support of his Deputy Prime Ministers, first Tun Dr. Ismail, and after the latter's early death, Tun Hussein Onn. This non-confrontational politics had an effect in contributing to the new pattern of political and economic developments in Malaysia.

It was Tun Abdul Razak's vision at that time of the unification of the economic and political sectors of the Malays which was so important for the survival of the Malays. These policies had significantly influenced many young educated Malays. The support of the latter was important for Tun Abdul Razak, especially in his effort to generate the involvement of the Malays in commercial sectors.

Dato' Shahrir Samad, former Political Secretary to Tun Abdul Razak, viewed him as a man who had the very idea about the role and participation of the Malays in the country, not because of their rights but because of their responsibilities, too. In this position, he perceived the Malays to be able to hold dominant responsibilities to play an active role in participating in the economic and political activities of the country, which was important for the survival of future generations of Malays. In other words, Tun Abdul Razak saw both sides of the coin; by having rights and privileges, the Malays should fulfil their responsibilities to ensure harmony and prosperity in this country.

In his period Tun Abdul Razak's approach to Malay problems was uniquely different. He was aware that the practice of corruption and the promotion of national projects based on self-interest would divert the NEP's objective of making the Malays at par with the others in their own country. He was particularly aware that creating businesses and entrepreneurs among the Malays through political relationships would only create a few millionaires but would not have national impact in

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altering the overall economic and commercial share of the nation's development. In making the NEP successful, the involvement of clean and qualified Malays in his Government and Party was extremely important.

In order to activate the role and participation of the Malays in the economic and political activities of the country, the first task of Tun Abdul Razak was to clean up the Government by choosing professional and educated Malays of high integrity in his Government and Party. Only a clean leadership would ensure levelling up the whole structure of the Malays to be economically active and competent in order to be more in equilibrium with the economic well being and status of the non-Malays, in particular the Chinese. Tun Abdul Razak saw sincerity and integrity among his own party, UMNO, as a supreme pre-requisite to a clean coalition Government.

Tun Abdul Razak also stressed the importance of the contribution of the civil servants towards nation building. The civil servants had to be at their best because this sector was crucial to the implementation of the economic policies.

It was Tun Abdul Razak who utilised very effectively and systematically the Government machinery with the support of able technocrats and bureaucrats. He believed in the importance of monitoring the development projects, instead of just making policy statements. In such circumstances, Tun Abdul Razak emphasised good relations between the politicians, the Government servants, academicians and businessmen. Tun Abdul Razak wanted all these four sectors to work closely and synchronously.

For a man of his age, Tun Abdul Razak had risen to such a position of prominence in a remarkably short period. His sudden death in London in January 1976 took the majority of his fellow countrymen by complete surprise. He had kept the knowledge of his ailment to himself and to only one or two others throughout these years. When his ailment was diagnosed, Tun Abdul Razak had in 1970 been given much less than six years to live but he had seemingly held his own against the encroachment of the disease. Aware that he was a symbol of the unity and strength of the people, especially when the scar of the 1969 national tragedy was still fresh, he absorbed all the pain and agony of his fatal sickness to himself to maintain internal security and stability.

Tun Abdul Razak died young at the age of 53, in his sixth year as Prime Minister, but he had been at the centre of his country's affairs for more than twenty years. However, Tun Abdul Razak had not been able to

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achieve all his aims before he died, especially in trying to beat the problem of corruption at its roots. He had realised that due to the great opportunities that had become available in the rapid development of the Malaysian economy the cancer of corruption had taken a definite hold. He had in fact turned his attention to this problem by giving greater powers to the National Bureau of Investigation and by making use of the results of its investigations.

More than twenty years after his death and after more than twenty years of intense economic growth of the country after his demise, it seems necessary to revisit the man and his contribution to the history of Malaysia. Assessments of all historically important figures change as the emphasis of time changes, but there can be little doubt that whenever the story of the first twenty years of independent Malaya and Malaysia is written about, the role of Abdul Razak will have an important place. Besides Tun Abdul Razak's contribution in returning the country to Parliamentary Government in 1970, his contribution to education, to rural development and to national security had the most permanent impact.

When he died the whole country mourned the man who had unselfishly contributed the whole of his working life for the benefit of his fellow countrymen. By any standards Tun Abdul Razak was a remarkable man with many achievements to his credit. He is a true architect of his country's development. His contribution to his nation is legendary.

MARA Institute of Technology - A Heritage of Tun Abdul Razak

Early History

In tandem with the fast advancement of educational development and awareness in Malaysia, and the growing percentage of the population aspiring for tertiary education, Mara Institute of Technology (ITM) has shouldered the responsibility for providing adequate places for training for students from the indigenous population known as "Bumiputra". Bumiputra in Malaysia's and ITM's context includes not only the Malays but also the indigenous races of Sabah and Sarawak.

During colonial days, and even for many years after independence in 1957, the Bumiputra had been deprived the opportunity of going to the universities; on one hand due to direct poverty and on the other due to lack of adequate prior academic achievements, which was again partly due to poverty or lack of proper education, as the Malays mostly originate from the rural areas. This had created a great imbalance in the number of Bumiputra professionals, especially engineers, doctors, lawyers and accountants as compared to the number monopolised by the non-Bumiputra. The number of Bumiputra trained in business and commercial programmes was virtually nil. This was verified by a manpower survey conducted by the Government with the assistance of the United Nations in 1965; it was revealed that there was an acute shortage of trained manpower at the professional and semi-professional level, especially among the Bumiputra.

Tun Abdul Razak was determined to take all possible steps to ensure the gap be reduced to avoid future imbalance that could eventually spark communal unrest. For the common good and harmony of all Malaysians, Tun Abdul Razak had to take the prudent and challenging alternative of consciously restructuring Malaysian society. He had to make a change in the basic life pattern and attitude of the Bumiputra on one hand and to demand a great deal of understanding, cooperation and tolerance on the part of the non-Bumiputra on the other.

Arising out of this, ITM was entrusted with a "sacred" mission towards creating a just society. With this mission ITM was described as an institution with a very special responsibility for creating a harmonious and equitable Malaysian society.

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Although the mission of ITM in perpetuating the lasting mutual harmony of Malaysia in a multiracial society is not a direct function, it is very pertinent. The success or failure of this mission may determine whether Malaysia is to create a harmonious and equitable Malaysian society, or whether the country will continue developing economically but with the risk of communal conflicts lurking indefinitely due to economic inequalities between communities.

It was the mission of Tun Abdul Razak that if ITM proved a success, the first day of the 21st century would prove that race can no longer be identified as synonymous with economy. Within this context, ITM's specific role was to open up opportunities for qualified Bumiputra youths to gain entry into the world of commerce, industry and the professional fields. With ITM geared towards offering educational programmes which have a strong commercial, technological and science orientation, its graduates have been able to play their part in the commercial and industrial life of the country, in accordance with the nation's needs and priorities. Thus the phenomenal growth of ITM in the early years of its formation was characterised by a unique attempt to match it to national needs.

ITM has an array of more than 100 courses in various fields of study, categorised under 13 different schools in the areas of Science and Engineering, Business and Management and the Social Sciences and Humanities. It now has a student population of more than 60,000 students (enrolled in full-time courses and in Off-Campus and Distance Programmes) distributed throughout its 11 branch campuses. All courses have been designed to meet the manpower needs of the nation particularly in the commercial and professional fields.

ITM started with the name of RIDA Training College (Dewan Latihan RIDA) placed under the purview of the Rural Industrial Development Authority (RIDA), established in 1951. While RIDA was inspired by Dato' Onn Jaafar, it was Tun Dr. Ismail who officiated at the opening of the College in February 1957.

RIDA was a quasi-government body vested with the responsibility of uplifting the lot of the rural population. One of the first priorities of this body was to set up a Training Centre to provide education for the English-educated rural youth. The Centre began by offering courses in Stenography and Book-Keeping, but within five years had widened its scope by offering courses in accountancy and business studies as well.

Tun Dr. Ismail, the then Minister of Commerce and Industry, in declaring this new training centre open said that it was through such

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agencies that training would be given in commerce and industry to the Bumiputra so that their economic standard could be raised.

After three years of a hardly eventful existence, the College sought a shift in emphasising training and introducing courses leading to professional examinations. At the same time the entrance requirement was raised to the School Certificate qualification, which was a national examination conducted by the Ministry of Education in conjunction with the University of London, equivalent to the British Ordinary Level of General Certificate of Education (GCE "O" Level). Prospective students were prepared as external candidates for the Institute of Cost and Works Accountants, and the Corporation of Secretaries and London Chamber of Commerce examination. In 1963 a General Business Management course was introduced to prepare students for the examinations of the British Institute of Management.

The first batch of 25 students enrolled were registered for studies in the London Chamber of Commerce and in the husk rope industry. The first convocation of the RIDA Training College was held in 1964, with Tun Abdul Razak conferring diplomas on 50 graduates.

In June 1965, following the Bumiputra Economic Congress, RIDA was transformed into the Council of Trust for the Indigenous People (Majlis Amanah Rakyat - MARA). The change of name from RIDA to MARA was made so as to "give a face-lift and a new life to RIDA", as stated by Tun Abdul Razak. The name of the Institute was hence changed to the MARA College of Business and Professional Studies in the same year.

The establishment of MARA, a corporate organisation, was to find realistic and practicable answers, and solutions to the questions and problems relating to the implementation of its primary objective, which is to stimulate, assist and facilitate Bumiputra participation in commerce and industry. While the setting up of MARA was meant to boost the participation of the indigenous Malays in the business and technological sectors, simultaneously, the scope and functions of MARA were widened so that it could set up an infrastructure capable of providing a wide range of services, especially for the rural population.

The beginning of ITM was associated with and attributed to Tun Abdul Razak. Monitored closely by Tun Abdul Razak under its new name (the MARA College), the College underwent a phenomenal development, both in terms of its academic programmes and its physical growth.

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In October 14, 1967 MARA College was renamed MARA Institute of Technology, (Institut Teknologi MARA - ITM) with the historic event commemorated by the laying of the foundation stone by Tun Abdul Razak for a new campus in the new town of Shah Alam, Selangor, about 22 kilometres from Kuala Lumpur. Construction work began in early 1968 and in mid-1972 the new campus was ready for use. The complex promised to become one of Malaysia's most modern campuses. Apart from its main campus in Shah Alam, four other branch campuses were opened in other states.

By this time, the Institute had expanded its course offerings to fields covering not only business studies, accountancy, commerce and secretarial studies, but also applied sciences, engineering, languages, applied art, computer sciences and architecture. These courses are conducted under the programmes of the School of Accountancy, School of Administration, School of Business and Management, School of Applied Arts, School of Engineering, School of Hotel and Catering Management and School of Pre-University Studies.

The administration of ITM also changed. RIDA Training College, which was administered by the RIDA Training Department, was then moved to be administered by the MARA Training Department which meant that the Institute was directly under the purview of the Ministry of National and Rural Development. In June 1976, the ITM Act came into effect placing the Institute under the Ministry of Education. At the end of 1979, ITM gained complete autonomy and was administered by its own Council.

As mentioned earlier, ITM having started from a modest student population of 25 of the RIDA Training College in 1956, the number grew to more than 60,000 spread across the country in eleven branches, one in each state with the exception of Negeri Sembilan and Kuala Lumpur. The Institute accommodation in the principal branch in Shah Alam alone caters for more than 10,000 students.

A large proportion of students enrolled in ITM's early years were from rural areas and children of very poor parents, whose entry qualifications were barely sufficient, and whose academic performance could scarcely compete with that of more fortunate students coming from the urban areas, or from schools that were more adequately equipped in terms of facilities as well as the quality of teachers.

Tun Abdul Razak always had his attention focussed on promoting and improving the standard of living of the rural and poor population. He saw the dire need to increase the number of Bumiputra in both professional

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and semi-professional areas and pushed his plans strongly towards the realisation of his mission of making ITM's function as an institution with a very special responsibility for providing training to more numbers of Bumiputra, with special attention to children with potential from economically deprived families, and with a long-term objective of creating a harmonious and equitable Malaysian society.

His vision made a marked change in the economic and educational development of the Bumiputra population of Malaysia. Initially, with a hundred percent of the students being indigenous, unavoidable criticisms were thrown by the leaders of other component parties, whose members were mostly non-Bumiputra.

Despite all the protests and remarks on the issue of the Institute Tun Abdul Razak was determined to go ahead with the programme. He foresaw that racial imbalance, and if this is left unchecked, could create racial clashes, as was proved in May 1969. It took a gradual process to make the non-Malays understand and realise that it was the objective of the Institute to provide studying/training facilities to the indigenous people without suppressing the study opportunities of the non-indigenous. Achieving racial harmony with the fruits of the economic success of the country equally shared by all Malaysians irrespective of race was Tun Abdul Razak's first priority.

With more students enrolled, more staff employed (many were expatriates contracted from overseas), and more programmes offered by the Institute, the Institute had virtually outgrown MARA itself and was consequently placed under the Ministry of Education. With the placement of ITM under the purview of the Ministry of Education, as with other universities, the Institute is officially recognised as an institution of higher learning, although it was not distinctly recognised as a university.

The impact of Tun Abdul Razak's programme of widening the mission of ITM was very positive. Supplementing the Bumiputra professionals produced by other local universities, and with the Institute also producing sub-professional (diploma) qualification, the programme was of significance; although the percentage of Bumiputra professionals as planned in the New Economic Policy has never been achieved, even to this day. The programmes had not run without a hitch, however.

Student Unrest

Tun Abdul Razak had to face a great test of his leadership when the fruit of his vision was eventually turned against himself. To add insult to injury it was mostly the Bumiputra students who protested against the Government for different kinds of reasons. This can be related to the issue of the increasing militancy of the Institute's students. The militancy of students in ITM and other local universities was shown by the growing number of demonstrations outside the campus although all those demonstrations ended peacefully. One of the demonstrations was the anti-American demonstration outside the US Embassy in Kuala Lumpur on the issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict that took place in October 1973. Another constant target for protest was the issue of corruption in high places. For ITM's students, their restlessness was more on the issue of demanding from the authorities an upgrade of their Institute to university status.

On April 29, 1973 students from ITM went on a midnight march to Parliament House from their campus in Selangor, 22 kilometres from Kuala Lumpur, to voice their demands to upgrade their Institute to university status. A few miles out of the capital, the police called on them to disperse by throwing tear gas at them. At the same time, a group from the branch campus of the Institute, in Petaling Jaya, 9 kilometres from Kuala Lumpur, were also stopped from marching. In this demonstration, student leaders alleged that police used batons to beat them. Some students were injured, a total of 181 were arrested and appeared in court. Those arrested were charged with taking part in an unlawful assembly.

The Minister of Home Affairs, Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, who was also Chairman of the ITM's Governing Council, promptly but reluctantly ordered an indefinite closure of the Selangor campus and sent the students home. But the students ignored the order, barricaded themselves in by putting concrete slabs across the roads leading into the campus and patrolled the area with walkie-talkie radios. Police estimated that about 4,000 of the total student enrolment of more than 6,000 took part in this demonstration.

On the day of the demonstration, the students sent a telegram to Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak, demanding that he upgrade ITM's status to that of a university. Many ITM lecturers silently supported the students. They were well aware of the increased status and benefits that they would receive by the upgrading of the Institute's status.

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Tun Abdul Razak had to resist the pressure. He realised the danger of the increasing militancy of the students. There was already a tendency for certain politicians to start building up their image among students. As ITM provided many non-university-type courses and as graduates of ITM with foreign professional qualifications, like architects and accountants, were already recognised as university graduates when applying for employment both in the government service and the private sector, the change of status was not important. Students leaders met the ITM Governing Council at Tan Sri Ghazali's office and reached an agreement on the issue of the Government's giving degree status for some of the courses conducted at ITM.

In 1974, ITM had over 6,400 students, and received more operating expenses than the allocation of at least two other universities. The Government had made it clear that it wanted ITM to proceed in line with the Government's attempts to provide the Bumiputra with professional and sub-professional training.

The students' militancy had partly contributed to the enactment of the Universities and University Colleges Act (UUCA) in 1976. The impact of the UUCA in promoting a healthy growth of higher education, especially in ITM, and improving the academic performance of Bumiputra students was great.

For more than twenty years after its imposition, criticism of the UUCA has revolved around the alleged unfairness of the Government in suppressing the freedom of political participation of the students and academicians of the Institute and other local universities. As a result, the students are becoming more reserved, aloof and mere paper chasers, but indirectly, the UUCA has helped the Government, in particular, to maintain peace in campuses and, in general, to stabilise the political order of the country, so long as political and economic development remains stable.

ITM, A Growing Institution

Despite all difficulties, thirty years have passed since the first foundation stone was laid by Tun Abdul Razak at the Institute's current site in Shah Alam, and more than twenty years have passed since the students' demonstration, the Institute has steadily grown in size, in students and staff population and in its academic programmes.

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Occupying an area of 300 hectares on the main campus in Shah Alam, and with one branch campus in almost all of Malaysia's states, and with an academic staff of about 3,500, supporting staff of about 2,000, and a student population of more than 60,000, the Institute is simply the largest institution of higher learning in Malaysia. The Institute, currently under the purview of the Ministry of Education, and recognised as a full institution of higher learning, also offers a number of degree programmes, and twinned Master's programmes.

ITM underwent its greatest expansion under the able leadership of its first Director, Tan Sri Dato' Arshad Ayob, a highly disciplined leader who would not tolerate passiveness, laziness, and non-commitment among his staff and students. He understood well Tun Abdul Razak's mission and vision and led ITM through its formative years instilling high discipline among the students whom he saw as having the potential to become leaders of the future generation. Many members of the academic staff who had the opportunity of serving under him realised Tan Sri Arshad Ayob's able leadership, enthusiasm, vigour and charisma. Tan Sri Arshad Ayob had been instrumental in executing his task to start fulfilling the vision of Tun Abdul Razak.

Tun Abdul Razak had to handpick the right man, Tan Sri Arshad Ayob, to manage the Institute to materialise his vision for ITM's physical and programme expansion. It was Tun Abdul Razak's belief that this man could carry the responsibility for fulfilling his vision of improving the economic well being of the Malays. At the time when ITM was experiencing a rapid change, Tan Sri Arshad Ayob's educational background in agriculture, economics and business, together with his wide experience in government and public sectors, had partly contributed to bring ITM to a level of importance and significance.

About 80 per cent of ITM students in its early years have come from the rural areas, inadequately equipped and poorly prepared for challenges and pressures. The rural Malay children were a disadvantaged lot who have been isolated from educational facilities necessary to prepare and train them for their future careers. This isolation mainly had been brought about by poverty, by meagreness of intellectual resources in their home and surroundings and also by the illiteracy of their elders and relatives in their community. Rural schools were typically small and very poorly equipped. They were also deprived of their share of the country's best teachers because most teachers were reluctant to leave the towns for teaching posts in the rural areas. Educational facilities, opportunities and educational counselling were indeed limited for the rural students.

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In these circumstances, there was a belief in the need of the average Malay students to upgrade their academic performance by profitably using the learning facilities provided by ITM, by accustoming themselves to independence and by driving them to a high level of motivation.

For Tan Sri Arshad Ayob, given the poor economic and political circumstances of the Bumiputra students, environment and interests should be developed together. The Bumiputra need paper qualification both to elevate their economic performance and to provide them significantly with new vision.

Since local universities had stressed and concentrated more on general academic education, for Tan Sri Arshad Ayob it was important to set up an institute where Business, Management and Engineering courses were taught. With this setting up, individual interests in the professional dimension would be developed among the Malay students at the Institute. He was aware of his responsibility to fully understand the principles of the Government's policies and the role of ITM as an institution of academic excellence to improve the standard of living of the Bumiputra. Tan Sri Arshad Ayob had successfully made the ITM diploma a foundation to its graduates either to be absorbed in the semi-professional career market or as a passport for further acquisition of higher professional qualifications.

Concomitant to this, Tan Sri Arshad maintained the use of English as the medium of instruction by necessity; inviting many sectors to accuse him of sidestepping the national education policy of implementing the Malaysian Language as the national language. ITM's courses were either examined externally or internally but with moderation made by external examiners. Eleven of ITM's courses at that time were examined in the United Kingdom.

To maintain the required standard of the locally conducted courses external examiners from well-known universities were appointed. This was important to sustain an acceptable quality in curriculum and in instruction in the Institute. This was necessary to obtain recognition of the courses not only from the private and public sectors for job opportunities for the graduates, but equally important, from the external universities to ensure acceptance of graduates for degree or for postgraduate education.

Tan Sri Arshad Ayob realised that the only way to provide tertiary education opportunities for more Bumiputra students was to increase the Institute's student population. The Shah Alam branch was made the main

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campus and branch campuses were set up one each in Sabah, Sarawak and Perlis in 1973, followed by other states in later years.

The Institute's mission to play a major role in providing the Bumiputra with the skills needed by the nation's commerce and industry in the years to come has been in line with the policy of and helped the Government to create a dynamic Bumiputra business community to own at least 30 per cent of the commercial and industrial sector of the country, a goal which since the implementation of the Second Malaysia Plan, was far from being reached, notwithstanding the contribution of ITM and other local universities in terms of producing professional manpower.

In the history of tertiary education development in Malaysia, the Institute had developed rapidly and progressively to become the biggest institution of higher learning in the country, performing a very strategic role of providing the Bumiputra with tertiary education, to balance the wide gap in the number of professionals and semi-professionals locally among the various races.

A Reassessment of Tun Abdul Razak's ITM Mission

From 1958 to 1998 the cumulative number of graduates produced by the Institute was more than 100,000, both at professional and semi-professional levels, to feed Malaysia's ever demanding job market. The change in its physical growth over the years has been tremendous.

As the years pass by and more graduates are produced, the success of ITM needs to be maintained in tandem with Tun Abdul Razak's original objectives. In tandem with the increasing number of students graduating from the Institute, which is always echoed as a good indication of the success and contribution of the Institute, Tun Abdul Razak's objective should not be manifested by mere quantitative demonstration of the Institute's capabilities. The devotion so much demonstrated by Tun Abdul Razak through the person that he entrusted to make ITM an important phenomenon in the restructuring of Malaysian society and specifically in upgrading the economic performance of the Bumiputra was significant in ensuring the continuing success of ITM in pursuing its objective.

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ITM's changes under the leadership of other Directors after Tan Sri Arshad Ayob have also been significant. The Institute expanded further with more state branches, a higher intake of students and more graduates every year. Subsequent Directors after Tan Sri Arshad Ayob needed to have strong leadership qualities and clear understanding and commitment to Tun Abdul Razak's vision and use the platform actively to fulfil the aspirations of the indigenous societies. Together with other institutions of higher learning, ITM is responsible for preparing a tough and resilient new breed of future Malay leaders and technocrats to face the challenges of bringing the country to the realisation of its VISION 2020.

Academic priority and academic excellence in the Institute's leadership is important to put in place Tun Abdul Razak's original objectives of the Institute. ITM needs academic leaders who are committed to the causes of the country's indigenous population and whose integrity in their academic leadership would not be questioned.

The amendment of the MARA Institute of Technology (ITM) Act 1976 reflected both the Government's and the public's recognition of the Institute's maturity and its contribution towards producing a quality professional Bumiputra workforce to be in parallel and in alignment with the vision and mission of Tun Abdul Razak. The amendment, in view of the proposed corporatisation of higher learning institutions in the country, would enable the Institute to offer degree and post-degree courses, especially in professional fields, to help realise the country's vision of becoming fully industrialised.

With Dato' Sri Najib as Minister of Education, the country at large has high expectation and hopes that he will revive more strongly the vision and mission of his father, Tun Abdul Razak, in the education development of the country at large. Even higher is the expectation that under Dato' Sri Najib, ITM will be transformed into a Centre of Excellence to achieve one step forward from what his father left. This is important in order to demonstrate that ITM is not just an Institute to help the indigenous group of the country but rather an Institute with whose appropriate training and opportunities the indigenous groups could become top cadres in the professional world.

On the whole the contribution of Tun Abdul Razak in his formation of ITM was one of his greatest endeavours. A high percentage of the current Malaysian politicians, entrepreneurs, journalists, businessmen, managers and bankers, as well as engineers, technologists and scientists have received an early part of their tertiary education or training at ITM. The Institute was one of the most valuable treasures left by Tun Abdul Razak

Epilogue

for the country's multi-racial unity in general, and for the indigenous citizens in particular.

While other national leaders were in some way associated with the initial establishment of ITM, it was Tun Abdul Razak, noting his sacrifice and life-time struggle to improve the educational and economic being of the rural population, where the majority are Bumiputra, who made the Institution remembered as an attribute of Tun Abdul Razak. Tun Abdul Razak performed a miracle in lifting up in just one generation the quality of life of the rural folk. A significant percentage of the nation's current leaders, bureaucrats, technocrats and entrepreneurs have been successful because of the opportunity provided to them to study in ITM two or three decades ago while they may not have produced the best of examination results from their rural schools. The miracle should not be allowed to stop together with the heartbeat of Tun Abdul Razak.

It may be destined that it would take Tun Abdul Razak's own blood and heartbeat continued by his eldest son to continue his vision and mission to make the ITM of contemporary time able to produce professionals resilient enough to face the globalised era.

Glossary and Brief Description of Names Appearing in this Book

Author's Note: The descriptions of the individuals mentioned in this glossary are only limited to the context of this book

Tan Sri Abdul Kadir Shamsuddin

Director of Public Affairs who was a Member of the National Operations Council (NOC) during the Emergency period following the May 13, 1969 racial riot. He was Chief Secretary to the Government under the premiership of Tun Abdul Razak.

Tan Sri Abdul Kadir Yusof

Attorney General under the Emergency Cabinet that was formed on May 20, 1969. He was second cousin to Tun Abdul Razak's wife, Tun Hajah Rahah.

Abd. Rahman Hashim

Security Chief (Head of the Special Branch at Police Headquarters) during the May 13 tragedy who was responsible for safeguarding the peace of the country and to advise Tun Abdul Razak as Minister of Home Affairs accordingly.

Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Alhaj

First Prime Minister of Malaysia (from 1957 to 1970), better known as Malaysia's Father of Independence. Being considered as a national institution, he exercised a peculiar ability to hold together the various racial groups in Malaysia. He was succeeded by Tun Abdul Razak not long after the May 13, 1969 tragedy.

Dato' Abdul Rahman Talib

Minister of Education who succeeded Tun Abdul Razak when Tun Abdul Razak moved up to Deputy Prime Minister just after Independence. He was responsible for looking into the implementation of the Razak Report.

Tun Patinggi Abdul Rahman Ya'akub

Minister of Education under the Emergency Cabinet formed on May 20, 1969. He later became Chief Minister of Sarawak. His daughter, Khatijah, is married to Tun Abdul Razak's third son, Mohd. Nizam. He was mentioned as a serious contender during the period of unfilled post for Deputy Prime Minister when Tun Hussein Onn succeeded as Prime Minister after the demise of Tun Abdul Razak in January 1976.

Glossary and Brief Description of Names

Tun Abdul Razak Hussein

Second Prime Minister of Malaysia (from 1970 to 1976), known as Malaysia's Father of Development, Father of Peace, and the Architect of Malaysia's Development, the main subject of this book. Was Deputy Prime Minister (from 1957-1970) all along when Tunku Abdul Rahman was Prime Minister. When he succeeded Tunku Abdul Rahman, he was the Director of the National Operations Council (NOC) to lead the special operations to normalise peace and security of the country after the 1969 May 13 racial riot. His leadership qualities and national contribution are considered by many as legendary.

Tan Sri Abdul Samad Idris

Minister of Culture, Youth and Sports during Tun Hussein Onn's premiership. After the demise of Tun Abdul Razak, he published two volumes of 'Lagu-Lagu Rakyat Malaysia' which were a collection of traditional songs especially loved by Tun Abdul Razak. One notable song featured in the first volume was titled 'Putera Berjasa' with the lyrics written by himself, reflecting in poetic form the great contribution of the 'Prince' to his nation.

Sir Anthony Abell

A Member of the Commission of Inquiry on Malaysia appointed by the British Government in February 1962 to ascertain the views of the peoples of Sabah and Sarawak on the intended formation of Malaysia.

Tun Adam Malik

Indonesia's Foreign Minister when General Suharto was in power, playing a leading role on the Indonesian side to normalise diplomatic relations with Malaysia following the Indonesian Confrontation against Malaysia. He co-signed the ASEAN Declaration on 8 August 1967, leading to the formation of ASEAN.

Ahmad Johari Tun Abdul Razak

Second son of Tun Abdul Razak, born on November 29, 1954 in Kuala Lipis, Pahang and the only son to follow his father to take up law. He studied at the University of Kent, Canterbury (1972-75) for his Bachelor of Law, then at Lincoln's Inn (1975-76) for his Barrister-at-Law. A practising lawyer, he is currently Group Managing Director, Ancorn Bhd.

Dato' Haji Ahmad Razali Ali

Alliance State Assemblyman of Selangor who was asked permission by a group of Kampong Bahru youths who wanted to hold an UMNO victory procession to reciprocate the previous DAP's 'victory parade' just before the incident of May 13, 1969.

Glossary and Brief Description of Names

Tengku Ahmad Rithaudden

Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet of Tun Abdul Razak, who together with Tan Sri Abdul Kadir Shamsuddin, went to visit Tun Abdul Razak in London Clinic to discuss the coming Malaysia-Thai border talks, on January 13, 1965, the day before Tun Abdul Razak passed away.

Datin Paduka Aishah Ghani

Successor of Tan Sri Fatimah Hashim as Minister of Social Welfare under the Premiership of Tun Abdul Razak. As Head of UMNO Women Movement she was automatically one of the Vice Presidents of UMNO.

Toh Puan Dr. Aishah Omar Ong Yoke Lin

Wife of Tan Sri Omar Ong Yoke Lin. Tan Sri Omar Ong Yoke Lin's very close association with Tun Abdul Razak's had made Tun Abdul Razak and his wife act as "parents" at the wedding of the Muslim couple when they were married at the Prime Minister official residence Sri Taman.

Dato' Sri Anwar Ibrahim

Current Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia (since 1993), with strong political grassroots support especially from the younger Malaysian intellectuals. He was detained under the Internal Security Act during the later part of Tunku Abdul Rahman's premiership, but later, because of his high leadership potential, was picked up by Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir to strengthen UMNO. His fast rise to Deputy Prime Ministership has been phenomenal.

Tan Sri Arshad Ayob

First Director of Mara Institute of Technology (ITM), personally chosen by Tun Abdul Razak. A highly disciplined leader, he would not tolerate passiveness, laziness and non-commitment among his staff and students. ITM underwent its greatest expansion under his Directorship.

Dato' Michael Chen

Minister of Science, Environment and Technology in 1973 and Minister of Housing, Local Government and Village Development in 1974. A confidante of Tun Abdul Razak, he aligned with the MCA reform group formed by younger elements in the Party. Being a law graduate with both English and Chinese education behind him, which was rare in the sixties, and sharing Tun Abdul Razak's vision on nation building made him eloquently acceptable within both MCA and UMNO circles.

Glossary and Brief Description of Names

Tan Cheng-Lock

National President of the MCA who gave his blessing to the first merger of UMNO and MCA to form the Alliance.

Premier Chou En-Lai

Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China who invited Tun Abdul Razak to visit China in 1974. Tun Abdul Razak responded to the invitation turning a new page in Malaysia's foreign policy. The two contemporary great leaders of Asia Chou En-lai and Tun Abdul Razak died in the same week.

Lord Cobbold

Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry on Malaysia, appointed by the British Government in February 1962 to ascertain the views of the people of Sabah and Sarawak on the formation of Malaysia.

Des Alwi

Adopted son of former Indonesian Prime Minister Shahrir, and a close friend of Tun Abdul Razak who acted as middle man in the secret unofficial negotiations between goodwill mission officials of Malaysia and Indonesia to end the Confrontation.

Major-General Djatikusumo

Indonesian Ambassador to Malaysia during the Malaysia-Indonesia Confrontation who, together with his diplomatic staff, was exposed by the Malaysian Government as carrying out spying activities.

Fatimah Haji Daud

Tun Abdul Razak's mother. Her husband Dato' Hussein Mohd. Taib is her cousin. Their marriage was endowed with two children, Tun Abdul Razak and Datin Maimunah.

Tan Sri Dr. Fatimah Hashim

Minister of Social Welfare in the Emergency Cabinet of May 29, 1969. She was wife of Tan Sri Abdul Kadir Yusof, Attorney General in the Emergency Cabinet. They were the only couple in the history of Malaysia to be members of the Cabinet at the same time.

Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser

Contemporary Prime Minister of Australia. He flew in to Kuala Lumpur to pay his last respects to Tun Abdul Razak.

Glossary and Brief Description of Names

Tun Ghafar Baba

Deputy Prime Minister under Dato' Seri Mahathir until he was replaced by Dato' Sri Anwar Ibrahim. Previous to this he was also Minister of National and Rural Development and Minister of Lands and Mines in the Emergency Cabinet formed on May 20, 1969. He was a veteran politician whose political commitment started at the same time as Tunku Abdul Rahman and Tun Abdul Razak.

Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie

Was Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when appointed as a Member of the National Operations Council (NOC). He then became Minister of Home Affairs. He was a statesman and long-time politician and was a close colleague and friend of Tun Abdul Razak since their Raffles College days. He had a long association with Tun Abdul Razak in wartime anti-Japanese activities, in civil service, in the Emergency period following the May 13 riot, and in Cabinet.

Dato' Ganie Gilong

Minister of Justice in the Emergency Cabinet formed on May 20, 1969.

Sir Henry Gurney

High Commissioner of the Federation of Malaya in 1948.

Dato' Hamzah Dato' Abu Samah

Minister of Information and Broadcasting appointed to the Emergency Cabinet formed on May 20, 1969. He was a member of the National Operations Council (NOC) during the Emergency. He was brother-in-law to Tun Abdul Razak.

Tan Sri General Hamid Bidin

Chief of the Armed Forces. He was Director of Operations of a West Malaysian Command set-up by Tun Abdul Razak in order to coordinate the operation of the Armed Forces and the Police in dealing with the communist insurgencies along the Malaysian-Thai border.

Dato' Harun Hashim

Chief of the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) whose assistance was sought by Tun Abdul Razak to make plans to restore order immediately after the outbreak of the May 13, 1969 riot.

Glossary and Brief Description of Names

Dato' Harun Idris

A veteran politician, Chief Minister of Selangor and UMNO Youth Chief and a strongly opinionated politician in UMNO circles. He was also a former Legal Adviser to the Selangor State Government and Deputy Public Prosecutor. Was detained during Tun Hussein Onn's premiership on charges of corruption, and after serving some of the sentence was later pardoned by the King. Based on his political strength and achievement, he was once seriously regarded as a potential Prime Minister.

Dato' Hussein Mohd Taib

Father of Tun Abdul Razak. A Pahang aristocrat of Bugis descent, he was the eighth holder of the ancestral title of Orang Kaya Indera Shahbandar of the royal town of Pekan, Pahang. Despite his affluence, letting his son (Tun) Abdul Razak spend his early years in the village with his grandfather had shaped the boy's mind that was destined later to shape the rural development and the economic being of the whole nation when he became the nation's leader.

Tun Hussein Onn

Third Prime Minister of Malaysia and in-law of Tun Abdul Razak (their wives were sisters). Son of Dato' Onn Jaafar, the Founder-President of UMNO, he received military training and became captain with high disciplinary conduct. He was well known for his strength of character, unquestionable integrity, and guts. He was Deputy Prime Minister under Tun Abdul Razak succeeding Tun Dr. Ismail.

Tan Sri General Ibrahim Ismail

Member and Chief Executive Officer of the National Operations Council (NOC) during the emergency period following the May 13 riot. He led the Secretariat providing the administrative machinery for the office of the Director of Operations.

Haji Idris Shaari

Tun Abdul Razak's Personal Body Guard since 1965. After the demise of Tun Abdul Razak, he was appointed by the Government of Malaysia to take care of the welfare of Tun Abdul Razak's family. Since then, he has been considered by Tun Abdul Razak's family as part of the extended family. A small detached house was provided for his family next to the house of Tun Abdul Razak's family in Jalan Eaton 6, Kuala Lumpur.

Glossary and Brief Description of Names

Tun Dr Ismail Dato' Abdul Rahman

Deputy Prime Minister under Tun Abdul Razak. The first Malay doctor to qualify from an Australian university, he was a close aide of Tun Abdul Razak since pre-independence UMNO struggles. Prior to being Deputy Prime Minister he was Minister of Home Affairs and resigned from this position in June 1967. As a politician he was invaluable as a man who had the ability to discipline the Malays as well as the Chinese. He had a reputation for liberalism and provided solid support to Tun Abdul Razak.

Kalthum Taib

A daughter of Tan Sri Taib Andak and a junior to Tun Hajah Rahah, attending the same school, Convent of the Holy Infant Jesus in Johor Bahru.

Khatijah Tun Patinggi Abdul Rahman

Daughter of Tun Patinggi Abdul Rahman Yaa'kub who is married to Tun Abdul Razak's third son, Mohd. Nizam.

Khaw Kai Boh

Minister without Portfolio in the Emergency Cabinet formed on May 20, 1969.

Tun Thanat Khoman

Contemporary Foreign Minister of Thailand who co-signed the ASEAN Declaration on August 8, 1967, leading to the formation of ASEAN.

Tan Sri Latif Jamal

Malaysian Ambassador to France when Tun Abdul Razak was rushed to Paris for medical treatment on December 18, 1975. He was a close friend of Tun Abdul Razak.

Dato' Alex Lee

An MCA young-blood leader who together with his followers made frequent visits to the villages to win more support from the party's dwindling members. He was a Cambridge educated lawyer.

Col. H. S. Lee

A veteran politician of the MCA who was one of the senior MCA party officials who agreed to the first merger of UMNO and MCA in January 1952 to form the Alliance.

Glossary and Brief Description of Names

Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew

Prime Minister of Singapore until 1990. During the short stint Singapore was part of Malaysia, he was the main figure to voice strongly Singapore's dissatisfaction as part of Malaysia and promoted the idea of Malaysian-Malaysia that contributed to the worsening of the relations between Malaysia and Singapore and eventually to Singapore's secession.

Dato' Lee San Choon

MCA Deputy President who was appointed as Assistant Minister and later Minister of Special Functions during Tun Abdul Razak's premiership.

Lee Siok Yew

Minister Without Portfolio in the Emergency Cabinet formed on May 20, 1969.

Dr. Lim Chong Eu

Chief Minister of Penang appointed after the General Election of 1969. A moderate leader of the United Democratic Party, he resigned from his own Party, and together with Dr. Tan Chee Khoon, set up a new GERAKAN party. As Chief Minister he was anxious to cooperate with the Central Government in maintaining law and order.

Joe Lim

A close friend to Tun Abdul Razak who was always Tun Abdul Razak's partner in golf.

Dr. Lim Keng Yaik

Special Functions Minister under the premiership of Tun Abdul Razak. He was earlier pressured out of the Cabinet by Tun Tan Siew Sin due to disagreement.

Lim Tuan Siong

A former member of the Labour party, he was the only independent candidate who won a seat in the Selangor State Election of 1969. His collaboration with UMNO, after successful persuasion from Dato' Harun Idris enabled the Alliance to form (and retain) the State Government after the polling results revealed a draw of 14 - 14 seats to the Alliance and the opposition.

President Diosdado Macapagal

President of the Philippines from 1961 to 1965 and the Chief of the Legal Division of the Philippines' Foreign Affairs Department who filed a claim on Sabah.

Glossary and Brief Description of Names

Sir Harold MacMichael

A representative sent by the British Colonial Government who arrived in Malaya in October 1945 and concluded treaties with all the Malay Rulers who effectively signed away all their powers to the British Crown.

Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad

Current (Fourth) Prime Minister of Malaysia (since 1981) committed to steering Malaysia to become a developed nation by the year 2020. His vocal and strongly voiced opinion in the UMNO Party during the turbulent years of Tunku Abdul Rahman's Government led to him being dismissed from the Party. When Tun Abdul Razak was Prime Minister he was called back to be active in the Cabinet as Minister of Education and was Deputy Prime Minister under Tun Hussein Onn's premiership. His will power and strong voice championing the causes of developing nations on international platforms make him well known and respected regionally and internationally.

Datin Maimunah Dato' Hussein

Tun Abdul Razak's sister who was married to Dato' Muhammad Jusoh, former Pahang Chief Minister.

Tun V. Manickavasagam

Minister of Labour and Acting Minister of Transport in the Emergency Cabinet formed on May 20, 1969.

President Ferdinand Marcos

President of the Philippines from 1965 to 1986. It was under him that the Philippines agreed not to bring up the Sabah issue in ASEAN meetings. He flew in to Kuala Lumpur and filed past Tun Abdul Razak's flag-draped coffin to pay his last respects.

Chairman Mao Tse-tung

Chairman of the Communist Party of the People's Republic of China. Tun Abdul Razak called upon him to convey the best wishes of the Malaysian Government when he visited the People's Republic of China in 1974, leading subsequently to the establishment of official ties and representing a fresh start in the relations between these two countries.

General Benny Moerdani

Senior Army Official who, together with General Ali Moertopo, was secretly assigned by the Indonesian Government an important role in the operational link to overcome the ruptured diplomatic ties between Indonesia and Malaysia as a result of the Confrontation.

Glossary and Brief Description of Names

General Ali Moertopo

Senior Army General who, together with General Benny Moerdani, was secretly assigned by the Indonesian Government an important role in the operational link to overcome the ruptured diplomatic ties between Indonesia and Malaysia as the result of the Confrontation.

Dato' Mohamed Asri

National President of the PMIP/PAS whose charismatic leadership brought his party to join the ruling coalition, the National Front. He was appointed Minister of Land Development with concurrent responsibility over Islamic Affairs.

Tan Sri Mohammad Khir Johari

A veteran politician of UMNO, he was Minister of Commerce and Industry and Acting Minister of Local Government and Housing in the Emergency Cabinet formed on May 20, 1969.

Tan Sri Mohammad Salleh

Inspector-General of Police who was a member of the National Operations Council (NOC) during the emergency period following the May 13 riot who was responsible for safeguarding the peace of the country and to advise Tun Abdul Razak as Minister of Home Affairs accordingly.

Dato' Mohd. Ariff

Chief Police Officer of Selangor who worked closely with Tan Sri Mohammad Salleh during the May 13 racial riot.

Dato' Sri Mohd. Najib Tun Abdul Razak

The eldest son of Tun Abdul Razak, born on July 23, 1953. An economist by education, he entered Malaysian politics at a young age, soon after the demise of his father, and climbed up the political ladder fast. Following the legacy and traits of his late father, he was appointed Orang Kaya Indera Shahbandar of Pekan, Pahang, was UMNO Youth Chief, Chief Minister of Pahang, Minister of Sports, Minister of Defence and currently Minister of Education. Like his father he made significant changes in all portfolios that he held and is observed by Party analysts to have high potential to rise to top leadership in the Party in the future.

Glossary and Brief Description of Names

Mohd. Nazim Tun Abdul Razak

The fourth son of Tun Abdul Razak, born on March 25, 1962. Received his architecture qualification from the School of Architecture, London. He was appointed Director of O.Y.L. Industries in Nov. 1991, and Director of Hock Hua Bank Bhd. in April 1992 and is currently Managing Director of NR Associates Sdn. Bhd.

Mohd. Nazir Tun Abdul Razak

The fifth and youngest son of Tun Abdul Razak, born on November 19, 1966. Attended Bristol University, England (1986-88) for his BSc. in Social Science, and Cambridge University (1988-89) for his M. Phil. He is currently Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Commerce International Merchant Bankers Bhd.

Mohd. Nizam Tun Abdul Razak

The third son of Tun Abdul Razak, born on October 3, 1958. Attended Oxford University, England (1977-80) for his B.A. in Politics, Philosophy and Economics. He is currently Managing Director, Public Bank Securities Sdn. Bhd.

Dato' Muhammad Jusoh

Former Chief Minister of Pahang who was married to Datin Maimunah, Tun Abdul Razak's sister.

Tan Sri Musa Hitam

First Deputy Prime Minister under Dato' Sri Dr. Mahathir. In his early career as Assistant Minister, together with Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir, he was frank in his criticism of Tunku Abdul Rahman. He became Education Minister under the premiership of Tun Hussein Onn. A very influential political leader, when he was Deputy Prime Minister under Dato' Sri Dr. Mahathir, the 2-M Leadership (Mahathir-Musa) was very highly praised.

Tun Mustapha Jabar

Chief Minister of Sabah who with other USNO members expressed their support and enthusiasm for Tun Hussein Onn's Cabinet and the appointment of Dato' Sri Dr. Mahathir as Deputy Prime Minister.

General Nasution

Indonesia's most senior and influential military official during President Sukarno's era. He escaped kidnapping and assassination in the communist-led GESTAPU coup which led to the death of six other army generals. Together with General Suharto, he led the loyal armed forces in suppressing the coup.

Glossary and Brief Description of Names

Tan Sri Haji Noah

Tun Hajah Rahah's father. He was a Senior Officer in the Islamic Religion Department in Johor Bahru and later became Speaker of the House of Representatives during the premiership of Tunku Abdul Rahman. As destiny willed it, two of his daughters became Malaysia's First Ladies; Tun Hajah Rahah was married to Tun Abdul Razak and Tun Hajah Suhaila was married to Tun Hussein Onn.

Omar Dhani

Commander of the Air Force and a known Communist sympathiser under President Sukarno.

Tun Omar Ong Yoke Lin

Chairman of the MCA Liaison Committee who together with Dato' Yahya Abdul Razak initiated the merging of MCA and UMNO, the two largest and broadest communal groups in Malaya, to form the Alliance in January 1952. He had held Ministership of a number of portfolios before and after Independence, and was Malaysian Ambassador to the United States and concurrently Permanent Representative to the United Nations in 1962. He was elected President of the Malaysian Senate from 1973 to 1980. A very senior member of MCA he was a close confidante of Tun Abdul Razak and had high respect for the leader's vision and enthusiasm.

Dato' Onn Jaafar

The Founder-President of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). The son of the former Chief Minister of Johore, he called a meeting of all the Malay Associations and succeeded in amalgamating them into one body, UMNO. With the formation of UMNO, for the first time the Malays started to realise the importance of their unity.

General Tengku Osman Jawa

Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces who was a member of the National Operations Council (NOC) during the Emergency period following the May 13 riot.

Dr. MacPherson

A British citizen, and friend of Tun Dr. Ismail, he was private doctor to Tun Abdul Razak who always accompanied him especially on overseas trips and knew the disease suffered by Tun Abdul Razak. He accompanied Tun Abdul Razak on his last flight to Paris (then to London) for medical treatment.

Glossary and Brief Description of Names

Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj

Contemporary Prime Minister of Thailand who filed past Tun Abdul Razak's flag-draped coffin to pay his last respects.

Tun Hajah Rahah Tan Sri Haji Noah

Tun Abdul Razak's wife. The traditional Malay wedding of Tun Abdul Razak and Tun Hajah Rahah took place in Johor Bahru in 1952 when she was eighteen. A religious woman and devoted wife, every Friday dawn sees her offering prayers beside her husband's grave at the Heroes' Mausoleum in Kuala Lumpur.

S. Rajaratnam

Singapore's Minister of Foreign Affairs who co-signed the ASEAN Declaration on August 8, 1967, leading to the formation of ASEAN.

Narciso Ramos

Foreign Secretary of the Philippines who co-signed the ASEAN Declaration on August 8, 1967, leading to the formation of ASEAN.

Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah

Formerly one of the top UMNO leaders in the early years of the premiership of Tun Abdul Razak. In his early political career he was Chairman of the National Oil and Gas Corporation (PETRONAS) and later appointed to a number of cabinet positions. He was one of the candidates of choice as Deputy Prime Minister when Tun Hussein Onn took over the premiership after the demise of Tun Abdul Razak.

Rodziah Hassan

Third adopted daughter to the family of Tun Abdul Razak. She was adopted because of poverty.

Rohaya Abu. Bakar

Second adopted daughter to the family of Tun Abdul Razak. She was adopted because of poverty.

Toh Puan Indera Datin Sri Rosmah Mansor

Educated and career woman from Negeri Sembilan who is married to the eldest son of Tun Abdul Razak, Dato' Sri Mohd. Najib. The couple have two girls and three boys.

Glossary and Brief Description of Names

Saidah Abdullah

First adopted daughter and became part of the family just after Tun Razak and Tun Hajah Rahah got married.

Tun V. T. Sambanthan

President of the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). He was a member of the National Operations Council (NOC) during the Emergency period following the incident of the May 13, 1969 racial riot and Minister of Works, Posts and Telecommunications in the Emergency Cabinet formed on May 20, 1969.

Tan Sri Sardon Zubir

A veteran politician of UMNO, he was made Minister of Health in the Emergency Cabinet formed on May 20, 1969.

Tunku Tan Sri Shahrizan Tunku Sulaiman

First Director-General of the Implementation, Coordination and Development Administration Unit of the Prime Minister's Department and became first Chairman of Lembaga Kemajuan Pahang Tenggara in 1972. In 1974 he was given responsibility by Tun Abdul Razak to become President and Group Chief Executive of Perbadanan Nasional Bhd (PERNAS), positions that he has held until today.

Tan Sri Senu Abdul Rahman

A senior statesman and Minister of Information and Broadcasting under the premiership of Tunku Abdul Rahman. He was UMNO Youth Leader and UMNO Secretary-General. After the May 1969 riot, the National Goodwill Council to promote communal harmony was formed under his advice.

Dato ' Sheikh Ahmad Mohamed Hashim

Chief Minister of Perlis who was one of Tunku Abdul Rahman's aides in the Malayan struggle for independence.

Tan Sri Sheikh Abdullah

The Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs during Tunku Abdul Rahman's premiership who was later closely involved in helping Tun Abdul Razak's plan and strategies to restore peace and stability after the May 13 incident.

Sim Mow Yu

Sponsor of the Chinese Unity Movement who was charged under the Sedition Act on April 1971.

Glossary and Brief Description of Names

Donald Snodgrass

Economic Advisor to the Malaysian Government during the period 1960 - 1969.

Tun Hajah Suhaila

Wife of Tun Hussein Onn, the third Prime Minister of Malaysia. Tun Hajah Suhaila and Tun Hajah Rahah are sisters.

President (General) Suharto

Current President of Indonesia who initially as an Army General led his nation back to political stability after suppressing the GESTAPU coup that resulted in the death of six Army Generals. Once in power he initiated opening moves designed to lead to a final settlement of the Indonesian conflict with Malaysia. A very influential leader and a strong proponent of ASEAN, he has been responsible for three decades of Indonesian political stability and economic growth.

President Sukarno

The (First) President of Indonesia who earlier led his people and country against the colonialisation of the Dutch. In 1963 he declared a "Confrontation" protesting the formation of Malaysia. In 1965, following turbulence created by the Indonesian communist uprising, he was ousted from power.

Tan Sri Syed Ja'afar Albar

A veteran politician of UMNO, he opposed the "give and take" attitude of Tunku Abdul Rahman and agreed that a "new model Government in Malaysia was needed under a new leader".

Tan Sri Syed Nasir Ismail

Member of Parliament from Johore and Speaker of the House of Representatives who opposed the "give and take" attitude of Tunku Abdul Rahman and agreed that a "new model Government in Malaysia was needed under a new leader".

Tan Sri Taib Andak

A very devoted family friend of Tun Abdul Razak. He surprised and intrigued Tun Abdul Razak following the wish expressed to him by Tun Abdul Razak's father just before he died, to look out for a suitable bride for him. He found one, Tun Hajah Rahah.

Glossary and Brief Description of Names

Tun Tan Chee Khoon

A moderate leader of the Labour Party, now extinct, the power struggle of 1968 eventually led him to quit the party and to set up another party, GERAKAN. The victory of GERAKAN in Penang in the 1969 General Election led him to apply for a permit to hold a "Victory Parade" on May 12, 1969, culminating in a racial clash tragedy.

T.H. Tan

A veteran politician of the MCA who was once one of the party officials who agreed to the first merger of UMNO and MCA to form the Alliance.

Tun Tan Siew Sin

President of the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and a senior member of the Cabinet under the premiership of Tunku Abdul Rahman. He was a member of the National Operations Council (NOC) during the Emergency period following the May 13 riot and became Minister without Portfolio in the Emergency Cabinet of May 20, 1969. He returned as Minister of Finance under the premiership of Tun Abdul Razak.

Datin Teh Tan Sri Haji Noah

Tun Hajah Rahah's sister who was married to the brother of Tan Sri Taib Andak's wife.

Tan Sri Temenggong Jugah anak Baring

Minister of Sarawak Affairs in the New Cabinet that was formed on May 20, 1969.

Sir Gerald Templer

High Commissioner of the Federation of Malaya, before Malayan Independence. He liked occasionally playing practical jokes on his officers, informing Tun Abdul Razak on his honeymoon vacation in Mt. Pleasure, by sending a telegram, that his leave was cancelled and that he was to go immediately to Cameron Highland and prepare an official report on the situation of the swarms of flies there.

Lt. Colonel Untung

Commander of the Palace Guard who led the "GESTAPU" (September 30 Movement) that took place in Indonesia on September 30, 1965 on the pretext of forestalling a plot by "the Council of Generals to overthrow President Sukarno". In this incident, six of Indonesia's most senior army generals were kidnapped, tortured and assassinated.

Glossary and Brief Description of Names

Sir David Watherston

A Member of the Commission of Inquiry on Malaysia appointed by the British Government in February 1962 to ascertain the views of the peoples of Sabah and Sarawak on the formation of Malaysia.

Dato' Wong Pow Nee

A Member of the Commission of Inquiry on Malaysia, who together with Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie was appointed by the Government of the Federation of Malaya in February 1962 to ascertain the views of the peoples of Sabah and Sarawak on the formation of Malaysia.

Dato' Yahya Abdul Razak

Chairman of the Kuala Lumpur UMNO Division's Election Committee who initiated an Alliance between UMNO and MCA together with Tun Omar Ong Yoke Lin.

Yazid Jaafar

Candidate of the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP/PAS) who ran against Tun Abdul Razak in the Parliamentary Constituency of Pekan, Pahang in the General Election of 1969.

S.M. Yong

A veteran politician of the MCA who was one of the top party officials to agree to the first merger of UMNO and MCA to form the Alliance.

Datin Zainab

Wife of Tan Sri Taib Andak. Her brother was married to Tun Hajah Rahah's eldest sister, Datin Teh Tan Sri Haji Noah.

Dato' Zakiah Hanum

Director of Arkib Negara who was responsible for the setting up of the Memorial to Tun Abdul Razak based on the concept of Libraries of the Presidents of the United States.

Notes:

- 1) *The names are arranged in alphabetical order according to surnames (note, however, that surnames are not applicable in Malay names)*
- 2) *The names, some of which are written in full and some not, and the honorary titles associated with them, are listed in the manner in which the individuals are/were best known publicly or politically.*

TUN ABDUL RAZAK'S LIFE IN CHRONOLOGY

(as appeared in this book)

School Days:

- March 11, 1922: Abdul Razak was born at Pulau Keladi in Pekan, Pahang
- 1928: Began attending village school of Jambu Langgar
- January 26, 1934: Began attending Malaysian College Kuala Kangsar (MCKK)
- 1937: Passed School Certificate Examination
- 1938: Became Captain of his house, Prefect and Head Boy of the entire student body
- August, 1939: Appointed as Student Probationer in the Malay Administrative Service
- May 31, 1940: Completed MCKK and entered a three-year programme of Economics, Law and History at Raffles in Singapore
- 1942: Stayed in Jambu Langgar after the Japanese had captured Kuantan
- January, 1943: Joined the Third Koa Konrensho in Singapore for a six-month indoctrination course in the Japanese language, Nippon culture and Bushido
- April 1, 1943: Transferred to the civil service with the rank of Malay Officer on Probation
- 1945: Became Assistant District Officer in Raub, Pahang
- 1945: Joined underground anti-Japanese Malaya Resistance Movement (Wataniah), until disbandment after the war in December 1
- 1945: Served as a Captain in Force 136 of the Wataniah Movement
- July 13, 1946: A scholarship to study law in London was approved by the Malayan Director of Education and confirmed by the Chief Secretary

Tun Abdul Razak's Life In Chronology

- 1947: Secretary of the Malay Society of Great Britain
- May, 1947: Passed the London Matriculation Examination in Latin
- August, 1947: Signed an agreement to enter Lincoln's Inn to study law
- October, 1947: Entered Lincoln's Inn in England
- February 1, 1948: As Secretary of the Malay Society of Great Britain, celebrated the formation of the Federation of Malaya at Cheese August, the members' favourite Soho Restaurant
- September 29, 1948: Invited to Malaya House to attend a reception in honour of Sir Henry Gurney, the new High Commissioner of the Federation of Malaya
- 1949: Entered the University of Cambridge and successfully completed the Second Devonshire Course in Economics and Public Administration
- 1949: Became President of the Malay Society of Great Britain after Tunku Abdul Rahman left England
- 1949: Attended First World Assembly of Youth as representative from the Federation of Malaya
- April, 1949: Passed Bar Final Examination
- May, 1950: Called to the Bar
- May 6, 1950: Left London and school days to return to Malaya after the demise of his father, Dato' Hussein

Tun Abdul Razak's Life In Chronology

Governmental Appointments and Beginning of Political Career:

- August, 1950: Appointed as UMNO Youth Chief and Vice-President of the Party
- November 1, 1950: Installed as Orang Kaya Indera Shahbandar (a Major Chief of Pahang) in Pahang
- February, 1951: Nominated as a Member of Malaya's Federal Legislative Council. As member of the Federal Council served on many Committees such as the Special Committee on Education
- June, 1951: Appointed as Assistant State Secretary of Pahang
- August, 1951: Became Deputy President of UMNO, a position held throughout until becoming Prime Minister on September 23, 1970
- August, 1951: Became the Permanent Chairman of the Youth Section of UMNO and member of first UMNO-MCA Alliance Round Table Conference and Alliance Executive Council
- January, 1952: Became State Secretary of Pahang
- September 4, 1952: Wedding of Tun Abdul Razak with Tun Hajah Rahah in Johore
- July 23, 1953: Birth of first son, Mohamad Najib
- February, 1954: Visited USA on leadership grant
- April, 1954: Joined Alliance delegation to meet Secretary of State for Colonies in London. After the talks, remained in London and helped to organise Merdeka Bureau
- November 29, 1954: Birth of second son, Ahmad Johari
- August 27, 1955: Moved the seat of Pahang state government to the coastal port of Kuantan

Tun Abdul Razak's Life In Chronology

Road to Prime Ministership:

- February, 1955: Became Acting Chief Minister and eventually Chief Minister of Pahang
- June, 1955: Resigned from civil service to run in next Federal Election
- 1955: Elected as Member of Parliament for Semantan, Pahang and became Deputy Chairman of the Alliance Party
- August 9, 1955: Appointed as Minister of Education
- September, 1955: Headed a Committee of experts to inquire into the state of education in the Federation, and prepared a report, many of the recommendations of which were enshrined in the 1957 Education Ordinance
- 1956: Formed FELDA (the Federal Land Development Authority) followed by the creation of Jengka Triangle Project
- January, 1956: A member of the Merdeka Mission (Independence Mission) to London led by Tunku Abdul Rahman
- May, 1956: Published the Razak Report which is the basic education policy of Malaya (later Malaysia) and presented it for acceptance by the Federal Legislative Council
- 1957: Became President of the Olympic Council of Malaya and Malayan Hockey Federation
- September, 1957: Became Deputy Prime Minister, after Malaya's independence on August 31, 1957 and was also Minister of Defence
- October 3, 1958: Birth of third son, Mohd Nizam
- 1959: President of Federation of Malaya United Nations Association until 1970, Chairman of Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, Malaysia Branch and also Chairman of Malaysia National Group of the Asian Parliamentary Union
- 1959: Elected as Member of Parliament for Pekan, Pahang
- February, 1959: Appointed as second Prime Minister for Federation of Malaya upon temporary resignation of Tunku Abdul Rahman

Tun Abdul Razak's Life In Chronology

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|-----------|---|
| August, | 1959: Reverted to the post of Deputy Prime Minister of Malaya and Minister of Defence |
| December, | 1959: Became Minister of National and Rural Development (as additional portfolio) |
| | 1960: Launched Rural Development Programme |
| | 1960: Established MIDF (the Malaysian Industrial Development Finance Berhad) as a national development financing institution in order to encourage the participation of the Malays in the industrial sector |
| May 19, | 1961: Went to Mecca to perform Haj |
| May, | 1961: Led Malayan delegates in the beginning of negotiations for the formation of Malaysia |
| March 3, | 1962: The birth of fourth son, Mohd. Nazim |
| March 10, | 1962: Announced that all citizens between the ages of 21 and 28 would be liable to be called up for National Service in either the armed forces or the civil defence as heavier and more widespread attacks were anticipated in the continuing Indonesian Confrontation |
| July, | 1962: Flight to London for further discussion on the formation of Malaysia |
| August, | 1962: Deputy Chairman of the Inter-Governmental Committee on the formation of Malaysia |
| | 1964: Established a wholly-owned subsidiary, MIEL (Malaysian Industrial Estates Limited) to develop industrial sites and build modern standard factories for small enterprises |
| May, | 1965: RIDA transformed into the Council of Indigenous People's Trust (Majlis Amanah Rakyat - MARA). Indicated the need for a further expansion of the armed forces in the light of the expansion of Indonesian incursions into Peninsular Malaysia |
| | 1966: Heavily involved in the reconciliation process of the Malaysia-Indonesia confrontation |

Tun Abdul Razak's Life In Chronology

- March 14, 1966: Launched a Community Development Programme called Operation Progress (Gerakan Maju)
- May 27, 1966: Welcomed at Seri Taman the Indonesian Goodwill Mission of army officers initiated by General Suharto
- May 29, 1966: Attended the Peace Talks between Malaysia and Indonesia in Bangkok
- August 11, 1966: Led top Malaysian delegates to sign the Peace Treaty with Indonesian officials ending the confrontation
- November 19, 1966: Birth of fifth son, Mohd. Nazim
- June, 1967: Appointed Minister of Home Affairs (Internal Security) another portfolio replacing Tun Dr. Ismail who resigned from the Government
- August 8, 1967: Inauguration of the five-nation Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) following the ASEAN Declaration signed by Tun Abdul Razak as Malaysia's Foreign Minister and his counterparts from the other ASEAN Member Countries
- August 13, 1967: Tun Abdul Razak was given the Magsaysay Award of the Philippines as a reward for his outstanding contribution to Malaysia's national and rural development
- October 14, 1967: MARA College was renamed MARA Institute of Technology with the historic event commemorated by the laying of the foundation stone by Tun Abdul Razak for a new campus in the new town of Shah Alam, Selangor
- 1968: Became the most senior Malaysian minister to visit the USSR which eventually led to the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1970
- May 18, 1969: Officially appointed as Director of the National Operations Council (NOC) to curb the riot and to chart strategy for future national unity and harmony, five days after the tragic May 13 racial riot
- 1969: Chairman of the National Unity Council

Tun Abdul Razak's Life In Chronology

- 1969: Implemented the 1957 Education Ordinance after confirming the significance of the failure of the Government to implement a national language and national education in 1967 as being one of the major causes resulting in the May 13 incident
- May 20, 1969: Appointed Minister of Defence and acting Finance in the Emergency Cabinet
- May 21, 1969: Established the Civil Affairs Secretariat as a result of the Chief Executive Officer's Order No. 1
- July 12, 1969: Called a meeting of the Party's Executive Council which at last decided to ask Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir to resign from the Party's Executive Council due to the delicacy of the internal security situation
- July 30, 1969: Announcement of plan to introduce Bahasa Malaysia in school in stages, starting from primary one in Jan 1970
- August, 1969: Announced the formation of a Committee to review the Party Constitution "to make it more flexible and prevent splits in the ranks"
- September, 1969: Students of the University of Malaya held demonstrations against Tunku Abdul Rahman for five days
- October 9, 1969: Release of the official report of the National Operations Council on the May 13 tragedy
- December 29, 1969: Officiated the first meeting of the Muslim Pilgrimage Control and Savings Corporation (Tabung Haji - LUTH)
- 1970: Established diplomatic relations with the USSR
- January, 1970: Department of National Unity and National Consultative Council was formed to promote national unity
- January, 1970: Ordered the Economic Planning Unit attached to the Prime Minister's Department to formulate a completely New Economic Policy (NEP)
- January, 1970: Created the Department of National Unity and the National Consultative Council which bodies had official links with the NOC

Tun Abdul Razak's Life In Chronology

- April, 1970: In capacity as Minister of Defence, was a prime mover in the Five-Power Defence Pact (FPDA) subscribed to by Australia, Britain, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore, signed in London
- July, 1970: The state level coalition government between the Alliance and opposition parties was formed in Sarawak
- August, 1970: The proposal for a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia was originally expounded at the Non-Aligned Nations Conference in Lusaka, Zambia
- August, 1970: The National Operations Council with the full cooperation and assent of the National Consultative Council, arbitrarily decreed the strengthening of the Sedition Act
- August 31, 1970: On this 13th Anniversary of the Independence of Malaya/ Malaysia, the National Ideology (Rukunegara) was first introduced with a promulgation made by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (King)
- September 22, 1970: Tunku Abdul Rahman formally submitted his resignation from the Premiership to the King. This was followed by the appointment of Tun Abdul Razak as the new Prime Minister
- September 23, 1970: Invited UMNO leaders and senior members all over Peninsular Malaysia to assemble in Kuala Lumpur and announced that Tun Dr. Ismail, Minister for Home Affairs would be his Deputy
- September, 1970: Became Chairman of the Alliance Party and President of UMNO after resignation of Tunku Abdul Rahman
- December, 1970: Tunku Abdul Rahman officially took over as Secretary of the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC)
- 1971: The year that marked UMNO's silver jubilee, a revised Party Constitution and the establishment of the Central Executive Committee (later called the Supreme Council)
- 1971: Adopted the New Economic Policy (NEP) as part of the response to the 1969 race riot to ameliorate the economic plight of the indigenous Malays and to eradicate poverty irrespective of race

Tun Abdul Razak's Life In Chronology

- 1971: Developed and maintained the warmest and most cordial of relationships with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Socialist Republic of Egypt, two Arab states fundamentally different in terms of their ideological commitment and political organisation
- February, 1971: The resumption of Parliamentary rule after Malaysia has been ruled by decree for nearly two years
- February 23, 1971: Addressed the House of Representatives for the first time as Prime Minister at the State Opening of the New Parliament
- July 26, 1971: Explained to members of Parliament the Government's new foreign policy and the fundamental change of political direction
- February, 1972: The state level coalition government between the Alliance and opposition parties was formed in Penang
- March, 1972: Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir was welcomed back into UMNO after three years in a kind of political uncertainty
- May, 1972: The state level coalition government between the Alliance and opposition parties was formed in Perak
- 1973: PAS joined the ruling coalition, the National Front
- 1973: Established diplomatic relations with North Korea, North Vietnam and East Germany
- January, 1973: State level coalition governments between the Alliance and opposition parties were formed in Kelantan, Terengganu and Kedah
- August 2, 1973: The demise of Tun Dr. Ismail left Tun Abdul Razak with the task of recovery from the economic and political instability of the country. The job of Deputy Prime Minister then went to the Minister of Education Tun Hussein Onn
- November, 1973: Returned a visit to Singapore, eight years after Singapore left the Malaysian Federation in 1965
- February 1, 1974: Kuala Lumpur established as the Federal Territory

Tun Abdul Razak's Life In Chronology

- August 24, 1974: The validity of the National Front was vindicated by the 1974 General Election
1975: Became President of Asian Hockey Federation and Football Association of Malaysia
- December 18, 1975: Flown to Paris for urgent medical treatment
- December 22, 1975: Entered the London Clinic. His condition was so serious that his life was diagnosed not to last beyond Christmas Day
- January 12, 1976: After rallying and appearing to be progressing well, suffered a relapse from which he never recovered
- January 14, 1976: Passed away, at the age of 53, at the London Clinic, before he could manage to return to Malaysia.
- May 6, 1982: Seri Taman, Tun Abdul Razak's residence since 1962, was transformed as "Memorial Tun Abdul Razak"

OTHER HISTORICAL DATES **(as they appear in this book)**

- 1945: The threat to the Malay rulers came after the surrender of the Japanese and when the British returned to Malaya and announced their plans for the setting up of a Malayan Union

- October, 1945: Sir Harold Mac Michael arrived and concluded treaties with all the Malay Rulers who effectively signed away all their powers to the British Crown

- December, 1945: Wataniah Movement was disbanded by the British Military Government

- April 1, 1946: Formation of the Malayan Union as a full-fledged Crown Colony of the British Empire

- May 11, 1946: Formation of UMNO from the amalgamation of all Malay associations

- February 1, 1948: Formation of the Federation of Malaya (Persekutuan Tanah Melayu). The 1948 agreement was designed towards eventual self-government

- June 23, 1948: State of Emergency declared for the Federation of Malaya (ending in 1960)

- 1949: The National Electricity Board (NEB) was established

- 1951: The establishment of the Rural and Industrial Development Authority (RIDA) as a promotional and financing agency aimed at redressing regional and ethnic economic imbalances. RIDA was inspired by Dato' Onn Jaafar

- 1951: Tun Hussein Onn and his father left UMNO due to differences in party principles

- January, 1951: The first merger of UMNO and MCA

- 1954: Alliance Party was formed consisting of UMNO, MCA and MIC. The Alliance demanded federal elections be held in Malaya

Other Historical Dates

- 1955: Tunku Abdul Rahman made an attempt to induce the Communists to surrender by having a dialogue with their leaders in Baling
- 1955: Malaya started seriously moving towards Independence
- March, 1955: The Government announced that Nomination Day for the first-ever Federal Election would be on June 15, and Polling Day on July 27
- 1957: Anglo-Malaysian Defence Arrangement (AMADA) was signed
- February, 1957: Tun Dr. Ismail officially opened the RIDA Training College
- August 31, 1957: Malaya achieved Independence
- 1960: The Emergency Period (due to Communist insurgency) which erupted in 1948 ended
- 1960: The Malaysian Industrial Development Finance Berhad (MIDF) was established to develop industrial sites and build modern standard factories for small enterprises
- July, 1961: The leaders of Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia acted in concert to establish the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) in order to promote regional cooperation
- September, 1961: Setting up of National Operations Room
- June, 1962: The Philippines officially filed its claim on Sabah
- April 4, 1963: Official proclaiming of Indonesia's undeclared war (Confrontation) against Malaysia
- September 16, 1963: Inauguration of Malaysia consisting of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak.
- April 25, 1964: General Election was held
- 1965: Indigenous Economic Congress (Kongres Ekonomi Bumiputra) was held
- 1965: The establishment of Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad

Other Historical Dates

- May, 1965: The Royal Address to the Malaysian Parliament indicated the need for a further expansion of Indonesian incursions to Peninsular Malaysia
- August 9, 1965: Singapore broke away from the Federation of Malaysia
- 1966: President Ferdinand Marcos officially recognised the formation of Malaysia
- September, 1966: The idea of ASEAN was mentioned by Tun Abdul Razak at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London when he said that regional cooperation was the best means of meeting the threat to Southeast Asia from the North and of stabilising and strengthening the economies of each country in the area
- 1967: Tun Dr. Ismail resigned as Minister of Home Affairs
- 1967: The establishment of the Government Offices Housing Development Sdn. Berhad (SPPK)
- 1967: The ending of the Indonesian Confrontation with Malaysia
- June 12, 1967: Bank Negara Malaysia took over currency issuing functions for Malaysia. Singapore issued its own currency
- August 9, 1967: Formation of ASEAN, initially with five members, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Singapore following the ASEAN Declaration signed on August 8, 1967
- September, 1967: The Philippines Congress passed a Bill purporting to incorporate Sabah as part of the Republic, prompting Malaysia, in retaliation, to break diplomatic ties with the Philippines
- 1968: The establishment of the Malaysian International Shipping Corporation
- 1968: Indigenous Economic Congress (Kongres Ekonomi Bumiputra) was held
- January, 1968: The state visit of the Philippines President Marcos and wife to Malaysia, initiating reconciliation of the diplomatic break-up

Other Historical Dates

- March, 1968: The Corregidor Incident rekindled strong public support in the Philippines for its Sabah claim
- May 13, 1969: Racial riot sparked in Kuala Lumpur putting the country under Emergency period
- May 15, 1969: The National Operations Council (NOC) was established following the declaration of a national state of Emergency by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (King)
- May 20, 1969: Formation of Emergency Cabinet following the May 13 racial riot. The Civil Affairs Secretariat was established as a result of the Chief Executive Officer's Order No.1
- August 8, 1969: The Muslim Pilgrimage Control and Savings Corporation was officially formed under Act 8 after it was passed by Parliament at the end of December, 1968
- December 16, 1969: ASEAN's Third Ministerial Conference restored back diplomatic ties with the Philippines
- 1970: The National Operations Council with the full cooperation and assent of the National Consultative Council, arbitrarily decreed the strengthening of the Sedition Act
- 1970: The termination of the Anglo-Malaysia Defence Agreement (AMADA)
- January, 1970: The Department of National Unity and the National Consultative Council came into being
- August 31, 1970: The Yang di-Pertuan Agong (King) formally promulgated the statement of national ideology called the Rukunegara
- 1971: Five countries; Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom discussed an integrated air defence system for Malaysia and Singapore
- 1971: Marked UMNO's silver jubilee, a revised Party Constitution and the establishment of the Central Executive Committee (later called the Supreme Council)
- 1971: The Kuala Lumpur Summit Declaration on ZOPFAN (the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality)

Other Historical Dates

- November, 1971: The Urban Development Authority (UDA) was set up
- 1973: The establishment of RISDA (the Rubber Industry Small-holders Development Authority)
- April 29, 1973: Students from ITM went on a midnight march to Parliament House from their campus in Shah Alam, Selangor to back their demands to upgrade their Institute to University status.
- June, 1973: The Malaysian National Reinsurance Berhad was formed as a joint venture in which PERNAS was the majority shareholder, and the locally-owned insurance companies as participants
- June, 1974: The longer-term National Front grand coalition that replaced the Alliance formula of a tripartite coalition became a legal entity
- April 29, 1974: The Chinese Communist Party sent a congratulatory telegram to the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) on the occasion of the celebration of its 45th Anniversary, raising Malaysia's protest
- 1976: Amendment of the UCCA, a special law promulgated by the King in 1971, aimed to keep student activists in check and to ensure that their interests were confined largely to the classroom in order to bring peace to the campuses, and to make the students more disciplined and improve their academic performance
- 1976: President Marcos made a dramatic move towards normalisation of bilateral relations with Malaysia, just prior to an ASEAN Summit meeting, when he stated that the Philippines no longer intended to press its claim of sovereignty over Sabah, though he did not officially drop it
- July, 1976: The Annual UMNO General Assembly gave Tun Hussein Onn a clear mandate as leader of the Party to confirm support of his choice of Deputy President, Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir
- 1977: After a dispute over the right of the party to nominate the Chief Minister of Kelantan, the PAS left the National Front. Since then, it has been one of the National Front's strongest opponents

Other Historical Dates

May 15, 1981: At the local Party Congress in his home town base of Johor Bahru, Tun Hussein Onn announced that he was relinquishing the Presidency of UMNO and stepping down as Premier.

Endnotes

CHAPTER ONE

1. William Shaw, *Tun Abdul Razak: His Life and Times*, (Kuala Lumpur: Longman Malaysia Sdn. Berhad 1976), p. 13.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
3. *Ibid.*, p.10.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
7. *Autobiography of Tun Abdul Razak Bin Hussein*, (Kuala Lumpur: Sunset Services Malaysia), p. 7.
8. William Shaw, *op. cit.*, p. 15.
9. *Ibid.*, p.19. Please also see J. Victor Morais, *Strategy For Action: Tun Abdul Razak - The Nation Builder*, (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Centre for Development Studies, Prime Minister's Department, 1969), p. xviii.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
11. *Autobiography of Tun Abdul Razak Bin Hussein, op. cit.*, p. 9.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
14. *Ibid.*
15. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 138.
17. *Newsweek*, 26 January 1976.
18. *Bintang Timur*, 5 May 1982.
19. *Ibid.*

CHAPTER TWO

1. William Shaw, *Tun Abdul Razak: His Life and Times*, (Kuala Lumpur: Longman Malaysia Sdn. Berhad, 1976), p. 44.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 48.

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4. *Autobiography of Tun Abdul Razak Bin Hussein*, (Kuala Lumpur: Sunset Services Malaysia), p. 11. Please also see J. Victor Morais, *Strategy For Action: Tun Abdul Razak - The Nation Builder*, (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysia Centre for Development Studies, Prime Minister's Department, 1969), p. xviii.
5. William Shaw, *op. cit.*, p. 67.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 68.
7. *Autobiography of Tun Abdul Razak Bin Hussein*, *op. cit.*, p. 13. Please also see J. Victor Morais, *op. cit.*
8. William Shaw, *op. cit.*, p. 69.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 71.
10. *Autobiography of Tun Abdul Razak Bin Hussein*, *op. cit.*, p. 15.
11. William Shaw, *op. cit.*, p. 72.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 83.
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Ibid.*, p. 77.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 94.
16. J. Victor Morais, *op. cit.*, p. xxi.
17. *Autobiography of Tun Abdul Razak Bin Hussein*, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

CHAPTER THREE

1. For further information, please refer to *The May 13 Tragedy: A Report*, (Kuala Lumpur: the National Operations Council, 9 October, 1969), p. 5. Please also see K.G.Tregonning, *A History of Modern Malaya*, (London: Eastern Universities Press Ltd., 1964), p. 288.
2. Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra, *Looking Back*, (Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara, 1977), p. 180. Please also see Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra, *Political Awakening* (Kuala Lumpur: Pelanduk Publication (M) Sdn. Bhd., 1987), p. 35.
3. *Ibid.*
4. J. Victor Morais, *Strategy For Action: Tun Abdul Razak - The Nation Builder*, (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Centre for Development Studies, Prime Minister's Department, 1969), p. xxi.

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5. William Shaw, *Tun Abdul Razak: His Life and Times*, (Kuala Lumpur: Longman Malaysia Sdn. Berhad, 1976), p. 117. Please also see Inaugural Lecture in the Annual Cempaka Lectures by Tun Omar Yoke Lin Ong, 'Leadership in the Malaysian Context: Past, Present and Future', Kuala Lumpur, 17 July, 1993.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 126.
Omar Yoke Ong Lin, *op. cit.*
7. James P. Ongkili, *Nation-Building in Malaysia 1946-1974*, (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 152.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Ibid.*, p. 165.
10. M. Sivaram, *World of Today: Malaysia*, (New Delhi: National Trust India, 1972), p. 66.
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 69.
14. William Shaw, *op. cit.*, p. 184.
15. A. Kadir Jasin, 'Turning Point in tie with Indonesia', *NSUNT* 2*, 25 July 1993.
16. *ASEAN: Shortfalls of the Past and Pitfalls of the Future*, Text of Speech at the Special Dinner Address of the First ASEAN Congress by Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, Kuala Lumpur, 8 October, 1992.
17. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 9 March 1967.
18. James P. Ongkili, *op. cit.*, p. 182.
19. *Ibid.*
20. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 25 August 1966.
21. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 20 February 1971, 4 March 1972, and 31 December 1973.
22. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 26 November 1973.
23. Paridah Abd. Samad, 'Malaysia-Philippine Relations: The Issue of Sabah', *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXII, No. 6, June 1992, University of California Press, USA, p. 555.
24. Ting Ting Conjuangco, 'Sabah: A Footnote of History', *Manila Standard*, 3 August 1990.
25. Santanina T. Rasul, 'The Resolution of the Philippine Claim to Sabah', *Foreign Relations Journal*, December 1988, Manila, p. 80.

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26. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
27. Michael Leifer, *The Foreign Relations of the New States*, (Camberwell: Longman Australia. Pty., 1974), p. 62.
28. Santanina T. Rasul, 'Resolution of the Claim', *op. cit.*, p. 91.
29. Paridah Abd. Samad, *op. cit.*, 557
30. *Ibid.*
31. The Asean Declaration (Bangkok Declaration), Bangkok, 8 August, 1967. Please refer to Fauziah Ismail, 'Private sector can help shape ASEAN as economic entity', *Business Times*, 6 May 1993.

CHAPTER FOUR

1. For further information, please refer to Leon Comber, *13 May 1969: A Historical Survey of Sino-Malay Relations*, (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Asia, 1986), p. 63.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 65.
3. Harun Hashim, '26 years on, Malaysians have become more united', *New Straits Times*, 11 May 1996, p. 12.
4. William Shaw, *Tun Abdul Razak: His Life and Times*, (Kuala Lumpur: Longman Malaysia Sdn. Bhd., 1976), p.203.
5. *Kuala Lumpur*, (Kuala Lumpur: PTM Communications Publication, 1974).
6. *City Hall - Kuala Lumpur*, (Kuala Lumpur: Information Handbook, August 1983).
7. *Kuala Lumpur*, *op. cit.*
8. *The May 13 Tragedy: A Report*, (Kuala Lumpur: The National Operations Council, 9 October 1969), p. 27.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 30. Please also refer to Mubin Sheppard, *Tunku: His Life and Times*, (Kuala Lumpur: Pelanduk Publications, 1995), p. 161.
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Ibid.*

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15. *Ibid.*, p. 40. For further information please refer to Leon Comber, *op. cit.* p. 69.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 49.
17. Harun Hashim, *op. cit.*
18. *Ibid.*
19. *The May 13 Tragedy, op. cit.*, p. 62.

CHAPTER FIVE

1. S. Husin Ali, *The Malays: Their Problem and Future*, (Singapore: Heinemann Asia, 1985), p. 5.
2. For further information, please refer to Mahathir Mohamad, *The Malay Dilemma*, (Kuala Lumpur: Federal Publications, 1970) and also see S. Hussin Ali, *op. cit.*, p. 87.
3. Wan Hashim, *Race Relations in Malaysia*, (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Educational Books (Asia) Ltd., 1983). p. 62.
4. S. Husin Ali, *op. cit.*, p. 87.
5. *Banci Penduduk dan Perumahan Malaysia 1970*, p. 9.
6. S. Husin Ali, *op. cit.*, p. 87.
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